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Abstract 
 
The topic of this thesis is evidence-based healthcare, EBHC. The thesis has two key aims: to 
undertake an empirical exploration and analysis of debates around EBHC; and to develop a 
conceptual theorisation of these debates in terms of power. To fulfil the empirical aim I conduct 
a reading and analytic re-reading of EBHC-literature from the disciplines of medicine, 
physiotherapy and sociology. To fulfil the conceptual aim I draw upon the work of Foucault, 
Bakhtin and Barbalet to produce a ‘dialogical’ model of power. 
Treating debates around EBHC as ‘EB-discourse’, this thesis follows the tradition of discourse 
analysis; but breaks ground by deploying writing as a research method and applying 
ethnographic ideas to discursive study. This novel approach I call ‘literary ethnography’. Being a 
literary ethnography of EB-discourse, the thesis begins with a descriptive overview of the chosen 
disciplinary literatures. A methodological section explains the rationale for proceeding along the 
analytic path of dialogue; and then the thesis becomes gradually more analytical through 
progressively deeper readings of the same literatures.  
The thesis is structured into these three levels of review, methodology and analysis; and in each 
level, the three strands of literary context (medicine, physiotherapy and sociology) run in 
parallel as comparators for each other. EBHC began in medicine (as EBM), but following its 
course in other disciplines allows discursive similarities and differences to be explicated. The 
initially descriptive and gradually more analytical approach reveals the dialogical structure of the 
discourse, and discovers embodiment and emotion as ideas which, across all three contexts, 
trouble the terms of the discourse. 
The key findings of the thesis are that in EB-discourse, power operates through dialogue, by 
being split into different forms which interact to reinforce each other. Specifically, EB-discourse 
is built upon dialogical distinctions between mind and body, and between emotion and reason. 
These are dialogues which powerfully re-produce particular kinds of rationality. They are also in 
dialogue with each other; embodiment for the repressive aspects, and emotion for the 
productive aspects of power. The thesis also raises questions relating to the predicament of the 
patient in contemporary healthcare, and relating to the role of philosophical argumentation in 
social theory. It finishes with some suggestions for investigating the dialogical-power model in 
other areas of social life.  
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NHS  - National Health Service 
PC  - Patient-Centred 
PCC  - Patient-Centred Care 
RCT  - Randomised Controlled Trial 
SSK  - Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction. 
 
 
1.1 The Research Question: Framing EBHC in Terms of Power.  
What is Evidence-Based Healthcare, EBHC? Originally a set of imperatives for practice, EBHC 
became a sequence of events in the social life of healthcare (so far lasting twenty years) which 
has left a generous history in academic literature. It became a self-reflexive and open-ended set 
of ideas, always in motion and feeding back into itself. As a cluster of acronyms (EBM 
(evidence-based medicine), EBP (evidence-based practice) and EBHC) it has become an 
autonomous sign and a simulacrum, something which has accrued symbolic value in itself, where 
what it refers to is not necessarily clear. It has expanded into different areas of public policy 
(there is evidence-based education, and evidence-based policing). Increasingly it has become a 
sign-of-the-times with popular and transferable currency: one can now speak of evidence-based 
activism, and of evidence-based cookery1. 
EBHC is, however, a phenomenon of special sociological interest. Perhaps more than any other 
focus for official debates, it has contributed to the maintenance of modern social institutions of 
healthcare. As a means to the maintenance of these social institutions, not just EBHC but the 
discourse around it (which I call EB-discourse) is a forum for expressions of power, and many 
sociologists are interested in power. Power, in broad terms, is what determines the structures 
of societies, the courses of lives and the conduct of individuals. The case of EBHC, for the depth 
of its influence in institutions seen as vital to the fabric of society, provides an opportunity to 
study power at work. Michel Foucault (1926-1984) is the most prominent of recent scholars to 
commit strongly to studying the nature of power, in which he used medicine as a paradigmatic 
case (Foucault 1963).  
Foucault’s later understanding of power as ‘productive’ is still current in sociology, but while it 
has been readily adopted2, it is an understanding overdue for further elaboration, especially 
where medicine is concerned. The historical trajectory of EBHC shows that although 
sociologists are prepared to think of medical healthcare as powerful, they have not developed an 
                                                          
1
 The internet now carries ample evidence of the possibilities for appendages to the EB- stem. 
2
 See eg. Lawler 2008. 
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assured conceptual apparatus to do so. As I will show, some sociologists thought that EBM itself 
would be the thing to overthrow medicine as a hegemonic and repressive power; but EBM has 
arguably made medical knowledge more institutionally secure, more stable in its relationship to 
power than ever before. Phil Strong (1984) foresaw this stability; he observed that modern 
medicine undergoes regular scientific revolutions which revitalise its social eminence. The 
eventuality of the latest such revolution – EBHC – continues of this cycle. Sociologists have 
been involved in the process of renewal, but are still not well placed to explain how the power 
of medicine, and (for that matter) power in general, is constituted.  
 
1.2 Aims and Outcomes of Thesis. 
In this thesis I look to address these deficits in the sociological understanding of medical power 
using the debate about EBHC as a case-study. Accordingly the thesis has two aims, of which the 
first is empirical and the second is conceptual. The empirical aim is to undertake an exploration 
and analysis of debates around EBHC. The conceptual aim is to develop a novel theorisation of 
power which applies to medicine, and which has the potential for general applicability. Neither 
of these aims are simply fulfilled. The empirical task begins with a description of the debates in 
medicine and an allied health professsion (physiotherapy), and continues with a description of 
the debates in sociology. In both cases the increasing complexity of debates around EBHC can 
readily be seen, and the means I propose for understanding these debates are themselves 
somewhat complicated. 
Seeking appropriate themes for analysing these complex debates, I settle on the topics of 
dialogue, embodiment and emotion. Each of these analyses explores a particular perspective for 
understanding the debates around EBHC. In each of them, the issue of power is considered. For 
instance, in my analysis by dialogue, I find that the debate can be understood in relation to the 
different forms of dialogue which, in different contexts, give it structure in language and 
thought. The structuring of language and thought is an effect of power; so while arguing that 
EBHC-debates are constructed through different types of dialogue, I also argue that power can, 
and indeed should, be thought of in terms of dialogue. Being a relational phenomenon which 
operates across all levels of social life (the macro-, meso- and micro-social), power is manifested 
through dialogue. 
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There are particular dialogues, concerning particular concepts, which I argue are especially 
useful for understanding debates around EBHC sociologically. One such is the dialogue between 
embodied and disembodied forms of social life; another is the dialogue between social life 
classified as being emotional or non-emotional. Analysing debates around EBHC from the 
perspectives of embodiment and emotion allows me to consider aspects of the debate which 
have evaded consideration by others. For example, a focus on embodiment allows me to 
investigate the role of the patient in sustaining these debates. A focus on emotion allows me, 
rather than limiting my concern to the explicit content of these debates, to investigate the 
source of energy which animates them. 
The relationship between these two channels of analysis – embodiment and emotion – is 
something which has its own relevance to the conceptualisation of power as dialogical. A point 
of controversy in recent sociologies of power has been whether it is in the basic nature of power 
to be repressive or productive. In the context of debates around EBHC I come to the view that 
power is both repressive and productive. Some dialogues, in this case the dialogue of 
embodiment, expose with clarity the repressive action of power. Other dialogues, in this case 
the dialogue of emotion, expose with clarity the productive action of power. And indeed, these 
repressive and productive aspects work in dialogue with each other. 
Alongside these attempts to understand EBHC and to understand power, the thesis has 
implications for sociological methodology. I categorise it as discourse-analysis, but I appropriate 
ideas from anthropology to locate it in a hybrid genre (for which I use the label ‘literary 
ethnography’3), in which writing (in dialogue with reading) is the most important empirical 
endeavour. I also take a sceptical view of pure-philosophy when it appears in sociological writing. 
To draw attention to the problematic nature of this relationship, I take the step of removing my 
own purely-philosophical analyses to an appendix. 
 
1.3 Overview of Thesis. 
The body of this thesis has a three-level structure, each level of which contains two chapters, 
making six main chapters in total. In addition there is a short concluding chapter at the end. The 
first level, chapters two and three, can be thought of as characteristically descriptive. The 
second level, chapters four and five, can be thought of as characteristically methodological. The 
                                                          
3
 This label has been used before, but not in the way I use it. 
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third level, chapters six and seven, can be thought of as characteristically analytic. The 
distinctions between levels are not stringent: chapter three is more interpretive than chapter 
two, and feeds directly into concerns of method. Chapter five is analytic as well as 
methodological; it demonstrates the practical value of the dialogical analytic method. Chapters 
six and seven are analytic in different ways; chapter six analyses for absences, chapter seven 
analyses for presences in the discourse. 
Chapter two is an orthodox literature review in which I follow the history of EBHC as a 
sequence of literary events which can be recovered and reported with a minimum of 
interpretation. This establishes a substantive basis for the study of EBHC. I focus primarily on 
the beginning and early history of evidence-based medicine (EBM), but I also include as an 
exemplar an account of evidence-based practice (EBP) in physiotherapy. Chapter three is a 
literature review with a broader license for interpretation. Its follows the history of EBHC as a 
topic in sociological writing. This body of literature I report for its content, but I also comment 
upon it as a sociologist commenting upon what other sociologists have done, particularly 
highlighting their polarisation around issues of politics and philosophy and their inattention to 
the issue of unifying perspectives on EBHC. 
In the second level, chapter four is an orthodox-style methodology chapter in which I set out the 
justification for my own study of evidence-basedness as discourse analysis. After making an 
argument about methodological reflexivity, I reflect upon my own path through the discourse 
and report the basic terms of what I have done to analyse it. I then focus on the political and 
philosophical concepts which sociologists have used to analyse the idea of evidence-basedness 
(making reference to the philosophical content of the appendix). I explain that these concepts 
have operated together in a dialogue which builds upon the dialogues established in clinical EB-
literature. I justify dialogue as the key principle for my analysis of EB-discourse, and also discuss 
embodiment and emotion as dialogues crucial to EB-discourse.  
In chapter five I work through the implications of dialogue as key analytic principle. In this 
chapter, and chapters six and seven, the tripartite division of material for analysis – from 
medicine, physiotherapy and sociology – comes into play, and issues of power are to the fore. I 
use Bakhtinian ideas to compare dialogical forms across the three sectors of the discourse, each 
being analysed in itself and in comparison with the others. I use Foucauldian ideas to typologise 
power. Combining these, I produce a Foucauldian-Bakhtinian theory of dialogical power. The 
theme of dialogue remains prominent, as does the influence of both Foucauldian and Bakhtinian 
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theory, in chapters six and seven, in which I pursue an account of the specific mechanisms of 
dialogical power in EB-discourse. 
In chapter six, on embodiment, I argue that the ideological power visible in EB-discourse is 
derived in dialogue with a material source, which is embodied. This can be illustrated by saying 
that dialogical power works by splitting our minds from our bodies, giving us to believe that the 
two are indeed separate, and that our minds take precedence. In this way power makes our 
bodies strange to us. In chapter seven, on emotion, I argue that the rational power visible in EB-
discourse has its basis in emotion, and that emotion is what powers the discourse. Power 
encourages us to believe that our reason is separate from our emotion, and makes our emotions 
strange to us. This can be illustrated by saying that we channel our actions through reason; but 
the more we try to reason, the more do we become unwittingly subject to power through our 
emotions. 
Something the reader will notice about the three-level structure is that it necessitates repetition, 
going over the same body of literature three times. What is different between each level is the 
depth of reading. Starting with a shallow reading allows the reader to become familiar with EB-
literature. Reading again for structure allows the reader to see patterns within it. Reading again 
for absences and underlying energies brings the reader to an intimate understanding. In this 
approach, tiny fragments of discourse can yield multiple insights by the end which were scarcely 
imaginable at the start. Before beginning this journey, I offer a perspective on EBHC designed to 
set the scene for the arguments to come. 
 
1.4  A Future-Oriented view on EBHC, Power, and the Morality of 
Critique. 
In the present, we can look back at transformations in the history of health and medicine and 
make comment with the privilege of hindsight. In future times, people will likewise be able to 
pass judgement on how we have acted collectively with regard to issues of health. EBHC is seen 
as having been instrumental in a thorough transformation of healthcare institutions to accord 
with the conditions of late modernity (see Moreira 2012). The foreseeable future will likely 
echo this interpretation. People might say, it was through evidence-basedness that healthcare 
became truly modern. Through evidence-basedness, health institutions were able to establish 
systematic links between knowledge of population-level responses to treatments, and the 
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treatments applied to individuals in clinics. They might say that through evidence-basedness, 
robust bureaucratic efficiency and stability was achieved in healthcare. 
There are other possibilities for what the people of a more utopian future might say about our 
collective actions in relation to our health. One such possibility concerns the social generation of 
health problems. Since the industrial revolution we have seen, from epidemiological 
observations, that health problems occur with greater frequency and severity at lower levels of 
socio-economic status. Relative poverty causes relative illness. We have also known that 
societies with steeper social gradients are subject absolutely to worse health than societies with 
relative equality4. Even without formal studies we can surmise that many health problems do not 
occur naturally and inevitably, but as a result of things which collectively we do to ourselves. 
The people of the future might reasonably ask why, even when we knew that we were often the 
cause of our own bad health, we were reluctant to protect ourselves. Why did we think 
treatment so much more important than avoidance of illness? 
We can answer our future selves to the effect that we are not free to think thoughts unbounded 
in their possibilities for change. Especially in healthcare, we are not free to exercise our 
sociological imaginations, as C Wright Mills (1959) encouraged us to do. Only with an effort of 
will can we imagine the health problems of individuals in relation to the social system which 
produces them. The institutions which are powerful in our society do not produce knowledge 
which helps us to think in such terms; in fact we are incentivised to think of illness in terms of 
individual and technical aetiology. For many of us, our livelihoods depend on addressing the 
problem of what we can do individually about illness after it has occurred, not what we can do 
collectively to counteract its social genesis. In the UK, even the relative beneficence and equality 
of access to healthcare is currently under threat from a government trying to optimise profit-
making opportunities.  
The role of evidence-basedness in directing us away from thinking creatively about the social 
genesis of illness, and towards thinking along conventional lines, can be seen in a recent UK-
government report on health inequalities. The Marmot Review (2010) proposes strategies for 
reducing health inequalities in a way characterised by a rhetoric of evidence-basedness. It is 
concerned to effect changes in healthcare to offset social inequality, but without the need to 
affect social inequality itself. This ambiguity is crystallised in the summary statement: 
                                                          
4
 See Phillimore et al 1994, Coburn 2004, Wilkinson and Pickett 2010. 
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‘the lower a person’s social position, the worse his or her health. Action should focus on 
reducing the gradient in health.’ 
         Marmot 2010:15. 
The gradient in health is to be targeted then, but the gradient per se is not. Health gradients are 
detachable from economic gradients, and as such are to be addressed after their occurrence using 
Evidence derived in contexts of inequality and applicable to contexts of inequality. This ratifies 
the institution of healthcare as an ongoing analgesic for the pain of social inequality. 
In the context of healthcare, expressing political awareness can be seen as an abuse of position or 
a neglect of professional duty. Thoughts and actions are constrained and directed by the material 
and ideological conditions in which people live and work. In professional roles as clinicians, 
researchers, and analysts of health the primary concerns are to be assured that the things done to 
patients, who are ill, are correct. Professionals seek to act with the best of intentions. To take an 
idea from Wittgenstein (1968), professionals would like to be convinced not merely that what 
they do seems right, but that it is right. They need to believe, in good conscience, in the rightness 
of what they do, and so the problem of evidence-basedness for health treatments is to them a 
compelling one.  
Besides, it is not just professionals who must have faith in modern healthcare. People who go to 
the doctor when they are sick also have a need to believe that they will receive proper treatment. 
It is possible, as Parsons (1951) has argued, that their sincere investment of hope in the doctor 
and in medicine is an important condition for their social recovery. The doctor, by the authority 
of medicine, is appointed to authenticate their suffering and validate their return to health. Even 
if this system does sometimes lead the public to an exaggerated belief in the healing capacities of 
medicine and the heroism of doctors, is this really a problem? And if EBHC is what it takes for 
the majority to be assured of the benevolence of medicine, is it not rather unkind to put it under 
the microscope of critical scrutiny? 
This scrutiny is justified for a number of reasons. EBHC and EB-discourse may restore collective 
faith in the healthcare system, but at what cost? The case of Michael Marmot, above, suggests 
that a rhetoric of evidence-basedness can be used to subdue critical voices which logically it 
should not. I show in chapter two that it is concerned with treatment, not prevention. As such it 
cannot address the basic problem of health inequality, but is proffered as an ideological panacea 
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for all ills in healthcare. There are other emergent ethical problems with EBHC itself which I 
uncover, but perhaps more salient than these is the problem that in the terms of its construction, 
EB-discourse might not be found convincing: because on careful examination, it does not make 
sense. 
How can we (the people) renew our collective conviction that what healthcare does about 
illness is correct? EB-discourse, to simplify, provides two options. We can convince ourselves 
by thinking from the top down, bringing macro-scale data to bear on individual instances of 
illness after its occurrence. EBHC lets us use our knowledge of the forest to understand each 
tree within it. Alternatively we can think from the bottom-up, interpreting the micro-scale 
mechanisms of illness, again after its occurrence. Clinical expertise lets us understand each tree 
without classifying and checking its relation to the whole forest. Neither of these sides can be 
quite right. Neither makes sense except in comparison to the other. But they seem to exhaust all 
the reasonable possibilities for thought, and so set the conditions for a discourse which circulates 
indefinitely. 
To borrow another philosophical metaphor (from Kuhn 1962) this paradigmatic discourse 
directs us to problems which, within the existing social-structural framework, we act as if we 
can solve. It directs us away from more imaginative thinking as to how the problems which seem 
urgent to us are produced, and how other problems are made to seem unreachable and 
irrelevant. It prevents us from trying to imagine a different world. This misdirection is not 
achieved once and for all, but repeatedly and continuously. It is achieved by mechanisms which, 
because they direct our thinking, are difficult for us to comprehend. Nevertheless we can try to 
comprehend them even while caught in their grip.  
From this perspective, the attempt to understand the mechanisms of power demands 
considerable effort from us as subjects to power. The attempt to understand power itself is not 
innocent – it always carries, however distantly, the possibility of intervention and change. 
Maybe if we understand power we can arrange for it to work in ways which we experience as 
better than the ways which we experience at present. The desire to understand, even for 
understanding’s sake, is born of this emotion; the desire to make things as good, for everyone, 
as they can possibly be. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review Part One. 
Clinical Perspectives of Evidence-Based Healthcare. 
 
Synopsis. 
This chapter covers the historical facts of EBHC discerned from the archive of clinical-academic 
literature. I begin by describing the pre-history of EBM, reporting critiques of medicine from 
the 1970s and 1980s which, in association with various understandings of science, created a 
context for EBM. I then go into detail on EBM itself, which means reporting how it was thought 
about by different people and groups in medicine. This means telling not just what was written, 
but how it was written; I take note of rhetorical styles as well as conceptual content. I begin by 
discussing the EBMWG (1992), the Sackett school of EBM-advocates and the issue of evidence 
hierarchies, and the polemical anti-EBM school, typified by the JECP. I follow Sackett to his 
‘retirement’ from EBM-writing, and the continuation of the controversy afterwards. I then 
focus on two writers – Trisha Greenhalgh and Ross Uphsur – whose writing I see as having been 
significant for the development of the EBM debate.  
I use Greenhalgh and Upshur to create a space to unpick the fine detail of EB-writing. In these 
passages I anticipate issues which are addressed in later chapters – relating Greenhalgh to 
rhetorical techniques and language-games, Upshur to the philosophication of debates about EBM, 
and both of them to the balancing-up of sides in the debate. Expanding the view of evidence-
basedness outside the boundaries of medicine, to physiotherapy, I then give an overview of 
proceedings there which also serves to introduce themes that later become focal points for 
analysis. These include the internal-professional dynamics of EBP, which have been different in 
physiotherapy from in medicine; the suppression or expression of resistance and criticism; and 
the use of purely-political arguments, as opposed to practical and scientific ones, for or against 
EBP. This section unsettles the common sociological presumption that EBHC is only about 
medicine and EBM. Physiotherapy is established as a comparison-case which is used in later 
chapters. 
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2.1 Introduction.  
This chapter tells a story of evidence-based healthcare (EBHC) as a sequence of literary events 
which took place from 1992 onwards. Before reporting the details of those events it is necessary 
to provide a context in which they can be understood. This is to demonstrate that EBHC is not 
detached from social history but continuous with the circumstances in which it developed. It did 
not arise anomalously as a chance occurrence, but as an explicable consequence of social 
proceedings. Indeed it was foreseen by sociologists, and in this foreseeing, sociology (with other 
disciplines) was itself implicated in the beginnings of EBHC. While identifying social and 
sociological contexts, and describing them in generous detail, I try to keep from analysing the 
literary events of EBHC at this stage. The first task is to provide a thorough report of what can 
be shown to have happened. Possibilities for the interpretation of these events will be explored 
in later chapters. 
I begin by explaining how in a pervasive context of perceived threat to medicine, tension 
between ideas of science and of medicine gave rise to clinical epidemiology, and by association, 
to evidence-based medicine (EBM). It is important to recognise here, as a forerunner to 
considerations of science in later chapters, that an invocation of science is indeed important in 
the genesis of EBHC. A paradox appears, however: for the majority of the chapter is devoted to 
a report of clinical writing about EBHC in which the issue of science appears only sporadically, 
and always in entanglement with other concerns. The strategy I adopt is to give a broad flavour 
of clinical EB-literature, and to point out sociologically-interesting features as they arise. The 
chapter thus moves through four phases: a section on social contexts for the advent of EBHC; a 
section on polemical writing about EBM; a section on development of less polemical styles in 
medicine; and a section on EBP (evidence-based practice outside of medicine, for which I use 
physiotherapy as a case-study). 
 
2.2 Before EBM.  
Medicine, science and governmentality. 
I begin the story twenty years before EBM, with Archie Cochrane’s Effectiveness and Efficiency: 
Random Reflections on Health Services (1972). This work is often presented as a modern precursor 
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of EBM, and Cochrane identified as EBM’s founding father1. However, while there are elements 
of Effectiveness and Efficiency which correspond directly with EBM – particularly the advocacy of 
RCTs as the totemic research method for medicine – there are other elements which make the 
connection problematic. For example, Cochrane’s moral agenda and explicit concern with the 
cost-effectiveness of the NHS is at odds with claims made to cost-indifference and political 
disinterestedness in early versions of EBM. Cochrane’s exhortations to statistical research are 
mixed with expressions of antipathy towards the NHS, such as this one: 
‘This was a national organisation which from one point of view could be seen as giving a 
blank cheque to both the demands of patients and the wishes of doctors.’ 
         Cochrane 1972:9. 
These come alongside other ideological observations, casually given, which can be seen as 
politically insensitive: 
‘We would, I think, be well advised, before encouraging everyone to give up smoking 
cigarettes, to control our population increase. (…) It seems not unreasonable to try out a 
few possibilities now such as birth control and abortion.’ 
         Cochrane 1972:28. 
Such ‘random reflections’ as these are indicative of the moral imperative which explicitly 
motivates Cochrane’s project. They illustrate the importance of governmentality and 
population-surveillance in his manifesto for a radical clinical epidemiology. This does not match 
up with the assumption (which was to become widespread) that Cochrane’s concern was to 
oversee the scientisation of medicine for science’s sake, and his retrospective elevation to the 
status of scientific visionary2. A scientific aesthetic is part of this picture; but it is bound to the 
politics of criticism of state medicine and the government of populations.  Cochrane espoused a 
particular species of science – quantitative epidemiology – in support of a quintessentially moral 
vision. 
Cochrane’s was not the only mainstream 1970s critique of medicine. Where his Random 
Reflections offered suggestions for how to improve medicine’s effectiveness and efficiency, others 
                                                          
1
 The introduction to the 1999 edition of Effectiveness and Efficiency makes this connection explicit. A 
worldwide movement to accumulate RCT-evidence, founded in 1993, had been named in Cochrane’s 
honour (the Cochrane Collaboration). 
2
 See, for example, Kelly and Moore (2012). 
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were more generally suspicious of medicine as an institution. Chicago-School sociologist Eliot 
Freidson (1923-2005), for example, became a leading figure of a genre corresponding with this 
suspicion – the sociology of professions. Beginning with Profession of Medicine (Freidson 1970) 
and ending with Professionalism: the Third Logic (2001), Freidson has written prolifically on the 
social operation of the medical profession which, frequently-quoted, he characterised as being 
‘blind to its own shortcomings’ (1970:371). He characterised medicine as seeking ‘to create 
social meanings of illness where that meaning or interpretation was lacking before’ (1970:251), 
and sketched a moral economy in which medicine, and doctors, are grasping, opportunistic and 
predatory.  
Ivan Illich’s Medical Nemesis (1975) was still more scathing. In this text, Illich turned the language 
of medicine against it, characterising it as an ‘epidemic’ (1975: chapter 1) which is at best 
useless, at worst a systematic infliction of injury on defenceless patients. Although polemical, 
Illich’s text was symbolic of an apparently far-reaching loss of faith in modern western medicine. 
Its foundations are statistical, the early pages being extensively footnoted with population-data 
to demonstrate medicine’s inefficacy. Here, in contrast to Cochrane (1972), numerical-
scientific evidence is not the saviour of medicine, but its chief torment. Science cannot rescue 
medicine from charges of malevolence, but can only expose the moral corruptions of medicine 
with especial clarity. In relation to this question of science, Freidson (1970:251) had separated 
science from medicine in that being ‘a consulting rather than a scholarly or scientific profession, 
medicine is committed to treatment rather than merely defining and studying man’s ills’. 
Cochrane, Freidson and Illich each imagine a different set of relations between medicine and 
science. Cochrane and Illich both include a distinctively quantitative-statistical science in their 
arguments; the former to protect medicine, the latter to attack it. Statistical critique of medicine 
was to be expressed with particular authority in the UK with the publication of the Black Report 
(1980). The Black Report demonstrated that socioeconomic inequalities are systematically 
related to differential outcomes for health. To put this more pointedly, the immediate medical 
causes of ill health – biochemical processes, exposure to harmful substances, supposed genetic 
predispositions – are enveloped within a prior social cause, specifically, the condition of 
(relative) poverty. This suggests that medicine itself has a political role; it is the treatment of 
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health problems at great expense and after their occurrence, done in such a way as to compensate for, 
and so to naturalise and disguise inequality3.  
The argument from health inequality has a different character from those which criticise 
medicine for failure to succeed on its own terms. It encourages thinking not in terms of how 
medicine can be better made to fulfil its current social-structural purpose, but how it can be re-
imagined as thoroughly political. Medicine is made suspect for being part of the ideological 
fabric of an unfair society. The raw material for a health industry is people who become ill not at 
random, but systematically and regularly. The industrialised treatment of these patients is 
associated with the circulation of huge portions of economic capital. Recovered patients are 
released back into the social world, potentially to become ill and begin the process again.  
This argument cannot be offset by scientific improvements to medicine: health services could be 
impeccably efficient and completely effective, and yet still be part of a system founded upon 
unequal relations. This contrast illustrates two poles of critique of medicine: one an 
instrumental critique (typified by Cochrane), the other an ideological critique (from health 
inequality), with others (Freidson, Illich) situated somewhere between the two. The significant 
point here is that in the 1970s and 1980s medicine was the target of multiple critiques; but only 
the instrumental critique became systematically influential, being channelled into EBM. A 
rhetoric of science has been a key element in separating these critiques, and elevating the 
instrumental critique above the ideological. 
 
The Encirclement of Medicine and Quest for Medical Science. 
Different strands of criticism of medicine in the 1980s were identified by Phil Strong in his 
article on ‘the academic encirclement of medicine’ (Strong 1984). Strong’s focus is on the 
relationships between medicine and academic disciplines. He outlines models for this 
relationship which vary through the degree of equality between medicine and other disciplines, 
and the exchanges of knowledge, expertise and money between them. Strong creates an 
impression that critique of medicine can be subverted or neutralised by various means, and that 
disciplines compete against each other for rights of access to medicine. Medicine, in the middle 
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 The general figure of ‘the patient’ – the subject of medicine – is visible to this type of epidemiology. 
They are statistically describable as being, on average, of lower socio-economic class. 
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of this web of political intrigue, becomes all the more stable and secure. Apparent threats to 
medicine become stimuli for its preservation through managed change. 
Strong concludes that genuine changes to medicine are more likely to be brought about by large-
scale changes in the structure of societies and nation-states than by the efforts of particular 
disciplinary groups, whose concerns are to wear the crown of medical power, or to sit by the 
throne, rather than abolish this monarchy. There is one disciplinary group who, being adaptable 
to the perfidy of interdisciplinary relationships, emerge as front-runners in the race to assume 
the mantle of medicine. Statisticians, whose fluency in the powerful language of quantities 
allows them to translate their own objectives to mesh with those of any other discipline, are 
identified as having already made inroads into the medical power-base. A single technological 
invention – the randomised-controlled trial (1984:344) – accounts for this success. The RCT 
plays directly to the needs of pharmaceutical companies and treatment purchasers. Expertise in 
the administration of clinical trials puts statisticians in a strong position to strike bargains 
between their own disciplinary interests and the interests of medical people.  
In the history of medicine, Strong (1984:355) subordinates science to politics. He notes that 
earlier waves of ‘therapeutic nihilism’ had resulted not in decreases, but increases to the prestige 
of doctors, aided by scientific ideologies. He explains that it was not until powerful parties had 
political, rather than scientific, reasons to institute change, that changes in the structure of 
medicine were instituted. Here medical and governmental power are placed in tension with 
scientific knowledge imagined to be pure. Foucault (1977:109), who generally took a cautious 
approach to questions of science, linked his interest in medicine precisely to its ambiguous 
scientific status. In ‘Truth and Power’, he explained his focus on psychiatry and medicine as 
follows:  
‘if, concerning a science like theoretical physics or organic chemistry, one poses the 
problem of its relations with the political and economic structures of society, isn’t one 
posing an excessively complicated question? (…) But on the other hand, if one takes a form 
of knowledge like psychiatry, won’t the question be much easier to resolve …?’  
Foucault 1977:109. 
Georges Canguilhem (an early influence upon Foucault) had also been interested in the stable 
workings of medicine as an apparent science (see Tiles 1993:729). Mary Tiles summarises 
Canguilhem’s philosophical understanding of medicine as follows: 
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‘..medicine [is rendered] distinct from sciences such as physics or chemistry (…) for here 
the patient, or man as potential patient, is both subject and object of study.’ 
         Tiles 1993:740. 
While philosophers engaged theoretically with the problematic relations of medicine to science, 
there were those closer to medicine who pursued a more practical response. Professor Alvan 
Feinstein offered a concept of science custom-designed for the purposes of medicine: 
‘... clinical decisions and evaluations can no longer be satisfactory if they depend on 
anecdotes and undocumented judgement (…). A suitable scientific approach is needed (…). 
Clinical Epidemiology is the name of the new intellectual domain that provides the basic 
scientific methods needed for decisions and evaluations in modern medical care.’ 
         Feinstein 1994:233. 
Clinical epidemiology as conceived by Feinstein was an attempt to solve the problem of science-
for-medicine 4 . His, Foucault’s, Canguilhem’s and Strong’s accounts, as well as those of 
Cochrane, Illich and Freidson discussed above, demonstrate that science is important to 
sociological questions of medicine and EBM; but that the nature of this relation is complicated. 
 
2.3 Early-Stage Medical EB-literature. 
The Beginning of EBM. 
The phrase‘Evidence-Based Medicine’ as a re-styling of clinical epidemiology was coined in 
1992 (EBMWG 1992). Peter French (2002:253) demonstrates that after 1995, following a 
period of contemplation, literature making reference to EBM proliferated dramatically, so that 
by 2001 there were 5,612 publications on Medline5 which included the term. Many of these 
were not specifically about EBM but were clinical studies for which the status of Evidence was 
claimed; but the number shows that the term had acquired popular currency in a short space of 
time. In 2010, Andrew Turner reported at MedSoc6 some preliminary findings from a database 
                                                          
4
 Feinstein was cautious as to the transposition of knowledge from populations to individuals; but his 
clinical epidemiology was to be assertively transfigured into evidence-based medicine, EBM. Feinstein 
(in 1997) strongly dissociated himself from this development ; but by 1997, the cultural power of EBM 
was becoming established without need for his approval. 
5
 A freely accessible, US-based database of biomedical research. 
6
 BSA Medical Sociology Group, 1-3 sept 2010, Durham. 
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he had compiled of around 3,000 articles specifically about evidence-based healthcare practices. 
By July 2012, Sackett et al’s (1996) definition of EBM had been cited more than 7,500 times, 
according to the publicly-accessible search-engine, Google Scholar. 
The precursors of EBM can be traced as offshoots from Feinstein’s clinical epidemiology. For 
example, Haynes, Sackett and Tugwell7 (in 1983) had signalled their intentions with a piece on 
‘problems in the handling of clinical and research evidence by medical practitioners’. Here, 
Haynes et al identify clinicians as problematically incompetent in the interpretation of research, 
criticising them for their ‘ambiguous argot of clinical equivocation’ (1983:1971). Subsequently 
Guyatt and Sackett et al (1988) described a method (the N of 1 RCT) by which clinicians were 
encouraged to cultivate an experimental mindset in relation to individual patients. As well as 
being a prototypical form of EBM, this piece foreshadows the rhetorical features which were to 
become a theme of medical EB-writing. It is postscripted with the following stand-alone quote, 
not explained or commented upon: 
‘We are young when we expect variety, and indeed anything that promises variety or seeks 
change has youth. It is a curious paradox that we desire stability for our plans and require 
change for our souls’ sake.’ 
        Guyatt et al 1988:503. 
This paradox captures the changes the authors had in mind for medicine. Large changes were to 
be proposed, and changes which would allow for the expectation and desire for change to be 
stabilised and institutionalised; but at the same time, changes which would stabilise medicine 
and allow its institutional position to remain fundamentally unchanged. 
The vision for change was set forth definitively by the thirty-one members of the evidence-based 
medicine working group (EBMWG 1992). In this article, the replacement of The Way of the 
Past (marked by intuition, unsystematic experience and pathophysiologic rationale) with The 
Way of the Future (marked by evidence from clinical research) is narrated (1992:2420). The 
authors claim for this transition the status of a Kuhnian Paradigm Shift8. They specify a Former 
Paradigm, under which clinical experience, pathophysiologic principles and ‘traditional scientific 
authority’ held sway, and a New Paradigm under which these authorities are rejected (ibid: 
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 Their textbook ‘clinical epidemiology: a basic science for clinical medicine’ (1st ed. 1985) had its third 
edition in 2004. 
8
 The Kuhnian Paradigm Shift is here invoked in support of a claim for scientific status, rather than in 
critique of orthodox linear or cumulative concepts of scientific progress (see Kuhn 1962). The claim 
was rebutted damningly by Couto (1998). 
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emphasis added). The New Paradigm lessens the value placed on Authority in general and 
emphasises physicians’ regular consultation of ‘original literature’ and development of 
independent appraisal skills.  
In this context of proclaimed Newness, there is a simultaneous re-instatement of certain 
traditional and clinical knowledge which ‘can never be gained from formal scientific 
investigation’. Pathophysiological Understanding remains necessary to judge the applicability of 
research results, and as a ‘conceptual aid’. Likewise, emotional sensitivity to patients’ needs is 
emphasised. These elements are subordinated, nonetheless, to the enthusiastic learning of New 
Skills in Role Modelling, Critical Appraisal and recognition of Criteria for Methodological 
Rigour (or ‘Rules of Evidence’ – quotes 1992:2421). In Role Modelling, the ability to specify 
(quantitatively) the strength of evidence for clinical decisions, for example ‘how many patients 
one must treat to prevent a death’9, is important for inculcating in others a positive attitude to 
EBM (1992:2422). Critical Appraisal requires that clinical problems be seen as appropriately 
receptive to being ‘sorted out (…) by going to the original literature’ (1992:2423). 
Methodological Rigour is divided into criteria for diagnosis, treatment and review.  
‘Barriers’ to the dissemination of EBM are addressed from the outset. For the most part, these 
are classed as misapprehensions and misinterpretations of EBM which can be corrected by 
careful explanation (1992:2423). Where people perceive EBM as a threat, or as an inefficient 
use of clinical time, it is a problem of attitude and aptitude (and an inclination towards 
convenient ‘Cookbook Medicine’), to be resolved by effective Role Modeling and development 
of Appraisal Skills. Barriers to the practical implementation of research findings are considered 
as problems purely of accessibility and institutional constraint; these are expected to dissolve in 
time as EBM is progressively systematised. 
 
David Sackett and the BMJ. 
After the EBMWG piece, David Sackett began to write as an editor of the BMJ (see Sackett 1994; 
Sackett and Cook 1994; Milne and Sackett 1995; Cook and Sackett 199510), indirectly arguing 
the case for EBM. From 1995 onwards, such articles became more frequent and more direct. 
For example, Sackett and Rosenberg (1995), ‘on the need for evidence-based medicine’, is a 
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 The ‘Number Needed to Treat’: see Cook and Sackett (1995). 
10
 See also Sackett and Rennie (1992) in JAMA. 
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passionate espousal of the virtues of EBM. Davidoff, Haynes, Sackett and Smith (1995) 
celebrated the launch of the journal Evidence Based Medicine in an editorial for the BMJ 11 . 
Collaborators of Sackett’s also produced similar pieces among themselves, an example being 
Rosenberg and Donald’s (1995) ‘EBM: an approach to clinical problem-solving’. 
These articles provoked a quick and broadly negative response in the letters pages of the BMJ. 
Dearlove et al (1995) argued the inappropriateness of EBM for investigating certain clinical 
scenarios, specifically pain relief and side-effects of medications. Rowland and Shanks (1995) 
called for a broadening of the restrictive concept of clinical effectiveness to include patient 
satisfaction. A Lancet editorial (1995:785) ‘deplored attempts to foist EBM’ on medicine and 
admonished its advocates for getting above their proper position. Pearson et al (1996) expressed 
disappointment at EBM-advocacy being conducted largely through commentaries which 
themselves were unreferenced and unsubstantiated. Smith (1996) expressed reservations over 
the many types of evidence excluded from EBM. Others raised concerns over issues of ethics 
and scientific credibility (James 1996), publication bias (Dearlove et al 1996), decision-analytic 
clarity (Dowie 1996), equity and cost (Maynard 1996). Andrew Miles (1995:258) described 
EBM’s development as ‘inexorable’ in the BMJ, while announcing the inauguration of the Journal 
of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, discussed below. 
Sackett et al (1996) responded to these criticisms with ‘Evidence-based medicine: what it is and 
what it isn’t’. The signature motif of this piece is one of integration – the combination of 
different forms of knowledge into practice. This was, due to the definition given for EBM, to 
become comfortably the most heavily-cited piece in EB-literature12: 
‘EBM is the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making 
decisions about the care of individual patients.’ 
        Sackett et al 1996:71. 
This definition has qualities which have made it the choice option for writers to explain 
economically what they mean by EBM. Other efforts to produce a pithy elucidation of EBM, for 
example Rosenberg and Donald’s effort: 
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 Evidence Based Medicine carried mainly reports RCTs and meta-analyses, not arguments for EBM, 
which were conducted elsewhere. 
12
 To July 2012, it had 7,448 citations on Scholar Google. 
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‘EBM is the process of finding, appraising and using contemporaneous research findings as 
the basis for clinical decisions.’ 
       Rosenberg and Donald 1995:1122 
have not been well retained. Later on, French (2002:253) produced a selective review of 14 
definitions which had fallen into disuse, and used this to support an argument that EBM is, 
essentially, a meaningless term. Others would also mount critiques of EBM on this theme of 
meaninglessness, even while themselves doing much to invest EBM with meaning (eg. Loughlin 
2009b, Charles et al 2011). 
In Sackett et al’s (1996) definition of EBM, the meaning of ‘evidence’ is not developed (it is the 
same word at both ends of the definition). In early discussions of EBM (eg. Sackett and Cook 
1994) evidence is centred upon a particular type of pharmaceutical research associated with 
clinical epidemiology; the randomised-controlled trial (RCT) and the ‘meta-analysis’ of multiple 
RCTs. Sackett et al (1996:72) take up this discussion in their penultimate paragraph. Here are 
the key points of their view: 
‘EBM is not restricted to RCTs and meta-analyses. (…) When asking questions about 
therapy we should avoid non-experimental approaches (…). The RCT has become the ‘gold 
standard’ for judging whether a treatment does more good than harm. (…) If no 
randomised trial has been carried out for our patient’s predicament, we must follow the 
trail to the next best external evidence (…)’. 
        Sackett et al 1996:72. 
What is presented here, amid other things which EBM is not, is something which EBM is not 
restricted to; it is not restricted to RCTs and meta-analyses. But explicitly, it is in relation to 
RCTs and meta-analyses that the value of other evidence sources is to be judged. 
This stance was elaborated in an editorial by Sackett and Wennberg (1997), under the sub-title 
‘It’s time to stop squabbling over the “best” methods’. They criticise propensities towards 
disputation of methods in themselves, and the neglect of reference to ‘the question being asked’ 
which, they argue, ‘determines the appropriate research architecture, strategy and tactics to be 
used – not tradition, authority, experts, paradigms or schools of thought’ (1997:1636, emphasis 
added). In this opening section, Sackett and Wennberg deny any space for interpretation or 
flexibility in empirical activities; methods are a direct consequence of questions. They renounce 
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the legitimacy of any other influence on methods; not just the usual bugbears of EBM (tradition, 
authority and experts) but any human agency at all (paradigms and schools of thought are 
excluded). They begin the debate, then, by occupying a nihilistic attitude towards any kind of 
discussion over research methods, before proceeding directly to just such a discussion. 
 
Evidence Hierarchies and the Qualitative/Quantitative Divide. 
When the above exchanges were taking place in the BMJ, the same writers and others had 
elsewhere been working with ideas of the relationships between research methods, and 
formalised them into hierarchies of evidence. An early example is Cook et al (1992)13 in the journal 
Chest. These authors first make a direct opposition between validated results from RCTs and 
from clinical experience, cataloguing the reasons (related to placebo effects, natural tendencies 
to recovery, and bias) why experiential knowledge is unreliable. They construct a hierarchy 
without any reference to qualitative methods which would access such experiential knowledge, 
as follows: 
Level I: 
- Randomised trials with High Power (low false-positive and false-negative error). 
- Meta-analyses of high-quality trials. 
Level II: 
- Randomised Trials with Low Power (high error). 
(these may be combined meta-analytically to yield Level I evidence). 
Level III: 
- Non-randomised concurrent cohort comparisons (subject to bias). 
Level IV: 
- Non-randomised historical cohort comparisons (subject to bias and systematic 
temporal differences). 
Level V: 
- Case series’ without control subjects. 
       Cook et al 1992:306S-307S. 
This hierarchy is focused on methods in which truth is investigated as being independent of the 
contextualised and qualitative interpretations of both patients and clinicians. Other hierarchies 
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 David Sackett is the fourth listed author of this paper. 
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would include qualitative methods, but always at lower levels; either distinct from, or as an 
accessory to, clinically-applicable quantitative data. One such is from Hadorn et al (1996), for 
whom the problem of taxonomising methods is more easily reducible to the avoidance of bias. 
Their hierarchy runs thus: 
Section A 
-Level 1. Multi-centre RCTs of over 100 patients; meta-analyses with quality rating. 
-Level 2. Single-centre RCTs under 100 patients; meta-analyses of such. 
-Level 3. Well-conducted cohort studies, meta-analyses of such. 
Section B 
-Level 4. Well-conducted case-control studies 
-Level 5. Poorly-controlled experimental studies; potentially biased observational 
studies; case-reports. 
-Level 6. Studies conflicting with the weight of evidence. 
Section C 
-Level 7. Expert opinion. 
        Hadorn et al 1996:750 
The highest level attainable with qualitative data in this hierarchy is level 5, and qualitative 
investigative methods remain excluded. The purely qualitative category (expert opinion) is 
admitted only at the bottom rung, so as to be marginalised; even badly conducted experimental 
studies (level 5) are thought preferable. Also notable is the implication that evidence is judged in 
the light of an already-known ‘weight’ of other evidence, as supportive or conflicting (level 6). 
Efforts to produce similar hierarchies for qualitative methods have followed. Popay et al (1998), 
for example, outline a plan for a qualitative hierarchy based on criteria of sampling strategies, 
data collection and data content, theoretical perspectives, and generalisability.  
Later, the value of both quantitative and qualitative hierarchies was to be called in question. 
Petticrew and Roberts (2003), adopting a ‘horses for courses’ approach, advocate the 
replacement of hierarchy by a matrix, or typology of health-research types. Evans (2003) builds 
a hierarchy around standards of effectiveness, appropriateness and feasibility for interventions. 
In broadening the hierarchy and de-emphasising RCT research, he also presents it as ‘a guide 
rather than a set of inflexible rules’ (2003:83). Pope et al’s (2007) textbook-guide is concerned 
with the ’synthesis’ of methods, and less committed to rigid hierarchisation and categorisation. 
Although the earlier quantitative hierarchies might, as Roberts (2006:123) says, have been 
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‘largely discredited and rarely used except to prop up straw men’, the idea of hierarchy remains 
important in developing discussions of evidence. Daly et al (2007), for example, expand 
quantitative hierarchisation-principles into qualitative cases. They use generalisability and 
reliability as criteria to rate qualitative approaches for evidential applicability, just as if they were 
quantitative. 
 
The Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice. 
The adversarial articles of Sackett and others in the BMJ created an opportunity for a sustained 
critical response. From 1995 onwards, this niche was filled principally by the JECP and a group 
of writers whose voracious antipathy to EBM produced a catalogue of objections and a rich 
rhetorical legacy. An editorial by Miles, Bentley, Polychronis and Grey (1997)14 written in 
response to Sackett et al (1996) is representative of this genre. The attack on EBM in this piece, 
as a ‘product of the radical chic that well characterises the personalities of many of the advocates 
of this new movement’ (1997:83) is direct, polemical and angry. Miles et al accuse these 
advocates of cardinal sins against clinical medicine, concerning their uncritical devotion to 
science as a clinical arbiter, and presumption of the authority to identify ‘best’ evidence. They 
identify EBM with the creation of a ‘bald dichotomy’ which obscures practical excellence, and 
manifesting of a devotion to ‘platitudinous principles’ rather than understanding.  
Mixing religious and other metaphors, they characterise EBM-advocates as the ‘statistical high 
priests of a new cultus‘ who operate through the Machiavellian seduction of health service 
management (ibid). They further admonish these advocates for making claims which are 
‘ostentatiously biased’, and mock EBM for being ‘highly effective in precipitating intense 
irritation’ (1997:84). The authors invoke a lack of evidence for the applicability of EBM except 
in artificially simplified cases, accuse EBM advocates of slandering clinicians who raise objections, 
and express the hope 
‘... that (advocates) confess that not everything of value in healthcare is amenable to 
quantitative measurement, (and for) the screaming baby of EBM to be consigned to the 
nostalgic formaldehyde of medical history.’ 
         Miles et al 1997:85. 
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 This was not the first in the string (see also Miles et al 1995; Polychronis et al 1996a&b, Charlton 
1997). 
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Somewhat incongruously however, they finish not by anticipating the fulfilment of this hope, 
but a continued and vigorous debate. They identify a legitimate question in relation to science, 
about ‘whose science, how it is synthesised and with what authority changes in clinical practice 
(…) are judged suitable for immediate use (…) in the clinical encounter’ (1997:85). The JECP 
was to contribute consistently to this debate as it grew.  
Every year from 1997 up to the present, there has been an issue of the JECP devoted to critical 
writing on EBM. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, these special issues featured articles, co-
authored (with others) by Miles, Polychronis and Grey, attacking EBM with vitriolic fervour15. 
Miles et al (1998) for example, developed a strand of criticism adhering to a moral principle of 
science: 
‘EBM is unscientific because (…) it glorifies imperfect experimental designs over clinical 
experience and rejects the unquantifiable in medicine (…); anti-scientific because it avoids 
(…) the democratic consensus-building of science (…) and manifests some of the most 
authoritarian stances and magisterial disdain of criticism ever seen in clinical science’ 
         Miles et al 1998:258. 
In the same article, the authors position themselves heroically as spokespeople for a silent 
majority of medical colleagues, who are prevented by fear from arguing against EBM, and who 
find themselves alienated and vilified by the practices of non-clinical researchers and their 
supporters.  
Repeating their own (1997:84) caricature of EBM-advocates as ‘dazzled scientists who set out to 
dazzle, rejoicing like aerobatic children vaulting through the statistical stratosphere’, Miles et al 
describe meta-analyses (1998:259) as ‘the unacceptable face of statisticism’ which insists on 
combining data without justification. They declare that clinicians are ‘likely to receive these 
studies like garments from a plague village’. In Miles et al (1999:98), they suggest that insofar as 
EBM had made gains, it was due to ‘a predilection for rhetorical wordplay’ which had 
temporarily obscured its ‘unsure philosophical and methodological foundations’. But again, 
while finding little to recommend EBM, and predicting its imminent demise, they end by stating 
that the debate was not concluded, and that its continuation was of vital importance. They 
dedicate the edition to doctors who are ‘passionately concerned with the preservation of noble 
hippocratic ideals’ (1999:101). 
                                                          
15
 A selection of ‘Miles et al’ pieces are given in the references section. 
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2.4 Developments in the Literature of EBM. 
The Quarrelsome and Contrary Nature of Medical EB-literature. 
In a developing debate which is academic, and concerned with acts of caring for people who are 
ill, the rhetorical character of these exchanges ought to attract sociological attention. Calling for 
an end to rhetorical wordplay is an incongruous move for the JECP writers to make. While 
Sackett and colleagues had a stirring literary style, it is Miles and colleagues who are the more 
ostentatious in their deployment of poetic flair. The care they take in constructing baroque put-
downs and brickbats for their adversaries equals the domineering proclamations made in the 
name of EBM. After Onion and Walley (1998), Miles et al identify a beneficent Practical School 
(PS) which prioritises clinical knowledge, and a nefarious Scientific School (SS) of EBM’ers, 
which degrades it (1998:259). The configuration of protagonists of EBM as the ‘SS’ has a 
symbolic connotation with nazism16.  
Such underhand rhetoric as this indicates tension between a jocular type of masculine rivalry, 
and more vicious ill-feeling. The cocktail of pointed sarcasm with methodological and 
philosophical theorising, politicised posturing and academic presentation makes for a 
disorienting reading experience. The early publications of the JECP offer a vivid insight into an 
intense mixture of concerns expressed during the early years of EBM. Sackett’s (1997a) article 
in the Lancet, ‘evidence-based medicine and treatment choices’, demonstrates the contrast of 
rhetorical style with the JECP cohort. Here Sackett uses a dramatic narrative to respond to 
Maynard’s (1996) critique that EBM is naive to issues of cost-management in healthcare.  
In this anecdotal scenario from Sackett’s experience, a patient is dying of cancer, and their last 
hours are skilfully and compassionately managed. Clinicians balance an ethical imperative (the 
patient’s wishes) against the high cost of keeping them alive, in an evidence-based way. The 
confident re-assertion of EB-principles in an emotionally-difficult situation comes with strategic 
aggression, as Sackett sardonically invites Maynard to join his clinical team (1997:570). The 
cadence of this article, and selection of such an emotive dramatic example, leaves the reader 
without time to draw breath. As the narrative hurries along, Sackett leaves no room for any 
‘what-ifs’ or critical analysis. Through skilled storytelling, the cause of EBM is furthered 
theatrically and with charisma, but without addressing the issues which had been causing 
controversy. 
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 This foreshadows a controversy over ‘micro-fascism’ instigated by Holmes et al (2006), in the 
context of evidence-based nursing. 
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Another curious thing about EBM literature from the BMJ and the JECP is the encompassing 
tendency of each faction to self-reference. For example, Haynes and Haines (BMJ 1998), in a 
short article on ‘barriers and bridges to evidence based clinical practice’, draw upon twenty-
nine other articles. Of these, more than half (seventeen) are from sources associated with EBM 
advocacy: the BMJ, JAMA, the Annals of Internal Medicine, ACP Journal Club, Evidence-Based Medicine, 
Archives of Internal Medicine, and The Cochrane Library. Nine are co-authored by one or the other of 
Haynes and Haines themselves. None are from sources critical of EBM, even though by 1998, 
there was no difficulty in accessing critical literature. Conversely, Miles et al’s later (JECP 2006) 
‘state of the debate’ article made reference to forty-seven others. Of these, forty-four were 
from the JECP and thirteen featured Andrew Miles as a lead or co-author. Just one pro-EBM 
article was included: the EBMWG (1992).  
These attributes suggest a highly polarised debate, and a lack of acknowledgement by each camp 
of the contribution of their interlocutors17. The BMJ and JECP were, it is also notable, not the 
only places where EBM was discussed. A heavily-cited18 summary of early criticism of EBM is 
Feinstein and Horwitz (1997) in the American Journal of Medicine. This article highlights a 
continued legitimate practical reliance on types of evidence other than RCTs and meta-analyses. 
Because it makes individual cases invisible, Feinstein and Horwitz explain, RCT data lacks the 
fine detail which would make it clinically useful. The combination of RCTs into meta-analyses 
glosses clinical variations further, and camouflages the systematic patient selections and 
exclusions which are made in large-scale trials. This conjures a new subject, the averaged patient, 
who is clinically unrecognisable. The logic used to make clinical decisions consequently reverts 
to an understanding of causal mechanisms – or as they are known in the literature, 
pathophysiologic principles.  
These pathophysiologic principles are inseparable from individualistic parameters which must be 
assessed in the light of contextualised experience. With these factors recognised, the certainties 
to which advocates of RCT methodology are argued to aspire19 seem likely to be transient (they 
have a ‘coffee future’ (1997:532)). For Feinstein and Horwitz (1997), EBM thus presents a dual 
threat to good practice; by suppressing clinically-relevant methodologies, and by diverting 
clinicians away from their patients and into the library. On the subject of authority in EBM, they 
further explain how faceless presentation, particularly of meta-analyses, disguises the acts of 
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 This is characterised as ‘denial rather than refutation’ by Goodman (2000). 
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 470 citations on Google Scholar, Sep 2012. 
19
 The issue of whether EB-advocates really do aspire to timeless certainty is discussed in the appendix. 
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interpretative judgement used by particular (yet difficult to identify) individuals to produce 
them. This means that claims made for EBM to transparency and egalitarianism are unjustified.  
Finally they highlight the potential abuse of EBM for corporate or private ends. This is consonant 
with their view of the ‘dogmatic authoritarianism’ of those who coerce EBM into practice, 
particularly by withholding support for preventive and prophylactic (rather than curative) 
interventions not suitable for RCTs (1997:534). Coming from Alvan Feinstein, the founding-
father of clinical epidemiology, these criticisms (ironically) carry an authority of their own. Also 
notable in this piece is a transition from an argument based on knowledge-translatability and a 
philosophy of practice, to a political and moral argument. EBM comes to be presented as a 
conspiracy among different kinds of potential corruption.  
These issues can be found expressed (although perhaps less succinctly) by others in the JECP and 
BMJ. This can highlight that the BMJ was not purely pro-EBM in the way that the JECP was, to 
begin with, anti-EBM, a point well illustrated by David Grahame-Smith’s (1995, BMJ) piece, 
‘evidence-based medicine: socratic dissent’. Here Grahame-Smith imagines a dialogue between 
a naïve Socrates and a cheerleader for EBM, Enthusiasticus Meta-analyticus. This comic set-
piece masks an earnest dialogue in which Socrates exposes the flaws in Enthusiasticus’ outlook20. 
In the last two sentences Socrates warns of a deadly danger: 
‘Beware, Enthusiasticus, that you are not used as a dupe in a political game of health 
economics. Remember, hemlock may be down the line.’ 
        Grahame-Smith 1995:1127. 
Through the later 1990s critical literature on EBM proliferated, and frequently communicated 
this suggestion of edginess, urgency and threat. 
 
The Continuation of Well-Rehearsed Debates. 
In the later 1990s EBM-advocates still made regular appearances, and also manifested a sense of 
threat, or aggression, in different ways. An example is Straus and Sackett’s (1999) ‘applying 
evidence to the individual patient’, in the Annals of Oncology. Here, Straus and Sackett pursued 
                                                          
20
 Grahame-Smith (1998) later wrote a chastened piece expressing some regret for his earlier daring – 
which had ‘got (him) into trouble’ (1998:7) – but in which he nevertheless identified himself with a 
critical position on EBM. The trouble alluded to has to do with Grahame-Smith’s (1998:7) claim to 
have written his (1995) dialogue with his tongue in his cheek. 
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their (1996) theme of integration to answer the charges of incommensurability between 
epidemiological data and clinical practice. They use a specific clinical scenario, that of a 65-year-
old man with lung cancer, and describe a step-by-step process for his evidence-based treatment. 
This involves a successful literature search; a favourable comparison between the patient and the 
ones in the study found; a favourable consideration of feasibility of treatment (chemotherapy); a 
favourable consideration of likely benefits and risk factors; and a process of ‘decision support’ 
which recruits the patient into the decision to proceed with treatment, or not (1999:29-31). 
The majority of this article is given over to the discussion of decision support – ways to ‘enhance 
the communication of evidence to the patient’ because – after all – ‘he is the one with the 
disease’ (1999:31). The matter here is the likelihood of different responses being achieved 
through different means of presentation. For example, it has been found that patients are more 
likely to prefer chemotherapy over surgery if presented with a probability of dying, as opposed 
to a probability of living. Straus and Sackett (1999) thus choose a simple (single-pathology, clear 
diagnosis) case to develop their formulation of evidence-based care. They choose a case for 
which a trusted meta-analysis is available, and they choose a therapeutic technique which is well-
established. They direct the substance of their discussion away from any EBM-related 
controversy towards the manipulation of the naive patient into a narrowly-restricted choice. 
The active process of establishing the context and precedents for the scenario described is 
obviously, not carefully, hidden from view. 
From the point of view of the debate which had been developing, this response is aggressively 
provocative. The formulaic proceduralisation of EBM given is simplistic, and the configuration 
of patients’ input purely in terms of rational-numericised strategy disregards patients’ own 
decision-making resources in a way likely to attract concern. Meanwhile, the channelling of a 
general debate into consideration of such a specific and limited scenario is frustrating for those 
familiar with the exchanges in other sections of the literature. And the neglect to address 
criticisms of EBM, such as political objections raised and accusations of moral improbity, is 
suspicious. It is of sociological interest that EB-advocates would write something which plays 
directly into the hands of their respondents, adding more incendiary fuel to a fire of controversy 
which was already burning vigorously. 
The story of Dr David Sackett has a nominal finishing-point. In the latter 1990s Sackett had been 
engaged in re-stating the original terms of EBM. 1998 saw two pieces written with Sharon 
Straus. ‘The evidence cart’ (Sackett and Straus 1998) is a suggestion for how to enable the use of 
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research evidence in hospital wards; by having a trolley, stocked with printed information, ready 
to hand. ‘Using research findings in clinical practice’ (Straus and Sackett 1998:339) meanwhile, 
steadfastly repeats the model for EBM; ‘evidence can be applied efficiently and effectively to our 
patients’ problems’. Sackett’s role in EBM had by now been well-served, and others were 
positioned to sustain the debate in other ways. He made his exit with a further flourish, and a 
return to rhetorical form. ‘The sins of expertness and a proposal for redemption’ (Sackett 2000) 
is autobiographical and confessional, reflecting on a career spent as an expert. It subverts the 
religious themes (of sin and redemption) which had been used elsewhere to belittle EBM. 
As Sackett here renounces his own expert status, and pledges never again to speak of EBM, he 
makes a martyr of himself. He urges other experts to relinquish their prestigious positions, and 
in doing so makes a bid to enshrine his own place as a charismatic, even immortal leader of a 
movement. This could put one in mind of religious stories of heroic self-sacrifice, were it not so 
tongue-in-cheek a move to make. While Sackett would not write again using the terms of EBM, 
he continued the polemic against expertise (Sackett 2002a) in a barely-disguised continuation of 
themes from EBM. In ‘clinical epidemiology: who, what and whither’ (Sackett 2002b) he 
addresses his own legacy, situating himself in relation to Feinstein and presenting EBM as a 
successful, victorious, and finished project. The discussion was not finished, but Sackett’s place 
as its chief instigator was well-established. 
With Sackett having thus spoken, articles re-stating the case in favour of EBM became less 
common, but articles debating the issue of EBM did not. The JECP in particular prolonged the 
discussion without the necessity of further advocacies in other journals, and began itself to 
feature more moderate accounts, even if accompanied by critical commentaries (see for 
example Jenicek 2006 and Upshur 2006). Alongside conscious maintenance of the controversy, 
a thawing of oppositional relations was sometimes apparent. Lake (2006 in JECP), for example, 
purveys a gently ambivalent management of possibilities, using mollifying language and cliché to 
validate both sides of the argument: 
‘Unfortunately it would appear that there are now opposing camps with entrenched 
positions suggesting that the time is right for a fresh approach to facilitate a move forward 
but not throw the baby out with the bath water.’ 
         Lake 2006:433.  
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Articles authored (with others) by Andrew Miles from this period of post-Sackettism show that 
such equivocation could still have a hard edge. Miles et al (2004) is victorious in tone, looking 
back on EBM as a necessary debate which had ‘done medicine a great service’, but only because 
it was a nonsense which had clarified how medicine should not be understood (2004:138-9). 
Miles et al (2006) is a re-invigorated attack on EBM, in which the ‘almost sexual excitement 
some colleagues appear to experience when hearing the words ‘evidence-based’’ (2006:244) is 
made fun of. Miles et al (2008:639) confide that EBM ‘lies in ruins’, but nevertheless re-state 
their determination to progress the debate, which is being displaced by an unforeseen concern 
for patient-centred care. 
 
An Escape from Polemic: Trisha Greenhalgh. 
While the JECP school sought to continue the controversy in the same stylistic and conceptual 
terms, other figures had been steering it in different directions. A comparison can be drawn 
between Trisha Greenhalgh (who wrote at first for the BMJ) and Ross Upshur (who wrote later 
for the JECP). Her textbook ‘how to read a paper’ (1997, published by BMJ) has been a 
commercial success, whereas his status as an authority has grown more gradually through a 
series of journal articles. Both of them employed styles more circumspect than those witnessed 
above, and both negotiated ambivalent paths through EBM, becoming more openly sceptical as 
the years passed. Greenhalgh was a GP, whose commitment to clinically-derived knowledge is 
consistent through her work. Upshur was qualified as a physician, but had a prior degree in 
philosophy which, combined with later training in epidemiology and public health (from 
McMaster University, the place of EBM’s inception), placed him well to develop a philosophical 
commentary on EBM. 
Taking Greenhalgh first, Traynor (2007:303) describes her as ‘once an advocate [of EBM] but 
later a more measured voice’, which simplifies her trajectory. There were more than hints of 
dissent in her writing from the start, and demonstrable attempts to alter the course of EBM even 
while ostensibly supporting it. For example, she agitated for the ‘evolution’ of EBM into 
context-sensitive medicine (CSM) while it was still new (Greenhalgh and Worrall, JECP 1997). 
She led qualitative studies into folk models of diabetes (Greenhalgh et al 1998) – not an 
orthodox EBM thing to do – and in a commentary on a meta-analysis, presented an un-disguised 
critique of meta-analyses in general (Greenhalgh 1998). Particularly interesting is her 
formulation with Brian Hurwitz of ‘narrative-based medicine’ as an alternative to EBM built on 
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clinical stories (Hurwitz and Greenhalgh (eds) 1998, Greenhalgh 1999). Her article ‘narrative 
based medicine in an evidence based world’ (Greenhalgh BMJ 1999) can be read as keeping a 
foot on either side of the institutional divisions inscribed by EBM. 
In this (1999) article her clinically-led perspective, supported with examples from general 
practice, constitutes research evidence as being always at risk of irrelevance, and redeemable 
only with practical expertise. She emphasises ‘deductive narrative’ (1999:323) as the essential 
framework for clinical decisions. In support of this, she treads the familiar path of the 
impossibility of moving from general to specific cases, but also uses a dramatic tale of her own. 
This is the heroic story of Dr Jenkins, whose clinical intuition led to a diagnosis-by-telephone of 
meningococcal meningitis, which saved a girl’s life. The factor which enabled this diagnosis – ‘a 
feat we would all be proud to replicate just once’ (1999:325) – was the use of the word 
‘strangely’ by the girl’s mother. Although Greenhalgh makes an honourable mention for 
‘research evidence’ – meaning a sound knowledge of disease characteristics – this is of a 
pathophysiologic, not clinical-trial type. In any case, it is clear that the doctor’s personal 
expertise in communication was what saved the day. 
Greenhalgh (1999) goes on to develop a four-fold theorisation of clinical encounter using the 
literary and discursive idea of ‘text’, and anticipates a growth of research into ‘the narrative of 
shared decision-making’ (1999:325) in which she was herself to be instrumental. In her 
conclusion, however, she – strangely – saves EBM from further indignity, and redeems it by 
making recourse to the common evidence-based literary tendency of stating what it is that she is 
Not Saying: 
‘Appreciating the narrative nature of illness (…) does not require us to reject the principles 
of EBM. Nor does such an approach demand an inversion of the hierarchy of evidence (…).’ 
        Greenhalgh 1999:325. 
She explains that it is only within an interpretivist paradigm that clinicians can meaningfully 
draw on the concept of evidence. With a twist of lexical dexterity, Greenhalgh criticises EBM 
by endorsing it as something which does not make sense without a pre-existing clinical context. 
This is done deftly so as to disguise its critical implications.  
This raises, again, a question of sociological interest. Why would Greenhalgh (1999) spare EBM 
in her last paragraph, having subjected it to merciless critique in her first eighteen paragraphs? 
To what end is such ambivalent presentation? Greenhalgh’s scepticism of EBM was to become 
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clearer as she moved away from the BMJ. For example, her (2002a) ‘Intuition and evidence – 
uneasy bedfellows?’ in the British Journal of General Practice moves to formalise the unconscious 
influence of intuition on clinical action. While balancing the demands of conflicting knowledge 
types, she recommends ‘creative writing and dialogue with colleagues’ for clinicians to ‘revive 
and celebrate clinical storytelling’ (2002a:395).  
Other works continue this theme: Greenhalgh (2002b) strongly advocates the inclusion of 
qualitative methods into the evidence-base for diabetes. Greenhalgh et al (2005), in Social Science 
and Medicine, a foray into sociological writing, advances a narrative approach to the history of 
research evidence. Greenhalgh and Russell (2006) is an account of health policy-making as social 
drama, which advocates an awareness of language-games for understanding debates about 
evidence. Greenhalgh and Russell (2009) is a more direct argument against evidence-basedness 
for policy-making, which makes a call instead for socioloinguistics and argumentation theory. 
Finally, Greenhalgh and Heath (2010a&b) discuss qualitative approaches to assessment of 
doctor-patient interactions, moving towards a surveillance of the doctor-patient relationship as 
the key site of clinical knowledge production. 
 
Towards Philosophy: Ross Upshur. 
I now turn attention to Ross Upshur. For those interested in the philosophical aspects of EBHC, 
there are few elements of interest for which reference points cannot be found in his work. His 
first piece for the JECP (Upshur 1997) is a denunciation of the use of Gödel’s Proof to criticise 
EBM, and a recommendation to use the Quine-Duhem thesis and the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce 
instead. He (1997:202) explains that Gödel’s proof (that mathematics is not reducible to a finite 
set of axioms) had been misguidedly used to argue against EBM on the basis of EBM’s perceived 
proximity to ideals of mathematical proof. The Quine-Duhem thesis relates to the under-
determination of interpretations by data which, in practical terms, means that clinicians must 
acknowledge the uncertainty inherent to practice: ‘any sign of dogmatic certainty is a warning 
sign indeed’ (1997:204). C.S. Peirce’s abductive pragmatism offers a pathway to making clinical 
decisions based on the implementation and evaluation of practical and research knowledge, 
subject to continual revision, towards the ‘sharpening of clinical reasoning’ (1997:205). 
Upshur scorns both identified sides of the debate for their epistemological intemperance, and 
offers a compromised model for critique of EBM. His warning against dogmatic certainty echoes 
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accusations made against either faction by the other, and his pragmatism puts research evidence 
and clinical expertise on an equal footing. EBM-critics might be suspicious of injunctions to the 
analytic sharpening of clinical reasoning: it was clear from other writings that clinicians felt that 
they should be the ones to sharpen their own reasoning, if indeed such sharpening was necessary. 
Upshur’s recondite article is a departure from the hubristic writings of those he criticised, to the 
extent that neither can be comfortably taken at face value. The use of mathematical theorems to 
argue against EBM is, perhaps, to be read in the same climate of dramatic hyperbole as the 
EBMWG’s (1992) claims to having orchestrated a paradigm shift.  
It might be that Upshur’s (1997) elevation of the debate onto a purely philosophical plane, with 
which few could critically engage, is itself partly satirical or subversive. In any case, its invitation 
to the EB-protagonists and antagonists to put aside their differences did not find its mark. 
Similar comments might be made about Upshur’s ‘priors and prejudice’ (in Theoretical Medicine 
and Bioethics 1999) in which he advances a Hermeneutic account of medical reasoning. Using 
Gadamer’s idea of ‘hermeneutic circle’ together with Bayesian probability theory, he imagines 
the clinician as an interpretive agent who mediates between various sources of information and 
draws revisable conclusions. He states his wish to ‘draw attention away from unproductive 
discussions of simplistic dichotomies such as whether medicine is art or science’ (1999:325), 
implicitly rebuking other writers for their theoretical unsophistication.  
The approach here is to usurp EBM with a hermeneutic model of clinical reason. This offers a 
theoretical defence against EBM which could have been attractive to those protective of clinical 
autonomy, but which, again, was not readily taken up21. Maybe Upshur became conscious of 
singing in a philosophical register too high to be audible to many EB-writers. For his tone was to 
change, and his citation frequency to rise, in his next article for the JECP, ‘seven characteristics 
of medical evidence’ (Upshur 2000). There he laments the polemical nature of EBM, a topic 
which he says is ‘quintessentially philosophical’ (2000:93), and takes greater pains to link his 
epistemological insights to clinical conditions. Meanwhile his theoretical interest switches again, 
this time to fallibilism.  
The characteristics of evidence which he delineates are phrased in a way which stylistically 
undermines the credibility of EBM. For example, he says it is ‘inherently provisional’, ‘contrary’ 
and always expected to be superceded (2000:94). The protean nature of evidence means that it 
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 To October 2011, Upshur (1999) had 14 citations on Scholar Google, and 5 of these were by Upshur 
himself. 
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is unable to keep up with itself, and so always incomplete and restricted (2000:95), and its 
collective nature pushes it out of reach of the individual (rational) mind (2000:95). His 
philosophical pronouncement of fallibilism thus sounds like a sublimated critique. Evidence is 
fallibilist; therefore it is fallible. However his characterisations of evidence as provisional, 
defeasible and emergent amount to criticisms only for those with a prior commitment to ideas 
of science as definitive, insuperable, and deterministic. Upshur himself refuses any such 
commitments. His prioritisation of philosophy permits him to keep readers in suspense by 
avoiding the endorsement of any position on EBM, for or against. 
Removing his arguments onto a purely-theoretical plane sets up an interesting dynamic in 
Upshur (2000). It allows him to detach his arguments from the worldly concerns of evidence 
implementation and maintain an ambiguity of intent, and so straddle the chasm of evidence in a 
fashion similar to Greenhalgh’s earlier work. As is not the case with Upshur (1997) and (1999), 
EB-antagonists and protagonists can both read the ‘seven characteristics’ (2000) with approval. 
However, notwithstanding the intricacy of Upshur’s philosophical investigations, his conclusion 
is a political incitement to research: 
‘How we learn good clinical judgement, how we impart it to trainees, how we allocate 
scarce resources and communicate it to our patients (…) is an essential task for future 
health care research.’ 
         Upshur 2000:96. 
This is a ratification (albeit on modified, clinic-centred terms) of the EBM project, and a call to 
practical rather than theoretical action. Upshur himself was to heed this call as his writing 
became more oriented towards practical and policy recommendations, and more critical of EBM. 
In ‘meaning and measurement’ (Upshur et al 2001), he (with others) joins in the debate over 
evidence hierarchies, proposing a four-way typology which is inclusive and tolerant of diversity. 
The purpose of this typology is to avoid the ranking of research types (2001:93), but it is 
implicitly critical of EBM, for the preferred methodologies for clinical medicine are qualitative, 
personal and narrative (2001:94)22.  
Upshur (2002) focuses on the concept of ‘base’ for medicine, and linking this to problems with 
foundationalist epistemologies, deconstructs EBM in favour of a more nuanced, multi-
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 Upshur (2003) is a still more direct sceptical commentary on the lack of rationale for evidence 
hierarchies. 
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perspectival understanding of health care. Upshur and Tracy (2004) present four challenges to 
EBM which are supported by narrative examples from clinical practice. The necessity of 
embodied expertise for reconciling research evidence with the demands and expectations of 
patients is considered. Finally, ‘looking for rules in a world of exceptions’ (Upshur 2005) is a 
personal retrospective account of writing about EBM and engaging it in practice, candid and 
confessional in a way similar to Sackett (2000). Here, Upshur delivers a damning expert 
appraisal: 
‘The true failure of EBM is that it has stopped where the most urgent problems arise (…). 
That EBM has drawn attention to its own inherent limitations has not stopped its own 
efforts at self-congratulation. It is hoped that those interested in solving the current 
problems in health care can do so in an atmosphere unfettered by the restrictions imposed 
by EBM.’ 
         Upshur 2005:489. 
Upshur’s loss of faith conveys a sense of disappointment that his philosophical insights did not 
always gain traction, for he came to the disillusioned view that EBM is ‘not a philosophical 
doctrine’ (2005:477). Nonetheless, he had done much to extend the reach of discussions about 
EBM. The development of debate away from the narrow confines of ‘research’ versus ‘practice’ 
and into philosophical territory was important for its continuation. It is to this broader interest, 
the expansion of evidence-basedness beyond EBM, that I now turn. 
 
2.5 Beyond Medicine: Evidence-Based Practice, EBP. 
When crossing the borders of medicine into other health-professional contexts, evidence-
basedness became evidence-based practice (EBP). Its influence has been felt in all health 
professions, but the profession which I choose to investigate in this thesis is physiotherapy. 
Physiotherapy was the field in which I first encountered the idea of EBP. There are practical 
reasons for choosing it to build a case-study for this thesis. The physiotherapy literature on EBP 
is small and easy to manage in comparison to, say, the equivalent nursing literature. It is well 
self-enclosed and does not cross over much into other disciplines, or into other genres of 
literature within the same discipline. More important though are theoretical reasons to be 
interested in physiotherapy. As a discipline which is definitively concerned with bodies, 
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physiotherapy offers a fast route to socio-theoretical concerns with embodiment. The usefulness 
of this approach is made clear in later chapters. 
It did not take long for physiotherapists to become concerned with EBP. An early appraisal was 
Tracy Bury’s23 (1996) editorial ‘EBP – survival of the fittest’. There, Tracy Bury uses Darwin’s 
theory of evolution alongside market-fundamentalist economics to set out her view of the 
changing industry of healthcare. Welcoming the possibilities of EBP for ensuring good practice, 
her enthusiasm is packaged with bloodthirsty resolve:  
‘those who learn to adapt to the changing environment will survive, those who do not will 
become extinct. (…) Unless the profession learns to base its practice on evidence (…) it 
will not find itself to be the fittest!’ 
         Bury 1996:75 
‘We must not be frightened to make extinct those areas of our practice which are shown to 
be ineffective.’ 
         Bury 1996:76 
In this dire situation, of nature red in tooth and claw, the keynote of ‘extinction’ is both passive 
and active. On one claw, extinction is something that will happen to us if we do not become 
evidence-based, and on the other, extinction is something we must do to them (to practices, or 
to people who practice wrongly) if we are to save ourselves. EBP is synonymous here with 
danger, and with fear. Physiotherapists had reason to be frightened, if not of EBP itself, then of 
each other, as a study by Turner and Whitfield24 (published twice – Turner and Whitfield 1997 
and 1999) shows. Stating their aim to ‘benchmark’ the state of the profession (1997:110), they 
conducted a survey of therapists’ reasoning strategies, with emphasis on journal readership.  
Finding that research evidence was influential in a mere 5% of cases, Turner and Whitfield 
delivered a damning verdict on physiotherapy, predicting that the profession would not survive 
‘the current climate of budget-driven medical care’ (1999:245). They summarily rejected the 
validity of all approaches deemed non-scientific. While they successfully demonstrated the 
minimal role for research evidence within physiotherapy, this was done by disguising their own 
evidential preferences from respondents, who were presented with a neutral choice between 
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 Bury’s textbook with Judy Mead – ‘Evidence-Based Healthcare: a Practical Guide for Therapists’ 
(1998) – became a standard text for training allied health professionals. 
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 Pat Turner was a physiotherapy tutor, Allan Whitfield a graphics tutor. 
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types of reasoning. While the interpretation of these results is consequently problematic, the 
study is of sociological interest in relation to the nature of discourse around EBP in 
physiotherapy. Conditions of possibility were set for a witch-hunt orchestrated not from the 
outside (by doctors or nurses, for example) but from within. 
 
Physiotherapists’ ‘responses to’ EBP. 
Turner and Whitfield’s study was answered by several others re-affirming commitment to EBP 
in physiotherapy. Jette et al (2003), Stevenson et al (2004), Iles and Davidson (2006) and 
Grimmer-Somers et al (2007), conducting surveys with clear research values, obtained more 
positive impressions of physiotherapists’ attitudes to the use of research evidence. In Jette et al 
(2003), 90% of respondents believed EBP to be necessary, and 79% believed it to improve 
patient care (2003:790). Iles and Davidson (2006) reached similar conclusions of positive 
attitude, identifying time pressures as a significant barrier to EBP. Grimmer-Somers et al (2007) 
identified a progressive shift towards evidence-uptake compared to previous surveys. Stevenson 
et al (2004) had taken a different approach, conducting a randomised trial to measure the 
effectiveness of an EBP-training programme for changing attitudes to EBP.  
These survey-studies are problematic. Their use of quantitative methods to investigate a 
qualitative subject, namely therapists’ perceptions of EBP, (and in the latter case, a randomised-
controlled trial based on a convenience sample of 30 therapists), attests an unexamined 
commitment to narrow ideals of numerate scientificity. This is reflected in the taking-for-
granted of quantitative-positivistic EBP as the correct way to practice, and an overriding 
concern with ways to discipline the profession according to such values. Given the middling 
response rates in the three surveys (all close to 50%), such studies might systematically 
discriminate against those sceptical of EBP, who would be less likely to participate in a survey 
gathering evidence about Evidence. A study conducted using an interpretive approach was 
reported separately in physiotherapeutic (Barnard and Wiles 2000) and sociological (Wiles and 
Barnard 2001) literature25. 
In the journal Physiotherapy (Barnard and Wiles 2000), the authors used the concept of Evidence 
to structure their report, and found differences in views between grades of physiotherapists. 
Junior physiotherapists and seniors working in university hospitals defined the ‘evidence’ in EBP 
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as being scientific-research-based, and as taking precedence over knowledge from practice. 
Senior physiotherapists from community settings and those in management granted preference 
to knowledge from practice, with research playing a confirmatory role. For these therapists, 
reflection on practice and attendance at developmental courses were key to EBP. Seniors 
acknowledged a central role for patients’ views in clinical reasoning, whereas juniors were 
committed to the exclusive expertise of the professional. Seniors were more likely to question 
the value of research evidence per se or to be ‘fearful’ of it (2000:121); a tendency noted by 
juniors as a barrier to change.  
In Sociological Research Online (Wiles and Barnard 2001), conflict between generations of 
physiotherapists, rather than differences in the interpretation of Evidence, is heavily emphasised. 
For the sociological audience, the authors highlight (2001:8) that patient-benefits were not seen 
as an important factor in the justification of EBP (in contrast to their presentation to 
physiotherapist readers). There is confirmation between the two of a dissociation (which arose 
also in Jette et al 2003) between the political and practical utility of EBP: the political benefits 
perceived in paying lip-service to EBP were weighed against a practical preference for clinically-
derived knowledge. Physiotherapists who explicitly ventured objections to the evidence-based 
approach did so with trepidation.  
Bithell (2000), at this time, made RCTs the focal point of her analysis of EBP. Arguing that 
variability is a legitimate part of practice, she arraigns RCTs for the use of large homogenised 
populations to investigate a statistically disciplined patient (2000:59), and for the suppression of 
that very variability which makes physiotherapy responsive. She makes an anti-pharmaceutical 
argument locating the exaltation of the RCT with its origin in drug testing. This allows her to 
dissociate physiotherapy from a model of evidence ascribed by implication to medicine: 
‘delivery of a pre-specified and invariable treatment to each patient is not physiotherapy as 
we know it.’ 
         Bithell 2000:58 
She does not extend this defence of contextualism into a generalised assault on ideals of 
empiricism and universality, but makes commitment to EBP girded by a different understanding 
of science. This is the science of the clinic – the advocacy of research conducted on the basis of 
clinicians’ views and needs, and the call for clinicians’ expertise to be granted the authority to 
decide the value of research evidence. 
38 
 
Hurley (2000) is more provocative in distinguishing clinicians, who deal with the multiple and 
conflicting interests of real practice, from researchers who deal with the simplifications and 
idealisations of physiologic rationale. Although he encourages clinicians to educate themselves in 
the ways of research, he places the main responsibility for collaboration on researchers, urging 
them to ‘get out more’ from their ‘ivory towers’ (2000:340), presenting problems of 
translation between research and practical contexts as a matter of miscommunication between 
these mutually exclusive groups. In a final paragraph rich in metaphors, Hurley ‘comes out of 
the closet’ and ‘denounces himself as an untrendy heretic’ because he does not subscribe to the 
new orthodoxy of EBP (2000:341). But this impulse to dissent is immediately retracted: 
‘Of course I believe in the concept of EBP, and it is impossible to argue against its 
desirability and the need for it.’ 
         Hurley 2000:341. 
In this passage, there is an uncomfortable sense that the author is unable to let their own voice 
be heard. Expressing dissent to EBP was evidently difficult for physiotherapists in a way which 
had not been the case for the doctors of the JECP school. In drawing back from criticism, Bithell 
(2000) and Hurley (2000) both diminish their own perspectives. 
The resulting feeling of hopelessness is well-illustrated by Herbert et al (2001). They decry 
attempts to formalise criteria for systematic analyses, and bewail the problem of publication bias 
in EBP. These problems they resign, urging clinicians to use caution, and to trust only those 
studies which ‘provide more certainty than the reader already has’ (2001:205). In relation to the 
problem of skills, they refer therapists to pre-appraised material, including systematic reviews, 
in spite of the preceding warnings. Their view that ‘much of clinical practice is far from 
optimally effective’ (2001:204) is admittedly unsubstantiated. Likewise, their recommendation 
that  
‘time spent busily applying ineffective or harmful therapies would be better spent seeking 
out and critically appraising best evidence’ 
        Herbert et al 2001:204 
… begs the question, central to EBP, of whether therapies are ineffective or harmful. They 
contradict themselves by explicitly privileging research evidence over clinical experience, and 
then re-asserting that research evidence ‘informs, but does not dominate clinical decision-
making’ (2001:203). This uncomfortable position is distilled into a conundrum: 
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‘it makes sense to make decisions on the basis of expected outcomes, even though we know 
that the expected outcome will probably not occur.’ 
        Herbert et al 2001:208. 
This indicates a paralysis in reasoning, and demonstrates how EBP-related writing can become 
riven with contradictions, with a tendency to self-abasement. Herbert et al’s (2001) conclusion 
that EBP is the best model for practice comes not on the basis of comparison with alternatives, 
but the unexamined supposition that there are no alternatives. 
 
The Suppression of Critique. 
This reluctance to criticise EBP within physiotherapy endured while objections to it were 
developed in more detail. For example, Grimmer et al (2004) raise various issues with EBP for 
physiotherapy. With regard to RCTs, they identify three main factors which obstruct the 
translation of (general) research into (specific) practice: the simplified composition of study 
samples, which is preoccupied with generality; focus on specific settings, which conversely 
limits generalisability; and the use of outcome measures determined by research interests. Thus 
RCTs lack applicability through being simultaneously too specific and too general, and too far 
removed from clinical realities. Interpretative or qualitative dimensions would be necessary to 
salvage research for application in clinical contexts. Additionally, real interventions are unlikely 
to be conducted in isolation from each other, but rather in concert as part of a ‘package of care’. 
This is incompatible with an evidence-based method which depends on separating interventions 
to assess their effects.  
Despite all this, Grimmer et al (2004) claim to be supportive of EBP, stating that: 
‘there is no need to debate the appropriateness of the philosophy of providing care based on 
current best evidence.’ 
        Grimmer et al 2004:191 
Soon afterwards, Schreiber and Stern (2005) conducted a review of EBP literature which is 
more aggressively convinced, but in which ambivalent tension is clear. For them, EBP is 
identical with Science, to the strict exclusion of everything else. The buck for applying Science 
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stops with the clinician, who is the ‘interface’, but whose capabilities for understanding are 
lamented: 
‘the transition to EBP will not readily occur if clinicians do not know about the evidence, do 
not understand it, do not believe in it, or do not know how to apply the findings.’ 
       Schreiber and Stern 2005:5. 
EBP here is not something to be used for specified benefit, but a primal entity-in-itself which 
clinicians must uphold or else face unspecified harsh consequences. Reducing them to an 
‘interface’ carries a query as to whether, ultimately, they might be bypassed completely. The 
apparent persecution of clinicians, underwritten by a rigid distinction between Science and Non-
Science (and endorsement of the evidence hierarchy), comes with a manifesto for their re-
disciplining in accordance with the ‘reinforcement of desirable practices’ (2005:9). Proselytizing 
strategies are an explicit part of EBP as presented by Schreiber and Stern (2005), accompanied 
by open acknowledgement of the crucial importance of belief in ratifying EBP. They see the 
practical application of research evidence as a moral responsibility. 
In the writings of Bithell (2000), Hurley (2000) and Grimmer et al (2004), there is a palpable 
sense of something being not-said, just as in Herbert et al (2001) and Schreiber and Stern (2005) 
there are voices being not-heard. So a curious thing about Emma Stack’s (2006) Physiotherapy 
editorial, explicitly sceptical of EBP, was that it did not appear until a decade after Bury’s (1996) 
‘survival of the fittest’. Stack (2006) emphasises the importance of adaptable approaches in 
physiotherapy, noting the motivational and empathic role of the physiotherapist and caricaturing 
the evidence-based practitioner as ‘devoid of charm and spouting p values’ (2006:128). She 
notes difficulties with the concept of placebo in physiotherapy, which ‘leaves few patients 
unaware that they have had it’ (2006:128). This technical problem with RCTs she uses to 
illustrate the ‘seduction’ of physiotherapy by science, at the expense of practical craft knowledge. 
Although she concludes that physiotherapy is itself a placebo, (albeit an ‘ultimate’ one), this 
indicates a positive re-definition of the term, rather than accession to scientific ideals which she 
rejects. 
Jones (2006), by contrast, makes her argument against EBP on explicitly political (rather than 
practical) grounds. Having identified encroachment by nurses, occupational therapists, exercise 
physiologists and generic rehabilitationists as the major threat to physiotherapy, she discusses the 
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cost-effectiveness of distributing work in various ways. She dismisses the capacity of evidence to 
settle such disputes, emphasising instead the need to compete politically: 
‘…humility has been the bedrock of care underpinning the profession, but it is an 
inappropriate virtue for commercial competition’ 
         Jones 2006:2. 
She therefore argues for political training in undergraduate programmes, which would equip 
physiotherapists to ‘advertise our unique capabilities’ (2006:3), rather than committing to 
scientific ideals which would not necessarily be protective.  
This again implies an understanding of science as being essentially non-political. Jette (2005), on 
the other hand, sees science as a political weapon. This impassioned editorial piece is an open 
testament of the political nature of EBP in physiotherapy. It discusses the ‘75% rule’ in 
American healthcare26, which requires health services to ensure that 75% of their clients are 
afflicted with one of a medically-selected range of ‘serious medical conditions’ in order to 
secure funding. The only way to challenge this agenda is with empirical evidence, and so Alan 
Jette is clear that the ‘peril’ that the profession faces if it continues to practice with inadequate 
evidence is loss of financial support and expulsion from acute settings to ‘less costly’ ones 
(2005:303), with an accompanying loss of status. Practical considerations and benefits to 
patients are peripheral to this argument, if not explicitly excluded, in favour of the financial and 
prestigious gains envisaged. 
 
 
Conclusion. 
The historical starting-point for the question of medicine (and healthcare) becoming Evidence-
Based was closely related to science: theorists had made distinctions which separated medicine 
from science; medical people answered with ideas for how to make medicine properly-scientific. 
EBHC rapidly became a popular idea in reference to which the scientificity of healthcare could 
be thought about. The first thought of a sociologist approaching this development might 
                                                          
26
 The relevance of the 75% rule to the argument is not clearly explained. While used symbolically to 
illustrate the power of medical classifications over the context in which physiotherapy operates, it does 
not contribute directly to the argument that physiotherapy could challenge medical directives with 
research evidence. 
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reasonably be to think in scientific terms, and to bring already-established sociologies of science 
to bear on the phenomenon of EBHC. The major conclusion from this chapter is that such a 
commitment to sociology of science (nowadays called Science and Technology Studies, STS) is 
not necessarily helpful in the case of EBHC. Science as a social phenomenon does feature in 
EBHC; but the sociologist of EBHC cannot be confident that what they are principally studying 
is a matter of science. 
Indeed, indications from this chapter are for the most part that science is but a superficial theme 
in EBHC. Sure enough, science is drawn upon rhetorically in service of arguments constructed. 
Ideas of science are implicit in positions around EBHC, but rarely do clinical EB-writers 
examine these ideas and question their use of the term science. Even more rarely is their own 
approach to EB-writing recognisably scientific. In early medical EB-writing, a general unconcern 
for the meaning of science is clear enough to be obvious, but still worth stating. Those who have 
developed discussions of EBM away from the polemical mainstream have done so not by 
pursuing an understanding in terms of science, but in terms of social interaction and narrative 
(eg. Greenhalgh) or in terms of philosophy (eg. Upshur). Science must still have a role in EBHC; 
but the nature of this role is mysterious. It is a question to be addressed sociologically. 
Other conclusions to take from this chapter are firstly that clinical EB-writing provides rich and 
dense material for sociological study. At points I have given reasonably thick descriptions of this 
writing, and still there is much that I have not included. By hinting here and there at possibilities 
for sociological analysis, I have tried to convey the impression that such possibilities are many. In 
chapter 3 I examine which such possibilities have been taken up by sociologists, as a route then 
to elaborating my own strategies in chapter 4. Secondly can be taken the conclusion that while 
medicine, as EBM, is at the centre of EBHC, it is not all-encompassing. Sociologists (as I will 
show) have mainly confined their researches to the medical case. My case-study of EBP in 
physiotherapy finds similarities with the medical scenario, but also differences. 
Sometimes it feels as though there are anxieties in physiotherapeutic-EBP – relating to the status 
of a whole profession and recognition of its value – which are spoken out loud, while the 
equivalent anxieties in medicine are concealed. Themes of practical, political and financial 
aspects of EBHC, tensions between sectors within professions, and efforts of professions (as if 
they were sentient beings) to persuade themselves of particular values, can be laid bare in 
physiotherapy perhaps more easily than in medicine. The suppression of critique of EBP in 
physiotherapy, compared to the proliferation of critique of EBM in medicine, is too striking not 
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to mention even at this early stage. But it is not yet time to compare the two cases. My 
suggestion so far is that sociologists of EBHC should not confine their inquiries to the medical 
case, when there are comparisons to be had with proceedings in the context of other professions, 
closely related. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review Part Two. 
Sociological Perspectives of Evidence-Based Healthcare. 
 
 
Synopsis. 
In this chapter I continue my review of literature on EBHC by focusing on sociology, my own 
discipline. I move gradually towards an approach which is more critical and interpretive, less 
purely-descriptive than in chapter 2, because I am concerned to discover what dilemmas have 
been encountered, and which questions have and have not been asked, by sociologists of EBHC. 
I report upon sociologies of research methods and change-management; the dissociation and 
removal of the sociological writing-viewpoint from the clinical; overtly critical sociologies of 
EBHC; sociologies of EBHC-as-politics, and tensions with epistemology; perspectives on EBHC 
from sociology of professions; macro-sociological perspectives on EBHC; sociologies of RCTs as 
technologies of knowledge production and boundary-regulation; and finally, philosophy as a 
means to sociological explanation of EBHC. 
In the final sections and conclusion, I state my intent for locating the present thesis in relation to 
what has gone before. In trying to avoid re-treading the paths followed by others, I identify 
some problems to address. First is the relationship between the political and the philosophical in 
sociologies of EBHC, which has not previously been sensitively handled. The second is the 
relationship between different types of sociology which have been applied to EBHC, which I 
characterise as meso- and macro-sociological, and as sociologies in-EBHC and of-EBHC. I 
identify a need to develop analytic categories which facilitate the dissolution of these existing 
conceptual boundaries, and which make it unnecessary to rely upon the same patterns of 
thought which have so far been maintaining discussions, both clinical and sociological, of EBHC. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I continue the work of reviewing academic debate over evidence-based healthcare 
(EBHC) by following it into the discipline of sociology. Both form and content remain 
important in this narrative: both what has been written, and how it has been written. I show that 
the sociological development of EB-writing has substantially complicated and diversified the 
debate. In sociology, EB-writing has moved away from a simple dynamic of research-versus-
practice in the construction of individual attitudes to clinical decisions. It has moved towards 
other concerns, including the use of meta-analyses to construct clinical guidelines as evidence-
technologies, the proper interpretation of EBHC in relation to health professions, and the 
broader social context in which EBHC is situated. Regarding these concerns, sociologists have 
produced territorial claims and counter-claims which implicate the relations between disciplines 
and professions. They also implicate the relation of sociology, as a discipline, to the social 
institution of healthcare. 
In the context of these manoeuvres, I make a distinction between sociologies in-EBHC and 
sociologies of-EBHC. Sociologies in-EBHC are concerned to support or discredit EBHC, to 
drive it in one direction or another; sociologies of-EBHC are concerned with making sense of 
EBHC before deciding what to do about it, if anything. This takes after a distinction between 
sociology in-medicine and of-medicine, which despite being problematic, is still well-recognised 
(Williams 2003:134). This distinction means positing a difference between EBHC itself and the 
discourses used to describe and analyse it, which quickly becomes difficult to sustain. Analyses 
of evidence-basedness (such as this thesis) are themselves in the process of becoming part of 
evidence-basedness. However, for communicating how the topic of EBHC has moved beyond 
the confines of ‘research’ and ‘practice’ to become a debate in sociology more broadly imagined, 
it is a helpful notion to keep in mind. The sociological debate is arranged in relation to 
dichotomies other than research-versus-practice. 
As sociologists have departed from the original controversies of EBHC, it has become 
increasingly difficult to know what is precisely meant by referring to EBHC. Yet it is a 
terminology which, after 20 years, retains currency. The first EBHC-sociologies were attached 
to clinical debates (particularly over quantitative and qualitative research), and I begin with these. 
They connect to discussions about the management of change in healthcare, and dilemmas for 
sociologists locating themselves in relation to it. Sociology also became a forum for expressions 
of clinical dissent against EBHC, and for the intensification of anxieties about its rightness and 
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wrongness. In these discussions tension emerged between the politics and the philosophy of 
EBHC. Focusing first on politics, I split the proceedings into two sections: the micro- and meso-
politics of clinical interactions and professional sectors, and then the macro-politics of global 
neo-liberal marketisation. Finally I address the question of philosophy, but I do not assess its 
relationship to issues of politics until chapter 4. 
 
3.2 Taking EBHC Seriously (1): Concordance.  
Qualitative Methods and Change-Management. 
In chapter 2 I reported the views of writers who suggested that the basic ideas of EBHC were 
naïve, or insincere, or impractical – at any rate, not worth taking seriously. In sociology too, 
some were sceptical of the usefulness of ‘evidence’ as an idea which could focus debate. Roy 
Carr-Hill (1995) in an editorial for Social Science and Medicine1  was dismissive of attempts to 
remove judgement from any form of decision-making, and made a comparison with law. In law, 
he argued, evidence is the starting point for thought, but does not end thought. ‘Would it not 
be seen as rather silly’, Carr-Hill asks, ‘to promote evidence-based law?’ (1995:1468). As the 
clinical literature grew, it became clear that sociologists also – even if using evidentialism as a 
standard view from which their own position could be differentiated – were investing their 
serious attention into the ideas of EBHC. An aspect of EBHC which particularly caught their eye 
was the absence or mishandling of qualitative methods in evidence hierarchies. 
The mishandling of qualitative methods could potentially impact upon social researchers’ ability 
to influence the production of evidence for healthcare. Initially, sociological advocacies of 
qualitative methods refrained from criticism of EBHC which had given rise to the regimental 
hierarchisation of research methods. An example of this type of appeasement is Green and 
Britten2 (1998), published in the BMJ. In this article, a need is identified to assist the transfer of 
scientific knowledge into the humanistic realms of clinical practice, and to ‘widen the scope’ of 
evidence-baded medicine (EBM) (1998:1230), both of which could be achieved by employing 
qualitative approaches. Green and Britten provided a guide to basic principles of qualitative 
research which assumed not just an absence of prior knowledge, but an aversion to such 
methods. They explained that qualitative methods are systematic and rigorous, properties which 
                                                          
1
 Refined and repeated in Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, Carr-Hill 1998. 
2
 Judith Green and Nikky Britten were writing here as sociologists. 
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set them apart from anecdote. Similarly, Popay and Williams (1998:36) welcomed the advent of 
EBHC, to which qualitative research could make a ‘unique’ contribution, albeit one they 
anticipated being difficult to understand in narrow scientific terms. 
In such cases, qualitative researchers were positioned as outsiders to medicine, and doctors as 
sceptical and ignorant of social research as a valid type of enquiry. The emphasis on the bridging 
of a gap between evidence and practice involved the naturalisation of this gap, and blocked any 
critical consideration of how such a gap had come to be taken for granted. In this context, 
critical thoughts were prohibited. Green and Britten (1998:1232), for example, wrote that ‘the 
limitations of trials (…) should not lead to cynicism about research evidence’. Popay and 
Williams (1998:35) meanwhile expressed their sense of a darker threat through a metaphor; the 
‘gingerbread man’ possibility of social scientists being ‘gobbled up by the powerful wolf’ of Big 
Science. Continuing these themes, Pope et al (2002), in a subsidiary journal of the BMJ, gave 
descriptions of interview-based, observational, and narrative methods, imploring researchers to 
give credence to qualitative techniques.  
Pope et al (2002) emphasised the use of qualitative methods as adjuncts to quantitative-scientific 
ones, to be judged by quantitative standards and used in support of EBM. While qualitative 
health research is valuable in itself, they argued, it particularly offers an aid to the management 
of change in healthcare (2002:151). This management of change became a strong theme in 
sociological reactions to EBM; a theme compatible with established sociological critiques of 
medicine, and amenable to empirical investigation. Wood et al (1998), for example, used four 
acute-care initiatives as case studies to investigate processes of institutional change; Armstrong 
(2002) interviewed eighty GPs to discover behaviours of change at the level of the individual 
physician; and Summerskill and Pope (2002) conducted interviews and focus groups to examine 
difficulties with change through evidence-implementation, in relation to doctor-patient 
interactions. 
An interest in the management of change, although resonant with the agenda for evidence-
basedness, implies a complicated orientation to EBHC itself. Wood et al’s (1998) poststructural 
analysis of evidence implementation diverged confidently from conventions of evidence-
basedness, using theory-led language not common elsewhere in EB-writing. They urged a shift 
away from notions that evidence and practice are diametrically opposed, to ‘incorporate 
evidence and practice in a more immanent relationship and perhaps to recognise that this has 
always been so’ (1998:1737). This tension is evident also in Summerskill and Pope (2002), who 
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equivocated between the need to ensure the delivery of evidence-based secondary prevention 
and to preserve the doctor-patient relationship on its current model. In these cases, a qualitative 
approach comes with the expression of doubts about EBHC, but also with the endorsement of 
an agenda for ongoing change in clinical practice, with which EBHC is associated. 
 
Placing Sociology in the EBHC-debate. 
This ambiguity of loyalty is illustrated by Dobrow et al (2004). They sketched a vision of 
‘context-based evidence-based decision making’ which emphasises the utilisation of evidence. 
They distinguish between philosophical-normative and practical-operational conceptions of 
evidence. In the first case, evidence is conceived as knowledge that is contextually independent 
and judged by its inherent quality (reliability and validity), leading to rigid hierarchisations of 
evidence. In the second, evidence is conceived as being emergent, contingent, revisable, 
incomplete, and inseparable from context. They invoke a two-tiered model of context, a 
mathematical continuum for locating evidential approaches, and a three-stage processual schema 
for evidence application. But their argument has a simple outcome. It is that the clinical 
environment is scientifically determinable and therefore suitable to the ‘strictly-research’ 
approach of EBHC, whereas health policy and management decisions (in the disciplines from 
which Dobrow hails) are less well determined and require a less restrictive conception of 
evidence. 
Dobrow et al (2004) exemplifies a tendency among writers identified as sociologists to 
downplay the confrontational aspects of EBHC, which in medical contexts had been prominent. 
A special issue of health (2003:vol 7(3)) further illustrates this conflict-avoidance, and the 
removal of the writing-self from the controversy. It featured ‘local’ empirical studies of EBHC 
(Dopson et al 2003, Gabbay et al 2003), historical-social narratives of EBHC (Pope 2003, 
Mykhalovskiy 2003), and a theoretic-philosophical account (Cronje and Fullan 2003). These 
writers all managed to maintain support for evidence-basedness in healthcare while not applying 
it to themselves, and so not facing its implications from a first-person perspective in the way 
which writers from health professions do. Such writing is reliant on displacement of the author 
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from the actions being examined, which says, ‘others should apply these principles to 
themselves, but we should not apply them to ourselves’3. 
Pope (2003) helps particularly to demonstrate this problem. She analysed EBM using Herbert 
Blumer’s ‘social movements’ perspective and Freidson’s work on health professions, having 
conducted interviews with surgeons. She reported on the strategies used by surgeons to defend 
their practice from the threat of EBM, strategies in which a distinction between art and science 
was pivotal. On these arguments, she takes an ambivalent view. They are reported 
sympathetically with the insight that EBM had ‘sown the seeds of its own opposition’ 
(2003:279)4. EBM is criticised for lacking a response to the contingencies of clinical practice. 
However, emphasis remains on strategies of ensuring professional dominance, rather than taking 
the surgeons’ testimonies as empirically justifiable and sincerely-held. A point of difficulty for 
Pope (2003) is the apparent origin of EBM within medicine, which invites an analysis of intra-
professional dynamics. Pope (2003), like others from the special edition of health, encounters a 
dilemma of being an outsider to intra-clinical confrontations, but still having to take sides in the 
EBM debate. 
EBM led sociologists to write under a dynamic of ‘them-and-us’. Taking a view on changes 
inside medicine meant having to become implicitly aware of the position of one’s own discipline. 
Gabbay and le May (2004) offered an innovative approach to the disciplinary evidence-divide. 
This piece published in the BMJ (later the basis for a book, Gabbay and le May 2010) used 
anthropological techniques to investigate clinical knowledge management. The ‘over-rationalism’ 
of EBM is thought to underestimate the influence of local contexts on the implementation of 
research evidence. The finding that ‘clinicians rarely accessed, appraised and used explicit 
evidence directly from research or other sources’ (2004:1018) does not lead to the 
disparagement of clinicians (as it led Turner and Whitfield to their mass-critique of 
physiotherapists in 1997), but to the formulation of the concept of ‘mindlines’. 
These mindlines are networks of communication among clinicians, medical opinion leaders, 
patients and pharmaceutical representatives. They have roots in the immediate embodied 
experience of practice, and their functioning requires pervasive trust. Through the mechanism 
                                                          
3
 This designates a distinction between social analysis outside the clinic, and natural action inside the 
clinic. It supports the construction of the clinic as a natural and determinable space, rather than a 
cultural and contingent one. 
4
 This was the first inspiration for my interest in EB-discourse as dialogue. 
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of mindlines, clinical knowledge is socially constituted within the clinic. Rather than disrupting 
these mindlines, as EBM had originally been envisaged as doing, they should be exploited:  
‘…the potential of networking as part of professional development must be recognised and 
fostered, and appropriate information must be targeted … to the relevant individuals.’ 
       Gabbay and le May 2004:1020. 
This upholds the impulse to institute the evidence-driven change of healthcare, but in a way 
which preserves the integrity of the clinic and positions social researchers within the process of 
change, as knowledge-brokers. Sociologists imagined in this way are expert in the manipulation 
of micro-social relations, but not well-placed to ask critical questions of healthcare institutions. 
 
3.3 Taking EBHC Seriously (2): Critique. 
In juxtaposition with these qualified endorsements of EBHC, more sceptical and critical 
sociologies were written. Even those who, like Carr-Hill (1995), found in EBHC something 
ridiculous, also found that it demanded their attention. In such cases, the muted incredulity of 
reactions to the ‘obviousness’ (Denny 1999:247) of EBHC produced writing with a satirical 
character. Michael Traynor’s 5  (2000) study of ‘purity and conversion’ in evidence-based 
movements is an example of this. Playing on religious themes found in writing on EBM, Traynor 
made a comparison between the discourse of EBM and the discourses of judeo-christianity. 
Explanation is given of the process of ‘othering’ in creating a privileged and powerful discourse 
(after Barthes, Derrida and Kristeva), associated with the purging of unwanted elements, and 
with purification and redemption. Traynor explains that in the Old Testament, the distinction 
between the human and the godly is made in terms of Dietary Intake, while in the New 
Testament, uncleanness comes not externally, but from within the subject-person themselves.  
Traynor (2000) made comparison between these ideas and those presented in two EBM-related 
texts. In the first (Smith 1991 – a forerunner of EBM), there is a stark dualism of pure wisdom 
set against dangerous knowledge, and an individualised narrative of conversion. EBM itself is 
formulated as being pure and holy, and ‘traditional’ medicine equated with witchcraft. In the 
second text (Sackett et al 1996), such dualisms are substituted by reconciliation. The strategy 
                                                          
5
 Traynor’s educational background is in literature and sociology, and his clinical-professional 
background is in nursing. 
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adopted removes the space for doubt, Traynor argues, by systematically quashing all possible 
objections to EBM. These texts, he suggests, mirror Kristeva’s analysis of the transition from 
Old to New Testament. Clinicians are to be redeemed by the incorporation of pure knowledge 
into their internal selves. In sum, EBM is argued to delineate stable categories of knowledge, 
distinguished by their level of purity/holiness. This act is taken beyond the mere creation of 
order, to the annihilation of any possibility of challenge.  
Traynor claims (2000:152) not to judge the usefulness of EBM, and to be concerned only with 
the structures of arguments used to promote it, but this does not match his condemnatory 
conclusion (2000:153) that EBM ‘morally denigrates and intellectually disqualifies all other 
positions’. Finally, the political target of Traynor’s detraction becomes clear, as he portrays 
EBM as a mechanism for the protection of the medical profession against external threats (ibid). 
Denny (1999) had also apportioned responsibility for EBM to those within a self-enclosed, self-
determining profession of medicine: 
‘Although the discourse of EBM appears to question the individual authority of medical 
doctors, it actually reinforces such authority by regulating the conditions under which a 
physician may speak authoritatively (…).’ 
Denny 1999:247. 
Denny approached EBM as a discourse among doctors ‘concerned with the regulation of medical 
authority in order to define and clarify what it means to be a doctor in relation to those who are 
not’ (1999:248). EBM, he argues, enables doctors to collectively tighten their grip on power 
and knowledge in discourses of health.  
Like Traynor (2000), Denny (1999) distanced himself from value-judgement on EBM, 
emphasising his concern with its consequences for the hegemonic dominance of a professional 
elite (1999:253). However, his is a position in which the orientation adopted towards EBM is 
one of suspicion. He did not take EBM at face-value as a route to improved practice, but looked 
for an ulterior motive and a deeper truth about EBM. While Denny (1999) and Traynor (2000) 
made a departure from clinical-professional literature in terms of method and rhetorical 
sophistication (explicitly deploying a discourse-analytic approach to the texts of EBM), they 
showed similarities of spirit with medical writing which had brought the moral motivations for 
EBM into question. Traynor’s (2000) erudite piece particularly is an elaborate satire directed 
against the powerful institution of medicine. This critical perspective can be read more plainly in 
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his earlier piece in Nursing Inquiry (Traynor 1999:187), where he deployed arguments from 
feminist theory and SSK to attack EBHC as ‘textually-based social control’.  
The demeaning of EBHC through levity created tension within an argument that at the same 
time as being risible, EBHC is nonetheless dangerous and powerful. This tension is associated 
with the sociologisation of critical perspectives originating inside the clinic. Two later articles 
from sociologists working in health research, but closely connected to the clinic, illustrate this 
point. These are Grypdonck (2006) in Qualitative Health Research, and Lewis (2007) in The 
Journal of Health Services Research and Policy. Alongside ambivalent tension, these pieces display 
anger and resentment. Grypdonck’s piece sounds a warning against the insidious threat to 
qualitative research posed by EBHC. Lewis’s advances explanations for what he sees as the 
failure of EBHC to effect changes in healthcare practices. Grypdonck (2006) argues that 
evidence-basedness is destructive to qualitative research which is essential to good practice. 
Attempts to conform to the standardised criteria of quantitative research, she explains, endanger 
the integrity of language-based work. This blinds health policy-making to the views of patients, 
and excludes atypical and vulnerable patients by systematic averaging6.  
Lewis (2007) is more forthright in his derision for the supposed achievements of EBHC. The 
task for him is not to appraise its success – as it has ‘achieved little traction among people who 
are neither stupid nor hostile to science and rigour’ (2007:166) – but by offering a ‘theory of 
indifference’ to research-based evidence, to assert that such indifference is the norm. Rather 
than defend health practices however, Lewis (2007) occupies a dystopian and conflicted position. 
‘Our fondest hope’, he explains, ‘should be to turn medicine into a tautology, with computer-
generated diagnoses, designer therapies tailored to our individual biological signatures’ 
(2007:171). On one hand, he opts for a stricter model of EBHC; evidence needs to become less 
probabilistic and more patient-specific and clinically-driven. On the other, he warns that ‘in 
those few domains where such success is even imaginable, healthcare will cease to be interesting 
to practitioners because their intelligence, wisdom and skill will have nothing to contribute’ 
(2007:171).  
Such speculation leads Lewis to a position of resignation, something which also seemed to affect 
Traynor as time passed. Again pursuing political and sociological understanding as a route to a 
less conflictual perspective, Traynor (2002), on ‘the oil crisis, risk and evidence-based practice’, is 
                                                          
6
 This argument can be found elsewhere, before and since. Other examples are Morse (2006a) and 
Nelson (2008). 
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cautious and restrained. His creative passion of 2000 is replaced by a concern to naturalise EBP 
in a global economic context. In a later article about historical tensions between utilitarianism 
and transcendentalism in nursing which are reflected in debates over EBP (Traynor 2007), he 
became pessimistic: 
‘an exploration of (…) the enduring appeal of such oppositions is beyond the scope of this 
paper and there is unlikely to be a simple way of side-stepping any of them to reach a 
consensus about EBP or any other issue.’ 
       Traynor 2007:304 emphasis added. 
Similar to the paths of Greenhalgh and Upshur through EBM, Traynor’s trajectory is associated 
with changes in the expression of affective orientation to the controversy. But whereas they 
became more vociferously opposed to EBHC, his path was away from dissent and towards 
apathy. 
 
EBHC as Turf-War and as Politics. 
Helen Roberts (2006:122) has ventured that sociology is historically ‘littered with turf wars’, 
few of which have ‘been turfier or more warlike than reactions of sociologists to the claims of 
evidence-based medicine’. This idea of turf-war well captures the mood of writing in which 
sociologists were concerned to find room for themselves in relation to a way of organising 
practice and thought, EBHC, which was either already powerful, or expected to become so. If 
sociologies of EBHC were warlike though, it was not easy to tell where the battle lines were to 
be drawn. The clinician was opposed to the researcher, clearly enough. Sociologists were 
themselves researchers, but not usually the type of epidemiological researcher lauded in 
advocacies of EBHC. Some sociologists had connections or loyalties to clinical practices, or were 
themselves also identifiable as clinicians. Those with an interest in management and policy 
perhaps hoped or expected that EBHC would be a way to further such agendas, but still could 
not be certain, and so welcomed it with reservations, as seen above. 
Roberts’ depiction of EBHC debates as a turf-war expresses the view that EBHC brings people 
(professionals, academics, policy-makers) to engage in conflict. This could be expressed more 
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formally 7  as the view that the essence of EBHC is politics. Among the first sociological 
commentaries on EBM was Stephen Harrison’s (1998) technical account of its politics in the UK 
context of the NHS. Applying a supply-and-demand market-model of healthcare, Harrison 
discusses different types of risk associated with healthcare transactions in money-economies. 
Such transactions must be paid for, but the displacement of costs to third-parties (the state, 
insurers) creates an issue of ‘rationing’. Formerly, Harrison explains (1998:18), rationing had 
been conducted tacitly, but subtle structural shifts in health institutions now brought it into the 
explicit domain. There is a political incentive for the explication of rationing to be performed by 
doctors rather than policy-makers, and EBM emerges as a convenient vehicle for recruiting 
doctors into this process.  
Consequently, Harrison says, there is generated a network of bureaucratic institutions dedicated 
to designating ‘effective’ and ‘ineffective’ healthcare interventions. This process benefits 
healthcare purchasers fiscally, and simultaneously secures the prestige of the medical profession. 
Having thus rationalised EBM, Harrison (1998) sketches three lines of critique. The first 
concerns the assumption that clinical guidelines would guarantee their own implementation, 
which he says is ‘extraordinarily naive’ (1998:22). The second concerns the vulnerability of the 
‘effectiveness’ model to dissent based on other criteria for rationing (1998:24). The third 
concerns the uncertain epistemological underpinnings of EB, in which realist-determinism is 
supposedly replaced by empiricist-probabilism in a manner incompatible with the realities of 
clinical practice. These three conceptual problems are potentially fatal for EBM, as ignoring 
them ‘amounts to the assumption of consensus where there is none’ (1998:26).  
Having begun from a position of ‘concrete’ political specificity, Harrison’s closing sections are 
theoretical and abstract8. The piece plays out a tension between actual politics – the contingent 
relations between social institutions – and philosophical considerations which undermine the 
functional aspiration towards political goals. This tension creates an awkward problem, because 
while EBM makes sense politically, it does not make sense conceptually and philosophically. The 
philosophical view moves Harrison’s account away from neutrality about EBM, into a position 
of critique, comparable to critiques from within clinical disciplines. For sociological writers, 
making sense of EBM might mean trying not to take sides; but maintaining detached neutrality 
                                                          
7
 Perhaps with reference to Foucault’s (2003:16) imagining of politics as ‘the continuation of war by 
other means’ 
8
 See also Harrison and Ahmad (2000) for further development of these themes in relation to medical 
autonomy. 
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proves difficult. In this respect Harrison (1998) juxtaposes nicely with Judith Green’s (2000) 
article on ‘epistemology, evidence and experience’ in Sociology of Health and Illness. 
Green starts not with politics, but with the conceptual construction of Evidence as a route to 
strategic decision-making. Like others mentioned above, she presents her work as exploratory 
rather than critical. The delicacy of this operation is illustrated by her reporting of a reviewer’s 
comment that her findings were ‘unduly pessimistic’ for EBHC (2000:458), to which she 
responds: 
‘This comment added to the data on how scientific evidence is constructed as rational and 
unanswerable, but also influenced the tone of the final report to make clear that this 
analysis is not offered as a critique of EBHC, but rather as exploration of how it is 
implemented in practice.’ 
         Green 2000:458-9. 
Green reports upon the variability of objectives originating from different healthcare policy 
contexts. She discovers the intractability of evidence specificity: to be useful to any party, 
evidence must be specific to particular outcomes; but this specificity makes evidence irrelevant 
to other parties for whom different outcomes are targeted. Practices necessarily generate their 
own evidential cultures which exist separately from research literature, and have the potential to 
render it incidental. Professional expertise can clash directly with injunctions to use data, which 
‘form not a neutral resource of information, but a contested site around which professional 
identity can be demonstrated’ (2000:465). Evidence is a conductor for the polarisation of 
disputes between disciplines which are mutually different by definition.  
In this conflictual arena, both the validation and deprecation of evidential forms is associated 
with rhetorical dexterity, in which common-sense and personal experience are highly valued 
strategic resources. Evidence enriches and intensifies political conflicts rather than facilitating 
resolutions. The accusation of pessimism which Green reports is understandable in relation to 
her findings, and she uses it skilfully by feeding it back into her text to help make explicit her 
concern to preserve neutrality. However, concluding that: 
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‘the challenge9 for EBHC is perhaps to broaden the nature of the evidence base so that it 
reflects a wider set of outcomes than those associated with effectiveness and efficiency’ 
         Green 2000:474 
… she repeats critiques of EBHC which were already established. As I have shown, EBHC 
depends, at least initially, on the idea of restricting, not broadening, definitions of evidence.  
The tightrope of rhetorical-correctness which Green walks makes a sharp accompaniment to the 
keenly-felt and openly-expressed sensitivities over evidence which are her subject matter. 
Although she makes clear the political nature of evidence by her analysis, sticking tenaciously to 
the evidence-ness of evidence helps her distract from a critical-political viewpoint. The dynamic 
of tension in this article accompanies the difficult (impossible?) task of being critical while trying 
not to degrade the object of critique. Different from Harrison (1998), Green’s (2000) relative 
success in sidestepping the politics of EBP-advocacy or detraction is facilitated by presenting her 
findings in the neutralising terms of epistemology; but her argument is that Evidence is not 
constituted in pure knowledge or epistemology, but in politics. 
 
3.4  Defining the Politics of EBHC  
Managerialism and Professional Autonomy. 
Independently of Harrison and Green in the UK, Marc Rodwin (2001) in America advanced the 
opinion that politics was the principle most important to the understanding of EBM. Rodwin 
emphasised the potentially critical nature of this argument. As he says (2001:439), ‘politics is 
portrayed as what EBM will avoid’. Presenting EBM as the financially-driven rationalisation of 
medical care which shifts power away from physicians, he explains that evidence is ‘an 
instrument of politics rather than a substitute for it’ (2001:442)10. In this account, EBM arises 
from the managerialisation and consumerisation of healthcare. With managerial challenges to 
medical dominance being established in sociological discussions prior to the development of 
EBM (see eg. Hunter 1994), it is easy to associate EBM broadly with agendas for the control of 
health practices by people other than doctors. Trinder and Reynolds (2000:8), for example, 
                                                          
9
 The notions of ‘challenge’ and ‘barriers’ recur across both clinical and sociological EB-literature: see 
eg. Tanenbaum (1999), Bhandari et al (2003), McKenna et al (2004), Grol and Wensing (2004). 
Challenge is usually, but not always, used more critically of EBHC than barriers. 
10
 A similar point was made from within clinical medicine by Saarni and Gylling (2004). 
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locate the roots of EBHC in risk management and audit culture, and present it as a ‘natural’ 
product of these contemporary social trends.  
In this context, sociologists focused on a theme of clinical autonomy for investigating the 
changing influences on clinicians’ (especially doctors’) practices. Nicky Britten (2001) 
investigated the challenges from government, patients and other professions to doctors’ 
autonomy in prescribing pharmaceutical drugs. EBM is associated with guidelines and protocols 
which, she explains, potentially regulate the actions of individual doctors. Britten argues that 
doctors are able to claim an alliance with patients in order to protect themselves from 
managerial interference, but also, when necessary, to villify the ‘demanding patient’ (2001:488) 
as a threat to the integrity of their practice. EBM fits into a complex dynamic in which the 
autonomy of doctors is protected, rather than threatened. David Armstrong (2002) had 
presented EBM as a reflection of the intra-professional formalisation of control rather than 
something which impacts upon medicine from the outside. He argued that EBM institutes 
collective autonomy for doctors. They can then re-individualise their autonomy by recourse to 
the rhetoric of patient-centred care. 
The issue of professional autonomy in relation to EBM has been followed intensively by Stefan 
Timmermans. In ‘From Autonomy to Accountability’ (Timmermans 2005), he considered 
whether practice guidelines constitute a threat to the power of clinicians to determine their own 
actions. His view is that because the production of guidelines is dependent on professional 
consensus, and because clinicians themselves determine the manner in which guidelines are to 
be applied, they do not. In fact, guidelines reinforce collective autonomy by producing the 
appearance of orchestrated changes to practice. Timmermans does see guidelines as possible 
harbingers of a future shift to accountability and a general erosion of trust in medical healthcare 
(2005:497). Situating this struggle in the context of a history of failed attempts at 
standardisation though, he is pessimistic for the prospects of guidelines breaking the professional 
monopoly on health practice. 
Timmermans and Mauck (2005) focused more closely on a problem of doctors’ non-adherence 
to guidelines. Characterising EBM as a struggle for the ‘soul’ of medicine (2005:20), they 
explain that the presumption in EBM of an autonomous clinical decision-maker, whose personal 
reasoning can be influenced by Evidence, is misconceived. In fact, clinical decisions are made 
collaboratively by clinicians in community with other stakeholders. Guidelines can achieve 
change only if they become a collective ‘scientific rallying point’ (2005:26). This jars against the 
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the concerns of Timmermans and Angell (2001). Interviewing paediatric doctors, they drew up 
an account of their respondents’ practical use of evidence in terms of uncertainty-management. 
They suggest an individualistic typology where clinicians use evidence in ways which are active, 
variable and personal. Speaking of a ‘legacy’ of EBM (2001:356), they report the development 
of skills of judgement, which affects both the following of protocols and the disregard of 
research evidence. 
Timmermans and Mauck (2005) contrasts also with Timmermans and Kolker (2004) on the 
‘Reconfiguration of Medical Knowledge’, which presents guidelines as having indeed been 
rallied behind (2004:182). Guidelines are thought to reflect a shift in the epistemology of 
medicine, from pathophysiology to epidemiology (2004:183). Against the taking-for-granted of 
the self-determining power of medicine, Timmermans and Kolker (2004) scorn Freidson’s 
theory of professional power. They ironically proffer the idea of ‘evidence-based sociology’ for 
making sure theories are empirically verified. This contrasts again with Timmermans (2008), 
which finds value in Freidson’s theory of ‘market shelter’ for explaining how EBM made 
medicine responsive to a changing social world, turning a ‘potential threat to autonomy into a 
tool to strengthen the field’s scientific foundation’ (2008:183).  
Reading across these pieces uncovers discontinuities, as Timmermans (with various others) 
explores different perspectives on EBM and medical professionalism. Across sociological writing 
on EBM and autonomy however, there is broad consensus that EBM does not threaten the 
individual or collective status of medical professionals. McLaughlin (2001:361) succinctly 
summarises the view that EBM provides a rhetorical resource available to doctors and health 
policy-makers both, for ‘constructing their identity and narratives for the future’. While EBM 
(and EBHC) does this for doctors and their associates, it evidently serves a parallel purpose for 
sociologists, being a prism for the focusing of ideas about professional power. Standardisation, 
autonomy and practice variation were themes which facilitated a connection between 
management and policy agendas and social theorising.  
Another example of this connection is from Moreira (2005), who identified the reduction of 
variability in clinical practice as the key policy objective of EBM. Moreira conducted 
ethnographic observation of clinical guideline production. Making a distinction between political 
and non-political factors affecting the behaviour of guideline writers, he uses the idea of 
‘repertoires of evaluation’ to describe the contributions of different members to the productions 
of the group. The major conflict reported by Moreira (2005:1981) was not between doctors and 
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non-doctors, but between GPs and consultants, who ‘compete to have their visions accepted by 
researchers, often by attempting to enrol the patient’s accounts of illness experience.’ Moreira 
(2005) indicates a complex interplay between pragmatic-political concerns and epidemiological-
scientific ones, in which a diversity of knowledge forms generates a ‘technical document’ 
(2005:1984). The social processes at work in such collaboration transcend the political interests 
of any particular group.  
Other sociologists re-focused attention on the internal workings of professions, particularly 
medicine. Traynor (2009), following Jamous and Peloille’s (1970) work on indeterminacy and 
technicality in professions, asked whether EBM can be explained as a systematic move towards 
technicality driven by lower-status sub-groups, including epidemiologists, within medicine. His 
finding that this is the case, supports him in de-emphasising the policy and managerial agendas, 
and shifting attention back towards a medically-driven model for understanding EBM. This 
contrast shows how the processes of EBM appeared differently to sociological thinkers; in 
Moreira’s case in the sphere of guideline production, in Traynor’s case in the sphere of clinical 
interactions. This reflects Clancy and Cronin’s (2005) emphasis on a distinction between 
Evidence conceived as a global entity, and the practical application of such knowledge, which is 
fundamentally local. Different types of conflict were apparent to sociologists in each context. 
The writings from Green (2000), Timmermans (various), Moreira (2005) and others reflect a 
sociological interest in EBHC as it affects and is affected by the politics of health professions. 
Such sociologies remain connected to clinical activities, and as such might be thought of as 
sociologies-in-EBHC rather than of-EBHC. Nevertheless they are concerned with thought 
categories which are detached from the original dichotomy of research-versus-practice from 
which EBHC was sprung. Autonomy as opposed to accountability, and politics as opposed to 
science and philosophy, are distinctions which come into particular focus in such writing. 
Within these parameters there is considerable scope for debate; but there are also other 
sociologists who adopted a broader contextual perspective for understanding EBHC. Being 
further removed from the clinic as the site of practice, these can be thought of more as 
sociologies-of-EBHC. They involve attempts to understand EBHC less in terms of activities 
within and between health professions, and more in terms of national and global social 
conditions. I turn attention now to these broad-context sociologies. 
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Market Economics and Global Politics. 
Whether EBM is considered as primarily intra-medical or primarily managerial (extra-medical) 
in origin, there remains an issue of the broader conditions under which it gained purchase. In 
this respect, matters of localised guideline production and application, and of national healthcare 
policy-making, are surpassed by matters pertaining to international corporations, particularly 
pharmaceutical ones, which supply medical industries for profit. Timmermans and Oh 
(2010:S100) discuss the relationship of mutual dependency between pharmaceutical companies 
and medical professionals, in which doctors ‘gatekeep’ the supply of drugs to patients. The local 
effects of this relationship are detectable in micro-sociological accounts of EBM, for example 
Gabbay and le May (2004:1017) noted distrust of pharmaceutical representatives among doctors. 
Here it might be surmised that doctors are institutionally reliant upon the act of prescription, 
and beholden to the drug products which they are in a position to prescribe. 
Sociologists have developed various accounts of the pharmaceutical industry itself11. Concerning 
the link between EBM and pharmaceuticals, De Vries and Lemmens (2006:2694) approach it by 
investigating the potential of industry influence as a ‘threat to objective evidence’. Unreservedly 
supportive of EBM, they are nevertheless concerned that clinical trials can unexpectedly work 
‘to the advantage of industry interests’ and ‘transform EBM from a challenger to a protector of 
corporate agendas’ (2006:2704). A less credulous view on EBM can be found where writers 
from within medicine have produced a lay-sociology of their own. Doctors have characterised 
their relationship with corporations as an ‘uneasy alliance’ (Bodenheimer 2000) between 
‘uneasy bedfellows’ (Smith 2003). An insight into this unease in the context of EBM comes from 
Choudhry et al (2002) who surveyed the authors of clinical guidelines to assess their interactions 
with the pharmaceutical industry. 
Following this direct route, likely if anything to underestimate pharmaceutical influences, 
Choudhry et al (2002) nonetheless found that almost all guideline authors were involved with 
pharmaceutical companies. Other medical writers too have expressed concern over the 
relationship between pharmaceutical companies and doctors as mediated through clinical-trial 
Evidence and EBM (see Steinman et al 2001, Melander et al 2003). Howard Kushner (2007), 
examining ‘the Other War on Drugs’, explored this theme through sociological and other 
literature. He sees EBM as providing the means for the pharmaceutical industry to tighten its 
                                                          
11
 Some such accounts relate to power and scientific fact-making (Busfield 2006), transparency of links 
between companies and consumer groups (Jones 2008), and more general sociological perspectives 
(Williams et al 2008). 
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grip on a system of healthcare which was already well under its control. As medicine becomes 
thoroughly commercialised, the influence of drug companies, who dictate the terms of Evidence, 
becomes harder to counteract; but Kushner is optimistic that Regulation can protect medicine 
from pharmaceutical EBM.  
The relation between pharmaceuticals and EBM has captured popular interest. UK science-
journalist Ben Goldacre (2008, chapter 10) has written of pharmaceutical companies  ‘pulling 
the wool over [doctors’] eyes’ (2008:188). Goldacre lists ways of tinkering with clinical trials 
(which are usually funded by drug companies) so as to produce desired results. His insights into 
the devious tactics used by pharmaceutical companies do not lead him to a critique of EBM, of 
which he is an ardent supporter12. Goldacre (2008:184) also identifies pharmaceuticals as the 
third biggest profit-making sector of the UK economy. In a capitalist market-economy, it is in 
the interest of the State to see that such industry succeeds. This is the case elsewhere too, and 
might offset Howard Kushner’s hope that state governments would bring moral arbitration to 
relations between pharmaceuticals and medical practices, for the purpose of protecting 
standards of care. 
While some point a general-accusatory finger at pharmaceutical companies for manipulating 
EBM, it is possible to widen this sphere of influence to Corporate Interests or a ‘best buy’ 
imperative associated with the marketisation of healthcare in capitalist economies. Links 
between the ascendancy of a healthcare marketplace and an increasing generalised social demand 
for objectivity, such as made by Greenhalgh (1999), implicate the consequences of living in a 
profit-based neo-liberal economy. Writing from a nursing perspective, Mantzoukas (2007) 
argues that funding agents are able to define the parameters of evidential acceptability to suit 
their own ends. The sensitivity of such issues is illustrated by some harsh equivocation in clinical 
literature. For instance, Straus and McAlister (2000) first identified EBM as a direct 
consequence of restricted expenditure (2000:838), only to assert soon after that it is cost-
indifferent (2000:839).  
                                                          
12
 Ben Goldacre is an established cheerleader for EBM and for RCTs in other policy contexts. For 
example,  he appeared on BBC Radio 4’s ‘Material World’ on 28/6/12, during which he used the 
following ‘is-not’ strategy (a trope familiar from chapter 2, and further discussed in chapter 4): 
BG: 'for planning on applying ideas to the real world . . they've decided to do randomised trials, out in 
the real world’ (…) 'think how much good could be done, in the UK and the world, if we did more 
RCTs of policy interventions' 
Presenter: 'can you give a simple example of a randomised controlled trial?' 
BG: 'well, in some ways it's easier to think of what happens if you don't do a randomised trial . . .' 
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Saha et al (2001) showed that cost-analysis can easily enough be incorporated into EBM; and 
later Bogdan-Lovis (2010) explained how EBM can be deployed as a sales technique to point 
consumer-patients in the direction of the cheapest option. Both of these present financial 
benefits as fortunate by-products of EBM, as opposed to having been active factors in its genesis. 
May (2007) presented a theoretical sociological view of these issues. The systemic changes of 
late modernity, he argues, lead to a new kind of healthcare which leaves the Parsonian paradigm 
of doctor-patient interaction behind. The clinical encounter is now defined by ‘corporate 
professional practice’. Just previously, May et al (2006) had made a case linked more explicitly 
to EBM. Technological solutions, related to modernisation and bureaucracy, bring non-human 
elements directly into ‘the symbolic drama of the consultation’ (2006:1028). They give rise to 
technogovernance as a new form of governmentality, where technology is active in conditioning 
clinical behaviour patterns.  
May’s two pieces together demonstrate the potential for macro-social features of late modernity 
not just to contextualise EBM, but to contribute explanatory analyses of it. This dynamic can be 
applied at the practical level of evidence production and application, insofar as Evidence derived 
from any population is for export to other populations in different places. This has consequences 
unacknowledged in most EBM-related writing, observed briefly by anthropologist Helen 
Lambert (2009): 
‘The growing need for population-based evidence for clinical interventions has led to a 
rapidly rising worldwide demand for human subjects for clinical trials.’ 
         Lambert 2009:18. 
Appreciating that Evidence has to come from somewhere might provide a material anchor for 
the arguments from May et al (2006) and May (2007), in which corporate practices and 
technogovernance can be presented as rootless, free-floating and self-guaranteeing. Lambert’s 
point also suggests ethical problems, where malleable populations are required as the raw 
material for evidence production. The imperative for evidence-basedness presupposes a well-
established research industry, and a ready supply of research subjects for RCTs. This indicates a 
need for a global and post-colonial anthropology of EBHC. 
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EBHC, Neoliberal Governance and the Meaning of the RCT. 
As a global phenomenon, EBHC is within reach of existing anthropological ideas. Neoliberalism, 
although it is a broad-brush term ‘often invoked without clear referent’ (Wacquant 2010:212), 
could be a pivotal concept for investigation of EBHC in relation to economic deregulation and 
the transformation of healthcare into a free transnational marketplace. International 
organisations (such as the WHO, alongside pharmaceutical corporations) and the technocratic 
discourses they deploy might be targeted for deconstructive analysis13. The key problematic of 
such a project is the reconciliation of local activities – health practices and individual 
perspectives upon them – with phenomena which appear place-transcendent and global. Collier 
and Ong (2005) have proposed the term ‘global assemblage’ to describe the articulation of 
global cultural forms in specific situations and places. Erikson’s (2012) analysis of health 
statistics as the girders of ‘Global Health Business’ does just this in the context of EBHC 
(although without using EBHC as a term of reference). 
Erikson (2012) uncovers the work done by statistics to ‘enable health endeavours to become 
business enterprises’ and to re-route human behaviours in accordance with profit-making norms 
which are ‘not innocent’ (2012:367). This power of statistics and numbers to govern micro-
level social behaviours is something which seems largely to have escaped the notice of 
sociologists of EBHC14. Their attention has been drawn instead towards the role of the RCT as 
the central data and knowledge-producing technology of EBHC, and a method which can be 
skilfully manipulated to produce Evidence of a particular type. The fear tacitly expressed is that 
once RCTs have been produced according to corporate need, their passage into guidelines and 
practice is assured. Carl May’s (2006) auto-ethnography of government health policy meetings 
brings this into question.  
May reports on proceedings between 1998 and 2004 in which policy-makers became 
progressively more sceptical of the merits of RCTs as an influence on their decisions. The 
justification for this scepticism, while expressed from the perspective of funding management 
rather than clinical practice, is not different from that repeated ad nauseam by clinical writers. It 
is that RCTs are estranged from the realities of healthcare practice. This estrangement is not an 
accident: the modus operandi of the RCT is precisely to erase the local contingencies of practice 
which obstruct the path to Truth. May (2006:520) notes an aesthetic of elegance among trial-
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 Annelise Riles (2004) has begun a project of unwinding technocracy in the context of financial 
organisations, which could be similarly applied to the technical processes of EBM. 
14
 I make a move towards addressing it in chapter 6. 
64 
 
designers which typifies their abstraction from concerns of utility. These researchers are 
sketched as an isolated elite who operate with conventions of knowledge production 
unrecognised by the policy-makers for whose benefit their works are supposedly produced.  
This raises a question as to the discursive and rhetorical role fulfilled by RCTs, which were a 
bulwark of EBM as originally advocated. Timmermans and Berg (2003:chapter 6) discuss RCTs 
in relation to risk, focusing on the notorious case of thalidomide, which was found to cause birth 
defects after its release onto the market. RCTs ought to prevent harmful drugs reaching practice, 
but this aspect of their usefulness is rarely discussed in literature on EBHC15. A context in which 
sociologists have considered RCTs in detail is in relation to health professions other than 
medicine, and particularly complementary and alternative medicines (CAMs). Three studies 
make this move in the directions of chiropractice (Villanueva-Russell 2005), acupuncture 
(Jackson and Scambler 2007) and RCTs as boundary-regulation devices generally (Derkatch 
2008).  
The main point of discussion for Jackson and Scambler (2007) is whether the view of EBP as a 
‘levelling of the playing field’, which enables CAMs to prove their effectiveness, is plausible. 
Resistance from acupuncturists to EBP was based on scepticism of research values, which were 
seen as narrowly reductionist rather than holistic and person-centred, and as being ‘disembodied’ 
(2007:427). The article is sympathetic to alternative therapies, and observes that a consequence 
of EBP for such therapies is that even in resistance, they are forced to define the basis of their 
knowledge, which had hitherto been an open issue. Villanueva-Russell (2005:559) had 
assertively made just this point, urging chiropractice to ‘define for itself what [its] parameters are, 
and how to legitimate and validate these knowledge claims’ (original emphasis). She sees the 
vitalism of chiropractice as irreconcilable with the positivism, empiricism and politicised-
economism of EBM. In both of these pieces, EBM sharpens perceptions of contrasts between 
professions understood as being, or urged to become, coherent autonomous units16.  
EBM thus consolidates a situation where CAMs are connected to medicine by being 
differentiated from it. Derkatch (2008) further instatiates this situation. She uses the idea of 
scientific rhetoric to frame her analysis of RCTs. She reports appraisals of CAMs conducted by 
RCT-styled reasoning as being regularising, idealising, unifying, implicated in authenticating 
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 Timmermans and Berg’s (2003) piece is the only example I can find to directly discuss this point. 
16
 This is significant in the case of acupuncture, which had already been partly incorporated into the 
practices of allopathic professions (particularly physiotherapy – see Alltree 1993, Hopwood 1993), and 
therefore might have had the potential to blur inter-professional boundaries. 
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performances of scientificity – in short, all the things which CAMs are defined by not being. 
Derkatch (2008:379) acknowledges that medicine has produced critique of the RCT method, 
but explains how it also makes use of safety and efficacy as ‘god-terms’ (powerful and flexible 
last words) which re-define the boundaries of ideological exclusion as and when required. She 
argues that the rhetoric of RCTs is used to ‘black-box’ the issue of efficacy so as to preserve the 
status of CAM-practitioners as strangers to biomedicine.  
The combination of RCTs and other research into meta-analyses and systematic reviews has also 
received sociological attention, notably from Moreira (2007). He identifies techniques of 
disentanglement and qualification of data in producing systematic reviews. Qualification is 
particularly a process of ‘changing the political meaning of data’ (Moreira 2007:183). This 
process of evidence production is linked inalienably to the political organisation of healthcare, 
and so the focus is again on interactions between science as pure-knowledge, and politics. 
Moreira explains that there is conflict between the rhetoric of trial-authors and the aims of the 
systematic reviewers. Reviewers neutralise the power of the author through the application of 
selection criteria. Texts are inoculated by reading them in terms defined by the study protocol. 
Each paper included is effectively re-written and data re-calculated. Meta-analytic results are 
then re-entangled with political-clinical factors.  
The relationship between regulatory conventions for practice established within the clinic, and 
those imposed from outside, was discussed by Cambrosio et al (2006) under the title of 
‘regulatory objectivity’. Clinical objectivity is now dependent, they say, on ‘entities and 
protocols produced and maintained far outside the intimate encounter between doctor and 
patient’ (2006:189). These endogenous forms of regulation, like the ‘global assemblages’ of 
Collier and Ong (2005), connect local practices with global trends. The political balance and 
tension addressed explicitly in this article is between the inside and outside of the clinic. But 
once again, there is an additional, unheralded tension in the term objectivity between a political 
understanding (where objectivity is collective and conventional) and a more purely-
philosophical kind of objectivity (which is absolute). This gives me an opportunity now to 
discuss sociologists who have written about EBHC in terms of pure philosophy. 
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3.5  EBHC and Philosophy. 
In chapter 2 I reported philosophical discussions of EBM, especially those of Ross Upshur. The 
EBMWG’s (1992) introduction of EBM as being a Kuhnian paradigm shift shows that the 
controversy over EBM had philosophical themes from the beginning. Like other debates in EBM, 
precursors of such philosophical discussions can be found in polemical pieces from writers linked 
with clinical medicine17. The nature and purpose of this philosophication is not something 
sociologists have generally been eager to analyse, preferring to focus on the political nature of 
the problem. Sociologists with philosophical inclinations however, have tended to join in with 
the philosophising of EBHC rather than reflecting upon it critically. In this type of writing the 
nominal identity of the writer as sociologist or clinician can melt into the background. In the 
context of EBHC it seems that anyone can become a pure-philosopher (without necessarily 
reflecting on their reasons for doing so). 
As an example, Maya Goldenberg wrote pieces on EBM for BMC Medical Ethics (Goldenberg 
2005) and Social Science and Medicine (2006). The first of these is a defence of ethics against the 
encroachment of evidence-basedness. Goldenberg locates a flaw in evidence-basedness which is 
due to its objectivist commitments and masculine bias. Drawing upon feminist theory, she 
argues that such commitments are incompatible with the normative mandate which sustains 
efforts at ethical policy-making. The launchpad for Goldenberg (2006) is the ‘lessons learned’ 
from post-positivist philosophies of science. EBM shows that those who have not learned these 
lessons require assistance to help them catch up. In contrast to practical objections to EBHC 
from clinical sources, Goldenberg’s (2006) argument is to show that EBHC is without a sound 
scientific-theoretical foundation. She challenges it using the category of experience to 
differentiate between a masculine, objectivist science and a feminist, embodied and 
contextually-situated science.  
Empiricists regard universal experience as foundational, whereas Goldenberg’s preferred 
(feminist and phenomenological) approach values plurality of perspectives and so reclaims 
experience for subjectivism. Evidence-basedness is to be preserved using ‘experiential givenness’ 
to develop a new scientific method (2006:2629). At later points, Goldenberg seems to revert to 
the bottom-line thinking which she has criticised: 
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 Examples of this, which for reasons of space I have omitted, are Shahar 1998, Couto 1998, Ghali and 
Sargious 2002. Sehon and Stanley (2003) gave a more earnest philosophical account. 
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‘health interventions that recognise the social and political context (…) have consistently 
proven to be more effective in improving health outcomes’ 
      Goldenberg 2006:2628, emphasis added. 
This recourse to insistence that clinical effectiveness can be proven restores an underlying 
impulse to evidence-basedness. Goldenberg (2006:2624) laments the ‘misplaced effort (in EBM) 
to separate science from values’, and comes to an ambivalent position where science is 
something to be rejected wholesale, but still desired. She also discusses the nature of illness 
experience, and, separating the ‘existential’ aspects of illness from the technical, advocates the 
re-integration of the patient into clinical reason, and inversion of the evidence hierarchy 
(2006:2629). She concludes with a discussion of politics in distinction to science, evidence and 
philosophy: ‘political issues are not resolved [by EBM] but merely disguised in technocratic 
consideration and language’ (2006:2630). Ultimately then, this philosophical account of EBM 
remains grounded in familiar problems, and in a struggle to mitigate political effects. 
The association of EBM with positivism is something sociologists (eg. White et al 2002, 
Villanueva-Russell 2005, Goldenberg 2006) have asserted rather than elaborated upon. 
Positivism is, in current times, a pejorative term (see Willig 2001:3) and practitioners’ levelling 
of accusations of positivism against EBHC is usually a prelude to criticism18. For a critical 
discussion of this connection one must look to medical writers Djulbegovic, Guyatt and 
Ashcroft (2009 in Cancer Control) who restored positivism to respectability for their defence of 
EBM. They identify affinities between positivism and EBM: predictive power as a test of theory, 
restriction of theory to observable reality, and disregard for causal explanatory mechanisms 
(2009:161). On the other hand, they explain, strict logical-positivism is too narrow a doctrine 
to encompass all the epistemological needs of EBM19.  
While various other philosophical connections (notably to falsificationism) can be made, 
Djulbegovic et al (2009:166) conclude after all that EBM is ‘not about developing a new 
scientific or philosophical theory’ but is a model of practice, and one which they say ‘has become 
coherent’. Although unsuccessful, their philosophical explorations seem to provide the backing 
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 see Upton 1999, Welsh and Lyons 2001, Walker 2003 in nursing; Webb 2001, Humphries 2003 in 
social work; Oliver and Connole 2003 in education. 
19
They use the inobservability of results from meta-analyses to make this point. It is tempting to 
comment that there are more obvious ways available for doing this. As Keat and Urry (1975:9-12) 
explain, positivism is supposed to provide a model for scientific explanations which are universally 
applicable. EBM involves particular entities (such as drugs, patient-types) which are non-universal. 
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for this conclusion which is to assure the legitimacy of EBM20. Sociological writers, too, have 
implied the legitimacy of EBHC by their efforts to make sense of it philosophically. An example 
from Cronje and Fullan (2003) helps illustrate this effect. Cronje and Fullan (2003) see EBM as 
an orchestrated purposive effort to forge a new model of rationality for medical practice. 
Working around the idea of rationality, they draw on the philosophies of Harold Brown (for 
classical rationality) and Jurgen Habermas (for dynamic negotiation and the ‘ideal speech 
situation’) to outline the conditions for a ‘cooperative search for the truth’ (2003:363).  
Highlighting continuities between these philosophies, the arguments for EBM associated with 
David Sackett, and attempts to bring ‘the patient’ back into clinical decisions, they present EBM 
as a process of dealing with philosophical problems in pragmatic terms. Concluding (2003:365) 
that ‘ultimately, the test of any definition of rationality’ is ‘its compatibility with the pragmatic 
needs of its community’, they construct a functional account of EBM which is consensual rather 
than conflictual. Emphasis on the philosophical in EBM allows Cronje and Fullan (2003) to 
validate the controversy and dissociate it from the politics of disciplinary power, by imagining 
stakeholders in medical practices as working constructively and collaboratively towards the 
ongoing achievement of rationalisation in clinical proceedings.  
Kelly and Moore (2012) also later conducted a philosophical discussion of EBHC around the 
issue of rationality, but in relation to the production of clinical guidelines. Their theoretical 
authority is derived from the enlightenment philosophies of Emauel Kant and David Hume (for 
rationalism and empiricism), so that, while being sociological, sections of their paper are close 
to being purely philosophical. The authors explain that pursuing this philosophical resolution, 
while it might seem far-removed from the actualities of health policy decision-making, helps to 
‘illuminate the real tensions’ (2012:16, emphasis added) experienced by policy-makers 
grappling with the difficulties of evidence application. The juxtaposition of EBP with a ‘very old 
intellectual divide, well-known to Enlightenment philosophers’ (2012:16)  is referred to as 
getting it ‘off the hook’ of accusations of philosophical naivety (2012:9).  
This reprieve is achieved by a careful balancing-up of Kantian and Humean analytic and synthetic 
a priori judgements with a posteriori empirical knowledge. Such an approach elevates discussion 
of EBHC to new heights of theoretical sophistication and historicisation. Kelly and Moore (2012) 
use the orthodox ideas of evidence hierarchy and bias to uphold a philosophical distinction 
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 Recall that, in a similar way, Upshur’s extensive philosophications of EBM elevated the discussion to 
a more sophisticated plane, even though Upshur ultimately grew disillusioned with them. 
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between practices which are and are not evidence-based. They contrast ‘the processes of 
inductive reasoning associated with clinical activity’ with ‘the deductive reasoning associated with 
the mechanics and techniques of EBM’ (2012:14, emphasis added). Their Kantian/Humean 
synthesis shows that the contemporary dilemmas faced by health policy-makers match up with 
the concerns of classical philosophy – that they are ‘quintessentially and inevitably difficult’ 
(2012:15).  
Critical engagement with this argument requires a considerable capacity for analytic philosophy. 
There are issues as to whether Kelly and Moore’s (2012) distinction between real things and 
observations of things is robust; as to how far their theme of elimination of bias can withstand 
scrutiny; as to how assertions like ‘meta-analyses produce a truer result than a single observation’ 
(2012:12) are to be understood; as to whether their elision between sense-data and empirical 
data is faithful to the philosophical concerns of Hume and Kant; as to whether deduction can be 
cleanly excluded from clinic-based reason, and induction from evidence-based reason; and other 
difficulties. The key point however is the implicit outcome of philosophical proceedings for 
Kelly and Moore (2012), which is that the debate over EBM can be made philosophically 
legitimate, and indeed resolved using philosophy. The unexamined alternative possibility is that 
it cannot.  
I have pure-philosophical contributions of my own to make on the topic of EBHC, which are set 
out in the Appendix. I keep these separate from the main body of the thesis, in which it is their 
sociological significance (rather than philosophical technicality) which is made clear. Before 
doing this I note that in sociological EB-writing, philosophy has been a means of channelling 
debate away from agendas which are more obviously political. This has the effect of legitimising 
the debate over EBHC as a whole, and to an extent, EBHC itself by association. Writing 
philosophically has also enabled the presentation of generalised forms of thought which don’t 
appear to be discipline-specific. But while addressing philosophical generalities, pieces such and 
Cronje and Fullan (2003) and Kelly and Moore (2012) preserve without question the 
disciplinary conflicts of research-versus-clinic and evidence-versus-practice upon which the 
debate is originally built. 
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3.6 Appraisal of Sociological Perspectives.  
Positioning the Present Thesis in Relation to Previous Sociologies of EBHC. 
The question of where sociology stands in relation to EBHC is part of a question as to where 
sociology stands in relation to medicine and healthcare generally. Reflecting on Roberts’ view of 
the debate over EBM as a turf-war, it is noticeable that in comparison with other sections of the 
literature, sociological writing has been peaceable. Sub-disciplinary allegiances have been muted, 
often dressed in the neutral rhetoric of social science and sometimes camouflaged by 
philosophication. Mykhalovskiy and Weir (2004) provide a contrast to such restraint: they give a 
triumphant account of EBHC, and chastise social scientists for their slow and misguided 
responses. (The accusation of ‘lagging behind’ (2004:1060) is familiar from other domains of 
EBHC literature). They review the sociology of EBHC in terms of political economy, humanist, 
and post-modern approaches (all of which have themes which are political in nature, rather than 
philosophical). 
Gathering recommendations for sociologies of EBHC, they prefer Foucauldian genealogy and 
specific discursive analyses of EBHC as knowledge practice. These are to address the details of 
EBHC as manifested clinically, the place of patients in EBHC, and its textual mechanics. The 
clinic is to be studied as the milieu in which different sources of evidence collide; the patient 
seen as a site for evidence production; and the textually-mediated character of EBHC given fine-
detailed analysis in terms of production, dissemination and consumption of evidence. In these 
pronouncements upon what is and is not correct practice for sociologists of EBHC, the object of 
derogation is not an easily-identifiable ‘other side’ who would criticise EBHC where 
Mykhalovskiy and Weir (2004) support it, but those whose analysis is based on methodological 
principles with which Mykhalovskiy and Weir find fault.  
As the sociological debate has grown in complexity, it has become less clear that it is appropriate 
to assign writers to one side or another – but remained clear that writers see themselves as being 
on a ‘side’ in relation to EBHC (whatever it may now be taken to mean). The present thesis has 
elements which Mykhalovskiy and Weir (2004) approve; a Foucauldian-genealogical focus on 
textual mechanics, and a committed interest in the configuration of the patient. It also has 
elements which they disapprove: critical scepticism of ideas relating to science and mathematics; 
and a suspicion of power which is not assuaged by assurances of power-productivity and 
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optimistic patient-centredness 21 . It has something further which they do not consider; a 
proclaimed interest in philosophy as a counterpoise to the political arguments which are 
exchanged over EBHC. 
In the course of the above philosophical discussions a paradox emerges. On one hand, 
philosophy stands over and above disciplinary distinctions. It is accessible to everyone – 
researchers, clinicians, sociologists, policy-makers. In this sense it transcends boundaries and 
seemingly sublimates discussion of EBHC into a domain of pure reason. On the other hand, 
philosophical ventures are attached to disciplinary perspectives, and so can make disciplinary 
loyalties clearer. This can be illustrated by a brief detour into Bayesianism, where statisticians 
have advanced a statistical philosophy not just as a basis for conducting EBM, but also towards its 
theoretical justification. Issues of probabilistic decision-making are directly addressed by 
Bayesianism (Dennis 1996, Kaplan 1996). Bayesianism can readily be applied to the analysis of 
clinical trials (Berry 1993) and in the context of clinical reasoning (Gill et al 2005), and has been 
presented as a general philosophical basis for EBM (Ashby and Smith 2000). 
Ashby and Smith’s (2000) argument for Bayesianiam as a basis for EBM has been cited by others 
in the field of medical statistics, but has not been taken up within clinical and policy discussions 
of EBHC. This indicates that not just understandings of what EBHC is, but also understandings 
of how it is theoretically justified, are streamed by discipline. For sociologists just as for others, 
engaging with EBHC has meant engaging with its philosophical as well as its political aspects; but 
not, so far, in a critical and reflexively-aware way. Towards a sociology in which care is taken to 
understand EBHC before becoming involved with EBHC, I pursue a greater awareness as to the 
purposes served by this engagement. There is something suspect about trying to construct an 
after-the-fact philosophy of EBHC which is not sociologically grounded. After all, EBHC has 
become culturally established without agreed-upon philosophical justification; and it is set to 
continue, irrespective of old philosophical justifications which are discredited or new ones which 
are added.  
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 Mykhalovskiy and Weir (2004) invoke Foucault’s productive model of power to support their 
positive view of EBHC, and assert a possibility for harmonising the EBHC and ‘patient-centred’ 
discourses. 
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The View from Politics. 
In light of the literature reviewed in this chapter, it can be stated confidently that the ‘political’ 
view of EBHC has been valuable for sociology as a disipline. A recognition of politics of EBM 
within-medicine and about-medicine is descriptively useful; and expanding this political 
sensitivity to other domains, such as complementary and alternative medicines (CAMs), allows 
for EBHC to be mapped in different social levels and contexts. Political factors are used both to 
make sense of responses to EBHC, and also as causal explanations for the genesis of EBHC. 
Politics seems to ‘lift the lid’ off evidence-basedness across its implications and situations, by 
making it navigable in terms of insides and outsides which correspond to different social 
institutions, and by securing it in broad social context. Such accounts indicate that EBHC is a 
thoroughly political phenomenon. What can be the problem with this? 
First, there is a reflexivity problem in which, by being projected outwards, a concern with 
politics influences researchers to imagine themselves as non-political. Consider for example 
Barry (2006) who contrasts biomedical with anthropological approaches to evidence for 
alternative medicine. Barry (2006:2648-9) criticises the rhetoric of EBM principally for its 
‘deeply political’ nature, which systematically de-values alternative therapies. To counteract the 
myopic tendencies of EBM, Barry advocates anthropological techniques which accord value to 
homeopathy users’ accounts of effective therapy. Acknowledging the strengths of her argument, 
it carries the implication that the validation of alternative therapies is somehow more pure and 
less political a project than the validation of capitalist-industrial medicine. In fact both projects 
are politically embedded. This indicates a problem which cannot be resolved merely by 
enjoining analysts to recognise their own political interests, if there is something inherent to 
‘politics’ which blinds their reflexive vision. 
Not only does a preoccupation with politics blind researchers’ reflexive vision; it also leads them 
to attribute political motives to others which others might legitimately protest. In the act of 
writing, writers might be aware of their own political motives; but this does not preclude them 
from producing arguments which they believe to be not just politically correct, but purely 
correct. If writers do not present their own ideas as matters just of politics, and do not see them 
as matters just of politics as they write, then some other parameter is needed to understand why 
participants in discourse do the things they do. There is an associated question as to how 
participants process their political awareness into writing, especially if the political consequences 
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of EBHC are complicated and hard to predict. Rather than being conscious and explicable, there 
might be an element of this processing which is non-conscious, sub-conscious or instinctive.  
Failure to appreciate these subtleties of EB-writing can lead not only to misattributions of 
motive, but also to conspiracy-type theories. Then reified entities, such as The Medical 
Profession or The Pharmaceutical Industry, are imagined as knowingly orchestrating EBHC for 
their own nefarious purposes. Without denying that such entities do exist and work generally to 
protect their own interests, a risk can be detected of sociologies presenting the entirety of social 
phenomena around EBHC as having been choreographed amongst figures too powerful to be 
named. Such accounts, being basically psychological in the attribution of explicit motives, miss 
the point of sociology. An accusation of psychologism can perhaps also be used to trouble the 
persistence of ‘autonomy’ in sociological accounts of EBM in relation to medicine. The idea of 
autonomy continues a theme from medical and health-professional EB-discourse where 
professionals are explicitly protective of their autonomy which they perceive to be threatened by 
EBHC.  
Within sociology, techniques for bringing the concept of social autonomy into question are well-
established. Nikolas Rose, building from Foucault’s work on subjectivity, is a spokesperson for 
such concerns. In Governing the Soul (Rose 1990:244), he discusses ‘technologies of autonomy’ 
which reflect an imperative to freedom through which modern selves are made governable. In 
this understanding, personal autonomy is essentially a mythical and unachievable ideal. Rose’s 
arguments might not be directly transposable into the analysis of EB-discourse, but they are a 
sign at least that autonomy ought not to be used uncritically as a concept for sociological analysis. 
It is perhaps because those concerned with a politics of professional power are themselves bound 
to a particular political pespective, preoccupied with doctors as individual custodians of power, 
that they are reluctant to question the sense in which clinicians can be thought ‘autonomous’.  
Here a preoccupation with political concerns leads sociologists away from a broader critical 
perspective. The category of politics channels support for thinking about EBHC in the same way 
as established in clinical writing, rather than making space for deep critique. Sociologists, 
understandably where their work is dependent upon a reification of The Clinic, have preserved 
and naturalised the binary opposition of evidence against practice. This opposition, like the idea 
of autonomy, might not at first seem an easy one for sociologists working within the field of 
health to deconstruct, but to do so is not impossible. Fox (2003) and Hammersley (2003c), for 
example, have successfully brought it under scrutiny. This is made easier by those who identify 
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the patient as the site for all evidence production; for if research and practice have the same 
embodied source, one must see their separation and opposition as something contrived rather 
than something natural. 
Some sociologists have noticed that the original idea in EBHC, the purification of practice by 
evidence, can be interpreted as a de-politicisation (albeit a de-politicisation which is insincere or 
unsuccessful). They have not appreciated though that the idea of politics, because it is carried 
inside the dichotomy of evidence and practice, might be rendered unsuitable for critical use. It 
can only perpetuate the debate between evidence and practice by reaffirming its conceptual 
grounds. Its value lies in description, for which purpose it is essential; without political 
distinctions within and between professions, the mass of EB-writing could not make sense. One 
might even say regarding EBHC, that everything is political. But if everything is political, the 
idea of politics has no outside for EBHC; and then its capacity for making explanatory 
distinctions is severely limited. Some of this limitation can be alleviated by recourse to 
philosophy; but not all of it, as I explain in chapter 4. 
 
Conclusion 
Just as EBHC poses a question to clinicians, it poses a question to sociologists as to what they 
should do about it. Are they with it, are they against it, or what else are they? In this chapter I 
have reported a selection of sociological answers to the EBHC question. Some used the 
controversies of research methods and practical expertise to locate themselves inside EBHC. In 
doing this, they found room for themselves inside the clinic, or on the outside looking in, and so 
contributed to the construction of clinical boundaries. While such writers made clinical 
sociologies, others tried to stand on the outside and interpret. One route to making sociologies 
from the outside of the clinic was to use politics as a guiding principle; and very often where 
politics was used, philosophy was not far behind. Political sociologies-in-EBHC were usually 
focused on EBHC as it affected health professions; but also there have been sociologies-of-EBHC 
which look first to broad global social conditions for an explanatory context. 
A comment I would like to make upon these proceedings is that like the clinical writings 
reported in chapter 2, they are highly repetitious. At many points the arguments made in 
sociologies of EBHC are the same as those encountered previously from clinicians. Sometimes 
they are expressed in an idiom sociological rather than clinical; but not always so. It does not 
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appear that sociologists are aware how repetitious this discourse has become. Engaged for the 
most part in finding new ways to express over and again the same set of anxieties, sociologists’ 
fields of vision have been restricted within sub-disciplinary enclaves. Averting their eyes from 
the ‘big picture’, sociologists of EBHC have lacked awareness of their functional role in 
perpetuating and proliferating discourses around EBHC. This is perhaps most clearly evident in 
relation to philosophical sociologies of EBHC. Here sociologists, heedless of clinical endeavours 
to philosophise the controversy, have produced their own philosophical accounts without 
reflexive consideration of the sociological implications of doing so. 
At the same time, sociologists of EBHC can be categorised quite easily into those concerned 
with meso-level phenomena (relating to professions and sub-professions) and with macro-level 
phenomena (such as global trends to neo-liberalism and capitalist-industrial healthcare). These 
two types of accounts both have merits, but they can only be considered as giving partial 
sociologies of EBHC. It is not clear how they connect to each other, and neither of them can 
elucidate the micro-level proceedings of EBHC. New guiding principles are needed for thinking 
about EBHC in ways which can transcend the parameters which are so well established. In 
seeking new parameters, there is still a place for philosophy in sociologies of EBHC; but 
philosophy is to be pursued under sociological supervision, not to replace the sociological-
political perspective but to enhance it. In doing this I strive to avoid taking sides in other 
people’s arguments over EBHC, arguments which circulate endlessly and, so far, lead not to any 
sociological resolution. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology and Conceptual Framework. 
 
 
Synopsis. 
In this chapter I justify my selection of analytic categories for understanding Evidence-Basedness 
discourse. This is done in three stages. In the first stage I explain what is meant by thinking of 
evidence-basedness as a discourse, and my reasons for doing so. I develop an understanding of 
discourse analysis in general and specifically in relation to debates around EBHC. I identify the 
choice of analytic categories as the most important step in, and distinguishing characteristic of 
discourse analysis. I then proceed to investigate possibilities for analytic categories in EB-
discourse. In the second stage, I discuss the relationship between the categories of politics and 
philosophy which have been used in sociologies of EBHC. I show that these categories work 
together in dialogue to guide and restrict the possibilities of thought around EBHC.  
I also use philosophical insights (which I present in the appendix) to support the derivation of 
dialogue as the most important structuring principle of EB-discourse. In the third stage I develop 
this understanding, leading to two further analytic categories, embodiment and emotion. These 
follow from the observation that EB-discourse is of rationality, but has aspects which are 
recognisably irrational. The categories of embodiment and emotion are validated as being 
marginal to the dialogue of rationality, but are anchored empirically in the discourse itself. Each 
poses methodological problems to which I propose solutions, and explain the techniques used 
for the investigation of each analytic category. 
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4.1 Introduction.  
Evidence-basedness Discourse: the Problems of Coherence and Unity. 
In previous chapters I presented evidence-based healthcare historically as a series of literary 
events in chronological and conceptual order. In the context of these discussions, the acronyms 
EBM (evidence-based medicine), EBP (evidence-based practice, and the general EBHC, 
evidence-based healthcare) refer to ways-of-doing which are argued for and against. For 
example, clinical writers describe how they envisage EBM being enacted in practice, or they 
develop theoretical critiques of EBP as practical method. Here in chapter 4 I develop a different 
perspective on the push-and-pull dynamic of such discussions. This acknowledges that both 
apparent ‘sides’ contribute to the ongoing debate, a debate which is sociologically important as a 
whole and not just for the isolated contributions of particular groups within it. I make use of the 
idea of discourse to clarify this. I use the phrase ‘EB-discourse’ to refer inclusively to the set of 
discussions and patterns of thought which are centred around EBHC.  
EB-discourse includes both advocacies and critiques of EBHC, ambivalent pieces in which 
advocacy and detraction come together, and equivocal pieces which might not fit into either 
category. As I indicated in chapter 2, EB-discourse has been well-sustained for twenty years and 
remains influential in the upkeep of healthcare as a social institution. In making this claim, the 
distinction between EBHC and EB-discourse becomes important. The claim that EBHC has led 
to institutional changes in medicine might be true, but is controversial and requires historical 
elaboration in terms established in EB-discourse. The claim that EB-discourse is implicated in 
the upkeep of healthcare, meanwhile, is weaker, and more-or-less self-evident.  
All sorts of people – doctors, other clinicians, policy-makers, researchers – have joined in with 
EB-discourse on the understanding that it affects their work. From a sociological point of view, 
people’s sustained interest in EBHC is sufficient to guarantee the influence of EB-discourse on 
social life; it is agreed to be important and influential, therefore (by definition) it is important 
and influential. EB-discourse serves a functional social role which protects the status of health 
institutions. Across the discourse, a range of possible perspectives on EBHC is articulated within 
a range of plausibility (the Foucauldian range of the thinkable). The process of this articulation is 
the operation of power within this social context, for it is the means by which seemingly 
disparate elements are amalgamated into a collective and functional social act.  
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One way to approach this functionality might be through an idea of consensus, asking how 
consensus is established. Harrison’s (1998:26) scepticism of EBM comes partly from his 
identifying a ‘presumption of consensus where there is none’. Similarly Turner’s (2010) review 
of EBM literature sought to establish coherence, or a hidden consensus to be clarified by reading 
across the debate. In the present thesis I observe, instead, that consensus has not been necessary 
for the maintenance of EB-discourse. Perhaps, on the contrary, it is the continued lack of 
consensus which makes EB-discourse powerful. Consensual resolution in EB-discourse would be 
of sociological interest (if it could be established empirically); but the present concern is with 
the mechanisms by which EB-discourse began, and by which it is sustained in different fields of 
social life.  
There is a field of research for the analysis of discourse – discourse analysis – which informs the 
present study, along with other traditions of research method. Some explanation is needed when 
thinking of the EB-debate as a discourse. While ‘discourse’ is an old term, its modern 
sociological use is strongly associated with the legacy of Foucault, particularly after The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1969) and The Order of Discourse (1970). In The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
Foucault considers problems of discursive unity and discursive formation. Returning to the 
paradigmatic case of medical discourse, he discusses the difficulty of formulating the discursive 
rules by which particular statements are made; especially when the objects of discourse are 
always in the process of changing. (The objects of medical discourse, for instance, are different 
in the late twentieth from in the early nineteenth century). 
In the case of EB-discourse, this problem of discursive unity is less troublesome. Where 
Foucault was talking about following the history of discourses across centuries, I have followed 
EB-discourse over just two decades. It may still be argued, though, that by 2012, EBHC meant 
something different from what it meant in 1992. In this respect Foucault’s (1969:35) comments 
on discursive formation are helpful. If discursive unity cannot be found in the coherence of 
concepts, perhaps it can be found in their ‘simultaneous and successive emergence, in the 
distance that separates them and even in their incompatibility’. The analyst is to look for order 
not in chains of inference, but in systems of dispersion of ideas (1969:37). EB-discourse shows 
encouraging signs for such a project: the recurrence of linguistic tropes in various contexts; the 
multiple repetition of similar ideas in slightly different forms; the apparent incompatibility of 
two opposing sides whose underlying similarities are concealed.  
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This is helpful for thinking about discourses as groups of statements which form a kind of unity 
without the need for consensus or overarching coherence. There are other reasons to be 
confident of evidence-basedness as ‘discourse’. It exists primarily in the form of written 
language; in academic literature, in fact, a highly codified and formally regulated literary style. 
These writings offer an unbroken fossil-record of its past, convenient for research purposes. It is 
easily isolated in this literature from related discourses. When written about, it is usually the 
main topic for discussion, with contributions from other discourses being juxtaposed but 
separable. In this respect it occurs as a distinctive discursive form. It is also self-limiting and self-
referring; EB-writings are connected by reference to other EB-writings, forming a set of texts 
which is highly self-enclosed. This particulate nature fosters discursive peculiarities and 
unwritten rules which appear relatively specific to EB-discourse, and relatively slow to change1. 
I have said that it is with regard to the collective maintenance of healthcare institutions that EB-
discourse is an expression of power2. To make this observation is to step outside the boundaries 
of EB-discourse, in which the anxieties presented concern only the statuses of entities within the 
terms of EBHC. For example, some are anxious that EBHC would open the way to marketised 
healthcare, would silence the patient’s voice, would erase the skills of clinicians. Others are 
concerned that resistance to EBHC would impede modern progress, would put patients at risk, 
would preserve professional monopolies. Many are caught in ambivalence between 
countervailing sub-powers. Nobody worries that both sides, and everything in between them, 
are dangerous.  
In The Order of Discourse Foucault (1970:52) writes of ‘anxiety about this transitory existence 
which is destined to be effaced, (…) anxiety at feeling beneath this activity powers and dangers 
that are hard to imagine.’ He is conscious of danger ‘in the fact that people speak, and that their 
discourse proliferates to infinity.’ To perceive this all-encompassing danger is to recognise that 
it is discourse as a whole, not just sectors within discourse, which is powerful. How is the 
powerful discourse of evidence-basedness to be approached for analysis? Foucault (1969:38-39) 
recommends, ‘instead of going over with bold strokes lines that have already been sketched’, an 
advancement into unfamiliar territory and unforeseeable conclusions.  
                                                          
1
 EB-discourse is also self-constituting. Each piece of EB-writing is a contribution to its own subject 
matter, an example of the thing being written about. Each piece adds to and consolidates the store of 
things which can be thought and written in EB-discourse.The constituent nature of discourse is a topic 
commonly discussed amongst discourse analysts (see eg. Phillips and Jorgensen 2002:20). 
2 This is a slightly different use of the term power than is made by eg. Vos et al (2002) when discussing 
inter-professional power relations. 
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4.2 Doing Research on EB-discourse. 
The Need for Reflexivity. 
Part of EB-discourse, especially that part involved with evidence hierarchies, is a contest for the 
general credibility of different empirical research methods. In this respect a warning must be 
sounded, about taking by implication a position within the discourse. This problem can be 
illustrated with examples of things written about EBHC. Some physiotherapeutic writers, for 
instance, investigated EBP using the (strictly-quantitative) techniques advocated within EBP. In 
so doing, they aligned themselves rhetorically with a movement towards EBP. Conversely, 
certain clinical-sociological writers (notably Denny 1999, Traynor 2000) identified with 
discourse analysis as a way of putting distance between themselves and the values of EBM. It has 
also been usual to find sociological advocacies of EBM which are themselves based on literary 
and qualitative methods, not EBM-style methods. This implies a separation between the 
sociologists writing and clinicians who are supposed to be adopting EBHC, a separation which 
generally passes unexamined. 
This issue is one of methodological reflexivity – being aware of the position one is taking within 
a methodological debate by adopting methodological sensibilities. On the one hand, it is an 
urgent problem of practicing what is preached. It is difficult to maintain a position of neutrality 
when one’s methodological preferences are displayed by example. In a fashion, this problem has 
been attended to in EB-literature, insofar as there are the beginnings of awareness of a difficulty 
in providing evidence for (or against) EBM (discussed in appendix). For the most part though, 
EB-writers have not concerned themselves with this issue. The first advocacies and detractions 
of EBM, even those arguing against Opinion, were opinion-pieces. This tradition continues, 
even if the rhetorical styles of EB-discourse have become more variable. Others’ reluctance to 
pursue such reflexive awareness incentivises me to do so, as a way of insuring my work against 
conceptual vulnerabilities. 
On the other hand, this problem of reflexivity can be tranquilised. I do not offer an account just 
of EBHC, in which context methodological commitments are painfully sensitive issues; I offer an 
account of EB-discourse, in which an ironically small amount of work has gone on 
methodological justifications. Even in writing a ‘methodology’ chapter, I am going beyond what 
has gone before in the tradition of writing on EB-discourse, so far as it is recognisable as such. 
There are also practical reasons why EB-writers have adopted a freewheeling attitude to 
methodological reflexivity; a strictly evidence-based account of EBHC would be difficult to 
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make coherent, having to constantly make reference to itself. Against the prospect of such 
hyper-reflexive tail-chasing, the best position to adopt is one of contingency and tolerance.  
The research act starts with an outline of methodological predispositions; these are subject to 
refinement and qualification in ways responsive to what is found in EB-discourse (rather than 
being rigidly pre-determined, as are the methods of EBHC). There remains a need to be clear 
on how arguments about EB-discourse are constructed, while replacing a static conception of 
research-method and research-topic with something more fluid. This study is conducted on EB-
discourse, but is also part of EB-discourse, and so there is continuity and feedback between the 
research act and the research content. In EBHC there is perceived a need to label methods, to 
put them in order and discipline them. In researching EB-discourse there is a need to avoid such 
preoccupations, and to bring into question the linearity of research-time. This stepping away 
from EBHC is important for creating space in which things about EB-discourse can be observed3.  
 
My Personal Path Through EBHC. 
A starting point for the present thesis can be found in the personal terms of what I have done. 
EBP caught my attention in 2005 when I was training as a physiotherapist. The first EB-
literature I read was written by physiotherapists. My impressions of EBP were conditioned by 
my prior education in sociology of science. I had conversations about EBHC with doctors and 
health professionals, and university tutors. Sometimes I encountered well-developed opinions, 
but indifference and reticence were more usual. I became familiar with what seemed a never-
ending supply of academic literature on EBHC. I formed the impression that this literature was 
disproportionate to the barely-detectable presence of EB-related discussions in hospitals and 
health-training universities. More slowly, I formed the impression that within the expanse of 
EB-literature, every perspective on EBHC had already been expressed; and yet people were 
continuing to write about it, sure that what they were writing was always something new and 
important. 
It seemed to me as I began to research it that the significance of this social phenomenon, a 
discourse of evidence-basedness, lay in the mass of what was being written about it, not in some 
                                                          
3
 Tendencies to methodological labelling and loyalty become suspicious in a way which calls to mind 
Foucault. ‘Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same’, he wrote (1969:17). Placing 
value on difference of perspective, creating space for an ever-changing dialogical relation, calls to mind 
Bakhtin’s commitment to a principle of dialogue (Bakhtin 1981). 
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other tangible reality which EB-writing was failing to capture. I decided to make the literature 
the raw material for my research, and to adopt a naturalistic approach. EB-writers, I supposed, 
were writing not so as to be read electronically by computer programs which would chop up all 
the EB-writings and splice them back together by counting them in different ways; but read by 
others interested in the narratives of EBHC. In such a naturalistic approach, the basic activities 
of research are reading, writing and literature-seeking. The naturalistic approach does not 
import technologies to mediate the processes of reading and writing, nor does it elicit the 
production of custom-made data4. 
This naturalistic approach to spontaneous discourse involves a type of immersion which is 
ethnographic. To be sure, some who write about EBHC also practice EBHC (or don’t) in their 
clinical roles. Others imagine (or don’t) what it would be like to practice EBHC when they 
write about it, or draw upon the testimonies of practitioners. What makes these people 
participants in EB-discourse is purely the act of writing about EBHC. By participating, I have 
become one of those who experience EB-discourse as a literary form of social life. The 
experience of EB-discourse ‘from the inside’ has been crucial for the development of analytical 
categories for this thesis; but the act of stepping beyond the boundaries of the discourse, to see it 
as a unity, is also crucial5. I have used myself as a means of collecting and expressing knowledge 
within and about EB-discourse, and it is in this sense that I claim for the thesis the status of a 
literary-ethnography.  
The next problem to address is one of sampling from a large population of pieces written on 
EBHC, a population which I estimate in the order of 10,000 referenceable articles and books6. A 
statistical approach to such a population would be to sample pieces at random, but this is not a 
good idea for researching an academic discourse in which some pieces are more important than 
others. Some articles have been referenced thousands of times, others not at all. Some are 
written by recognised authorities and published in widely-read journals, others are not. Focus 
on pieces closer to the ‘centre’ of the discourse makes for the sense of a self-selecting sample; 
especially when many of these influential pieces are connected to each other by referencing. On 
                                                          
4
 Starks and Trinidad (2007:1373) refer to a natural environment in which discourse is produced, but 
perhaps spontaneous is a better word to recognise that textual utterances in EB-discourse are not 
provoked by the researcher in the sense which applies to interviews, focus groups and questionnaires 
(This reflects a caution raised by Hammersley (2003a:122) about interviews in general.) 
5
 This matches the classic anthropological anxiety over the relationship between emic and etic 
perspectives (Eriksen 2001). 
6
 Based on the number of references for Sackett et al (1996) which includes a popular definition of 
EBM. A search for “evidence-based medicine” on Google Scholar retrieves over two hundred thousand 
results. 
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the other hand, particular pieces which might appear peripheral are essential for making 
comparisons and contrasts, and demonstrating possibilities.  
 
4.3  Discourse Analysis. 
The Strength Through Flexibility of Discourse Analysis. 
A label of ‘discourse analysis’ can be attractive precisely because it is imprecise. Hodge (1989), 
for illustration, counsels against formalism in discourse analysis, expressing a wish for diversity 
which typifies the field. Foucault’s discursive method having been characterised as a ‘kind of 
toolbox’ (Foucault 19747), the possibilities for different styles in the analysis of discourse are 
opened up. Some have mapped out these styles along different dimensions of conceptual space. 
For example, Phillips and Hardy (2002:20) use a continuum from constructivist (active, 
psychological) to critical (passive, institutional) on one axis, and from text (micro-linguistic) to 
context (macro-structural) on the other. Alvesson and Karreman (2000:1135) draw a similar 
map using continua from ‘determination’ to ‘autonomy’, and from close-range (micro, meso) to 
long-range (grand, mega) interests. Barker (2008:153-4) tabulates analytic types discretely in 
terms of responses to eight defining questions. Meanwhile Titscher et al’s (2000:51) expansive 
map attaches traditions of theory and method to particular authors. 
Discourse analysis is a diaspora of methods whose boundaries are open. Encompassing different 
possibilities allows the researcher to maintain flexibility to the demands of the topic (see Gill 
2000, Hammersley 2002). As well as being compatible with an idea of literary ethnography8, 
discourse analysis can include a notion of narrative which I make use of. Narrative analysis is 
well-established as a research method for sociology (Franzosi 1998, Lawler 2008) compatible 
with other discursive methods (Johnstone 2004, Taylor and Littleton 2006). Similarly, Billig’s 
(1996[1987]) development of Rhetorical Analysis has appeal for studying EB-discourse as 
rhetoric. Billig’s discussions of tactics of persuasion (1996:81) and of ‘arguing against common 
sense’ (1996:246), for example, are ideas relevant throughout this thesis. Both of these interests 
(narrative and rhetoric) have precedents in EB-discourse through the work of Trisha Greenhalgh 
                                                          
7
 See dits et ecrits 2001 edition, page 1391: ‘Je voudrais que mes livres soient une sorte de tool-box 
dans lequel les autres puissent aller fouiller pour y trouver un outil avec lequel ils pourraient faire ce 
que bon leur semble, dans leur domaine’. ‘I would like my books to be a sort of tool-box in which 
others can seek and find a tool which they can use how they wish in their own area’. 
8 I use this term to mean ethnography-in-literature, rather than in creative personal writing, as it has 
been used by eg. Fine (1993). 
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(see Greenhalgh and Hurwitz 1998; Greenhalgh and Russell 2006; Russell, Greenhalgh et al 
2008); and both require the development of analytic categories. 
The process of developing analytic categories to a point where they can be confidently trusted is 
difficult to generally explicate. Writing about Grounded Theory9, Charmaz (1990:1164) warns 
against premature commitment to categories, before the researcher has ‘fully explored the 
issues, events and meanings within the research problem’, and gained ‘intimate familiarity’ with 
it. In qualitative research it is tempting to make use of concepts like saturation and exhaustion as 
poetic expressions for reaching a relatively secure state of knowledge wrought from qualitative 
data. A problem with these terms is that they have recently come within reach of some 
uncritical evidentialism. Bowen (2008), for example, calls for claims of saturation to be 
substantiated by evidence; as if saturation were a quantitative and measurable state which is 
either achieved or not. Similarly Morse et al (2002) counsel qualitative researchers to regulate 
their studies for reliability and validity on a model attributed to mainstream science. Pope et al 
(2000:116) defend qualitative methods through assurances that they can be systematic and 
rigorous, if ‘done properly’. 
Assertively-phrased evidentialism is treated hygienically and forensically in the present thesis. 
Being something to be investigated, it cannot comfortably be presumed in the methodological 
justification. Most pressing is the need for contextual specificity, conceptual coherence 
(especially avoiding circularity), and the construction of arguments which are sustainable by 
standards which become clear as analysis proceeds. With regard to validity, prior claims need 
not be made with regard to projectability. The thesis concerns EB-discourse; any extension of its 
arguments to other discourses would need to be quarantined. With regard to reliability, the full 
exploration and intimate familiarity which Charmaz (1990) recommends are what is to be 
demonstrated through the ensuing examination of analytic categories. This means paying tribute 
to Grounded Theory, alongside other methodological influences, in a way which again puts 
value on methodological diversity10. 
Choosing analytic categories is the most important step towards the explication of method. 
Methods are flexible in their specifics, but analytic categories provide the conceptual framework 
for determining what types of things can be said about a discourse. Across different schools of 
                                                          
9
 Grounded Theory can be connected to Discourse Analysis – Starks and Trinidad (2007) present some 
similarities and differences between these methods. 
10
 Valuing diversity, as opposed to unity and homogeneity, recalls another Bakhtinian idea, of 
heteroglossia, from ‘Discourse in the Novel’ (1981). Consciously deploying heteroglossia of method 
avoids the drawbacks of evidential monologism. 
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discourse analysis this is recognised. In the context of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Kress 
(1990:93) states that any analysis will ‘attempt to describe the categories which are generative in 
the production of discourse’. Titscher et al (2000:12) phrase this more strongly; ‘one may say 
quite simply that every observation requires particular observational frameworks or categories’. 
In Discursive Psychology, the focus is on the everyday use of categories and constructions 
(Potter and Molder, 2005:2), and the discursive practices through which categories are 
constructed (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002:108). In Discourse Theory, as presented by Howarth 
(2000:12), meanings are understood as effects of the interrelational ‘play of signifiers’. This 
protean nature of discourse compels theorists to ‘modulate and articulate their concepts’ to 
particular problems (2000:133), thus formulating flexible and responsive analytic categories. 
Within EB-discourse, categories for thought are offered up – evidence, expertise, and autonomy, 
for example. These are, to use Foucault’s terms, lines of explanation which have been covered 
with bold strokes. The first task of my analysis is to briefly draw out the further categories which 
have been used to make sociological sense of those basic categories; these are politics and 
philosophy, familiar from chapters 2 and 3. Going back over these two, and their relationship to 
each other, yields a new general category of dialogue. The principle of dialogue provides a 
framework for looking again at EB-discourse through a new sociological lens. It enables the 
identification of dialogues which transcend the dialogue of politics and philosophy; these are 
dialogues around embodiment and around emotion. These new categories disturb the original 
terms of EB-discourse. Distancing sociology from those original terms enables me to construct a 
sociological analysis which builds upon those which have gone before. 
 
The ‘Actual Doings’ of this Discourse Analysis: Deep-Reading and Long-Writing. 
I explained in chapter 1, but will repeat now, that this thesis is written in three layers. The first 
layer is basically descriptive of EB-literature, read with an attitude which is critical but not 
interpretive11. This second layer, concerned with a methodological framework for researching 
EB-discourse, is based on interpretations; an interpretation of debates around EBHC as 
discourse, and interpretation of that discourse in terms of dialogue. It involves a return to the 
same literature, reading it in a different way. The second reading identifies a structural pattern 
in EB-discourse and follows it to the development of dialogue as a general explanatory principle. 
                                                          
11
 In those chapters I have applied empirical values known in anthropology after Geertz (1973) as ‘thick 
description’.  
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This general principle enables two specific dialogues, of embodiment and emotion, to be 
identified as especially important in EB-discourse. These are each investigated (in layer three) by 
returning again to the same body of literature, and re-reading it from these newly-developed 
perspectives. 
The analytic technique of this thesis then, is one of progressively deeper reading. I return to the 
same set of data to produce successively different sociologies which are connected together. It is 
of necessity that the same set of data is used each time; for otherwise, the sociologies of dialogue, 
embodiment and emotion could not be arranged on top of each other. They would refer to 
different things. The sensibility for this analysis is to work not so much in-breadth – covering as 
much different data as possible, and each time expanding the horizons so as to be able to draw 
different conclusions. It is to work more in-depth – taking texts and fragments of text to pieces 
to find out how they work. Digging downwards, rather than sideways, is envisioned to excavate 
more valuable sociological truths. 
This strategy brings risks, of repetition and of loss of contextual awareness. The issue of 
repetition I have addressed by keeping the range of texts as wide as possible (within manageable 
limits), and by using different texts to generate points of argument. This means negotiating a 
balance of tension; covering ‘enough’ texts, not too many, not too few. It means varying choices 
of exemplary texts between chapters, but choosing texts which are similar enough to each other 
to be representative of recurring themes of discourse (while also remembering that there are no 
accidents in discourse, and every text is significant). The issue of contextual awareness I have 
addressed by positioning each text in relation to its discursive setting, and each section of text in 
relation to the whole piece in which it was written. I experimented with different means of 
doing this; and found in the end ethnographic immersion in the discourse, and ‘long’ writing to 
be the most successful12. 
By long writing I mean the committed act of writing about EB-discourse continuous with 
reading it. Rather than first generating masses of decontextualised data from which elements can 
be plucked to fit into a tidy writing process, this technique generates masses of written text for 
editing and re-writing. Literature is re-read for data to fit into the writing; but the writing must 
alter to accommodate what is read. A dialogue is formed between writing and reading. Not only 
                                                          
12
 For instance, I began my research using grids to systematically record the contents of texts in relation 
to particular categories. I moved away from this method when I noticed that it repeatedly led me to 
make out-of-context analytical claims; but it remains useful as the basis for the descriptive claims of 
earlier chapters. 
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is this dialogue never finished; it produces much more text than is finally presented to the reader. 
This thesis of 90,000 words is the tip of an iceberg which, by counting previous drafts of writing, 
I can estimate close to 400,00013. The idea of writing as research method is not well-recognised 
in sociology or even in discourse analysis; but it does have precedents and emerging presence in 
anthropology14. 
Further specifics of how this discourse was analysed are best explained in relation to the three 
analytic sections of dialogue, embodiment and emotion. However there is one more influence to 
acknowledge which is present to analysis of dialogue, and also to analysis of embodiment and 
emotion as particular dialogues, and therefore present to all three. This is the deconstructive 
method associated with Jacques Derrida. As Eagleton (1996:115) explains, the deconstructive 
method means looking always to isolate the binary oppositions which structure patterns of 
thought in discourse; and by collapsing these oppositions, to escape from those patterns of 
thought. To use Eagleton’s terms, my analysis by dialogue is more structural, being concerned 
to identify the binary oppositions which, across EB-discourse, are the bases for systems of 
dialogue. My analyses by embodiment and emotion are more post-structural, being concerned 
to show how these categories trouble the terms of discourse.  
In each of these cases, following Derrida, I ‘seize on some apparently peripheral fragment (…) 
and work it tenaciously through to the point where it threatens to dismantle the oppositions 
which govern the text as a whole’ (1996:116). From Derrida can also be gained support for the 
idea of writing as research-method. As Eagleton (ibid) says, there is something in writing itself, 
as a socially embodied and performed behaviour, which escapes systems of containment. 
Writing is a challenge to thought structures, and something which cannot be kept under control. 
It is done so as to see what happens; it is an empirical act. With this in mind I now leave 
generalities of discourse analysis behind and embark on methodological explanations relating to 
my three categories. The first category, dialogue, is fundamental to the other two. To show 
how it was developed I must return to the matters of politics and philosophy which I have 
already discussed at some length.  
                                                          
13
 This is not a boast. Writing-as-research is extremely inefficient. But it ensures integrity between 
writing and the thing written-about, which in this case is imperative. 
14
 See eg. Ely et al (1997) on ‘writing towards understanding’ and Wall’s (2006) ‘autoethnography on 
learning about authoethnography’. 
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4.4  Old categories: the Lines Already Sketched. 
The majority of chapter 3, my literature review of sociologies of EBHC, reported sociologies of 
a political type. Towards the end of that chapter I pointed out some limitations of politics as an 
analytic category for EBHC. There is one more such problem to point out which leads towards 
the identification of dialogue as something which is of key importance in EB-discourse. In 
labouring the point of this dialogue somewhat, I suffer with the reader some repetition; but it is 
a crucial step in the argument of the thesis, and needs to be emphasised. The problem is that the 
political approach has encouraged sociologists to think of EBHC as a ‘movement’. This can mean 
that particular groups are identified as benefitting systematically from the adoption of EBHC as a 
practical orthodoxy, and others as systematically resisting it. Or, it can mean that those who 
consistently advocate EBHC are in the process of overcoming those consistently opposed to it15. 
Neither of these suppositions can be shown to be generally true. When reading EB-literature 
(apart from the polemics of EBM) one does not always discover groups recognisably for-or-
against EBHC, but usually encounters a mess of controversy and ambivalence. One finds that the 
vessel which carries EBHC is not those who make a movement for it, so much as those who 
insist that it is a movement which must be resisted. One could be forgiven for surmising that 
EBHC has still not yet happened; but that this not-happening has not stopped EBHC from having 
social effects. Further, originating the idea of EBM with a particular group of clinician-
epidemiologists (the EBMWG 1992) cannot explain its acceptance as an idea by such disparate 
communities as have been drawn into the debate. EB-discourse, although unique in its specifics, 
must also be continuous with other contemporaneous discourses, and discourses which have 
gone before.  
In this sense EB-discourse has no beginning nor end, but circulates open-endedly in both micro-
social and macro-social contexts. Practitioners may debate the specifics of evidence without 
alluding to the influence of market economics; policy-makers may debate the generalities of 
evidence-basedness without a real concern for its repercussions within the clinic. These 
instances are part of the same discourse, which is not just one in which advocacy overcomes 
resistance; but in which advocacy and resistance work together in dialogue and are contained 
within each other. Often advocacy and resistance are found mixed together, and both are 
necessary for the discourse to persist and have social effects. The ‘social movements’ perspective 
encourages sociologists to think of only part of EB-discourse – the advocacy of EBHC – as being 
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 This approach was first introduced explicitly by Pope (2003). 
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productive. Instead they should be attentive to the importance of the whole discourse – 
advocacy and resistance and everything in between.  
Sociologists attuned to the dialogical properties of language (following both Derrida and Bakhtin) 
might identify another dialogue which consistently appears in EB-discourse, between politics 
and philosophy. Although I have alluded to this dialogue in both chapters 2 and 3, there remains 
the task of properly theorising it as justification for using dialogue as a general analytic category. 
The duality of meaning of the term ‘politics’ can first be noted; political knowledge implying 
also the existence of non-political pure knowledge, which might be called philosophical16. This is 
a reason why analysts using politics as a category are likely to find themselves drawn also 
towards the question of philosophical knowledge, creating a new binary system of politics and 
philosophy. Although built upon the foundations of practice-versus-evidence, the politics-
philosophy dyad leaves the evidence-practice dyad intact. One can work within the politics-
philosophy system without having to question the basis for the distinction between evidence and 
practice17.  
To say more about the politics-philosophy dialogue, its philosophical side must be developed. In 
the appendix, I have pursued three lines of inquiry into EBHC which are purely philosophical. I 
first argue that both EBHC itself and EB-discourse cannot be conceptually defined by philosophy; 
that within both, incompatible philosophies can co-exist (specifically objectivism with 
conventionalism, and positivism with realism). I secondly argue that EBHC carries a 
hermeneutic philosophy which has been completely overlooked in EB-discourse, and that this 
hermeneutic philosophy is in fact more important in EBHC than those which have been 
acknowledged. I thirdly argue that EB-discourse contains what I call the Evidence Paradox; 
indeed, the evidence paradox may be a philosophical necessity for the discourse to have been 
conducted as it has been. The present task is to explain the sociological implications of these 
philosophical insights as support for the category of dialogue. 
 
Interpeting Philosophical Conclusions Sociologically in Terms of Dialogue. 
To take first the issue of philosophical indeterminacy in EBHC; it might seem strange that 
writers on EBHC have not made more of these technicalities. After all, the observations I make 
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 Philosophy in its linguistic origin meaning knowledge-seeking or knowledge-loving. 
17
 Colyer and Kamath (1999) for example do just this. 
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in the appendix (part 1) are no more sophisticated than other philosophical contributions in EB-
discourse. Non-objectivist elements are readily found in EB-advocacies; and the positivist-realist 
incompatibility cannot be disguised – it is visible as soon as EB-advocates make an exception of 
pathophysiologic rationale and rely upon causation in RCTs. It can be said about both of these 
problems that they do not fit into a simple dialogue in which evidence is supposed to be opposed 
to practice. They show that the category of evidence is divided on at least two axes; an 
objectivism axis and a realism axis. From the point of view of EB-discourse which is arranged 
politically by an opposition between research and clinic, this complication will not do. It spoils 
the grounds for debate. And so, it goes unseen. 
The problem of the hermeneutic programme demonstrates a similar point, but at a conceptual 
level which applies more to EB-discourse than just to EBHC. The term of hermeneutics is 
occasionally used in EB-discourse, but only as a sieve to separate the interpretive sciences which 
surround EBHC from the proper science of EBHC itself. It is invariably those arguing against 
EBHC who make this use. As they do so they blind themselves to something which, once 
noticed, becomes plain; that without unacknowledged hermeneutic-type suppositions about the 
transmission of knowledge through texts, EBHC cannot exist conceptually. These suppositions 
are not adherent to any arguments about the nature of evidence itself; for whatever the content 
of Evidence, it needs to be transmitted through text. Once again, this goes unnoticed because it 
does not fit the terms of dialogue. It collapses a distinction which is basic to the discourse. 
Together these cases highlight the philosophical transmutability of EB-discourse in accordance 
with political needs. Mutually-antagonistic philosophies can exist side-by-side, and their 
incongruity can pass unnoticed. Even something so conspicuous as the necessity of hermeneutics 
to EBHC can be accommodated and moved out of sight. The hermeneutic programme causes a 
further problem in relation to a principle of EBHC which tacitly asserts that evidence can 
become practice. Evidence is supposed to bridge a chasm between research and practice; but if 
clinicians are reconfigured as scriptural hermeneuticists, the chasm has only one side. There is 
no space to conceive of practical knowledge, nor any possibility of mediation between theory 
and practice. The hermeneutic clinician is stranded on the side of pure knowledge encoded in 
research literature, and practical knowledge ceases to exist. Ignoring the hermeneutic 
implications of EBHC is the only way to sustain the notion of a naturally-existing gap between 
evidence and practice, by keeping the sides separate. 
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By considering the evidence paradox, the necessary interdependence between these two 
separate sides can be demonstrated. Both advocates and critics are affected equally by it. 
Advocates need something other than evidentialism to support their advocacy; critics need some 
principle of evidence to support their critique. In this situation it might be that the only position 
which makes philosophical sense is a kind of agnostic ambivalence, or an acceptance that this 
debate about what can be known is situated within a condition of unknowability. But to accept 
unknowability is not in the repertoire of discussants; there are political reasons why they cannot 
accede to it. Therefore the dialogue goes on, and on. Advocacy and critique rely upon each 
other to survive. Although mutually opposed, they are not really separate but between them 
create unity, being dialogically bound together.  
The three cases discussed show how philosophising EBHC can contribute to sociological analysis. 
Philosophical potentialites are identified within the discourse; but a sociology of politics is 
required to explain why some are put on display, and others hidden. All three cases help to 
show EB-discourse as a dialogical space in which different philosophies, and different readings of 
the same philosophies, can be balanced against each other. The principle of politics needs 
philosophy to give it an outside, so it can have meaning; but the principle of philosophy needs 
politics to have sociological use. Politics and philosophy are necessarily bound together in 
dialogue: a new dialogue built on top of the one between evidence and practice, but still a 
dialogue which circulates endlessly without resolution. 
The preceding discussion and philosophical appendix do not exhaust the possibilities for 
philosophising EBHC. Rather than Kant and Hume for example, why should one not involve 
other rationalist philosophers (Leibniz and Spinoza, for instance), or other empiricists (Berkeley 
and Locke) in the discussion? Why not consider the changing predicament of the clinician in the 
proto-existential terms of Kierkegaard, or of Rousseau and the romantic preference for 
instinctive insight? Why not earnestly trace the roots of EBHC back to Aristotle and Socrates or, 
more provocatively, Jesus Christ? Why not link discourse to Wittgenstein’s idea of language 
games? Or venture into philosophy of mind, perhaps using Kristeva’s idea of symbolic order to 
define EB-discourse as a language system in which subjects struggle to make space for 
themselves?  
Such philosophical ventures are tempting, but philosophical allegiances can too easily create 
diversions from sociology. What I have written is to show that EB-discourse is philosophically 
diverse; that philosophical content in EB-discourse is sociologically significant; and that 
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sociologically-attuned philosophy can be used to shed light on discursive mechanism. In chapter 
6 I employ the notion of testimony from Kusch’s (2002) Communitarian Epistemology, to make 
a sociological point about EB-discourse. In this case, as in the cases discussed here, philosophy is 
a tool used for sociology, rather than sociology being an appendage of or an excuse for 
philosophy. These points being now sufficiently covered, I move on to an elaboration of the 
unfamiliar territories I have been seeking. First dialogue, a topic on which I will be brief, having 
already gone most of the way to justifying it; then embodiment and emotion. 
 
 
4.5 Analytic Categories to Proceed With. 
Dialogue. 
In chapters 2 and 3 I hinted sometimes at a relationship between politics and philosophy in EB-
discourse, which I have now argued is one of inter-dependence and dialogue. Different types of 
emphasis can be placed on this understanding. From the hermeneutic programme, one can 
observe a possibility for collusion which underpins dialogical conflict. EB-advocates and EB-
dissidents can collaborate by tacitly agreeing to attend to some philosophical facets of EBHC, 
and to ignore others. The evidence paradox, by contrast, suggests a more constrained social 
condition where participants, working under a condition of unknowability, have no choice but 
to collaborate. Their contributions depend on their being convinced that they can know things 
which perhaps, rationally, they cannot; and each position in the debate is reliant on other 
positions for certifying its validity. 
Whether the dialogues of EB-discourse are thought to be contingent or necessary, there is 
interdependency between participants, indicating a functional wholeness where all contributions 
are important. It is through such discursive mechanism, of pervasive and multiple dialogue, that 
contributors to EB-discourse can together create something from nothing. They operate within 
a system of constructed distinctions. At the point where all distinctions – between evidence and 
practice, politics and philosophy, empiricism and hermeneutics collapse – they might appear to 
be having a conversation about nothing at all. By mechanisms of dialogue, participants are 
continually diverted from paths leading to this point. The importance of dialogue being thus 
concluded, it might now seem strange to go back to the start of EB-discourse, as I do in chapter 
5, and read it all over again. To what purpose is this obdurate pursuit of dialogue? 
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The purpose is to give empirical weight to an argument which at this methodological stage is still 
greatly theoretical, and to discover how well the dialogical principle can be extended across all 
of EB-discourse. One may grant that the politics-philosophy dialogue is important in itself; and 
especially so for making the evidence-practice dialogue serviceable in non-clinical contexts. But 
are these the only dialogues that matter in EB-discourse? Even if they are, how do participants 
work with them in practice? What is it like to write EB-literature under different conditions of 
dialogue? These are questions which can only be answered by observation. Following the paths 
of dialogue through different texts is, fortunately, something with an established tradition in 
literary theory. 
The usual way to study the relations between texts is by the methods of ‘intertextuality’. This 
term was introduced by Kristeva in her analysis of Bakhtin (see Todorov 1984:60), and concerns 
the dialogical nature of the ‘utterance’ as the fundamental linguistic unit. It is through Kristeva 
that Bakhtin is connected historically to Derrida; and Vargova (2007) shows the compatibilities 
between the intertextual (dialogical18) methods of these three. In simple terms this method 
means seeing separate texts as part of a dialogically-constituted whole, and reading them in co-
relation to each other. I use this method to compare texts which are connected to each other 
explicitly in the topics they address; but also to discover connections which are hidden, 
differences of handling between ideas, and linguistic tropes which recur in different contexts. 
There is also intertextuality within texts; each article (or piece of text) being itself composed of 
elements which can be separated. 
Sociology has an analogous, but less well-established tradition. Arguing for a ‘More Dialogic 
Analysis of Social Movement Culture’, North-American sociologist Marc W. Steinberg has 
written that: 
“. . cultures constructed through contention are only partly the result of calculated action. 
(…) we must understand this process as relational. Rather than analyzing the culture of 
contention as divided between discrete dominant and dissident spheres we need to analyze 
how both are partly products of the other. (…) in protracted conflicts, both dominant and 
challenging discourses can mix together.” 
    Steinberg 2002:208. Emphasis and spelling forms in original. 
                                                          
18
 Intertextuality is not the same as dialogism; but to keep the terminology sociological rather than 
linguistic, I confine myself to speaking of dialogue. 
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Steinberg shows (in the case of workers’ opposition to domination by their employers in early 
nineteenth-century England) that a subjugated group of workers were able to re-fashion the 
discourses used by employers to legitimise power. Concerning EB-discourse, it is more 
straightforward to argue for a dialogical approach because it is not clear which side (EB-
advocates or dissenters) should be considered dominant. Both sides can see themselves as being 
in opposition to a certain kind of power. 
The dialogical techniques in this thesis are generally taken without modification from the work 
of Bakhtin and applied in a straightforward way. For example, I use a distinction in chapter 5 
between genuine and authentic dialogues, and rhetorical dialogues. This and the idea of double-
voicedness, which I rely heavily upon, are off-the-peg Bakhtinian concepts (although the term 
‘quasi-dialogue’ is a contribution of my own). I write in two places, and two different ways 
about the carnivalesque, another standard Bakhtinian form. In chapter 5 I use it in relation to 
irony and parody, in chapter 7 I use it in relation to hierarchy inversion and grotesque forms. All 
of these techniques involve a reading-style which aligns broadly with the grain of texts; reading 
for presences and connections, but also to some extent reading ‘between the lines’ for meanings 
which are not obvious. 
 
Embodiment and Emotion: Routes to the Irrational. 
I draw back at present from theorising the dialogical principle as a way of thinking about power, 
which is something for chapter 5. However it can immediately be asked on the basis of the 
dialogue between politics and philosophy which I have been at pains to expose (and also on the 
basis of other dialogues which I extract from the discourse in chapter 5); what type of dialogue is 
this? It is a dialogue between two types of rationality. To be politically concerned about the 
relationships between individuals and groups is to rationalise them; and to be philosophically 
concerned with truth, and to worry about what can and cannot be known, is to engage 
rationality. What then becomes of the irrational features and implications of EB-discourse which 
are excluded from this rational dialogue? While EB-discourse is itself ‘about’ rationality – the 
reasons for doing some things and not others – it is not rational to suppose that a dialogue 
between rationalities would be sufficient to give a full account of the discourse.  
As I have shown, EB-discourse has a particular social spirit; and it might be argued that the spirit 
of EB-discourse – in which aspersions are cast on the integrity of various contributors, in which 
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emotive appeals are routinely made for ideological support, in which philosophy is used 
unreflectively as a way to compensate for politics – is scarcely rational. When looking for 
unfamiliar territories, it makes sense to look for categories which are conventionally excluded 
from the rational domain. These categories cannot be plucked from thin air, but must be present 
within EB-discourse; present, but occluded or made inaccessible. There are reasons both within 
and without EB-discourse to identify embodiment and emotion as categories which are present 
but marginalised or unaccounted for. 
Emotion and embodiment are easily associated in opposition to rationality. Barbalet (2001:34) 
traces the association of emotion and embodiment to Descartes, who in allocating reason to the 
mind and emotion to the body, saw emotions as things done to us by our bodies. In such a 
Cartesian scheme of thought, ‘the best thing to do with the emotion which subverts reason’, 
Barbalet explains, ‘is to suppress it’ (ibid). From such a scenario can be drawn a justification for 
both embodiment and emotion as analytic categories for EB-discourse, which is a discourse 
broadly about rationality; for both emotion and embodiment are, in Cartesian thought, 
problematic for rationality. The routes to recognising their problematical nature in EB-discourse, 
and exploring them empirically, are different from each other. I will explain them now, taking 
embodiment first. 
 
Embodiment. 
The analytic category of embodiment in this thesis developed from a concern to discover the 
role of the patient in EB-discourse. A common move in EB-discourse is to raise the patient as a 
point of concern, and someone for whose sake healthcare is to become evidence-based, or not. 
Aside from being summoned at such times, the patient is difficult to locate in EBHC and EB-
discourse. I began by using the patient as a theme for reading EB-literature, expecting to find 
them influential; the columns of empty boxes under the heading ‘patient’ in my research notes 
are testament to their absence from the substance of the discourse. A moment’s thought raises 
this absence as a problem. The patient is absolutely necessary to practice and to evidence; and 
surely, no participant in EB-discourse would concede that patients ought to be unimportant. ‘Of 
course’, they might write, ‘the person who really matters is the patient’. So, where are they? 
At the same time the chronotopy of EB-discourse, in which imagined futures are pitched in 
dialogue against imagined pasts, raises further questions: is healthcare now evidence-based? If so, 
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when did the transition to evidence-basedness occur? If it has not occurred, how else has the 
experienced reality of healthcare changed while EBHC has been discussed? Surely, practices 
cannot have gone unchanged in this time. Based solely on EB-literature one cannot make an 
answer to these questions, which require a different type of empirical approach, one which 
accesses an embodied reality outside literary discourse. But one can expect such questions to 
have been asked within the discourse, in terms of perceived changes to embodied practices. And 
if they have not been asked (as generally they have not), then there is another absence uncovered; 
an absence of concern for the embodied and lived dimensions of practice. 
Unlike the absence of the patient, the case of embodied practice is an occlusion, not a total 
eclipse; there are some mentions of embodied and tacit knowledge in EB-literature. These are 
the starting point for chapter 6, but do not provide enough material for an analytic chapter. 
They are just enough to show embodiment as marginal to EB-discourse. This marginality is a 
warning sign, which might (to adopt healthcare parlance) be called a ‘red flag’ for the patient. 
For how else is the patient to be connected to the physicality of clinical proceedings than by 
attachment between their selfhood and their body19? And if embodiment is (at best) marginal to 
discursive proceedings, how is the patient to become active in the discourse? The marginality of 
embodiment gives the analyst hope: if they can follow the trail of crumbs to find out what 
happens to concerns of embodiment in EB-discourse, then maybe they can also discover where 
the body of the patient is hidden. 
The analytic technique required for embodiment in EB-discourse is not one which reads for 
presences, as was the case with dialogue, but one which reads for absences. This means 
identifying possibilities which could have been pursued in the discourse; asking at what points 
they could have been pursued; and asking what possibilities were pursued instead. What 
pathways are there in the discourse which divert attention from issues of embodiment? To 
discover these pathways requires a different kind of reading than in earlier chapters. Rather than 
dialogues between things said, the reader is looking now for dialogues between things said and 
unsaid. To find things unsaid in EB-discourse means looking outside its boundaries for ideas 
which cause trouble; as Alison Young (1990:160) puts it, to ‘subject the monolith to the 
absences of the other’. 
                                                          
19
 Even in mental illness, it is arguably the patient’s body in which orthodox healthcare is primarily 
interested (see Williams 2000). 
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Young (1990:163) uses the phrase ‘reading against the grain’ to describe this technique of 
looking for ways to re-think powerful discourse through the ‘opening of closed systems’. A 
technique of reading against the grain implies thorough familiarity with the texts being studied. 
In order to challenge these texts, the analyst must have developed an instinctive awareness of the 
grain of texts, meaning the directions in which texts encourage one to think. To read against the 
grain has become an established idiom in literary studies. In sociology, Traynor (2006:65) 
identifies it as a known technique in poststructural discourse analysis, for destabilising ideologies. 
Plumridge and Chetwynd (1999:337), to give an empirical example, use it for analysing the self-
understandings of drug users; it enables them to achieve theoretical distance from such accounts, 
so as the explicit content of text can be seen as a mediation rather than reflection of reality.  
In a similar way, EB-discourse can be seen as something through which embodiment is mediated 
(to the point of invisibility) and which does not reflect embodiment in a straightforward way. So 
much seems clear enough; one can notice that embodiment, which one might expect to be a 
visible category in EB-discourse, disappears like a river going underground. One can read 
against the grain to bring it back into view. Alas, the topic of embodiment is one which brings its 
own complications for sociologists in general, and particularly for literary discourse analysts. 
These complications are discussed by Crossley (2007), for example, who recommends Mauss’ 
concept of ‘body techniques’ for empirical analysis of embodiment. These techniques, Crossley 
argues, can allow sociologists to reach beyond representations and discourses of body, to 
embodiment itself.  
Mauss’ body techniques (Crossley explains) are ways to engage with embodiment through 
embodiment. They make the divide between mind and body possible to cross, but only if the 
analyst can participate with their research target in an embodied way. Strictly speaking, this is 
not possible for the analyst of EBHC who has restricted themselves to studying EB-literature. 
What is possible, though, is to observe and comment upon how participants in EB-discourse 
have themselves taken up issues of embodiment, or not. What results is not an account of 
embodiment specifically in EBHC or non-EBHC, for which body techniques would indeed be 
necessary. Instead it is an account of embodiment in EB-discourse, which reports how the 
discourse mediates ideas of embodiment. The discursive mediation of ideas of embodiment is a 
site of profound sociological significance, because it is the means through which embodied 
concerns are (or are not) represented conceptually. This (non)representation cannot but have 
repercussions for embodied social life. 
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The idea of dialogue in discourse-analytic research has two notable consequences concerning 
embodiment. The first is to highlight that embodiment is itself a dialogical category, its 
dialogical partner being disembodiment. Throughout chapter 6, it is in dialogue with 
disembodiment that embodiment is made sense of in EB-discourse. The second is to highlight 
that in accordance with a technique of reading against the grain there is, in chapter 6 particularly, 
a technique of writing against the grain of EB-discourse. Even more so than in other chapters, 
chapter 6 involves a writing experiment; to write about EBHC from a perspective outside the 
boundaries of EB-discourse. When writing away from the conventions of EB-discourse – into 
unfamiliar territory – one cannot be sure where writing will lead. As it turns out, writing about 
embodiment and away from EB-discourse leads back to the patient, and to wonder at the 
collective feat of their social construction. 
The distinction between discursive and embodied social life is useful for explaining difficulties of 
accessing practical reality for sociological analysis. It is also useful for imagining aspects of 
discursivity which are embodied, aspects of embodiment which are discursive, and things which 
are neither fully one nor the other. Emotion, particularly, is something situated across both 
realms. The research activity of reading and writing EB-discourse does have an embodied 
dimension which is different from the embodiment of practice (and in comparison, trivial); but 
it has an emotional dimension which is not at all trivial, and which is immanently embodied. It is 
a short step from thinking about one realm of the irrational – embodiment – to thinking about 
another, emotion. Emotion, like embodiment, is a phenomenon which can be researched 
socially; but again this is complicated in discourse analysis by the opacity of the relation between 
emotion and discourse. 
 
Emotion. 
A difficulty with using embodiment and emotion as analytic categories – which is connected to 
their characterisation as irrational – is that both of them are by their definition difficult to access 
through language. They are resistant to rational thought, and resistant to being written about. 
This difficulty is easier to explain in the case of emotion, which can at least be considered as 
partly-mental, not wholly embodied and unreachable through linguistic expression. Emotions 
can have names attached to them, and can consequently be discussed as worldly phenomena. 
Consider, however, the following excerpt from a quote with which Sara Ahmed (2004a) begins 
her account of collective feelings: 
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‘”It is not hate that makes the average White man look upon a mixed race couple with a 
scowl on his face and loathing in his heart. (…) it’s not hate, It is Love.”’ 
         Ahmed 2004a:25. 
Ahmed’s use of this quote is to show the action of emotions as defining the surface-contours of 
social relationships – as binding people together or separating them through complementary 
emotional identifications. I would like to draw attention instead to the ease with which the 
speaker can make an emotional substitution (albeit a tenuous one) simply by swapping labels, 
hate for love. 
This illustrates a basic problem with theorising emotions; they are slippery, nebulous, protean 
and transient. They are moving targets which language is ill-equipped to capture. They melt into 
each other and fall apart. One can claim different emotions as a justification for the same actions, 
but also one can use emotional tokens without an emotional basis. For example, the word for 
love is not the same as the thing, love, although it might be used as such. Nor is any emotion-
word an adequate representation of its emotion as an embodied and experienced state of being. 
Sometimes it is only in hindsight, in view of their effects, that emotion-labels can be designated 
(as for example, when one retrospectively rationalises actions in terms of emotions: I must have 
been angry, I must have been scared).  
Different from the naming of objects whose identity depends upon attachment to a conceptual 
label (see Kripke 1981), we might feel that emotions can exist in discourse without being named. 
As Barbalet (2001:24) notes, ‘the absence of a word for an emotion does not mean that an 
emotion is not (…) influential’. He alludes to an emotional life outside of language, and a 
culturally-enforced blindness to emotions which prevailing conventions do not recognise 
linguistically as emotion (ibid). He writes also of emotions ‘below the threshold of awareness’ 
(2001:114) which, like a collective subconscious, are nonetheless effective in structuring 
collective and individual social actions. The threshold of awareness for emotions is both 
culturally variable, and variable within individuals depending on nuances of context. It is 
difficult then for sociologists to know what they are talking about when they talk about emotion. 
In light of these theoretical difficulties, and also in light of disciplinary conventions where 
emotion is thought an individual rather than social thing, it is unsurprising that the weight of 
emotions-literature in sociology falls on theory rather than empirics. Through theory 
sociologists have engaged emotion enthusiastically in recent times. For example Jackson’s (1993) 
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‘Even Sociologists Fall in Love’, is exploratory of the meaning given socially to an emotion in 
constituting subjectivity. Burkitt’s (1997:37) ‘Social Relationships and Emotions’ proposes an 
understanding of emotions as ‘complexes rather than things’. Shilling (1997) looks to 
reconceptualise emotions with reference to classical Durkheimian theory. Also Turner’s (2009) 
overview of the topic is a history of sociology of emotions in terms of pure theory. These 
dextrous ways to make sociological sense of emotion do not offer much guidance for empirical 
approaches to emotion in social life. 
 
How to Access Emotion Empirically. 
Look again at the case of embodiment as something marginal to EB-discourse: its marginalisation 
is implicit. A good deal of reading is required before the reader can notice that embodiment is 
missing from the discourse. Then the issue arises as to which questions can and cannot be 
answered using a literary approach, as I have discussed. In the case of emotion, its suppression in 
EB-discourse is explicit. Granted this is not usually spelt out in so many words; but instances can 
readily be found where emotion is called out by name as a thing discredited, initially in the 
context of clinical reason, and then elsewhere. This suppression occurs within the terms of 
discourse, so is accessible to discourse analysis. And aside from the explicit discrediting of 
emotion there is a good deal more emotional content in EB-discourse, some of which is called 
by name but most of which is not. 
Emotion existing outside the thresholds of awareness can be brought into consciousness by 
analysis. As something whose essence is in feeling but whose effects are discursive, I contend 
that emotion can only be accessed for analysis through its presence (identified by name or not) 
in discourse. To know that emotion is present and to judge its effects, the analyst must be able 
to detect emotion by feeling and express it as language. The idea of literary ethnography is 
crucial to this aspect of the analysis. It is only through personal immersion – through living the 
discourse – that this type of embodied awareness can be reached. This claim goes somewhat 
against the grain of conventions in the ethnographic tradition, and needs some further 
justification. 
One classic (meaning now quite old) text on emotions (Lutz and White 1986) identifies 
emotion as something of burgeoning interest in anthropology, and something problematic. Like 
in sociology, the emphasis is on the re-conceptualisation of emotions as social phenomena rather 
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than addressing their empirical accessibility. Attention is given (1986:430) to ethnographers’ 
own emotional responses to fieldwork; and while these responses have their uses, the emic-etic 
division between researcher and researched makes for an emotional asymmetry which has to be 
accounted for and managed. More recent articles show that related anxieties have not gone away. 
Holland (2007:195) recognises that emotion is necessary for knowledge; but seems also to 
resent this necessity, offering ‘solutions to the pains of emotion work in the field’. Blackman 
(2007) uncovers a history of ethnographic research which has been hidden by researchers 
uncomfortable with its emotional content. 
This latter piece, Blackman (2007), highlights an uncomfortable incapacity of social 
anthropology to come to terms with its own potential for emotional insight. Perhaps it is a 
discipline in which an attachment to scientific objectivity is still difficult to escape; and 
consequently the necessarily-emotional being of researchers is something which needs to be 
concealed, like a mark of shame. Blackman presents a positive and proud view of the emotions 
of fieldwork; but is still some way short of the position I argue for. This is that the enabling 
properties of ethnographic research can be celebrated as the best way, the only way, that a 
researcher-analyst can hope to understand the emotional dimensions of culture; through 
becoming an embodied part of that culture. 
In this sense emotions are not a problem about which something must be done, but an invitation 
to understanding. Helen Allen (2006) has made a similar point in the context of nursing practice, 
and specifically in relation to experiences of infertility. Proposing the importance of an 
ethnographic approach to emotions-research in such a context makes intuitive sense in a way 
which in relation to researching a supposedly dry topic, EBHC, it probably does not. Sometimes 
I tell people that I research ‘competing accounts of scientific rationality in the context of 
bureaucratic healthcare’. In general, their responses are not to anticipate the emotional richness 
of such a topic. For some researchers – and I refer here to myself as such a person – to recognise 
and acknowledge the influence of emotions as a research principle in EB-discourse was not easily 
achieved.  
 
How to Analyse Emotion in EB-discourse. 
My first instincts, like those of others researching the topic of EBHC, were to rationalise it – to 
make it explicable in terms of rational politics and rational philosophy. Reading the literature I 
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would notice my emotional responses with puzzlement; having to take breaks to allow feelings 
without names to dissipate, so they would not distract from the proper business of research. My 
writing would break into viperish fits of indignation, to the annoyance of my supervisors, and to 
my own concern. Why could I not rationally isolate the important parts of the discourse, and 
rationally organise them into a safe scheme of analysis? Why was reading EB-literature such a 
draining activity? I wondered whether the evil eye upon me was a sign of inadequacy. But 
working on other projects – on eating disorders and infertility, both potentially upsetting topics 
– I found them, in comparison with EBHC, to be light-hearted and convivial. 
It took a long time (about three years), and personal ethnographic immersion in the discourse, 
for me to acknowledge how much of the content of EB-discourse was ‘genuinely’ emotional. It 
took longer to recognise that this emotional content could not be rationalised. And it took 
longer still to recognise how important was this emotional content to the working of the 
discourse, and finally to wonder whether it was important because it could not be rationalised. 
These processes of recognition and realisation were like an emotional coming-to-consciousness, 
and dependent on an ethnographic immersion which, being emotional, was also embodied. For 
the basic acts of participation in written discourse – reading and writing – are ultimately 
embodied acts. 
My chapter 7 can be read perhaps as the processing of raw emotion in EB-discourse into the 
rationalised form of academic-style literature. This involves one last step, which follows the 
recognition of emotion with its transcription into particular linguistic form20. Just as the cultural 
ethnographer having lived emically may pass back into an etic form when they write, the literary 
ethnographer may wish to achieve a separation between their feeling-self and their writing-self. 
This splitting of selfhood is not routinely discussed in anthropology where such emotional 
techniques remain hidden. However there can be found a precedent in the dramaturgy of Brecht, 
discussing emotional distantiation through the ‘alienation effect’ through which actors achieve 
distance from the characters they portray. He writes: 
‘Acting like this is healthier and in our view less unworthy of a thinking being; it demands a 
keen eye for what is socially important.’ 
       Brecht (trans. Willett) 1964:95. 
                                                          
20
 The equivalent process for embodiment comes by way of testimony, which I explain in chapter 6 by 
appropriating the term from its use in sociological epistemology. 
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Brechtian acting neither rejects nor feigns emotion, but makes emotion central to practice. In a 
practical way, it recognises emotion’s social relevance and makes it something to be analysed. In 
terms of reading techniques, the Brechtian-inspired view implies the need for a case-study 
approach in which particular instances of emotionality are analysed in the context of their 
occurrence. Accordingly in chapter 7 I analyse particular passages of text (some of them already 
familiar from earlier chapters) in depth. This approach allows me to display the emotional 
energy within texts; and then using the techniques of intertextuality and awareness of narrative 
to situate these emotional currents in relation to each other. 
A final thing to say on the difficulties of writing about emotion is that there is a risk in writing 
about emotions in general as if emotion were not an umbrella-term for collections of 
contextually-specific feelings. Barbalet (2001) avoids this difficulty by writing about specific 
emotions in specific contexts. I write in chapter 7 about specific emotions in EB-discourse 
where I can identify them; but I retain a general concept of emotion which can be used 
appropriately in the context of a discourse which is about rationality, and which is therefore also 
about the non-rational, which includes emotion as so-defined. The discourse is found to be 
emotionally-saturated; and the presumption is that this emotional-saturation has something to 
do with the nominal exclusion of emotion in the founding premisses of the discourse. Emotion is 
supposed to be suppressed in EBHC; but EB-discourse is found empirically to be emotionally-
saturated. The task of the analyst becomes to explain why this is so. Why is emotion everywhere, 
when it is supposed to be nowhere? 
 
4.6  Conclusion. 
The methodology for this thesis is complicated, so I have not presented it as being simple. The 
discourse around EBHC is a large topic. I analyse it in stages, and each stage has a different 
methodological explanation. The first stage is to show that it is a discourse, in the conventional 
sense of the word. The prominence of a methodological debate within the discourse compels a 
concern for reflexivity. I have answered this concern by finding space for my method within the 
field of discourse analysis; but explained that this label is appropriate because of its open-
endedness. This allows me to incorporate a diverse range of influences from narrative and 
rhetorical analysis, grounded theory, Derridean deconstruction and literary-ethnography with 
more usual discourse-analytic methods. A Foucauldian perspective underlies this congregation of 
styles. 
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In discourse analysis one searches for analytic categories; and I used Foucault’s understanding of 
familiar and unfamiliar categories to find new categories within the old ones. Having earlier 
commented on the shortcomings of political approaches for sociology, I added a discussion of 
philosophical approaches (and because of my suspicions about the use of pure-philosophy in 
sociology, removed my own philosophical analyses to an appendix). The outcomes of my 
philosophical investigations, and the identification of a true dialogue between politics and 
philosophy in EB-discourse, produced the new analytic category of dialogue. In turn, the pursuit 
of dialogue between rationality and irrationality led me to establish embodiment and emotion as 
further analytic categories. 
For the category of dialogue, a relatively straightforward methodology was available which 
adopts techniques from Bakhtin for application to EB-discourse. For embodiment, there was 
available a technique of reading-for-absence. This required some elaboration because of the 
limitations of doing literary discourse analysis, which is a form of research abstracted from 
embodiment. The concern, I explained, is to find out how the discourse mediates embodiment. 
For emotion, things are more difficult. Emotion is elusive to empirical research. To access 
emotion I have used the idea of ethnography in an innovative way to create the idea of literary 
ethnography. I am also reliant on Brecht – an unconventional influence on social research – to 
corroborate my technique for translating emotional experience into linguistic discourse. 
The methodological insights in this chapter are as important to the fabric of this thesis as the 
arguments I make about dialogue, embodiment and emotion in relation to power. They are the 
ground upon which those later arguments are built. They are empirical findings in themselves. 
The importance of ethnographic method and relevance of Brecht to the discourse-analytic 
investigation of emotion is an original contribution to empirical sociology. I have also 
highlighted a problem with the role of ‘pure’ philosophy which, if EB-discourse gives a true 
indication, poses a challenge for sociology generally. It is my impression that many sociologists 
unreflectively suppose philosophy to be a source of pure knowledge which they can use 
verbatim in their arguments. Sociologists should use philosophy freely, but always with an 
awareness that like all knowledge, its content is socially grounded.  
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Chapter 5 
Dialogue and Power in EB-discourse. 
 
 
Synopsis. 
In this chapter I analyse EB-discourse from the perspective of dialogue. To set a theoretical 
context for dialogue in relation to power, I begin by considering the difference between 
biopower and disciplinary power as imagined by Foucault, and as active powers in EB-discourse. 
I introduce Bakhtin as an influence on thinking of these power streams as dialogically related. I 
assess the dialogical properties of early medical EB-discourse, which I characterise as a quasi-
dialogue. I discuss double-voicedness as parody and as skilfully-managed ambivalence, and the 
role of dialogue in the reproduction and validation of professional identities through mutual 
difference. Considering the case of physiotherapy I discuss the suppression of dialogue, and 
subversion of EBHC. Comparing the physiotherapeutic with the medical case, I formulate a 
general argument about the operation of power stratified through dialogue. Power manifests 
through different dialogical forms in different social strata. These contexts also relate 
dialogically to each other. 
Turning attention to sociology, I argue that the role of sociology as a discipline in EB-discourse 
has been to validate and stabilise it, rather than to develop critical awareness. This has been done 
by developing the discourse into secure dialogical forms. Alongside the dialogue of rationality 
between politics and philosophy, discussed earlier, sociology has developed other ‘genuine’ 
dialogues of rationality between qualitativism and quantitativism, and between change and 
sameness. These dialogues I discuss in relation to tensions between biopower and disciplinary 
power, to show how sociologists act as mediators for power through the management of 
dialogue. I suggest that sociologists, by becoming more aware of the dialogues which structure 
their own and others’ thought, could achieve a greater critical capacity in relation to EB-
discourse, and an enhanced understanding of modern power in general. 
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5.1 Introduction. 
EB-discourse is concerned with power and characterised by dialogue. Writing of ‘Impossible 
Dialogue on Bio-power’, Mika Ojakangas (2005) discusses Focuault’s distinction between 
modern power, which is productive, and sovereign power, which is deductive. If EB-discourse 
can be imagined in Foucauldian language as a conflict between two streams of power, these 
streams would be biopower (derived from population-surveillance, developed through statistics) 
and disciplinary power (manifested in the expertise of professionals, exemplified in Foucault’s 
Birth of the Clinic (1963) by the ‘gaze’). Both of these, for Foucault, are modern and productive 
power forms. Biopower, Ojakangas says (2005:5), is ‘a positive influence on life, to optimise 
and multiply life, by subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations’. O’Farrell 
(2005:106) explains that disciplinary power historically preceded biopower but was overtaken 
by it, or became a subset of it. Foucault himself discussed the relationship between disciplinary 
power and biopower in a public lecture (on March 17 1976, in Society Must be Defended (2003)); 
but his words there are inconclusive. 
Foucault’s lecture reads like a commentary on some of the problems of evidence-basedness. 
Biopower, Foucault (2003:246) explains, intervenes at the level of social generalities. It 
institutes regulatory mechanisms which ‘establish an equilibrium, maintain an average (…) and 
compensate for variations’ within the general population. Foucault surmises that unlike 
disciplines, these regulatory mechanisms ‘no longer train individuals by working at the level of 
the body itself’1. This sets the scene for interference between biopower and disciplinary power. 
Foucault, however, comments that (2003:250) ‘the two sets of mechanisms do not exist at the 
same level. (…) They are not mutually exclusive and can be articulated with each other’. 
Medicine is at a crucial position in relation to both types of power, he observes, because of the 
link it establishes between the population and the body: 
‘medicine is a power-knowledge that can be applied to both the body and the population (…) 
and it will therefore have both disciplinary effects and regulatory effects.’ 
         Foucault 2003:252. 
Thus Foucault does not see these two sides of modern power, the disciplinary and the regulatory, 
as being in conflict. The technology of biopower, he says (2003:242), ‘does not exclude 
disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent (…) 
                                                          
1
 In EBHC however, it is precisely the conduct of the individual clinician which is attended to. 
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infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques’. This expectation of seamless 
transition underestimates the possibility for conflict over evidence-based healthcare (EBHC) 
which was to come. At the same time, it causes one to wonder whether EB-discourse really does 
express conflict, if the two types of power-knowledge are complementary arms of the same 
general phenomenon, power. There is a possibility to re-appraise Foucault’s account using the 
idea of dialogue to develop an understanding of what happened at the end of the twentieth 
century when in medicine, biopower and disciplinary power apparently clashed against each 
other. 
If, as I argue through this thesis, the discourse around EBHC takes dialogical form, and is an 
expression of the workings of power, then there is a need to make a link between the 
theorisation of power and the theorisation of dialogue in discourse. Some awareness of dialogue 
as a social principle can be found in Foucault’s writings, but only in hints and fragments which 
are not enough to put together into a theory. In his lecture of February 25th 1976 (Foucault 
2003:168), for example, Foucault said that ‘power is never anything more than a relationship 
that can, and must, be studied only by looking at the interplay between the terms of that 
relationship’. To understand power, he says, is to understand it as relational. On January 21st 
1976 (2003:51) he had spoken of a binary structure which runs through society: 
‘There are two groups, two categories of individuals, or two armies, and they are opposed to 
each other. (…) the person who is speaking is inevitably on one side or the other. (…) this 
discourse that tries to interpret the war beneath peace (…) is always a perspectival 
discourse’. 
         Foucault 2003:51-2. 
Here is the shadow of a theory of dialogue, but one committed to the reality of conflict. For 
analysing EB-discourse, a way is needed to manage the ambiguity between war and peace. What 
appears to be conflictual might appear from a different perspective as a type of co-operation. 
Just as there is relationality between the powerful and the disempowered, there is also 
relationality between different powers. To access these kinds of ambiguities through a more 
fully worked-out theory of dialogue, the obvious theoretical precedent (in discourse analysis2) is 
from Mikhail Bakhtin. A comparison between Foucault and Bakhtin is Michael Gardiner’s (1996) 
                                                          
2
 Another option is Gadamer, from hermeneutic tradition. This has been developed alongside Foucault’s 
work by Kögler (1996), but in this thesis I reserve hermeneutic theory for discussing my idea of the 
Hermeneutic Programme. 
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‘Foucault, ethics and dialogue’. Here Gardiner seeks to supplement the personal ‘ethics’ of 
Foucault’s later work (specifically The Care of the Self, 1986), which is concerned with the self-
governance of the sovereign subject, with a Bakhtinian dialogical model. As he puts it, ‘the 
relation to the other must take ontological precedence over the relation to the self’ (Gardiner 
1996:38). 
In this context it is possible to imagine dialogue as a productive process through which truth is 
created. Gardiner quotes Bakhtin: truth is not ‘to be found inside the head of an individual 
person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic 
interaction’ (ibid). This is the root of a social account of truth-production3; and if used alongside 
a Foucauldian equivalence between truth, knowledge and power, it can also be leverage for an 
account of power conducted through dialogue. To construct a thorough synthesis of Foucault’s 
and Bakhtin’s ideas is a difficult task, as Gardiner demonstrates. To use them together though, 
for the current purposes of making sociological sense of EB-discourse, is feasible. The tension 
which Gardiner identifies between the Foucauldian subject engaged in self-rationalisation, and 
the Bakhtinian subject engaged in various kinds of dialogue, is well matched to the drama of 
controversy over EBHC. To demonstrate this, it is now time to trace the dialogues which have 
been established in EB-discourse. 
 
5.2  Dialogical Forms in Medical EB-discourse. 
First, a brief reminder of what I have previously established. In chapter 2 I described how the 
EBMWG (1992) anticipated objections to their vision for EBM. These objections were indeed 
pursued by critics, leading to a series of fraught exchanges in medical literature. David Sackett 
and his colleagues emerged as the chief spokespeople on behalf of EBM, and the JECP school as 
their outspoken challengers. Sackett’s group sometimes employed conciliatory rhetoric (eg. 
Sackett et al 1996), but in general, their writing was provocative and inflammatory. The JECP 
contingent responded with polemical hostility. EBM had offered a radical approach to change in 
health practice, an approach which seems designed to inspire adversarial resistance. In hindsight, 
there is a sense of pantomime to these exchanges within medical literature; reasoned arguments 
being sideshows to creative vituperation directed at EBM, and mulish re-statements of the EBM 
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 Todorov (1984:30) writes that ‘for Bakhtin, society begins with the appearance of the second person. 
(…) If language is constitutively intersubjective (social), and if it is also essential to human existence, 
then the conclusion is inescapable: human existence is originally social’. 
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agenda. The authors themselves became frustrated with such proceedings. Miles himself 
(1997:85) characterised the situation, in condemnatory style, as a ‘dialogue of the deaf’. 
In Bakhtin studies, a distinction is sometimes made between authentic dialogue and other 
discursive forms which are not properly dialogical. Gardiner (1996:31) regards dialogical being 
as a ‘co-mingling of communion and distance’. He explains that for Bakhtin, dialogue was not 
just a principle of existence through language, but also a normative project, and something to 
aspire to. Bakhtin encouraged and valued a ‘fundamental receptivity with respect to the other’ 
so as to ‘fully grasp the dialogical nature of Being’ (1996:38). This receptivity with respect to 
the other is difficult to detect in early medical writing on EBM. Nevertheless, the incipient sides 
in the EBM debate depended upon each other for their legitimacy, even if their proceedings fall 
short of the dialogical ideal. Besides, an inspection of early EBM-writings discovers dialogical 
principles at work in other ways. 
Consider for example the EBMWG (1992), in which a basic antagonism between clinicians and 
researchers was formalised. Here an opposition is made between rigorousness of various types 
(in methodology, scientificity and appraisal) and other types of reason – understanding (of 
pathology) and sensitivity (of emotion). This opposition could be brought into question through 
the possibilities of understanding and sensitivity being themselves rigorous, or through rigorous 
methods being used thoughtfully and sensitively. But it is not, and its maintenance gives the 
piece its dialogical one-thing-versus-another coherence through which two mutually-
antagonistic sides are constructed. As well as being classically gendered, the opposition between 
rigour and non-rigour comes alongside other abrupt distinctions; new-versus-old, past-versus-
future, change-versus-sameness. Similarly, one can look at Sackett et al’s (1996:71) popular 
definition of EBM and see the advantages it confers for precipitating dialogue.  
Recall that in this definition, ‘EBM is the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current 
best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients’. In the developing 
controversy, all could agree that the making of decisions about individual patients is under 
discussion. The words conscientious, explicit and judicious give the definition certain phonemic 
and rhythmic qualities, but they do not seem to fix its meaning or to relate to the substance of 
the matter. (Nobody had seen themselves as arguing for irresponsible, badly-articulated or 
injudicious practices, after all.) Current best evidence is what people were arguing about, 
specifically the problem of what ‘evidence’ should mean, and what restrictions should apply to it. 
Leaving the difficult problem of evidence unexamined (it is the same word on both sides of the 
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definition) means that this definition can be quoted without foreclosing the interpretation of 
evidence. It is a definition which allows different interpretations and dialogue to proliferate. 
This flexibility of meaning gives the statement strength. It assists EBM to become a sign around 
which participants in EB-discourse can arrange themselves in relation to each other. 
Readers of early EBM were encouraged to think of it in terms of two clearly-identifiable 
opposing sides, each of which was coherent only in relation to the other. The details of EBM-
writing at the start indicate a willingness for writers to align themselves according to these sides 
of us-and-them. Consider Davidoff et al (1995:1085), in which the ‘widening chasm between 
what we ought to do and what we actually do’ draws up the bifurcated terms upon which the 
debate is set. In this mode of speech, where it is our understandings which are at stake, and what 
we do which is scrutinised, there is pathos and an appeal to empathy. Pity us doctors; our 
knowledge is quaint and outdated. We require sympathy and rescue, it seems to say. Help is at 
hand in the form of accessible processed data. Where this hope emerges, we is replaced abruptly 
by they. EBM informs doctors so that they can provide optimum management. They owe it to 
themselves to keep up. Equivocation between doctors as victims and doctors as beneficiaries of 
EBM is marked semantically in this way. 
Doctors are given an uncomfortable multiple role in Davidoff et al (1995), being at once the 
audience, the writing subject, the subject of writing and the quarry. It is doctors as ‘they’ which 
carries the urgent sincerity of the piece; the initial appeal to empathy being rendered less 
convincing by a disconcerting change of voice. It is notable though that Davidoff et al (1995) can 
by turns claim to represent clinicians, and distance themselves from the identity of clinician. 
Where is one to locate these doctors’ true identity? There is a gesture towards split-mindedness, 
and a tactical deployment of double-voicedness, but Davidoff et al (1995) do not leave the 
reader in doubt as to which side they are on. This clarity is mirrored in the writing of the 
immediate dialogical ‘others’ of EBM. In Miles et al (1998) for example, ‘we’ is used 
confidently and consistently to mark out those who are ‘called to the noble ideal of clinical 
practice’ (1998:264). These writers echo Shahar’s (1998) claim to speak for a greater ‘we’, the 
population of ‘busy doctors who have not the (…) courage to publicise their views’ (Miles et al 
1998:264). ‘They’ is used to signify the proponents of EBM, re-asserted as oppositional to 
clinicians. 
The explicit argument of Miles et al (1998) is that the ‘scientific’ and ‘practical’ schools of 
thought are irreconcilable (1998:260). The authors also make a sequence of dualistic distinctions; 
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medicine from science, local from national, practicable from abstracted, responsive from clumsy, 
human from inhuman (1998:261-2). Placing themselves on the positive side of these distinctions, 
they echo and invert Davidoff et al’s (1995) argument; for the advocacy of EBM is made on the 
basis of similar distinctions, with a simple inversion of values. Both sides see themselves on the 
just side of these distinctions, and their counterparts as corrupted and unreasonable. With the 
two ‘sides’ sharing conceptual apparatus, there is little space for true dialogue to develop. For 
advocates of EBM, the superiority of Evidence must be protected, and rhetorical concessions to 
expertise carefully qualified. For those who resist, expertise must be protected, and rhetorical 
calls for collaboration made only with caveats which prioritise the clinic. Each side bolsters the 
other in the ratification of its own identity. In this quasi-dialogue there is no space for the 
syncretic union of opposing principles, but only repeated insistence from each that the other is 
senseless. 
In this context, Sackett and Rosenberg et al’s (1996) use of the concept of ‘integration’ to 
address the conflict between clinical expertise and external evidence befits scrutiny. They 
explain: 
‘Good doctors use both individual clinical expertise and the best available external evidence, 
and neither alone is enough. Without expertise, practice risks being tyrannised by evidence, 
for even excellent evidence may be inapplicable to or inappropriate for an individual patient. 
Without current best evidence, practice risks becoming rapidly out of date.’ 
        Sackett et al 1996:71. 
Here Sackett et al (1996) formulate an asymmetrical relation between expertise and evidence. 
The two are dependent on each other for having usefulness; but evidence has a terrible capacity 
to tyrannise, whereas expertise leads to decay. What might be presented as a relation of equality 
actually suggests an admiration for evidence rather than expertise. The devaluation of expertise 
is smuggled through by rhetorical sleight-of-hand. This becomes clearer in the latter half of 
Sackett et al (1996), which gives an account of EBM in terms of ‘what it is not’. There are 
paragraphs on the valiant attempts of clinicians to stay up-to-date with medical advances; on the 
necessity of expertise for interpreting the applicability of research; and on the possibility of 
hijack of EBM by scheming healthcare purchasers and service managers for cost-cutting purposes. 
Rather than educing an integration of expertise and evidence, which would mean melding them 
harmoniously together, these sections are such as to suggest that evidence and expertise remain 
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separate and in mutual competition. Expertise emerges not as something valuable in itself, but 
an archaic and inadequate instrument for repelling the inevitable advances of evidence; for it is 
repeated that research evidence has the power both to invalidate experiential knowledge and to 
replace it (1996:72). The idea of integration reproduces the dichotomy of research against 
expertise by asserting that the two are naturally distinct, and that reconciling them is indeed 
problematic. It then acts as a vehicle to re-frame evidence as dominant and expertise as 
submissive. The controversy may then proceed in the same manner as before, but with 
integration as a new focal point for the intensification of debate. It is not a syncretic type of 
integration which imagines resolution, but an antagonistic type which imagines ever-renewed 
conflict. 
 
Dialogue as a Form of Presentation: Double-Voicedness. 
Under these conditions of rhetorical exchange, readers might not expect anything other than the 
same arguments, re-packaged and repeated in various ways. An alternative to identifying plainly 
with one side in the EBM controversy, and directing arguments against another who is not 
immediately represented, is to present an account of EBM in dialogical form. In such writing, 
the objections to or tenets of EBM are considered by being listed and then formally dismissed. 
An early example of this dialogical format is Grahame-Smith’s (1995) ‘Socratic Dissent’ in 
which EBM-advocates, belittled by caricature, are given a philosophical lesson. Straus and 
McAlister (2000) used a similar format for their ‘commentary on the criticisms’ levelled against 
EBM by the JECP school. Using this technique, writers retain control over the presentation of 
the adversarial position while (trying to) maintain an appearance of objectivity4.  
In Straus and McAlister’s (2000) case, this means that objections to EBM are raised in a way 
which disarms them from the start. The reduction of objections to nothing means that they 
either evaporate (in the case of difficulties of extrapolation from evidence, learning EBM skills, 
limits on resources), or themselves become arguments for evidence-basedness (in the case of 
shortage of usable evidence, financial barriers, and paucity of evidence to justify EBM). Of 
interest to the theorist of dialogue is the notion of double-voicedness. In ‘Discourse in the Novel’ 
(Bakhtin 1981:324), Bakhtin writes about double-voiced discourse which ‘serves two speakers 
at the same time and expresses simultaneously two different intentions’. There are two voices 
                                                          
4
 Other examples of this strategy are Cohen et al (2004), Gibbs and Gambrill (2002). 
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which ‘know about each other (…) as if they actually hold a conversation with each other’. The 
voices referred to are those of author (narrator) and character in the novel.  
How can Bakhtin’s concern apply to EB-writing which is in dialogical form? There is an author 
whose adversaries in EBM-debate appear as characters in the written work; but such characters 
are included only as a foil for the author’s monological view. Their role is to be made fools of. 
Bakhtin was suspicious of such false double-voicedness, such false dialogue. He (1981:325) 
scorned ‘rhetorical genres’, which are ‘at best merely a distanced echo of [dialogical] becoming, 
narrowed down to individual polemic’. This description fits the rhetoric of EB-writing in which 
dialogue is set up in such a way as to be resolved into monologue. Writing in which the ‘other’ 
is represented in the terms of the narrating-self, not given its own voice, is not authentically 
dialogical, nor double-voiced. 
Such pieces which are presented as dialogue might not be double-voiced in the way that is 
claimed for them, but this does not mean that they are not double-voiced at all. A more genuine 
type of double-voicedness can be found in dialogically-presented EB-writing, although it is more 
subtle, and might escape the notice of authors’ conscious intentions. To take as an example 
Straus and McAlister’s (2000) defence of EBM; they present criticisms of EBM not as given, but 
in terms compatible with the values of EBM. This makes the criticisms easy to deal with; too 
easy, perhaps, for the collapse of the criticisms into nothing means that there is nothing left to 
argue against, no grounds for the dialogue constructed. This leads Straus and McAlister to 
undermine their own position.  
They manoeuvre themselves into a task of having to explain the tautology that ‘patients who 
receive proven efficacious therapies have better outcomes than those who do not’; and to argue 
tendentiously that EBM is a concept which originates in practice, not in research (2000:839). 
Such moves as these short-circuit the oppositional dynamic upon which EB-discourse depends. 
Without privileging evidence of provenance external to the clinic, little remains to be discussed. 
The effect produced by the dissolution of dialogical positions can be to erode one’s confidence in 
EBM as a coherent idea. Straus and McAlister (2000) illustrate this themselves at the end of their 
essay. Having delivered an unqualified assault on EBM’s detractors, they conclude that EBM 
does have limitations, and that further innovation and study are required (2000:840).  
Here is the curious double-voicedness of EB-discourse; authors who set out to defend EBM can 
find themselves attacking it, or providing the ammunition for others to do so. Equally, nominal 
critique of EBM can have the effect of sustaining and strengthening it. In the appendix I discuss 
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the issue of detractors from EBM using principles of evidence-basedness to argue against 
evidence-basedness. This is crystallised in the case of the Evidence Paradox, where some call 
explicitly for EBM itself to be justified in strictly evidence-based terms. In its early stages, this is 
the quasi-dialogical mechanism of EB-discourse. Two sides are set up in opposition to each other. 
They guarantee each other’s validity, not by explicitly imagining each other as straw men, but 
each by tacitly taking the other seriously. They are produced by the dialogical splitting of power, 
and being finally inseparable, there is some ultimate sense in which they are one and the same. 
 
Developing Double-Voicedness into Parody. 
Such a situation would stagnate, or repeat itself, if not given opportunity to mature from quasi-
dialogue into dialogue ‘proper’. This maturation began to happen where writers did not position 
themselves on one side or the other, but on both at once, as was the case at first for Trisha 
Greenhalgh. An early piece of hers (Greenhalgh 1996) was addressed to doctors, imagined as 
anxious to be seen to meet the requirements of EBM. In EBM-style, she provided a checklist of 
six action-points for clinical encounters. The inflection of her writing is initially optimistic for 
the implementation of EBM. Unpicking her own checklist, she then uncovers a succession of 
difficulties which she does not enumerate in a list, but presents qualitatively5.  
In this short article, Greenhalgh writes with two distinct voices. The problems she raises in her 
closing section, which are broadly the same problems expressed across critical literature on 
EBM, undermine her opening section. If these two sections were run together, the piece could 
become incoherent. What helps to prevent this from happening is a stylistic difference of voice: 
the use of statistics and a numbered list on one side, the use of paragraphs and narratively-
structured argument on the other. As well as allowing the two sides to balance each other, this 
differential technique marshals two competing audiences at the same time. One audience 
interested in lists, (ac)countability and the establishment of protocol; one audience interested in 
complexity, contingency and variability.  
There are different take-home messages for each readership: one in favour of discipline and self-
surveillance, the other reassured that practice is beyond the grasp of crude regulatory 
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 First, there is a problem of complexity: clinical problems ‘do not lend themselves to the formulation of 
single answerable questions’ (1996:958) in the way expected in EBM. Second, there is a problem of 
reconciling patients’ preferences with such evidence as exists, and accounting for this process. Third, 
there is a problem of audit, in which attempts to measure evidence-basedness are shown to be limiting 
and distorting. 
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mechanisms. Although these audiences are configured in oppositional contrast, it is apparent 
that somehow they can also co-exist comfortably, even within the same reader or writer, each 
with a functional measure of disregard for the other. How different are these voices from each 
other? They might appear to be opposite extremes, antitheses of each other, connected through 
mutual difference. They might also carry equal weight; the all-seeing confidence of biopower, 
expressed through EBM, and the assurance of discipline, expressed through clinical expertise.  
Bakhtin (1981:325) is scornful of ‘rhetorical double-voicedness, cut off from any process of 
linguistic stratification’ where the ‘exchanges in the dialogue are immanent to a single unitary 
language’. This is ‘merely a game’, he says. A ‘tempest in a teapot’ (ibid). Hirschkop’s (2004:53) 
appraisal of Bakhtin emphasises the idea of parody in this context. Extreme double-voicedness, 
Hirschkop says, ‘can become parody, which means that the narrative context undermines the 
meaning intended by the speaker’. Perhaps this would be appropriate to pieces like Greenhalgh 
(1996) where the narrative context offers two extremes which are mirrored by a contrast in 
voices. To compare again BMJ advocacies with JECP detractions of EBM, these two sides 
presuppose and construct each other; but they can also be read as parodies of each other. 
 
Managing Double-Voicedness as Ambivalence. 
The ambiguities and double-voicedness of EBM might be expected to produce ambivalence 
within individual authors who are drawn to both sides. As the discourse around EBM developed, 
authors demonstrated skill at managing the possibility of ambivalence in their prose. Sandra 
Tanenbaum’s (1999) critique of EBM in Academic Medicine illustrates this skill at work. Indignant 
at the disenfranchisement of the medical profession which ‘no longer owns the knowledge it 
needs’ (1999:758), she makes a call to arms: ‘we must define and defend what professionals 
know’ (1999:762). The ambivalent content of the article relates to the issues of probabilistic 
thinking and rule-following. Tanenbaum acknowledges probabilistic thinking on both sides of 
the evidence-expertise dyad. Professionals make projections based on the experiential 
recognition of patterns; evidentialists make projections based on aggregate data.  
The two are distinguished, good from bad, by association with other categories: statistical 
probabilism is detached from causal principles, and attached to an impossible desire for certainty. 
Clinical probabilism remains determinist, and accepts uncertainty. It thus has a rootedness and 
emotional maturity which is lacking from the statistical probabilism of EBM (1999:760-1). 
116 
 
Tanenbaum goes on to make further bifurcations: professionals have ‘wisdom’ where EBM 
provides mere knowledge. Professionals make ‘interpretations’ where statistics offer none. EBM 
induces rule-following, whereas professionalism intuits whether or not the rules should be 
followed (1999:761). All of these bifurcations can be challenged. As discussed in the appendix, 
statistical probabilism might not be able do without a tacit concept of causation; statistics might 
not provide certainty, but a measure of uncertainty; wisdom and knowledge might not be so 
easy to separate, but be inter-dependent; data might be theory-laden, not outside of 
interpretation; knowing whether to deviate from a rule might imply the adduction of further 
rules6.  
The sides which Tanenbaum takes on each of these issues reflect and secure her social identity as 
a clinician. The ambivalences to which she offers resolutions contribute to the maintenance of a 
boundary between research and practice; and so to the simultaneous maintenance of 
evidentialists and experts, researchers and clinicians, as mutually-different professional identities. 
The ambivalent balance in Tanenbaum (1999) is brought to consummation in her conclusion, 
where the clinician-professional is presented as embodying a type of perfection. Professional 
knowledge is ‘large enough to make sense of all it contains, and yet also small enough never to 
lose sight of the individual case’ (1999:762). Notwithstanding Tanenbaum’s previous 
maintenance of the distinction, professional knowledge is ‘in fact inclusive of probabilistic 
research’ (ibid).  
With these oppositions transcended, there is no further grounds for mediation, and apparently 
nothing more to worry about, for clinical practice is both one thing, and the other. This seems a 
convenient resolution. Tanenbaum’s (1999) case is illustrative of those who write from a 
position of clear professional identity determined by practice. It says, I work in a clinic with 
patients, therefore I am a clinician, and resistant to EBM; you work in a laboratory with statistics, 
therefore you are a researcher, and receptive to EBM. The dialogical positions associated with 
these professional identities re-produce the identities in opposition to each other. Tanenbaum’s 
(1999) article illustrates the development of a dialogue in the service of power. In it, dialogical 
positions, directly identifiable with socially-differentiated statuses, are skilfully maintained.  
Tanenbaum criticises EBM; but through her argument both powerful factions, clinicians and 
researchers, have their identities validated. In comparison with other writings in the quasi-
                                                          
6
 See Bloor’s (2001) discussion of rule-following after Wittgenstein, for a rebuttal of Tanenbaum’s edict 
(1999:762) that ‘one cannot use a rule to decide to use a rule’. Her view of experts ‘acting on 
expectancies’ is a type of rule-following. 
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dialogue I have discussed, Tanenbaum progresses the debate in its theoretical sophistication. As 
in other cases I have discussed, this progression owes something to a move into philosophical 
terrain. The nature of knowledge, and the practical merits of different knowledge types, are 
Tanenbaum’s currency for placing her argument on one side rather than the other. As indicated 
in chapter 2, a prime mover in the philosophication of medical EB-discourse is Ross Upshur. In 
that chapter I suggested that Upshur’s early writings on EBM, being so knowingly Philosophical, 
can be read as a satire on both the BMJ and JECP schools. In light of Tanenbaum (1999) and 
others who were developing practical philosophies of EBM, one can re-read Upshur’s path 
through EBM-writing in dialogical terms. 
Recall that Upshur’s literary career through EBM is a hopscotch of philosophical perspectives. 
From Quine-Duhem and abductive pragmatism, via Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Bayesianism, 
fallibilism, and thence to epistemological typologies of research and clinical knowledge, Upshur 
used a wide range of philosophical voices. In the earlier stages of Upshur, his facility with 
philosophy allowed him to dissociate from both sides of EBM, and so to step outside the binary 
system of medical EB-discourse. Upshur’s skill was to keep both sides in suspense, making both 
seem simultaneously legitimate and not. In Bakhtinian terms (after Discourse in the Novel), his 
strategy was to deploy a heteroglossia of philosophies, and in so doing to build a dialogue 
between higher and lower cultural forms. The higher (sacred) form was philosophical and the 
lower form non-philosophical, being political, polemical and profane. Upshur laid the 
foundations for the expansion of EB-discourse outside the dichotomies of evidence-versus-
practice and research-versus-clinic, an expansion crucial to its continuation and development. 
Others built on these foundations, as Upshur identified gradually more with a clinical 
perspective. He joined in with the dialogue which at first he had called to question – joining 
clinicians at the barricades, as Sackett et al (1996) would have it. His giving up on seeking a 
philosophy of EBM meant giving up on EBM itself, denouncing it in the crudely-dialogical 
fashion of anti-EBM polemics (Upshur 2005). In Upshur (2002) – if not evidence, then what? – he 
had proffered the principle of dialogue as a solution to the EBM controversy, in the hope that a 
true and mature dialogue between research and clinic could ameliorate the conflict. I suggest 
that the dialogical principle runs too deep in EB-discourse to provide such a convenient solution. 
Dialogue cannot be brought in to solve the problems of EBM because dialogue underlies, 
nourishes, sustains and directs the problems of EBM in their construction. As such it is best used 
to help understand EB-discourse, not to resolve it on its own terms.  
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As I have said, the sociological task is not to resolve EBM, but to understand how its problems 
are constructed and legitimated as problems. In the years which followed Upshur’s commitment 
to a clinical identity, the dominant theme in medical EB-discourse is a reluctance to let the 
debate rest. Sackett had absented himself from proceedings, but the commitment to 
continuation of the debate was as strong as ever in the JECP. Here, moderately pro-EBM 
writings were scattered amongst more traditional anti-EBM fare. This is evidence that the 
functionally important and sociologically significant aspect of EBM-related debate is not its 
resolution, but its continuation. Medical EBM was the seedbed for strands of the discourse 
which would flourish in other contexts. Upshur’s concern for philosophy, for example, did not 
take deepest root in medicine, but in sociology, where it has developed in dialogue with politics, 
as discussed in chapter 3. Before returning to sociology, I now consider physiotherapy as a 
context for the proceedings of EBP in a health profession allied to medicine. 
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5.3 Physiotherapy: Harsh Ambivalence and Violent Dialogue. 
A Professional Context for Dialogical Understanding. 
Nicholls and Cheek’s (2006) genealogy of the formation of the Society of Trained Masseuses, 
engineered by doctors in 1894, gives an account of the beginning of the physiotherapy 
profession in the UK. The profession began as a specialist form of nursing for women7 operating 
under medical patronage. Ovretveit (1985) addresses the question of physiotherapeutic 
autonomy from medicine. He distinguishes between an all-or-none conception of professional 
autonomy which he attributes principally to Freidson, and an alternative conception of 
autonomy-by-degrees. He reports that the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s saw physiotherapists gain 
measures of self-management in the NHS. While these changes represent an increase in various 
aspects of autonomy, Ovretveit (1985) points out that such gains have taken place in areas which 
endorse, rather than threaten, the overall dominance of medical discourses. There is more 
reason to suppose that gains in autonomy have come through complicity with medical models 
than through posing challenges. Ovretveit’s analysis lends support to Freidson’s scheme of the 
preservation of medical power. 
Physiotherapy in the UK remains sheltered by medical patronage. Physiotherapists in the UK are 
trained by the state and generally spend some years working in NHS hospitals after qualifying, 
before potentially moving into private practice8. Medical endorsement sets physiotherapy apart 
from external competition (osteopathy and chiropractice – see Barnard and Wiles 2000), but it 
is defended also from competition internal to the ‘allied professions’ (nursing and occupational 
therapy – Higgs et al 2001, Jones 2006). In this context, the interests of physiotherapy as a 
profession are served by alignment with imperatives perceived to come from medicine, of which 
EBP is an example. Alongside compatibility-with-medicine, there is perceived a need for 
physiotherapy to be understood as different-enough from medicine to be autonomous, and also 
different from whatever osteopathy, chiropractice, nursing and occupational therapy might offer 
instead. In EB-discourse in physiotherapy, physiotherapists situate themselves and each other in 
relation to the symbolism of Evidence so as to protect their institutional status from these 
various competitive threats. Consequently EB-discourse in physiotherapy, just as in medicine, is 
                                                          
7
 Men were admitted to the profession in 1920 but the profession remains predominantly female. In the 
UK, 80% of physiotherapists are female (Health Professions Council: http://www.hpc-
uk.org/publications/index.asp?id=453 accessed 13/10/11). 
8
 60% of chartered physiotherapists work in the NHS. See CSP presentation to NHS pay review body, 
November 2010. http://www.csp.org.uk/sites/files/csp/secure/csp_evidence_PRB2011_12_0.pdf 
accessed 19/7/12. 
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a manifestation of power. To analyse the mechanisms of this discourse is to analyse power at 
work. 
It is reasonable to begin by thinking of EBP as a broadening of EBM, and as physiotherapeutic 
EB-discourse formed in dialogical response to EB-discourse in medicine. The basic problems are 
the same: the reconciliation of research knowledge with clinical and practical knowledge, and 
the bringing of research into practice. There are also stylistic continuities between the contexts. 
Bury’s (1996) editorial urging physiotherapists to embrace EBP is reminiscent of Sackett’s 
passionate pieces in the BMJ. In terms of dialogical rhetoric, an immediate point of interest is 
the frequency with which Bury (1996) uses ‘not’ sentences to produce her argument. This was a 
strategy of Sackett’s (especially 1996: ‘EBM – what it is and what it isn’t’9), and of Greenhalgh’s 
(1999), among others in EBM. Bury says: 
‘[EBP] is not just another buzz-word (…). It is here to stay (…).’ 
         Bury 1996:75 
‘A clinician is not expected to exclude all prior knowledge (…)’ 
‘Good clinical practice is not ignored or devalued (…)’ 
‘I am not saying that practices without evidence should be discarded.’ 
         Bury 1996:76 
Thus it is that EBP is definitively put forth as a series of things not-done, not-thought and not-
said. To practice EBP is to not exclude prior knowledge; it is to not devalue practice; it is to not 
discard practices; and elsewhere in Bury (1996), it is to not be frightened. 
Such writing, while expressing conditions of not-being with particular acuity, continues stylistic 
trends found in medicine. This similarity being noted, differences of dialogue between EB-
discourse in medicine and physiotherapy also present themselves. Bury’s (1996) piece is 
addressed to an identified other – physiotherapists who would be sceptical of EBP – but with an 
aggressive determination which is absent from equivalent medical pieces. The BMJ and JECP 
schools wrote provocatively and authoritatively, but in a manner such as to invite and encourage, 
even demand responses, towards the continuation of debate. Bury (1996) pre-empts criticism 
                                                          
9
 This motif was repeated by Bhandari and Giannoudis (2006) in ‘Evidence-Based Medicine. What it is 
and is not’, which makes no reference to the influential Sackett et al (1996) paper of the same title. 
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and closes debate; never mind the arguments, she says. We (physiotherapists) must embrace 
EBP no matter what. Resistance or critical thought are not permissible.  
To illustrate this point further consider Turner and Whitfield’s (1997, 1999) study10. Their 
punitive appraisal of physiotherapy can be contrasted with surveillance of doctors for evidence-
basedness. Cranney et al’s (2001) study of ‘why GPs do not implement evidence-based 
guidelines’ is perhaps patronising to doctors, but not demonising. Freeman and Sweeney’s 
(2001:3) study vindicates GPs who see research evidence as a ‘square peg for a round hole’11. 
Turner and Whitfield’s approach might be likened to previous sociological critiques of medicine 
for being unscientific; but is different in that it came from within the physiotherapy profession, 
not from outside. It is different in that it did not elicit a sympathetic defence and validation of 
physiotherapists’ reasoning techniques, but a collective concern to be seen as appreciative of 
research evidence, irrespective of the problems with evidence-basedness which were apparent 
elsewhere. This indicates a different dialogical dynamic within physiotherapy to that which had 
developed in medicine. 
As I showed in chapter 2, it is not the case that physiotherapists did not see problems with EBP. 
Barnard and Wiles’ studies (2000, 2001) and pieces like Bithell (2000) and Hurley (2000) show 
that they did. But in comparison with the output of the JECP in the late 1990s, the nature of 
these writings suggests a different emotional climate. Instead of indignation, anger and self-
confidence there was guilt, shame and self-doubt. The symmetrical double-voicedness of 
medical EB-discourse gave way to authoritarian monologism, where the dialogical-other (dissent 
to EBP) was suppressed. Instead of being channelled into some (however inauthentic) form of 
dialogue, dissent was silenced. Violence is an appropriate metaphor for this process 12; the 
symbolic violence of not allowing the other to speak, or the internalised violence of not allowing 
oneself to think certain thoughts. Where in medicine incipient-dialogue led to the skilful 
management of ambivalence, in physiotherapy the violent denial of dialogue led to harsh 
ambivalence. Some examples of this are given in chapter 2, but a more detailed example, which 
applies across allied health professions, follows here. 
                                                          
10
 Recall that Turner and Whitfield surveyed therapists’ reasoning methods in order to portray the 
profession as lacking in scientific credentials. This led to a series of responses (Jette et al (2003), 
Stevenson et al (2004), Iles and Davidson (2006) and Grimmer-Somers et al (2007)) which re-affirmed 
a collective positive attitude to research evidence in physiotherapy. 
11
 Other examples are McColl et al (1998), Green and Ruff (2005). 
12
 Bourdieu (1991), Bauman (2002), Zizek (2009) and others have used the notion of violence in this 
way. 
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In the review article of Swinkels et al (2002), the status of EBP in physiotherapy, midwifery, 
nursing and social work is considered. EBP is introduced as ‘being rapidly and universally 
adopted by public sector professions’ (2002:335), and something whose ‘acceptance and 
expansion may be considered unparalleled within health and social care’ (2002:336). This 
celebratory tone gives way to a less assured voice as within each professional context, doubt 
materialises. In physiotherapy, patient preference retains priority over policy-driven influences; 
in midwifery, the value of empirical evidence is queried; in nursing, an anti-evidence movement 
is gathering momentum; in social work, the anti-science lobby is strong. While the ostensible 
mood of writing remains breezy and positive, the reasons for optimism become less clear, and 
dialogical cracks in the narrative widen.  
EBP is ‘intuitively and intellectually appealing and a natural product of the times’ (2002:336); 
and yet it is not natural, but ‘ethical and economical’ (2002:342) and therefore social. It is 
refreshingly new, yet reassuringly old. While EBP is broadly accepted, and professions have 
produced forests of written approval for it, practices themselves have not changed (2002:342). 
RCTs are the epitome of an unchallengeable research method; and yet nobody finds them useful 
(2002:343). EBP is the responsibility of the professions; but it must be carried forward by non-
practising academics (2002:343). Although EBP, by definition, restricts the autonomy of 
practitioners, it remains ‘fair to speculate that in due course (it) may empower professions’ 
(2002:343). This last short phrase contains multiple caveats to the empowerment of professions. 
Such tentative optimism moves the reader firmly into a position of doubt.  
Perhaps this is something the authors are also aware of. Wistfully they offer their assurance, 
despite the many questions over EBP, that there is ‘no turning back’ (2002:342). This 
articulation of the possibility of turning back dances before the mind. Would it be wrong to 
think of turning back? Of course, it would. Once again, there is an unexpected double-
voicedness to this writing. Instead of being ambivalently-managed, it is a double-voicedness in 
which suppressed meaning seems to escape by subverting the meaning intended by the author. 
Or perhaps, the author allows their meaning to be subverted. Swinkels et al (2002) are almost 
playful in the way they balance up each side of the issue, and leave the drama unresolved.  
This playfulness might influence the reading of other allied-professional writing in which the 
propriety of EBP is aggressively and violently asserted. When Turner and Whitfield (1999) 
foretell the demise of physiotherapy, when Jette (2005) says the profession is in peril, when 
Jones (2006) advises physiotherapists to abandon humility, they seek dramatic impact which is 
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not commensurate with the technical content of their writing. The practical and theoretical 
intricacies of evidence-basedness are not discussed, the urgency of EBP instead being brutally 
asserted. To caricature such writing is to miss the sense in which it is already dramatic caricature. 
The reluctance of Bithell (2000), Hurley (2000) and Grimmer et al (2004) to criticise EBP 
leaves a stronger impression still of a desire to criticise it, a desire which speaks although it dare 
not speak. 
 
EB-discourse and Medical Power/Knowledge. 
Less playful than Swinkels et al (2002), but similarly disconcerting, is Di Newham’s (1997) 
opinion-piece which explains the absolute need for EBP in physiotherapy. She presents a curious 
type of ambivalence: 
‘In what appears to be a permanent state of change it is important that what might be seen as 
‘yet another directive from above’ does not engender resistance. (…) It is important that we 
embrace the need for research and that this is seen as a grass roots movement, rather than the 
result of pressure from above.’ 
       Newham 1997:5, emphasis added. 
The effect produced here is not one of sincere confidence in EBP, but one of having to repress 
doubts for the sake of appearances. Repetition suggests that these doubts are present to the mind 
of the writer. The narrative is a complex one in which again, it is not what is meant that is said, 
but in which the opposite of what is meant is not-said, or not-thought. The principal issue at 
stake is not what it is better for physiotherapists to do, but what it is better for them to be seen 
to do. 
Newham continues along this path, revealing other areas of anxiety: 
‘(Physiotherapy) prides itself on being practical. This is perfectly right and proper – so long 
as practicality is not thought to be mutually exclusive with research. (…) The knowledge and 
skills necessary for research are easily within the intellectual ability of physiotherapists.’ 
         Newham 1997:6. 
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‘There is something about the clinical environment which, inexplicably and incorrectly, 
tends to condition clinicians of all disciplines to think that not knowing all the answers is a 
sign of ignorance or stupidity.’ 
         Newham 1997:8. 
The suggestions brought into the narrative by these statements are, respectively, that practicality 
and research are inherently opposed; that physiotherapists are not capable of intellectual 
engagement; and that clinicians are ignorant and stupid. All these are thoughts which Newham 
explicitly does not mean to encourage, but to which, by accident or design, she draws attention. 
While these doubts about the competence of clinicians are familiar from medical EB-discourse, 
they are expressed there by those who identify as pro-EBM and as anti-expertise. In 
physiotherapy, it is clinicians themselves who are caught in self-doubt; who encourage 
themselves to believe that they might be incapable of correct thought. This is a tangible 
difference between the discourses of EBM in medical contexts, and EBP in allied-health contexts, 
and one in which the reproduction of medical power-knowledge is displayed. 
EB-discourse manifests different dialogues in different contexts. These different dialogues reflect 
different types of power at work. In Foucauldian terms, one can proclaim that the discourse in 
medicine feels productive; it simultaneously validates the work of clinicians and researchers, 
reproducing the identitities of both in opposition to each other. In physiotherapy, and perhaps in 
other professions, the discourse has some repressive properties. It makes clinicians doubt 
themselves, it convinces them that they are of inferior status to doctors, and that without 
medical patronage they could not function. This repressive sovereign power, viewed from 
another perspective, has productive features. It reproduces disciplines as allied-health 
professions, as subsidiaries of medicine. One might ask, which disciplines have come to grief in 
the twenty years of EB-discourse? Apparently none have, and certainly physiotherapy has not, 
despite dire warnings13.  
In medicine, the path through EB-discourse has been negotiated by a symmetrical quasi-dialogue. 
In physiotherapy, it has been negotiated through vociferous insistence-upon EBP, suppression of 
dialogue, and subversion of the nominally-dominant perspective. A sociological question follows 
from this suppression of dialogue. In medicine, EB-discourse brings into being two well-
                                                          
13
 From the records of registrants at the health and care professions council, http://www.hpc-
uk.org/aboutregistration/theregister/oldstats/index.asp, it is evident that physiotherapist registrations 
doubled from 1992 to 2012, just as they had doubled from 1972 to 1992. Accessed 19/6/2013. 
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matched forces, clinicians and researchers, imagined to be in oppositional conflict. In 
physiotherapy, just as in medicine, it hypothesises just such a clear division of identity between 
researchers and clinicians, which is to be managed. This division is the foundation of review 
articles such as Schreiber & Stern (2005) although it has also been expressed in the terms of a 
‘theory-practice gap’, for example by Roskell et al (1998). How is it that in the case of medicine 
this leads to the proliferation of vigorous writing from both sides, but leads in the case of 
physiotherapy to the apparent subduction of clinical resistance, which is expressed instead 
through a subversion of narrative?  
A mechanism for this difference of dialogical form can be suggested which concerns again the 
issue of philosophy. I have suggested above that the development of a philosophical dimension to 
EB-discourse in medicine was important for transcending the tit-for-tat polemics, the quasi-
dialogue of EBM-advocacy and detraction. It is significant that the philosophical dimension is 
absent from physiotherapeutic EB-discourse. Consider Stack’s (2006) editorial, which was 
perhaps the first confident unapologetic rejection of EBP in physiotherapy. This piece made an 
unconcealed parody of EBP on the basis of its practical inutility. (Other pieces had made 
arguments around the practical inutility of EBP, but been framed as endorsements of EBP.) The 
substance of Stack’s editorial piece is still political rather than philosophical; EBP is argued to be 
politically flawed because it does not play to the strengths of physiotherapy, which are craft 
knowledge, adaptability and sensitivity to patients.  
In other physiotherapeutic works discussed, advocacy of EBP is made in spite of its listed 
shortcomings, and in accordance with anticipated political gains. Stack brings these political 
gains into dispute. Philosophical discussions are disconnected from these proceedings. Perhaps 
there is less need for EBP than EBM to be disguised by seemingly non-political presentation: 
allied professions have less power then medicine, and with less professional power comes less 
moral responsibility. At the same time, it seems that physiotherapists are denied access to the 
philosophical domain, a domain which facilitates the sublimation of EB-discourse into a higher 
academic form. EB-discourse manifests different dialogues in different social strata, and in so 
doing, reproduces social stratification. There is dialogue within levels and dialogue between 
levels, as a reflection of power-hierarchies.  
These formations of dialogue, as well as being related to Power, are of interest from a 
Bakhtinian theoretical perspective. In this thesis I have been using Bakhtin as a social and a 
literary theorist, in accordance with my identification as an analyst of discourse. In the above 
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discussion I have drawn attention to contingencies of dialogue in EB-discourse as it has 
developed in social life14. The dialogical nature of language is not something which can be 
switched off at the will of the speaker, but something which pervades all communication and 
thought. Dialogue as an essence-of-social-being cannot be switched off by power; but perhaps 
power can channel it in particular directions. EB-discourse is powerful but it does not proceed 
through monological expression, generating consensus. It proceeds through the construction of 
dialogue, generating and regulating conflict. This conflict channels the productive energies of 
people whose identities are dialogically differentiated. By this mechanism, social institutions are 
preserved and defended. 
 
  
                                                          
14
 Bakhtin is increasingly recognised in social and cultural theory, but this does not detract from his 
status as a theorist of language. As Holquist (in Bakhtin 1981:xviii) writes, Bakhtin’s concept of 
language concerns a ‘sense of opposition and struggle at the heart of existence’. 
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5.4 Dialogue and EB-discourse in Sociology. 
In dialogues of EBHC, researchers and clinicians’ debating positions reflect their professional 
identities, but this is less clearly the case for sociologists. In chapter 3 I recounted some 
sociologists’ strategies for engaging with EB-discourse. For example, some sociologists looked 
to bring a positive awareness of qualitative methods into medical research hierarchies. Others 
interested themselves in EBM in relation to change-management. For some sociological writers 
EBM held the possibility of bringing medical power, a long-time target of sociological critique, 
to account. Sociologists had ambivalent reservations about EBM, but still hoped to make 
alliances with it. I indicated that in this respect, the origins of EBM within medicine posed a 
particular problem. Might EBM not be a Trojan Horse for medical interests? 
Like many clinicians, sociologists were indeed distrustful of EBM. But those who were 
suspicious still took EBM seriously (although not everybody was willing to do so). While 
sociologists produced social accounts of clinical knowledge-work, clinicians embraced sociology 
as a space for critique of EBHC15. In sociological EB-discourse, just as in clinical EB-discourse, 
there is space for both advocacy and dissidence. Remember though that the effect of EB-
discourse over 20 years has been, through dialogue and disagreement, to preserve and defend 
healthcare institutions. The argument I make in this section, which is the final major point to 
make in this chapter, is that in sum, sociology has played a validatory and stabilising role in EB-
discourse.  
 
Legitimating the Carnivalesque. 
As I have said, sociological EB-discourse has not just corroborated the terms of clinical EB-
discourse, but also has been instrumental in its development from quasi-dialogue to more secure 
dialogical forms (forms for which one might use Gardiner’s (2004:33) phrase ‘genuine 
dialogue’). One general way in which sociology has rubber-stamped EB-discourse can be 
narrated in terms of Bakhtin’s notion of carnivalesque. In ‘Rabelais and His World’ (Bakhtin 1984) 
Bakhtin develops his thoughts on the carnivalesque in which discourses of officialdom are 
subverted by drawing on the comic, ironic and parodic capacities of language. Previously I have 
indicated some instances where carnivalesque practices can be read in clinical EB-discourse. In 
                                                          
15
 Eg. Trisha Greenhalgh’s transition to advocacy of narrative-based medicine rather than EBM was 
accompanied by a move from a more-clinical to a more-sociological identity; see eg. Greenhalgh et al 
2005 
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medicine, clinical and research factions frequently parody each other. In physiotherapy, 
dramatic allegiances are pledged to EBP in ways which can be considered ironic.  
More so than these, there are instances from medicine in which both sides of EBM dialogue are 
mocked. For example, Isaacs and Fitzgerald’s (1999 in the BMJ, 2001 in The Oncologist) ‘Seven 
Alternatives to EBM’ offers such possibilities as eloquence-based medicine (measured with a 
Teflometer) and nervousness-based medicine (standard unit: the bank balance) to carnivalise the 
anxieties of EBM. Confidence-based medicine, they suggest, applies only to surgeons 
(2001:391). Similarly the CRAP Writing Group (Clinicians for the Restoration of Autonomous 
Practice – BMJ 2002) skilfully satirise the religious undercurrents of EB-discourse, making fun 
not just of critics of EBM (although they are particularly targeted), but everybody involved16. 
This latter article is anonymously written, but one must suspect its authors, given the intricacy 
of their satire, of being well-versed in EBM and responsible also for ‘serious’ pieces.  
Such pieces indicate possibilities within the clinic for not taking the supposed problems of EBM 
in earnest. Being comically polarised, EB-discourse might have become a subject for widespread 
levity and carnivalisation if isolated within medical and clinical literature. By their productions, 
sociologists determined that EBM should become an issue of genuine sociological interest, 
connected to the pervasive ambivalences of late-modernity. Sociologists rallied around the 
dichotomisations of research and practice, of evidence and expertise. Sociological writers linked 
to clinical or research institutions found in sociology a forum to underwrite their professional 
identities. Thus sociology has had an affectively-stabilising effect on clinical EB-discourse, 
linking it explicitly to policy and management interests, and contextualising it in broader 
discourses of social concern. This has been achieved through building a particular set of 
dialogical mechanisms. 
 
Sociological Dialogues: Numbers AgainstWords, and Change Against Sameness. 
Alongside the dialogue of politics and philosophy (to which I shall keep returning), sociologists 
have built dialogues around the oppositional categories of quantitative/qualitative and 
change/sameness. The preference in medical evidence hierarchies for quantitative research 
reflected a mostly-uninterrogated presumption. It was sociologists whose trade was in 
qualitative research who took up this dialogue by trying to bring qualitative research into EBM, 
                                                          
16
 See also Smith and Pell (2003) which I discuss in the appendix. 
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and to find ways in which quantitative and qualitative methods could be reconciled. Writings in 
this genre span a spectrum from militant qualitativism (eg. Grypdonck 2006) to scientistic 
justifications of qualitative methods (eg. Pope et al 2002), with more ambivalent pieces in 
between (eg. Popay and Williams 1998)17. In this context there is scope for genuine dialogue, 
achieved through various means of syncretism between qualitative and quantitative. The two can 
be imagined as complementary, with either one being supportive of, adjunctive to, or necessary 
for the interpretation of the other.  
Where sociologists are engaged in finding space for their own health-research expertise in the 
powerful discourse around EBM, it is not in their interests to take a critical perspective on the 
constructed dichotomy of qualitativism and quantitativism. It is in relation to this dichotomy 
that such writers can positionally differentiate themselves. Yet in discourse analysis it is a 
dichotomy which is deconstructable. Hammersley (in 1992 – the year of EBM’s inception) has 
done this, for example, but his insights have not had a reception in EB-writing. Numbers can be 
classed as linguistic vectors of meaning, situated within discourse and themselves discursive; 
numerical methods are discursive techniques, with particular rules; quantitative methods are a 
means to particular expressions of meaning, and are as such a specialist sub-genre within the 
qualitative. The analytic distinction between numbers and statistics as empty of meaning, and 
words as characteristically interpretive, is flimsy. But the cultural distinction between the two 
remains powerful.  
Building a dialogue upon this distinction has the effect of reinforcing it and, since it is a 
distinction presumed in the quasi-dialogues of EBM, has the effect of generating cultural 
approval for those dialogues, thus securing the status of EB-discourse. Another germinal 
dialogue in clinical EB-discourse, which sociologists are able to develop into dialogue-proper, is 
the dialogue of change and sameness18. To write about institutional change as an expected 
feature of modern social life is to engage a paradox, perhaps the quintessential paradox of 
modernity. As Bauman and Tester (2001:72) testify, ‘to be modern is to be in a state of 
perpetual modernisation’ which is to say, constant change. Contemporary healthcare institutions 
are in perpetual modernisation which means always being moved away from an imagined past 
towards an imagined future.  
                                                          
17
 An anthropological analogue is Lambert and McKevitt (2002). 
18
 A harbinger of change and sameness as a key tension in EB-discourse is Guyatt et al (1988) which I 
mentioned inchapter 1. 
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EB-discourse, more than other discourses around the maintenance of health, is part of this 
process of constant bringing-up-to-date. Sociologists interested in the management of change 
are engaged explicitly in a dialogue between ideas of present, past and future. With dialogical 
awareness of language one can see that while engaged in explicit dialogues of change, 
sociologists are also engaged in a tacit dialogue of sameness. For change which is manageable, 
predictable and expected is a conservative kind of change. At the immediate level of experience 
it appears as change; but at other levels of experience it appears as constancy. Such levels of 
change and sameness might overlap and merge in ways which are themselves changeable. It can 
be said though that to step outside the confines of present perception (in change or sameness) is 
to exercise a kind of historical and sociological imagination. 
Strong (1984) can be seen to have made such an exercise of historical-sociological imagination 
when he observed that modern medicine periodically undergoes renewal under the guardianship 
of science. At such a level of historical narrative, EBHC is the latest in a sequence of functional 
preservations made in the name of change. Participants in clinical EB-discourse are not well 
positioned to comment on such paradoxes. Their attention is drawn to the narrow concerns of 
their own discipline and practice. But in sociology, disciplinary concerns are potentially wider 
and sociologists are placed to comment on the effects not just of EBHC, but of EB-discourse. 
Rather than bringing into question the modern imperative for constant change, rather than 
asking where it comes from, how it is constituted and which interests it serves, they have 
generally endorsed it and looked to appoint themselves the expert-administrators of change.  
An unquestioning attitude to the predicament of constant-change, and uncritical perspective on 
the types of change imaginable through EBHC, once again makes for the preservation of EB-
discourse on its original terms. Sociologists of EBHC further the dialogues of EB-discourse 
which consolidate, naturalise and endorse the constructed distinction of research versus clinic. 
They ask each other how ongoing changes inside and outside of the clinic are to be reconciled. 
The outcome of these discussions, underlying the constancy of change, is the preservation of 
healthcare institutions and maintenance of the boundaries of the clinic. The instrumental 
dialogues of qualitative/quantitative and change/sameness, and the conceptual dialogue of 
politics/philosophy have facilitated such conversations. 
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Forms of Power in Sociological EB-discourse. 
How do Foucault’s two principal forms of modern power – biopower and disciplinary power – 
fit this dialogical picture? In clinical EB-discourse the two forms are recognisable: biopower in 
population-surveillance, aggregate data, statistical expressions of knowledge; disciplinary power 
in surveillance of the individual subject, experiential data, narrative expressions of expertise. In 
their efforts to restore value to qualitative methods, sociologists have a form of interpretive 
expertise which is located within a framework of disciplinary power. They strive to ensure that 
this expertise (qualitative research) be translated into biopower through inclusion in the 
category of Evidence. In their efforts to oversee institutional processes of change, sociologists 
employ a different kind of disciplinary expertise, which is to act as skilful intermediaries 
between streams of power and knowledge.  
In their role as mediators of change, sociologists are close to the interests of biopower (through 
policy) which are to be synchronised with resources of clinical expertise. They also occupy a 
translatory role as knowledge-brokers for the maintenance of health institutions. In both cases, 
sociologists administrate the balance between complementary forms of power. An illustration of 
this balancing process in action is the legacy of Stefan Timmermans’ various writings on EBM 
from 2001 to 2010. One of Timmermans’ principal theoretical concerns throughout is with the 
capacity of the medical profession for self-determination. His (2005) discussion of clinical 
guidelines can be intepreted in terms of tension between biopower which enforces 
accountability, and disciplinary power which protects autonomy. Timmermans and Mauck 
(2005) similarly emphasise the professional disciplinary influences on clinical reasoning which 
act against the mass-regulatory power of guidelines.  
In such proceedings, the entities of reasoning subjects, disciplinary groups and regulatory 
powers are constantly rubbing against one another, apparent gains for each one being offset by 
apparent losses elsewhere. Pharmaceutical Companies emerge as a representative of biopower; 
but their influence can also be brought under moral scrutiny, and shown to be dependent on 
disciplinary power through the medical act of prescription. In this dialogical predicament, 
interpretive possibilities are juggled in a way which makes space for a wide range of perspectives 
to be expressed with roughly equal authority. EBM becomes a versatile symbol whose precise 
meaning need not be made clear, but which can be used as leverage for deprecating dialogical 
adversaries.  
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To illustrate this effect, consider Timmermans and Kolker (2004:181, emphasis added), who 
speak of theorists’ concern that guidelines can be ‘hijacked by third parties to externally 
influence the decision-making processes of clinicians’. Sackett et al (1996:71) had acknowledged 
a worry that EBM could be ‘hijacked by purchasers and managers to cut the costs of healthcare’. 
If on the other hand, EBM is an attempt to restrict clinicians’ autonomy (as for Britten 2001), 
then it is the appropriation of guidelines by clinicians, in professional interests, which can be 
called a hijack. The recurrent rhetorical trope of hijack allows different interpretations of EBM 
to survive in parallel, as all are able to imply that theirs is the correct and true understanding, 
and that others have misapprehended. EBM itself, empty of specific meaning, becomes a 
discursive hinge, a fixed point around which discussants arrange themselves howsoever they may. 
Within EB-discourse there exist multiple levels in which different dialogues have functional 
roles in arranging participants’ perspectives in relation to each other. Consider Armstrong’s 
(2002) sociological piece on ‘the problem of changing doctors’ behaviour’. Here the key point 
of dialogical tension is a struggle in medicine between the defence of occupational privileges and 
the practical mechanisms of service delivery (2002:1776). Armstrong succinctly writes the 
history of EBM as consensual and purposive, even conspiratorial: 
‘(…) a new site for the construction of medical knowledge had been opened up,  not the 
experience of the clinic but evidence from the trials unit. (…) mechanisms of ‘decision 
support’ would ensure that clinical behaviour was effectively channelled towards the new 
therapeutic rationality.’ 
        Armstrong 2002:1772. 
The point of interest for Armstrong was not the struggle within medicine over therapeutic 
rationality (which as I have shown, was turbulent and conflictual) but a different kind of tension 
between the collective interests and defensive strategies of the profession and the autonomy and 
expertise of the individual clinician.  
Different disciplinary positionalities thus offer different possibilities for interpreting the history 
and character of EBM. In sociological EB-discourse, dialogical formations proliferate like never 
before. Tensions between whole-professional directives, the sectional interests of sub-
professional groups and individuals mesh with tensions between globalism and localism, and 
between biopower and disciplinary power. Sociologists become adept at shuffling the conceptual 
pack – exchanging perspectives on different power/knowledge forms and melding them into 
133 
 
each other. Like clinicians mediating their concerns between doing what seems politically 
sensible and what seems morally (philosophically) right, sociologists freely bring philosophies 
into juxtaposition with politics. This is compatible with the splitting of power into bio- and 
disciplinary forms. 
Sociologists interested less in tensions between different strands of political influence, and more 
in tensions between things classed as being of political power or of knowledge, can interpret this 
splitting in terms of science (conceived as apolitical). Moreira (2005 and 2007), as I noted in 
chapter 3, investigated the relationship between scientific knowledge-production and the 
political motivations at work in clinical guidelines and systematic reviews. The active dialogue 
here is between science and society. This can be located in relation to the structuring antinomy 
of philosophy and politics, where science (as natural philosophy) is constructed outside of 
politics, but yet has powerful effects. The particular dichotomies which are isolated for 
consideration by different sociologists of EBM, just as for different clinicians, are reflections of 
their sub-disciplinary loyalties. For Moreira it is science, as a branch of philosophy, which 
becomes visible in dialogical relation to politics. 
 
The Visibility of Dialogical Forms. 
In such a situation one can ask which dialogues are visible to different writers in EB-discourse 
and which ones are hidden; or which ones can be knowingly acknowledged and which cannot. In 
later medical EB-discourse, for example, one can find signs of dialogical consciousness being 
expressed in unexpected ways. Consider Loughlin (2009a in JECP) in which a claim to 
philosophical status is emphasised, but much of which is given over to a scolding attack on the 
intellectual credentials of the early protagonists of EBM in medicine. At the climax of the 
narrative, the author introduces a piece of dialogue from American TV show The X Files19, ‘for 
no better reason than that it amused [him] for a while’ (2009:937). The dialogue used features 
heroes Mulder and Scully discussing the merits of different evidential types (religiously-based 
and laboratory-based respectively).  
Just as Mulder and Scully’s characters validate each other in a dramatic narrative, Loughlin re-
validates EB-discourse on the conditions previously established by medical writers. He continues 
the argument over EBM without the need for further advocacies to be written. In fact there are 
                                                          
19
 The X Files was produced by Fox Television, USA, 1993-2002. 
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good reasons why dramatic dialogue is invoked by Loughlin. The author’s claim not to 
understand these reasons is significant – it suggests an uneasy awareness of the dialogical 
principles which animate EB-discourse. Being something which is used but of which 
understanding is to be denied, it might be read as an oblique acknowledgement of his own 
position within a dramatic dialogue. In contrast consider Nick Fox’s (2003) paper on ‘practice-
based evidence’ for social research. In this context at the periphery of EB-discourse, he 
advocates a re-constitution of the dichotomous categories which underpin the discourse.  
Fox (2003:85) gives a critical analysis of the research tenets of internal and external validity, and 
reflects on the paradox which allows researchers to deny responsibility for the transferability of 
their findings into practice (2003:86). In social research, Fox (2003) re-imagines researchers as 
having identities continuous with their research subjects, always embedding their work in 
practices, and gives an account of precedents for these ideas in the tradition of ‘action research’ 
(2003:88-9). Setting an agenda for transgressive research practices, he explicitly rejects three 
dualisms; researcher versus researched, research versus experience and theory versus practice 
(2003:90). Fox’s (2003) aim is to resolve the problem of Evidence through a conceptual re-
configuration of language.  
Research, he argues, ought not be thought of as separate from practice. He (2003:90) enjoins 
reseachers to be ‘constitutive of difference’, and not to ‘close down or limit the ways in which 
research subjects will conceive of themselves’. These moves illustrate possibilities for expressing 
dialogical awareness, and for thinking in terms of dichotomy-transcendence, which have proved 
inaccessible in EB-discourse generally. On the fringes of EB-discourse (dissociated from the 
clinic) there is space to bring its foundational dualisms into question, against a background of 
norms which can be taken for granted as a context for transgressive writing. Within the 
boundaries of EB-discourse (associated with the clinic) there is no such space.  
Participants in EB-discourse must see researcher and researched, research versus experience and 
theory versus practice as being valid and important distinctions, distinctions on which their 
identities and grounds for writing are based. Their interest is not to deconstruct such 
distinctions, but to reinforce them by building upon them. The binary oppositions which 
underwrite EB-discourse do not exist by accident; they express deeply embedded relations of 
power. They cannot easily be wished away. In the social-research context in which Fox (2003) 
writes, he is able to suppose that evidence-basedness reflects a problem which everyone would 
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like to see resolved. In healthcare the maintenance of this problem as an ongoing construction, 
albeit one with the appearance of conflict, carries tangible collective benefits.  
By the preceding discussion of awareness of the dialogical frameworks in which they write, I 
observe that authors do not have free reign to write whatever they choose. Certain dialogical 
possibilities, in discursive context, are available to them; others are in the perceptual 
background, dictating the terms of thought. Some possibilities are on the threshold of awareness. 
The example from Loughlin (2009) is one such – a dialogical metaphor being used by an author 
who claims not to know the reason for using it. In Fox’s (2003) case, far removed from the 
clinic, problematic dichotomies can be directly faced. But again, the author does not know why 
this is possible there and not elsewhere. It is because his thought, as is always the case, does not 
float freely on a cloud of wishes, but exists as an expression of dialogical power. 
 
5.5 Conclusion. 
The dialogue between politics and philosophy, alongside other dialogues of EBM which were 
evident, begat the present chapter in which the principle of dialogue is traced through various 
guises in EB-discourse. In medicine I found a situation where two sides conceived in opposition 
to each other conduct a restricted and repetitive dialogue. So polar is the opposition constructed 
between these two sides that each of them seems to contain the other, and either side can 
continue this quasi-dialogue without hearing the other, and once the other has ceased to speak. 
In physiotherapy I found a situation where the possibility of dialogue was violently denied; 
violently and unsuccessfully, as space remained for subversion of the apparently-dominant 
perspective by the apparently-submissive.  
In sociology I found a space where clinicians and non-clinicians could stabilise the emergent 
dialogues of EB-discourse by connecting them to more broadly-established social concerns. The 
making of these connections has created a more authentically-dialogical situation. Political 
reasons for different groups to align themselves with or against EBHC could be mapped out; 
doubts about the legitimacy of the debate over EBHC could be alleviated; different streams of 
knowledge-production could be made compatible; intra-clinical and extra-clinical voices could 
be heard. The rules which apply within the clinic could be differentiated from the rules which 
apply outside, thus bolstering the distinction between the inside and outside of the clinic. This 
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last dialogue is particularly important, as the institutions of clinic and research, constructed in 
mutual relation to each other, are at the core of debate.  
It is these two powerful social institutions of research and clinic whose ongoing maintenance is 
at stake in EB-discourse. They are social institutions in which a vast range of identities are 
arranged in relation to each other; and through EB-discourse, those who contribute to the 
institutions of clinic and research from the inside and outside occupy positions in dialogues. The 
dialogues which are visible and accessible to participants in the discourse depend on their 
institutional positions; but there is one dialogue which recurs across different contexts in EB-
discourse, and the reason for whose recurrence I have avoided trying to explain. Even in 
contexts where this dialogue is not visible, such as the case of physiotherapy which I have 
discussed, it is significant for its absence. This is the dialogue between politics and philosophy, 
which by this point has no doubt become repetitive. 
This dialogue has been empirical leverage for my pursuit of a Bakhtin-influenced analysis of EB-
discourse. It is stubbornly resistant to being resolved into other dialogical forms. It seems to 
cross-cut the debate. It is difficult to transcend and call into question; it is difficult to think 
outside of. The robust persistence of this dialogue is something which I have found troubling my 
conscience as an analytic writing-ethnographer; the politics-philosophy dialogue feels to me 
particularly significant. Some kind of reason for this significance can now be suggested in terms 
of Foucault’s major contribution to social philosophy, which was to recognise the equivalence of 
power and knowledge (see Foucault 1980). The politics-philosophy dyad is an analogue of the 
relation between power and knowledge; but rather than call it an equivalence, I have called it 
(because of Bakhtin) a dialogue. 
As an expression of equivalence between power and knowledge, the politics-philosophy 
dialogue completes a Foucauldian-Bakhtinian circle. Foucault sees power as split between 
biopower and disciplinary power, and Bakhtin sees discursive-being as a dialogical state of 
existence. Power is split dialogically within itself; but also split against what it is not – or what it 
seems not to be – knowledge. But power is subject to knowledge; and while power is split, 
knowledge is split also, into knowledge inside and outside of power. Which is to say, politics 
and philosophy. This is why the politics-philosophy dichotomy is so crucial to EB-discourse. It is 
no less than the very core of power, the splitting of knowledge into oppositional forms. 
Foucault felt the importance of the relation between power and knowledge. But perhaps even 
he did not realise that the splitting of knowledge from power was itself an effect of power, 
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acting dialogically. Bakhtin felt the importance of dialogue, but perhaps did not realise that he 
was dealing always with power. 
My main task in this chapter has been to promote awareness of the dialogues which condition 
sociological thought, and of how these dialogues are manifestations of power. EB-discourse is 
powerful insofar as it has contributed to the maintenance of social institutions of health research 
and practice. Foucault encouraged theorists to think of power as being productive rather than 
repressive. EB-discourse is indeed productive, but not purely so; for while in some respects its 
productivity is visible, it operates through subtle mechanisms which are in some ways 
productive, in other ways repressive. The interpretation of these mechanisms as productive or 
repressive depends on the situated perspective of the interpreter. Productive and repressive 
aspects of discourse work together in dialogue to constitute power. An appreciation of dialogue, 
after Bakhtin, is necessary to complete the understanding of power and discourse. Power is 
expressed through discourse; discourse is dialogical; therefore power operates through dialogue. 
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Chapter 6 
Embodiment in EB-discourse. 
 
 
Synopsis. 
In this chapter I raise the issue of embodiment as problematic for EB-discourse. Beginning again 
from a Foucauldian view on power forms, I identify the clinician’s body and the patient’s body 
as those primarily relevant to EB-discourse. Both clinician and patient are constructed entities, 
locatable within the institutional structure of societies. I review the embodiment of the clinician 
as it has been represented in EB-literature through the ideas of embodied and tacit knowledge, 
and explain that these ideas have not been accurately applied. I highlight the necessity of 
testimony as a means of bringing embodied knowledge into discourse, and distinguish it from 
trust (which has also been used in EB-discourse without due care for its consequences). I discuss 
mathematics as a testimonial form, and explain how an idealised view of mathematics as non-
testimony makes dialogical space for the recovery of meaning. 
Turning attention to the patient in EB-discourse, I explain how the marginalisation of 
embodiment and testimony in EB-discourse combine to exclude the patient from thought. I use 
two narratives of illness – one from literature, one witnessed by myself – to act against the 
silencing of the patient. Investigating the mechanisms of blindness to embodiment and testimony 
as categories of thought, I question whether ideas of patient-centredness and expert-patienthood 
(which form a dialogue with EB-discourse) are suitable to undo the radical exclusion of the 
patient. Because they naturalise the construction of the patient, they are not. I re-connect the 
constructed patient to the idea of a patient-class defined as lower, not socio-economically but 
through knowledge-production. Finally I use the case-study of physiotherapy, in which the 
topics of embodiment and testimony are unavoidable, to illustrate the implications of imagining 
a healthcare discourse in which embodiment is not marginalised. 
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6.1 Introduction. 
Thinking about evidence-based healthcare (EBHC) in Foucauldian terms as a confluence of two 
forms of power – biopower and disciplinary power – can lead to questions about embodiment. 
The regulatory mechanisms of biopower, as Foucault (2003:246) sees them, are abstractions 
derived from the social body in its generality. They do not work at the level of individual bodies, 
which are subject instead to disciplinary power. A concern associated with EBHC though is to 
ensure that biopower is brought to bear on individual material bodies, specifically the bodies and 
embodied behaviours of clinicians in clinics. This creates difficulties when the external source of 
power/knowledge does not readily mesh with the power/knowledge which is embodied inside 
the clinic. These difficulties are complicated when one realises that the clinician’s body is not the 
only important body in the clinic. The patient’s body is there too.  
The patient’s body is just as essential to the clinic as is the clinician’s body, or more so. Thinking 
about embodiment in EB-discourse can consequently lead one to think about how the patient 
features within it. EB-discourse, as I have observed, is associated with the upkeep of the clinic 
and of healthcare as social institutions. As I have also observed, the patient as substrate and raw 
material for a healthcare industry is not just anybody who happens to become ill. The patient as 
a generalisable social character, as statistically defined and imagined in discourses of disciplinary 
and bio-power, is (on average) of lower socio-economic origin. It is not just clinical and 
healthcare institutions which are socially constructed and in Foucault’s (2003) terms, must be 
defended; patients are socially constructed and must be defended too.  
The patient-class, as a population of people upon whom healthcare is practiced, is a social 
construction and one can ask, what does EB-discourse contribute to this construction? This 
might mean asking how patients are differentiated from others in the discourse; they are 
differentiated by their embodied condition as healthy or ill, and they are differentiated by the 
knowledge they can access. These differentiations take place against a context of power which is 
not neutral; the patient exists in a hierarchy of social inequality, in which they are positioned as 
lower. Thus in relation to the patient, just as in relation to research and clinical institutions, EB-
discourse can be seen to be an expression of power.  
Besides bringing the patient into play, a concern with embodiment presents another critical test 
for EB-discourse. In this thesis I place explanatory weight on the claim that EB-discourse has 
contributed to the maintenance of healthcare institutions. As I explained in chapter 4, this is a 
weak claim, barely more than a tautology. The volume of professional and academic literature 
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on EBHC shows that EB-discourse has widely influenced thought on healthcare. I also go so far 
as to presume that this influence goes beyond thought and rhetoric, and has had embodied 
effects. That is, I presume that healthcare practices have changed as a consequence of EB-
discourse. It is implausible to believe that EB-discourse could have had effects on beliefs about 
healthcare, but no effect at all on embodied practices.  
This issue of embodiment is not an all-or-nothing issue, and the manner of effect is significant. If 
issues of embodiment were a central concern in EB-discourse, addressed directly and 
consistently, one could feel confident that the discourse was well-connected to embodied 
practice. Embodiment is not a central concern in EB-discourse though, but is peripheral to it. It 
is present, but I have had to look hard to find it. This marginality leaves the issue of change to 
embodied practice in doubt. In modernity one can safely surmise that over 20 years, healthcare 
practices have not stayed the same. How much of the change which has occurred can be causally 
associated with EBHC?  
If the discourse were closely connected to issues of embodiment, one could feel confident that it 
has a direct influence on changes to embodied practice, which could connect to patient-
embodiment. Since the discourse is not closely connected to issues of embodiment, one can only 
feel confident that it has a direct influence on how healthcare is thought about and rationalised. 
Changes to the embodied practice of healthcare are not the primary product of EB-discourse, 
although they might be a secondary product. This difference means that in EB-discourse, bodies 
(including the patient’s body) can be avoided as a topic for thought. This avoidance in thought 
allows the structures of power which construct the patient to remain unscrutinised by those who 
participate in EB-discourse. 
To determine further the influence of EBHC on embodied healthcare practice, one would 
require the testimony of those who are in an embodied position to observe it. Testimony in 
relation to embodiment is another theme of relevance to the patient. Their own testimony is a 
source of knowledge, and so is the testimony derived from them in clinical observation. These 
types of testimony depend on the patient’s body and their embodied existence, and point to 
another way in which the patient is excluded from EB-discourse. Following the theme of 
testimony, I investigate how different testimonies are made visible and invisible in EB-discourse. 
I suggest that the idea of trust has served to obscure the importance of testimony, and so helped 
to keep the embodied patient outside of the discourse. I begin, however, with issues of 
embodied knowledge which are explicitly present, and can be easily reported. 
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6.2 Embodied and Tacit Knowledge in Medicine and EBM. 
In recent times, the  human body has been a popular topic in sociology (see Shilling 2007 for a 
review). Part of this interest, particularly in sociologies of disability and illness, is the idea of 
‘embodied knowledge’ connected to illness sufferers (eg. Hughes and Paterson 1997:335, 
Ellingson 2006). Embodied knowledge is often found alongside the related idea of tacit 
knowledge, especially in literature on Organisation Management (eg. Lam 2000). In sociology, 
tacit knowledge is familiar from the sub-discipline of SSK, in which it has been argued (after 
Polanyi 1966) that scientific knowledge is reliant on tacit knowledge forms. Harry Collins 
(2001:107) characterises tacit knowledge by ‘noting that mastery of a practice cannot be gained 
from books or other inanimate sources, but can sometimes, though not always, be gained by 
prolonged social interaction with members of the culture that embeds the practice’.  
For Collins, the test of worth of tacit knowledge as a concept is how much of it can be 
accounted for by consideration of other knowledge types which are explicit and propositional. 
Collins argues (2001:108) that in any practice, there is always an element of tacit knowledge 
which analysts of that practice cannot dispense into other forms. Similarly, the idea of embodied 
knowledge brings a problem of opacity; knowledge which is of the body is knowledge which is 
not of the mind. It is inaccessible to mental language. Somebody might feel or believe that they 
have embodied or tacit knowledge, but claiming to know the content of such knowledge risks a 
contradiction. Alternatively, people might ascribe tacit or embodied knowledge to each other, 
with or without awareness of so doing, marking both as being characteristically social knowledge 
forms.  
Further, tacit and embodied knowledge are not the same. Knowing how to sell insurance by 
telephone, for example, might be  more tacit, whereas knowing how to do a standing backflip is 
more embodied. In each case there are aspects of the knowledge which could become explicit 
and mental, and ways in which explicit mental knowledge could wash back into tacit or 
embodied knowledge forms. To deal with embodied and tacit knowledge is difficult then, and 
especially so if done exclusively in the terms of written language, as is the case in academic text. 
Assertions of knowledge which is beyond-knowledge invite scepticism. Strong (1984:343), for 
example, is dismissive of clinicians’ attempts to invoke ‘art and craft’ as a defence against the 
advances of the academy, endeavours which were to be perpetuated (and just as boldly 
dismissed) in EB-discourse.  
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Similarly, the idea of ‘pattern recognition’ as a mechanism for clinical reasoning is well-
established in medicine, and remains current (see Elstein 2002, Norman 2005). It is expressive 
of an instinctive dimension to decision-making which can be observed, but is resistant to 
explication. In  Sociology of scientific Knowledge (SSK), tacit knowledge is used not defensively 
but critically. The implication of tacit knowledge in accounts of science is that science is not 
wholly logical and transparent; it is not what it is supposed to be1. In chapters 4 and 5 I showed 
how EB-discourse is founded on various oppositional dichotomies, one of which is the 
confrontation between practical knowledge and research knowledge. The possibilities of tacit 
and embodied knowledge create problems for this dichotomisation.  
For example, if the evidence-basedness critique of medicine is read as a writing-off of tacit 
knowledge forms (as it is by Braude 2009), then advocates of EBHC must be vigilant for any 
unsolicited tacit knowledge carried within EBHC. Any such elements could be used to render 
EBHC vulnerable to its own criticisms. Even to recognise the embodiment of knowledge in 
practice might be dangerous for EB-advocates; for the attempted institution of new healthcare 
practices through the dissemination of ideas, rather than through embodied performances, then 
comes to seem naive or disingenuous. For EB-dissidents on the other hand, the idea of embodied 
expertise is only advantageous up to a point. While offering some protection from the 
pronouncements of extra-clinical governance, it opens up other channels of vulnerability. It 
indicates that clinicians are not the masters of their own practice; that they work in ways which 
are beyond rational understanding. 
Tacit and embodied knowledge forms thus have the potential to cut across EB-discourse by 
undermining both sides. They do not naturally serve the interests of the established dialogue; yet 
they are necessary to it, for there must be tacit agreement that clinicians have expertise in their 
embodied roles, even if that expertise is to be replaced by Evidence. Consequently there is 
reason to expect the tacit dimension to be present in the background of the discourse, and at the 
same time, ignored. Where it is not ignored, there is reason to anticipate trouble as people 
engage a concept which is by its definition difficult to engage. There are early signs of such 
trouble in Sackett and Rosenberg (1995) who, writing of unspecified ‘powerful’ methods of 
evaluation, produce the following: 
 
                                                          
1
 Consequently there is an element of satire or irony in SSK writing which builds on the tacit-
knowledge critique, for example MacKenzie and Spinardi’s (1995) invitation to the mass-uninvention 
of nuclear weapons via the deliberate extinction of the tacit knowledge required to build them. 
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‘these methods often have made explicit the expert’s implicit, non-verbal diagnostic, 
prognostic and therapeutic reasoning, making it possible for their trainees to replace mere 
mimicry with understanding, and avoiding the necessity for decades of experience as the 
only pathway to sound clinical judgement.’ 
       Sackett and Rosenberg 1995:30. 
Here there is an attempt to sweep two problems away. The dark unknown, tacit knowledge, is 
conveniently rendered explicit, and devoid of threat; and the process of medical education is 
split into two extremes of caricature (‘mere mimicry’ and ‘decades of experience’) which are 
perfectly neutralised. The clinician, as a distinct identity, is broken apart and put back together. 
But while this is done swiftly, it is also done in a provocative way which opens a space for critical 
response (see chapter 5). 
Kirsti Malterud (2001) in The Lancet was among the first to incorporate tacit knowledge into an 
account of evidence-based medicine (EBM). Her focus was on the role of qualitative research, 
and her understanding of EBM that it is predominantly a movement to quantitise2 the activity of 
making clinical decisions and rule the interpretive (qualitative) dimension of medical practice 
out of court (2001:397). She argues that this interpretive dimension is characteristically tacit, in 
the sense used by Polanyi (1966), but can be made explicit by subjection to qualitative scrutiny 
(2001:398). This scrutiny, she explains, is scientific if done correctly. She argues that EBM 
should be driven principally by qualitative research conducted to scientific standards. For 
Malterud, qualitative methods are not soft and flimsy but are robust and, if done properly, 
generally to be highly-regarded (2001:399).  
Although she references Polanyi, she sees tacit knowledge, whilst unquantifiable, as being 
nevertheless amenable to explicit observation and analysis without difficulty. In the analyses of 
Polanyi and Collins however, the importance of tacit knowledge is precisely that it is not merely 
pre-explicit, but is different in kind from propositional knowledge, and not directly accessible. 
This is a misapprehension also present in Wyatt’s (2001) piece on Knowledge Management in 
medicine. He maintains that, in general, tacit knowledge can be explicated. His preference for 
explicit knowledge carries a judgement of moral value: 
                                                          
2
 I use the term quantitise to mean the process of conceptualisation in quantitative terms; as distinct 
from quantify, which I understand to mean the act of counting things.  
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‘we hear the argument that by making tacit knowledge explicit we destroy it (…). Clearly I 
disagree. Much medical progress in modern times has been attributable to an evolution from 
tacit to explicit knowledge.’ 
         Wyatt 2001:6. 
Wyatt outlines different strategies for the management of the two types of knowledge in health 
services – codification for explicit knowledge, and personalisation for tacit knowledge. This 
signals a tolerance for tacit knowledge in principle. However Wyatt’s discussion of its 
management is imprecise. He draws on data from trials which found (as one might hope) that 
specialist clinicians gave better specialised care than generalists, and concludes briskly that ‘the 
future of knowledge management in health is bright’ (2001:8). This confidence rests on the 
presumptions that tacit knowledge in healthcare is both of marginal importance and is ultimately 
explicable. Neither of these presumptions are convincingly addressed by the literature Wyatt 
invokes. Like Malterud (2001), he ignores the problems which make tacit knowledge an 
awkward prospect for analysis, and misappropriates it in service of a particular professional 
agenda. 
 
A Second Wave of Interest in Tacit Knowledge. 
After these uncertain beginnings, tacit and embodied knowledge in EB-discourse receded from 
view. Later, Thornton (2006) made a move to place it at the centre of debate, as the unifying 
factor between research knowledge, clinical expertise and patient values. His argument runs 
that after Sackett et al (1996), evidence-basedness means integrating (scientific) research, 
(clinical) expertise and (patient) values. The problem faced in unifying these elements, and 
hence the whole controversy, arises because research is presumed to be a fully codified (explicit) 
knowledge form, whereas experience and values are presumed to depend on tacit knowledge 
forms. This problem can be solved by recognising that scientific research methods also depend 
on tacit knowledge forms: ‘in a slogan, at the heart of evidence-based medicine is good 
judgement’ (Thornton 2006:10).  
Thornton uses tacit knowledge as a factor common to both sides of EBHC, which flattens the 
controversy over evidence-basedness. In the ensuing years the ‘problem’ of evidence-basedness 
has not showed signs of being re-established on these altered terms. Participants in the debate 
have continued to ignore the issue of tacit knowledge. Seemingly it is not in their interests to do 
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away with the distinction between research-scientific and clinical knowledge, a distinction which 
the dualism of tacit and propositional knowledge, if used at all, has been used to reinforce. 
Neither is dissolving the idea of science into a socially-embedded knowledge form an attractive 
proposition for those who debate EBHC. Their social status often requires faith to be sustained 
in the transparent, rational and scientific character of their professional knowledge.  
Thornton (2006:10) makes two further points of note. He notes that tacit knowledge re-
potentiates the patient as a Whole Person and an active agent in the construction of illness. In 
relation to embodiment, he observes that ‘those who make medical judgements are not abstract 
rational points of view but embodied agents who share a ‘whirl of organism’’ (ibid). A writer 
who followed Thornton in theorising tacit knowledge in EBM is Hillel Braude (2009). Braude 
does not endorse Thornton’s (2006) argument for identifying tacit knowledge, maintaining that 
EBM is ‘premised precisely on the dismissal of tacit knowing (…) and cannot incorporate a 
theory of tacit knowing into its epistemology’ (2009:182). Giving a rich history of the RCT, 
Braude criticises EBM for the hubris in its unwarranted statistical determinism, and strongly 
advocates a return to Feinstein’s clinical epidemiology which was ‘betrayed’ (2009:190) in the 
creation of EBM.  
This advocacy is supported by resonances between Feinstein’s work and Polanyi’s (1974) view 
of tacit knowledge, which elucidate the process of bringing epidemiological knowledge into the 
clinic. Notwithstanding his disapproval of Thornton (2006), Braude fulfils Thornton’s wish for a 
resolution to the EB-debate led by a consideration of tacit knowledge; the notable difference 
being Braude’s willingness to dispense with the term ‘evidence-based’. However, Braude’s 
(2009) arguments might still be re-appropriated in the service of EB-discourse. Despite his 
careful handling of terms, Braude himself positions tacit knowledge close to clinical expertise 
and the attendant possibility of being systematically misled. To those accustomed to thinking in 
terms of the dichotomy between clinical and statistical reasoning, it remains easy to conceive 
tacit understandings as being subject to correction by explicit rationalisation (as illustrated by 
Wyatt (2001)).  
On the other hand, if tacit understandings are viewed positively, it is easy to forget the notional 
symmetry in Thornton’s and Braude’s arguments, and apply them as a defence of clinical 
knowledge. This possibility is borne out by Henry (2010) in the JECP. He provides a detailed 
descriptive account of tacit knowledge in clinical practice. His account is vulnerable to the basic 
EB-type criticism of clinical insularity; it imprisons clinical reasoning inside the clinic, isolating it 
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from external influence and broader-cultural embeddedness. Henry (2010:295) retreats into 
stating the need for ‘a frank acknowledgement of uncertainty in medicine’ and ‘humility about 
the limits of medical knowledge’ – just the positions of vulnerability which are distasteful to 
advocates of EBM. Rather than transcending the basic binary oppositions of EB-discourse then, 
the idea of tacit knowledge can be appropriated to strengthen them.  
One could imagine the development of accounts differentiating the practical-tacit knowledge 
generated in the clinic from the scientific-tacit knowledge associated with health research. This 
possibility stems once again from conceptual slippage in the use of tacit knowledge which, to 
repeat and repeat, cannot be faithfully articulated. Henry’s (2010) entreaties to recognise the 
tacit dimension fall foul of this difficulty; if something is tacit, then by definition it is difficult or 
impossible to recognise. Nonetheless, the recognition of tacit and embodied knowledge in 
medical practice has been attempted by sociologists Nettleton et al (2008). The strategy used 
here is to is to ask for the views of doctors who are in an embodied position to judge how 
medical practice has changed in recent times.  
Nettleton et al (2008) conclude that the embodied condition of medical practice is changing3. 
New systems of regulation and the institution of a bureaucratic culture of audit foster a context 
in which medical knowledge is becoming more codified, less embodied. Nettleton et al 
(2008:346) caution against nostalgia for craft knowledge which is threatened by such changes, 
but suggest that ‘intuitive and incommunicable knowledge could have a value that has hitherto 
not been fully appreciated’. An implication of the recession of embodied knowledge forms is 
their replacement by other forms which are thought to be transparent. Making reference to 
Polanyi (1966), Nettleton et al (2008:343) hint that these forms bring with them dimensions 
which, while maybe not embodied, are still tacit.  
As an extension of this, one could imagine heroic tales (such as in Greenhalgh 1999) of doctors 
making diagnoses by clinical intuition being replaced by heroism of a more hermeneutical kind. 
One might imagine asking, ‘doctor, how did you know that such an obscure study would prove 
relevant to this patient?’; and imagine the reply ‘when you’ve read as many papers as I have, you 
develop a feel for these things.’ Paradoxically, EBM (rather than EB-discourse) might be 
historically judged a success at a point when the need for such hermeneutical skill no longer 
need be made explicit in dialogical contrast to expertise. At such a point, the embodied 
                                                          
3
 This is in contrast to others, eg. Timmermans (2005:490), who suggests that the production of clinical 
guidelines is reflected in ‘at best, a modest change in clinical behaviour’. 
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knowledge of clinical practice would have been displaced by the tacit knowledge of evidential 
hermeneutics.  
Nettleton et al’s (2008) article displays one further paradox relating to the testimony of doctors. 
In EBM, doctors’ testimonial judgements, and testimonial judgements in general, are made 
suspect. Research evidence is used to substantiate or correct them. In assessing the impact of 
EB-discourse on embodied practice though, sociologists are reliant on doctors’ testimony; for 
what other way can there be to judge embodied experiences except through the testimony of 
those who experience them? EB-discourse is necessarily concerned with embodied practices, as I 
have shown. But embodiment can only enter literary discourse through testimony; therefore 
testimony is also of interest for the analysis of EB-discourse. Further, the testimony of patients, 
attached to their embodiment, is basic to healthcare; and again, if testimony is problematic in 
EB-discourse, this has an effect on the capacity of the discourse to engage the patient. Therefore 
it is wise to look again at EB-discourse to see how testimony features within it. In fact testimony 
is not a term much used in EB-discourse, where it is more common to speak instead about issues 
of trust. 
 
6.3 Testimony (rather than trust) in EB-discourse. 
It seems reasonable at first to think about the controversy over EBHC in relation to issues of 
trust rather than testimony. The supplementation or replacement of clinically-internal 
knowledge with externally-processed knowledge reflects a suspicion of things going on in the 
clinic; a distrust of clinical wisdom and a consequent restriction of autonomy (see Harrison and 
Ahmad 2000, Timmermans 2005). This distrust could manifest at any level from the single-
intervention (what a clinician does on this occasion) to the highest generalities (what medicine 
does, globally). On the other hand, the individual clinician presented with Evidence must decide 
whether to trust it (see Abramson and Starfield 2005), and health policy-makers engage in the 
collective allocation of trust to medical technologies (see Will 2005). In these instances, EB-
discourse can be associated with a change in the distribution of trust as a social currency. There 
are different conscious choices to be made in relation to trust than would have otherwise been 
the case.  
While the different operations of trust in different clinical contexts could perhaps be discerned 
empirically, there is also a bottom-line to this type of conceptualisation: continual appraisal of 
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evidence means adopting a default attitude which is critical, rather than trusting. In a 
bureaucracy of evidence, there seems to be absolutely less trust going around. The effect of this 
loss of trust might be related to the discussion of embodied and tacit knowledge, above. These 
non-propositional knowledge forms appear to be threatened by imperatives to accountable 
transparency. Perhaps it is the case that being trusted is a pre-condition for developing skilful 
expertise. Perhaps being able to place trust in others plays a socially-constructive role in 
recovery from illness (this could be imagined in the context of Parsons’ ‘sick role’ (1951)).  
In these possibilities, the right kind of trust seems inherently to be a good thing. Using the 
concept of trust, it is difficult to pursue enquiry while retaining a sense of sociological 
detachment. The trust concept might encourage nostalgia for the craft of health practice 
(because clinicians must be trusted), or indignant reaffirmation of the rectitude of EB (because 
patients must be able to trust medicine),  and thus help to support the well-rehearsed and 
restrictive dialogues of EB-discourse. The importance of trust points the way to a general 
analysis of emotional exchange in EB-discourse, which I pursue in chapter 7. There is recent 
sociological interest in trust (see eg. Misztal 1996, Gambetta 1998, Mollering 2001), and not 
much sociological interest in testimony. But my current purposes are less to do with 
understanding choices made psychologically and individualistically in particular contexts, and 
with regard to the competence and honesty of particular testimonies.  
My interest is in general patterns of testimony and the value systematically accorded to them in 
EB-discourse. For this purpose, a precedent can be found in the concept of testimony as it has 
been used in social epistemology (see Lipton 1998, Kusch 2002). Kusch, particularly, criticises 
the individualistic epistemological tradition in which accounts of testimony involve attempts to 
reduce it to psychological concepts such as perception, memory and reason, thought to be more 
epistemically-secure. He elaborates a program of communitarian epistemology in which 
testimony – the individual and collective utterances of people – is fundamental to the institution 
of knowledge. The concept of testimony might have things in common with the concept of trust; 
but where trust implies emotional consciousness, testimony implies systematic and mechanistic 
social processes of knowledge production. 
After the philosophical formulation of testimony as the basic material of knowledge, one can ask, 
what effect does EB-discourse have on the currency of different testimonial forms? First, 
consider EBM itself. Defined as a move to replace personally-held, contextually specific 
judgements with de-personalised and generalised knowledge, EBM explicitly diminishes the 
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knowledge-value of direct testimony. In EBM, the value of the things said by people in general, 
but particularly by clinicians from the position of their own subjectivities, is made suspect. This 
diminution of testimony affects patients as well; their perceptions of illnesses and treatments do 
not count as evidence unless they can be measured through a performance of objectivity. The 
testimony of the health-researcher is equally suspect taken on its own – hence the emphasis 
placed on critical appraisal of research literature, and pervasive concern to eradicate bias.  
These forms of individual testimony are easily recognised as such. One person or group may 
express an opinion. Different opinions can be found elsewhere. Isolated subjective testimonies 
are suspect, but when collected together and combined into consensus, they have the potential 
to become Evidence. Consider once again the defining research-method of EBM, the 
randomised-controlled trial (RCT). An RCT based on a large number of individual testimonial 
incidents produces a kind of testimony which is detached from the testifiers. If this RCT is 
written collaboratively by a large number of authors, the act of testimony is further dispersed; 
and if that RCT then becomes part of a meta-analysis, re-constituted by combination with other 
RCTs, it produces knowledge which is still less recognisable as testimony. Many people have 
been involved in processing the data, which comes to express judgements which are not 
individual but collective.  
Clinical guidelines manifest an even broader act of testimony, to which contributions have come 
from clinicians, academics, service-managers and representatives of government and industry. 
They speak of the collective judgements of different stakeholders in the social institution of 
healthcare. Also in EBM, there is explicit disregard for reports of causal physiological 
mechanisms. These might be difficult to reproduce, and inaccessible to most observers. Their 
veracity depends on witnessing through the expertise of biological science, with the assistance of 
technologies such as microscopes or chemical tests. Such witnessing has a testimonial character 
which can be difficult to disguise. Similarly, the views of expert clinicians bear witness to things 
from which others are excluded by their definition as non-experts.  
Even when combined, these instances of expertise have a testimonial character which is difficult 
to disguise. It seems that the more visible is the testimonial character of an act of judgement, the 
more difficult it is to camouflage, then the less likely it is to count as evidence in EBM. One 
means of disguising testimony is to disperse it. A clinical guideline, for instance, has identifiable 
authors. Being drawn from meta-analyses and other studies, it has further authors who are 
identifiable by reference. But each of these studies has testimonial contributions from hundreds 
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of others, each of these others being representative of many more similar acts of testimony. As 
an act of social consensual testimony, the guideline is produced from hidden testimonies which 
number many thousands or hundreds of thousands. 
 
Mathematical Testimony. 
Dispersal is important for procesing testimony into Evidence, but might not be enough on its 
own to warrant acceptance of collective testimony as knowledge-for practice; and then some 
other textual technology is needed. A key discussion in sociological EB-discourse, as I have 
shown, relates to the issue of quantitisation. While many have been attuned to the distinction 
between qualitative and quantitative methods, the weight of the literature is on finding room for 
qualitativism within an orthodox conception of science. Not many writers develop a discussion 
of mathematical and statistical techniques as discursive technologies. An exception is Upshur et 
al (2001), who make a distinction between qualitative research which they say carries inherent 
meaning, and quantitative research which does not. Upshur et al (2001:93) interpret this in 
terms of mathematical language as a special kind of testimonial form: it ‘transcends the 
particularities of specific natural languages’.  
From this super-testimonial status springs a special power: ‘mathematics compels assent from 
those who understand its logic’ (ibid). To take issue with mathematics, therefore, is to 
misunderstand it. This idea that mathematics compels assent from those who understand it 
merits immediate critical attention. For any mathematical statement there are levels of 
understanding which indeed compel assent, but other levels of understanding which instead 
compel dissent. These are of interest for examining the supposed transcendent capacities of 
mathematics. For example, one can make an argument that the vast majority, not to say the 
totality of use of statistical technologies in healthcare, is performed by people in whom a 
thoroughgoing personal understanding of those technologies is not required. Tacit recourse is 
routinely made to the validity of statistical testimony supported by consensus and convention.  
To illustrate this point, consider Greiffenhagen and Sharrock (2011) who present a discussion of 
‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ mathematics. They demonstrate a resolvable disconnection between 
the business of mathematical discovery and the use of mathematical technologies in applied 
contexts. Mathematical discovery is characterised by uncertainty which is erased when 
mathematical theorems come into mainstream use. The mathematical ‘public’ does not know, 
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nor need to know, all the details of production of mathematical technologies. Hinging on ideas 
of certainty and fallibility, Greiffenhagen and Sharrock’s (2011) analysis can be used to highlight 
that in health research, authors are not expected to demonstrate ‘backstage’ experience of 
mathematics: they are not expected to produce worked arguments for the formulae they apply 
to research data, or to demonstrate awareness of such arguments.  
At most, an explanation is given of the characteristics of data which place it in a particular 
statistical category. Health researchers might have been on applied-statistical training-courses, 
or they might consult with statisticans who receive credit for partial authorship in research work. 
But these testimonial forms are not normally placed in full view. Published papers are 
scrutinised for the type of statistics applied (see Greenhalgh 1996 and later editions); but only at 
a level which would substitute one technique for another. The construction of statistics as a 
route to the management of uncertainty is not brought into question. Health researchers are 
expected to use statistical techniques as if they were carriers of certainty. Strictly speaking, from 
the point of view of health research, statistical techniques are carriers of certainty. 
Being demonstrably empirical, Greiffenhagen and Sharrock’s (2011) study is different from 
purely-theoretical sociologies of mathematics, for example Bloor’s (1994) discussion of the 
‘proof’ that 2 + 2 = 4. If desired, these too can be used to make a stronger sociological 
theorisation of mathematics. They open a route to philosophies of mathematics which can be 
used to display the consensual and testimonial aspects of statistical methods. Take, for example, 
the simple mathematical idea of commutativity, as follows. The principle of commutativity is 
fundamental to forms of algebra which are based on counting. It states that ‘a + b = b + a’, or 
in words, that the number of a thing does not depend on the order of its counting. In A-level 
mathematics curricula, for example, this principle is sometimes mentioned, but not analysed.  
There, the principle of commutativity passes into the contextual background, and need not be 
explicated even though it is used routinely. When one moves beyond A-level and begins to 
study ‘number theory’ however, the principle becomes active as a point of discussion (see 
Davenport 1992). This illustrates simply that the parameters relevant to mathematical 
arguments are determined by the context of consideration. Mathematicians make their 
arguments on the basis of definitions and tacit understandings which are determined socially, by 
convention. Just as in pure mathematics, the parameters within which judgements are made 
about statistical propriety in health research are determined socially by conventions within that 
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field. These can be challenged within the field using comparable conventions; but one would not 
dream of using number theory, for instance, to challenge the claims of a health research paper.  
Take, for further example, the common technique of using p values as a measure of the strength 
of an empirical result. Health researchers using p values do not discuss the mathematical 
derivation of p values; they simply present the numbers which were produced in the course of 
their studies. They are sensible to do this, for a move to mathematical explanation would open 
up possibilities for more disagreement, not less. Instead the validity of statistical methods, often 
computerised, is taken by tacit consensus as a safe bottom-line for discussion. In this way, a vast 
amount of testimonial work is written out of consideration, and naturalised. Mathematics 
functions as a guarantor of testimonies less because of its technical properties, and more because 
it is consensually agreed to function as such. 
There is another sense in which Upshur et al’s (2001:93) assertion that ‘mathematics compels 
assent’ might be understood. This is to notice that quantitative and statistical technologies have 
properties apart from the instrumental utility of processing and expressing meaning-information 
in efficient socially-ratified ways. Mathematical idioms are rhetorically and aesthetically 
compelling for their universalising properties. Porter (1995:chapter 1) has highlighted the 
impersonalising, anonymising power of mathematical language. In the language of mathematics, 
and more specifically statistics, recognisable individuality of voice is erased. The style of 
testimony is narrowly constrained, and consequently less recognisable as being testimonial in 
origin. In social-scientific literature, it is a truth obliquely acknowledged that quantitative work 
carries social capital not for its content, but its form (see McLaughlin E 1991).  
Numbers can be experienced as persuasive in their apparent simplicity; they have a capacity to 
move people in ways which ‘mere words’ cannot. What is poetically compelling about numbers 
might paradoxically be their symbolic efficiency, which seems to be stripped of poetic content. 
A popular quote from Bertrand Russell (1953) that mathematics possesses ‘supreme beauty – 
cold and austere’ well characterises the über-scientific aesthetic of mathematics which prevails in 
EB-discourse. Such an understanding can be offset with a quote from the mathematician Paul 
Lockhart, whose ‘Mathematician’s Lament’ has gained cult status in mathematics education: 
‘The first thing to understand is that mathematics is an art. (…) there is nothing as dreamy 
and poetic, nothing as radical, subversive, and psychedelic, as mathematics. It (…) allows 
more freedom of expression than poetry, art, or music (…). Mathematics is the purest of 
the arts, as well as the most misunderstood.’ 
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         Lockhart 2002:3. 
Lockhart simply demonstrates that there is no need to think of mathematics as cold and austere, 
nor as scientific. In EB-discourse though, a Russell-like view of mathematics is tacitly and 
universally accepted, and mathematics deployed in the service of the dis-ownership of testimony. 
In EBHC, testimonies of health and illness are harvested from clinical interactions, directly from 
patients or derived from observations of patients. Such testimonies derived from clinical 
proceedings are exported and laundered by extra-clinical processes. These processes involve the 
collectivisation and validation of testimony through the language of numbers understood as science. 
Finally, clinical testimonies are returned to the clinic in the form of research reports and 
guidelines. There they are hermeneutically interpreted by clinicians and contribute to the re-
cycling of knowledge as embodied clinical acts. 
 
Testimony and Resistance to EBHC. 
The processing of testimony, and role of mathematical language in collectivising testimony for 
EBHC discussed above, is just half of the story. EB-discourse, as I have argued, is dialogically 
reliant upon resistance as well as faithful commitment to evidence-basedness. What happens to 
testimony when people identify as resistant to EBHC? Upshur et al’s (2001:93) notion that 
mathematics compels assent, and Russell’s feeling that mathematics is cold and austere, have 
dialogical implications. The compulsion of assent carries with it suspicion of the purposes for 
which assent is compelled; and the cold austerity of mathematics brings a desire for the warm 
generosity of poetic language. EB-discourse is not concerned purely with the militant pursuit of 
statistical justice in health, but also with the emotionality of caring. It exists in times where a 
suspicion of statistics is often presented as healthy.  
A literary example can illustrate this: in W.H. Auden’s (1952) requiem for modernity, The 
Shield of Achilles, statistics are associated with genocide: 
A million eyes, a million boots in line,  
Without expression, waiting for a sign. 
Out of the air a voice without a face 
Proved by statistics that some cause was just 
In tones as dry and level as the place. 
No one was cheered and nothing was discussed 
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Column by column in a cloud of dust 
They marched away enduring a belief 
Whose logic brought them, somewhere else, to grief. 
         Auden 1952:3. 
 
Here, the disembodied voice of statistics is the harbinger of death, and is tragically impossible to 
resist; but as this observation is made, the conceptual possibility of resistance is implicitly 
mobilised. Perhaps such cheerless belief need not be endured. Similarly in EB-discourse, the 
invocation of statistics as being transcendent of meaning creates a space in which meaning and 
humanity can be restored. As the foregoing discussion shows, mathematics and statistics are not 
outside of meaning. But the discursive configuration of them in such a way that they can be 
imagined and agreed to be outside of meaning sets up a dialogical possibility.  
The institution of Evidence as statistically-based and non-testimonial opens an apparent lacuna in 
meaning, which qualitative methods can be presented as being in a position to fill. Writers might 
then argue, like Mays and Pope (1996) or Popay and Williams (1998) that qualitative research 
produces Data, and is a legitimate part of EBHC. Like Giacomini (2001) or Leys (2003) they 
might argue that qualitative and quantitative research are different, but that qualitative studies 
can still be useful as additional information, or as evidence in its own right. Like Dixon-Woods 
et al (2005, 2006) they might argue that ways to synthesise qualitative evidence into systematic 
reviews must be sought, because ‘traditional forms’ (meaning quantitative data) are not 
sufficient. Such arguments have been developed for allied professions, including physiotherapy 
(Gibson and Martin 2003) and nursing (Flemming 2007, Freshwater et al 2010). Or like Morse 
(2006a, 2006b), they might argue that qualitative researchers should develop autonomy away 
from EBHC. 
These are ways of using the category of Qualitative to re-institute a space for clinical testimonies, 
presented as a different kind of specialist knowledge. The conversion of testimonies into 
qualitative data produces a field of expertise identifiable in contradistinction to the quantitative. 
Similarly, among communities of clinicians, Evidence (both quantitative-statistical and 
qualitative-linguistic) creates a space for dialogical interpretation. Only clinicians are in an 
embodied position to judge the applicability of evidence; only clinicians see multiple cases of 
illness and different kinds of patient. Only clinicians have the opportunity to re-institute expert 
testimony as a valid kind of knowledge to balance the apparent non-testimony of evidence. Such 
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testimony is not imagined as the subjective voice of an individual, but as a transcendent and 
humanitarian voice, the voice of one who is in a privileged place to make judgements. The 
patient, because of attachment to their body, cannot make such judgements. There is no way for 
their testimony to be presented as anything other than the testimony of the accidental witness. 
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6.4 The Patient. 
The issues of embodied and tacit knowledge, trust and testimony are positioned on the 
threshold of EB-discourse. Embodied and tacit knowledge are occasionally mentioned in EB-
writing, and on these occasions they cause problems. Trust and testimony are rarely mentioned, 
but as discussed above, they are also of significance for understanding EB-discourse. The related 
case of the patient is positioned differently, and has over-arching significance. The patient is 
fundamental as a basis for EB-discourse; a discourse which cannot be imagined without having a 
patient on whom practices are performed. The patient is not on the threshold, but at the centre 
of proceedings. But strangely, as well as being at the centre, they are also nowhere to be seen. 
Reading through literature on EBHC, one is intermittently assured that the patient is present 
and important, but never gets to meet them.  
In chapter 2 I observed that EB-discourse has qualities of theatrical performance. In the drama of 
EB-discourse, the key players are clinicians, researchers and policy-makers, not patients. The 
patient can be relied upon to appear in many pieces of writing on EBHC – normally towards the 
end – and always in a highly restricted role4. Clinicians, by contrast, play a limitless range of 
roles on a moral spectrum from the angelic to the demonic. The patient never becomes active in 
this way, but remains unelaborated and passive. In dramaturgical terms, the Patient’s passivity 
makes them a perfect and necessary foil, or plotting device, for the actions of other characters. 
In semiotic terms, the Patient is essential to EB-discourse, and yet the discourse has nothing to 
say about them; they are an empty category or what might be called, after Laclau (1996), an 
empty signifier.  
An empty signifier is, for Laclau, a category which is outside differentiation, and which is 
indispensable for configuring the content of active categories in political discourses. In EB-
discourse, the patient has presence as a unified entity which is protected from analysis. In 
Laclau’s (1996) terms, their exclusion from the discourse is a Radical Exclusion. Differentiating 
among patient-types is insupportable for EB-discourse; it opens the way to a set of complexities 
which would mean questioning the configuration of clinicians, researchers and policy-makers as 
exhaustive carriers of agency. This perspective accords with an industrial model of healthcare in 
which patients form a transient cohort, continuously processed by a static cohort of practitioners. 
                                                          
4
 An illustration of this is in the final phrase of Derkatch (2008:384 in Social Epstemology): ‘… 
biomedicine’s own idealised model of research, manifest in the EBM model, wherein the best evidence 
for a particular health practice seems to have little to do with patients themselves’. The irony of this 
statement is that the patient does not appear anywhere else in Derkatch (2008). 
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Focus on the actions of a static cohort of practitioners obscures the view of healthcare 
interactions as ephemeral achievements of social construction, in which patients are active even 
through their passivity.  
As I have observed, health in contemporary societies is a form of capital which is systematically 
related to class defined in socioeconomic terms, and therefore to distributions of power. Simply, 
lower socioeconomic classes have poorer health. In these literal terms it is possible to imagine 
the patient as a classed entity, or an entity in which categories of social classifications are an issue 
active but hidden. In EB-discourse it is asked; what types of knowledge are to be considered 
valid in health interventions? Or in other words, what types of knowledge can be used to 
underwrite the institutional power of the clinic and clinical research? In response to these 
questions, a complex of knowledge has been set up amongst researchers, policy-makers and 
clinicians.  
This knowledge-complex must have the patient in it, because the patient is needed as the basis 
for its construction; but the patient is hidden in the presentation of such knowledge. Their 
presence in its construction is denied. EB-discourse institutes the patient as an entity whose 
status is designated not socio-economically lower, but lower in the realm of knowledge 
production. Using the categories of embodiment and testimony, a mechanism for the radical 
exclusion of the patient from EB-discourse can be demonstrated. Two channels have been 
identified above through which the patient potentially has agency. The first is through their body 
as the locus of illness; the second is through the testimony they provide and which is derived 
from their reports of illness or health. These two channels of agency can be linked together, or 
they can be separated.  
Taking the patient body first, it is not problematic to assert the necessity of bodies as a basis for 
health practices. Foucault (1963) showed that modern medicine incorporated a gaze which made 
bodies visible to knowledge, re-configuring them as collections of organs. For Foucault, this 
dissection of the body is a symptom of an intensified governmental concern with the body as an 
entity in discourse. Jewson’s (1976) related account of the ‘disappearance of the sick-man’ from 
medicine recently drew a series of commentaries by sociologists. These are to the effect that this 
‘disappearance’ is to be read as a step towards the construction of the patient recognisable in 
contemporary medicine (Armstrong 2009, Prior 2009, Nettleton 2009, Nicolson 2009). Other 
sociologists have recognised the crucial importance of the body as a medium for social identities 
of illness and health.  
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Kelly and Field (1996) and Williams (1996), for example, demonstrate the necessity of a body 
as the point of attachment between illness and personhood. The absence of a body from the 
proceedings of healthcare is not (yet) thinkable. Not only does the presence of a body 
necessitate the presence of a patient; it is only because the body is attached to a patient, whose 
condition as healthy or sick has social significance, that it is of interest at all. Perhaps this 
connection between illness, body and patient could be challenged in the case of mental health, 
where illness is of mind not body. This venture is difficult to substantiate in a medical context 
where mental illness is conceptualised in terms of the physical body; through the brain as an 
organ, through molecular genetics, and through processes of biochemistry, to be diagnosed and 
treated with drugs (see Busfield 2000). 
In most cases, becoming a patient involves a personal act of testimony; ‘it hurts when I breathe’ 
or ‘I am experiencing anxiety’, for example. Such acts of testimony can be corroborated by acts 
of clinical measurement, which show that one has cracked a rib, or one is showing 
conventionally-recognised symptoms of emotional distress. The possibility for mismatch 
between testimonial levels is immediate. People’s claims to bodily illness can be countermanded, 
as can their claims to being in good health. In cases where mental health is implicated, it is 
people’s testimonial status which is itself the prime focus of attention. In the majority of cases, 
though, the patient gives testimony based closely on their embodied knowledge of self; clinicians 
and professionals interpret this testimony at a level of expertise which is potentially alienated 
from the patient. They derive their own testimonies from patients’ bodies, incorporate patients’ 
testimonies where they mesh with other influences, and discount them where they do not. 
The patient is uniquely attached to their own body, and so their person is connected to a source 
of agency and potential power in the arena of health practice. The patient’s body is active in the 
clinic as a determinant of action; but the way in which it becomes active depends on which 
aspects of the body are brought into play by being institutionally recognised as knowledge-
generative. In this respect, clinicians and researchers, by virtue of their social position, cannot 
avoid dictating the terms of knowledge by reading the significance of symptoms and bodily 
responses in disciplined ways. As discussed above, this process might itself be more or less 
embodied and instinctive; but to the extent that it is embodied and instinctive, it is degraded in 
EBHC. And to the extent that it is not degraded in EBHC and is protected in EB-discourse, it is 
protected by attachment to the clinician, not the patient.  
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For the patient, direct connection to the body means that they are constrained within the realm 
of embodied-tacit knowledge; just precisely that realm which, in EBHC, is made suspect. This 
situation is well-illustrated in Mildred Blaxter’s (2009) autobiographical account of the illness 
(cancer) which preceded her death in 2010. Building on the theme of the ‘vanishing patient’, she 
recounts occasions during the process of her diagnosis in which her interpretation of bodily signs 
and symptoms – her personal embodied knowledge – was overruled by clinicians5. Although her 
analysis is of medicine, rather than specifically of EBM, she draws attention to the way evidence 
within the clinic is arranged so as to vanish the patient: 
‘P [the patient] (…) had some clear personal opinions (…). What these opinions were 
based on is hard to say: medical history, knowledge of the ‘normal’ for this body, 
perception of symptoms, and something that can only be called instinct or ‘listening’ to the 
body.’ 
‘It was very clear to P throughout that the status of the patient’s own information – about 
medical history, about symptoms, about probable cause and effect – was given a lower 
status than the ‘evidence’ of the measurement or image.’ 
        Blaxter 2009:768,771. 
Here the patient’s embodied knowledge is overruled twice; once because it is embodied, 
once because it is expressed as testimony by the patient. The nature of severe cancer as a 
catastrophic condition, but one upon which (in some cases) the patient retains a rational 
perspective, offers a space to comment upon the workings of bureaucratic medicine6. I have 
myself had chance to observe this closely. Spending some days with a friend of mine in the last 
week of his life, I witnessed interactions between him and hospital staff. He indicated a sense of 
frustration in terms which I quote verbatim: 
“It’s not that they won’t listen to me ... they’re listening, but they cannot hear.” 
As he became more ill and more sedated, it became harder for this man to articulate his thoughts. 
Nevertheless he produced the following question as a comment on his predicament: 
“. . . why does the patient have to be institutionally free?” 
                                                          
5
 At MedSoc 2013, Sarah Cunningham-Burley mentioned this paper in the context of a talk which built 
from the idea of construction of disease towards construction of patients. 
6
 This makes a contrast with EBM-advocacies which had used cancer as a paradigm case of horrific 
illness, which I refer to in chapter 7 as a ‘human shield’. 
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This comment by itself is open to interpretation, but in the context in which it was spoken (in 
which the patient’s views had been repeatedly ignored) it indicates that the speaker felt that his 
institutional status as Patient deprived him of the social capacity to influence his own treatment. 
I, too, found it difficult to make myself heard as an advocate for the patient’s wishes, in a 
context where my testimony could not count as knowledge. 
As the end of his life grew near, this patient became increasingly insistent upon being discharged 
from bureaucratic, protocol-driven medical care in which his agency was institutionally removed.  
For this man, escaping the hospital became his final ambition; one which, with determination, he 
was able to achieve. He and Mildred Blaxter, before she died, were in a position to witness the 
radical exclusion of the patient from the embodied legacy of EB-discourse in healthcare 
institutions. 
 
Re-constructing the Patient. 
Through considering the categories of embodiment and testimony in EB-discourse, the means 
for a radical exclusion of the patient can be shown. Thus is the presence of the patient in EB-
discourse guaranteed, but their role tightly restricted. The patient is constituted through other 
discourses which may work in dialogue with EB-discourse. For example, sociology has been 
successful in articulating patients’ testimonial accounts of illness through the genre of illness 
narratives, in which a key authority is Arthur Frank (see Frank 1991, 1995, 2000). Frank (1995) 
examines the relationship between the patient and their body, and creates a three-way typology 
of narratives (restitution, chaos and quest). Bury (2001) offers a different trio of narrative types; 
contingent, moral and core narratives which are associated with the negotiation of identity 
statuses for ill people.  
These narrative types have a normative-descriptive character. They naturalise the patient as an 
entity to be understood, represented and defended. Narratives of ‘patient experience’ can 
enshrine a distinction between patient and non-patient narratives in health, and hence also 
between patients and non-patients. In this respect Alan Radley’s (1999) transgressive account of 
illness narratives makes a useful contrast. Radley (1999) focuses on the aesthetic and sublime 
dimensions of accounts of illness, and serves to highlight the significance of aesthetic idiom in 
such accounts. Radley (influenced by Sontag 1978) is suspicious of the valorising role of 
aesthetic expressions in patient-narratives. By implication, he queries the bifurcation between 
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patients’ accounts of illness which are presented as being properly aesthetic, and medical 
accounts which are not. In a way which echoes my comments about quantitative methods being 
presented as beyond meaning and beyond aesthetics, the effect produced is to suggest that the 
objectivity of medical accounts is also an aesthetic effect.  
The particular use of aesthetic techniques in sufferers’ narratives contributes to the construction, 
or as Radley terms it, the ‘fabrication’ of patient experience. Thus space is made to de-naturalise 
the category of ‘patient’, to present it as a construction, and one in which patients themselves 
are active, whether or not they are aware of being so. Patients are made with the willingness and 
determination of people to adopt the identity status of patient for themselves, or to attribute it 
to others. EB-discourse particularly involves the tacit differentiation of patient testimony from 
the types of testimony which can become Evidence. This process can be traced in general terms. 
At the root of any clinical encounter is the patient, who normally testifies to their own 
patienthood. Their testimony is the basis for further acts of testimony performed by a clinician 
or clinician-proxy (a questionnaire on a health-service website, for example), or testimony is 
derived from the patient’s body, with or without their complicity.  
In EBHC these acts of testimony are collected, modified, statistically processed and ratified, 
become data, become findings, become clinical guidelines and protocols, and are fed back to the 
patient as Evidence. In this act of feedback, the original patient is invisible; their input cannot be 
remembered. EBHC places the patient in a passive position, in which they are a literal match 
with what Foucault (1975) calls ‘docile bodies’. EB-discourse thus marks a considerable 
achievement; the appearance of exclusion of the patient from transactions to which they are 
fundamental. EBHC must have a patient in order to produce evidence, but the patient must be 
rendered inactive in order that Evidence can be applied. It is in this liminal situation of being 
present but excluded, central but invisible, that a case can be made to reinstate the patient, or 
bring them back into consideration.  
As I have shown, there is no room to do this within the confines of EB-discourse; but there are 
other types of health discourse in which the patient can be re-animated, given rights, stood up 
for, have things said on their behalf, and so forth. First-person accounts of illness can be read in 
this spirit, which is one of a kind of emancipation for the patient not in any specific case, but in 
general. The protection of the patient as a response to the effects of healthcare, whether 
evidence-based or not, is a dialogical move. In Blaxter (2009), as elsewhere, a direct conflict can 
be perceived between patient-centred care and EBHC; with ‘only lip-service being paid to the 
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principles of patient-centredness’ (2009:762). This contrasts with other contexts in which the 
suggestion is that it is the principles of EBHC to which only lip-service is paid (a suggestion of 
particular significance in physiotherapy, as discussed in chapter 4). These discourses nourish 
each other through the oppositional (dialogical) division of knowledge.  
It might be appropriate to ask what can be imagined for an emancipated patient. Perhaps they 
are a patient whose self-testimony has institutionally-recognised value, and who is accorded the 
status of an expert in relation to their own body. Such a patient has begun to exist recently in 
healthcare for chronic illness; the Expert Patient Programme has operated in the UK, for 
example, since 2001. Literature on expert-patienthood indicates how this idea can contribute to 
the ongoing renewal of the patient as a constructed entity. Wilson et al (2007), for example, 
found an apparent paradox in this discourse which simultaneously safeguards medical knowledge 
paradigms, but also delegates disease-management to patients in a way which is experienced as 
empowering, and can contribute to patient-consumerism.  
Fox and Ward (2006) had begun to develop an understanding of health identities in which the 
expert patient is at an extreme of self-biomedicalisation. They speak of a diverse constellation of 
such health identities, in which individuals are bound to different types of patienthood. Taylor 
and Bury (2007) warn against the psychologism in the idea of ‘expert patient’ which could be 
detrimental to standards of care if deployed without reference to social context. Such accounts 
speak not of emancipation, but of strengthened attachment of illness-sufferers, whether self-
defined or so defined by others, to a naturalised identity of patient. They express a re-
invigorated confidence in the categorisation of classes of people as patients, of expert kinds or as 
other kinds, all of whom need to be properly cared-for.  
The discourse of patienthood which is situated closest to EB-discourse in the context of 
academic health-institutional literature is that of patient-centred care. The idea of patient-
centred care has developed in synchronicity with the ideas of clinical epidemiology and 
evidence-basedness. Mead and Bower (2000) report its beginnings in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
increasing prominence through the 1990s. Some sociologists have commented on the tension 
between evidence-based and patient-centred impulses in healthcare governance (eg. Armstrong 
2002, Mykhalovskiy and Weir 2004, May et al 2006). The two meet directly in the arena of 
‘shared decision-making’ (see eg. Gwyn and Elwyn 1999), but in EB-discourse it is rare to find 
patient-centredness used except in passing.  
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The two discourses (EB- and PC-) have markedly separate existences. This separation tallies 
with an incompatibility between the patient around whom care can be ‘centred’, and the patient 
as conceived in EB-discourse. The patient required for evidence construction is one who can be 
subjected to different types of gaze; the statistical gaze of EBHC, or the expert gaze of the 
clinician. Both of these require a passive patient about whom generalisations can be made; a 
patient-population or a patient-class. EB-discourse requires that illness occurs not at random but 
systematically, in generalisable ways. One systematic determinant of relative ill-health, as 
exposed by epidemiology, is relative poverty which generates a patient-class. The patient-class is 
used to cultivate knowledge which is harvested, dissociated from its origins, and then put back 
to work in the processing of the patient-class.  
EB-discourse generates a new way of making identifiable this patient class. Through EB-
discourse, patients come to be defined as ‘lower’ not socio-economically, but through 
knowledge-status. Particular ways of recovering the patient from this predicament can be 
imagined through other discourses outside of EB-discourse, but only on condition that they 
remain a patient. The patient cannot be emancipated from their status as patient. The 
disconnection of the illness-sufferer from patienthood can only be achieved through detaching 
their personhood from their embodied existence – something which (notwithstanding recent 
interest in disease as located in silico) remains beyond the reach even of radical thought. 
 
6.5 Physiotherapy and Embodiment. 
While considering the tacit dimension of medical practice, Henry (2010) draws an explicit 
connection between tacitness and embodiedness: he complains that the clinician is ‘almost 
totally oblivious to his (sic) own body’s tacit role in evaluation of the patient’s [body]’, and 
laments the requirement of practice for clinicians to ‘take their own bodies for granted’ 
(2010:295). In this respect he is referring principally to the practice of medicine. As I have 
explained, the potentially great significance of embodiment to the discussions of EB-discourse 
has generally been ignored or mishandled in medical EB-writing. This ellipsis might lead one to 
wonder sociologically about other health disciplines where the topic of embodiment is 
unavoidable.  
It can be avoided in medicine where treatment is given with drugs. It can be avoided in nursing 
where treatment has prominent emotional and practical dimensions. In occupational therapy it 
164 
 
can be avoided where treatment is based around functional capacities. In CAMs it can be avoided 
where treatments are explained in terms of spiritualities and vital energies. Uniquely in 
physiotherapy, where treatment for embodied conditions is given through the body of the 
patient and using the body of the therapist, it cannot be avoided. In physiotherapy, the 
therapeutic approach is to the body as a self-enclosed mechanical system which is the basis for 
experience (see Zusman 2004; Gyllensten et al 2010). Physiotherapists act as embodied 
conduits for the inscription of socially-determined values of health in the bodies of patients 
(although in practice, this process is complex and not necessarily consummated – see Schoeb 
and Bürge 2011).  
Physiotherapeutic interventions generally utilise the body of the therapist, as well as being 
performed on the body of the patient. Here are some examples from my own experience of 
physiotherapeutic work: using my body to support a patient from the side as they practice 
walking after suffering a stroke; using my body to perform repetitious (passive) movements on 
the wrist of a patient in rehabilitation from a past injury; using my body to assist a child with 
cerebral palsy in stretching exercises; using my body to perform ‘vibrations’ on a patient in 
intensive care, to assist with removal of fluid from their lungs. These treatments are definitively 
embodied; they involve the body of the therapist as well as the body of the patient. 
Physiotherapists cannot very well deny the essential importance of the body, for to do so would 
refuse the basis for their professional identity.  
Nicholls and Gibson (2010:497) have recently expressed disappointment that ‘the body as a 
theoretical construct has been entirely bypassed by the profession’ and signalled their intention 
to establish better connections between physiotherapy and theories of embodiment. Laudable as 
this intention is, it overlooks once again the difficulties inherent to the project of bringing 
embodied phenomena into the realm of theoretical clarity. Perhaps this task is less daunting in 
the case of the examples given above, some of which could be described adequately in words, if 
not effectively taught without an embodied demonstration. However there are other 
physiotherapeutic endeavours which are harder to codify. Proprioceptive Neuromuscular 
Facilitation (PNF) as an active muscle exercise for people with neurological dificulties, for 
example, is a technique which depends on the rhythmic harmonious interaction of the bodies of 
patient and therapist. The Bobath Concept, which involves pressure applied to (often elusive) 
‘key points’, is even more difficult to articulate (see Davidson and Waters 2000). 
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Techniques such as these are opaque even to therapists who are able to use them confidently. 
Sceptical physiotherapy students are reliant on having their own bodies ‘treated’, but also on 
therapists’ testimonies, and the testimonies of patients successfully treated, to witness their 
efficacy. This opacity applies to the therapist’s knowledge of their own body, but there is a 
second level of opacity to physiotherapeutic practice where the patient’s body is concerned. 
This is that physiotherapists are dependent upon the patient’s testimony as to their experience of 
their body. In a popular undergraduate textbook for respiratory physiotherapy, Alexandra 
Hough (2001) gives a quote advising therapists to  
‘”listen to the patient. He is telling you the diagnosis”. To which I would add “and she just 
might be telling you the best management too”’. 
         Hough 2001:30. 
Physiotherapists are, of necessity, accustomed to making attributions of testimonial competence 
to their patients, where there is no other way to access patients’ embodied knowledge.  
In EB-discourse though, physiotherapists’ warrant for doing this is placed in doubt. 
Remembering my review of EB-discourse in physiotherapy (chapter 2), it seems at first that 
physiotherapists have not pursued an embodied account of their practice there. In the hard-line 
summonses-to-evidence of Bury (1996) and Newham (1997), for example, there is a tacit 
refusal of the possibility and legitimacy of embodied knowledge forms. Hurley (2000) and 
Bithell (2000), in their defences of clinical practice, present a more positive view of 
physiotherapy, but still centre their arguments for clinical-practical expertise as the proper basis 
for research on the assumption that it can be fully and unproblematically codified. More 
appreciation of embodied knowledge can sometimes be found where physiotherapists have 
collaborated with other professionals, such as nurses. Roskell et al (1998) defend the ‘need for 
practical abilities to deal with real problems from a basis of perceived certainty’ (1998:225).  
This is suggestive of a necessarily-embodied perspective, and it is noted that these private and 
tacit skills, these ‘elements of intuitive practice, are difficult to verbalise’ (1998:229). Just the 
same, the narrative climax of Roskell et al’s (1998) article is a recourse to Research Evidence. 
Neither is it that nurses were generally any more confident than physiotherapists to pursue an 
account of embodied knowledge. Thompson’s (2003) consideration of ‘clinical experience as 
evidence’ from a pure-nursing perspective, for example, is concerned not to find legitimate 
expression for non-propositional knowledge or ‘heuristics’, but ‘to combat them in nursing 
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decisions’ (2003:230, emphasis added). Thorne (2009) begins by positioning nurses at the 
forefront of evidential awareness because of their privileged access to practice; but ends by 
falling into line with hard evidentialism. Parker (2002) provides an analogous case in medicine, 
arguing that ‘to demystify clinical wisdom is not to devalue it’ (2002:273).  
The flight from embodied and tacit knowledge forms is just as likely to be found across allied-
professional EB literature as it is in medical. However, the issue of tacit and embodied 
knowledge is of especial acuity in physiotherapy; a discipline which, as I say, is more of-the-body 
than any other. What can be expected of physiotherapists in this situation? Their training equips 
them to take on the socially-assigned responsibility of treating their patients. While this 
responsibility is explicit (it might consist of instructions such as ‘ensure that this patient is safe to 
use stairs independently before discharge from hospital’), the therapeutic acts implicated for 
physiotherapy are embodied and more-or-less resistant to explication.  
 
The significance of physiotherapy for interpreting EB-discourse. 
I have drawn attention to an issue of rhetoric in EB-discourse which is easier to detect in 
physiotherapy than in the medical case. This is the possibility that physiotherapists might 
perceive a political need to espouse general commitment to EB-principles, while knowing at the 
same time that these principles are inapplicable to the embodied nature of their work. In this 
scenario, and in a subversion of the quote I gave from Herbert et al (2001:204), time spent 
engaging with the sublimated politicisations and philosophications of EB discourse would indeed 
be better spent on the embodied treatment of embodied problems. It is not reasonable to expect 
physiotherapists to conduct sophisticated theorisations of their embodied practice, and especially 
not if it is at the risk of being seen to resist evidence-basedness. 
The physiotherapeutic case has significance which should be of interest to analysts of EB-
discourse. As theoreticians, Thornton (2006) and Braude (2009) are justified in enquiring after 
the role of embodiment in EBM. EB-discourse is constructed on the supposition that discussion 
of the role for extra-clinical research knowledge in determining clinical practices is legitimate. If 
this discussion is indeed legitimate, its capacity to address the issue of embodied knowledge 
must be demonstrable. Since it is a discourse in which the legitimacy of embodied-tacit 
knowledge is doubted, it is an issue which is likely to be avoided where possible. In the case of 
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physiotherapy though, there is no way to escape the issue of embodiment. It is absolutely central 
to proceedings of practice.  
If EB-discourse is to be taken at face-value as a discourse of social change, then physiotherapy 
ought to have quickly become a focal point for discussion. Not just physiotherapists, but medical 
and sociological writers too might reasonably have taken an interest in the case of physiotherapy 
from the start of EB-discourse; but they did not. As demonstrated in my literature review 
chapter, the case of EB-physiotherapy, in comparison particularly with the medical case, drew 
little comment, except sporadically from a small number of physiotherapists. Broadly speaking, 
and contrary to the fears expressed by some physiotherapists in the mid-1990s, physiotherapy 
has not suffered as a result of EBHC7. Through the twenty years of EB-discourse, people have 
continued to experience illness in their bodies; and physiotherapists have continued in their 
application of embodied treatment interventions to bodily conditions.  
Physiotherapy thus points to the possibility of disconnection between evidence-basedness and 
healthcare practice, in a way previously considered in chapter 4. In those pages, I observed that 
EB-discourse exists primarily as a discourse which circulates in academic literature. My 
discourse-analytic approach enables the asking of questions about the workings of this discourse, 
but restricts what can be said about some reality of EBHC which might exist outside of it. 
Physiotherapy supplies an empirical reason to take a view on this problem. If EB-discourse does 
not engage the problem of embodied-tacit knowledge in the context of physiotherapy, where 
the problem is most immediate, then there is less reason to expect it to engage the problem 
elsewhere. In this spirit, one can look again to medical EB-literature and ask what elements of 
embodiment can be found in it.  
Where do doctors describe in detail the experience of leaving a patient’s bedside to perform a 
literature search, then returning with a selection of printed material which they translate into 
the terms of illness experience? Where do researchers describe in precise detail the embodied 
procedures which enable them to harvest knowledge from participants in clinical trials? It is not 
evident that this is done anywhere. Sociologists have fared little better in this respect. Gabbay 
and le May’s (2004) excavation of ‘mindlines’ is an observational account of what happens in GP 
surgeries; but as the term suggests, it is concerned with the transfer of information and with 
                                                          
7
 Statistics from the Health Professions Council show that registrations for physiotherapy in 2012 had 
increased by 37% from 2002, and 100% from 1992. This compares well with registrations for 
occupational therapy (increased 38% from 2002, 147% from 1992) and chiropractice (increased 48% 
from 2002, 89% from 1992). Figures are from   
http://www.hpc-uk.org/aboutregistration/theregister/oldstats/index.asp accessed 6th March 2013. 
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what is said and thought, rather than with the embodiment of what is done. Moreira’s (2005) 
and May’s (2006) thick descriptions of guideline production are detailed accounts of health 
policy processes in EBHC, but they have little to do with embodiment. As surmised in relation 
to the hermeneutic programme, surveillance of doctors’ behaviours in EBHC is most obvious in 
relation to the act of reading, rather than to acts committed corporeally in the clinic. 
 
6.6 Conclusion. 
When I first introduced embodiment as a topic for discussion, it was in the terms of a dialogue 
of irrationality: dialogue had been identified as a structuring principle in EB-discourse, with 
dialogues in rationality making up its explicit content. Embodiment (as the irrational other to 
the mind out-of-body) is a category in dialogue with disembodiment. Investigating embodiment 
in EB-discourse through this chapter, I have addressed the details of a dialogue which underpins 
the content of the discourse. I have found four connected points of focus for dialogues around 
embodiment. First, tacit and embodied knowledge (as opposed to codified propositional 
knowledge). Second, testimony (as opposed to free-floating knowledge). Third, the patient (as 
opposed to the well-person and the knowledgeable clinician or researcher). Fourth, 
physiotherapy (as opposed to other streams of professional knowledge). 
Each of these dialogues gives insights on EB-discourse. Embodied and tacit knowledge has a 
presence in the literature, but its consistent mishandling in clinical writing serves to show that 
its significance for EBHC has not been appreciated. Only Nettleton et al (2008) have used the 
concept in a way faithful to its meaning as extra-discursive; and their concern is to show that 
under bureaucratic evidence-based healthcare, clinical embodied knowledge is unaccounted for, 
and suppressed. In EB-discourse, there is no space for embodied knowledge to be positively 
represented. Similarly testimony (which is required for embodiment to breach the discourse) is 
excluded, being active only on occasion and in a compromised form, through ‘trust’. Testimony 
is allowed into EB-discourse only if it can be disguised as non-testimony. The usual way to do 
this is through an aesthetic of scientific-mathematics: a route which creates space for qualitative 
knowledge forms to be included by presenting them in dialogue with the scientific-mathematical 
ideal. 
The elimination of embodied knowledge and testimony explain the fate of the patient in EB-
discourse. That the patient is missing can be easily seen; but how can they be missing when they 
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are necessary to evidence production and practice? They are missing because their embodied 
knowledge is silenced, and because their testimony is appropriated and re-constituted into forms 
detached from their self. The practical consequences of these discursive processes are potentially 
catastrophic for the person who becomes a patient; they are systematically denied the chance to 
influence their own care. Lastly I have considered EB-discourse outside of medicine in 
physiotherapy, as a case where embodiment cannot plausibly be avoided. Here there is reason to 
suspect a discontinuity between EB-discourse and health practice. Such a discontinuity offers 
hope for the patient, and for healthcare in general, namely that there is life outside of (and after) 
EB-discourse. I suggest that medicine and sociology as disciplines could benefit from a more 
careful appreciation of embodiment in physiotherapy. 
These proceedings demonstrate dialogues around embodiment as fundamental to understanding 
EB-discourse sociologically as a discourse of power. If as I have argued, power is dialogically 
split, and is both productive and repressive, then perhaps its repressive dimension is most clearly 
displayed through the dialogue of embodiment. I have at points (and casually) described EB-
discourse as an ideology of practice, but it can be shown as an ideology with a material basis. It is 
dependent upon bodies and embodied practices; but in the discourse embodiment is 
marginalised and suppressed. The material basis for EB-discourse affects clinicians, but primarily 
it affects the patient who cannot escape from the embodied predicament, and whose status as a 
patient is already known to be an effect of power in the form of social inequality. In relation to 
the patient, EB-discourse is a manifestation of power in the traditional sense, which represses 
and silences. The dialogue of embodiment provides a mechanism for the channelling of 
repressive power. 
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Chapter 7 
Emotion in EB-discourse. 
 
 
Synopsis. 
In this chapter I consider the role of emotions in EB-discourse. I introduce emotion as implicit in 
the theoretical perspectives of Foucault and Bakhtin, and identify Jack Barbalet as a key source in 
the theoretical sociology of emotions. I highlight emotion as a sensitive topic in EB-discourse, 
and one which is usually addressed through coded terms. Principal among these, identified on a 
cue from Sara Ahmed, is the (dialogical) metaphor of hardness and softness. I follow this and 
other emotional metaphors through EB-discourse, for both EB-advocacy and detraction, 
considering dialogical differences and commonalities between the two. I discuss the free play of 
emotions in early-medical EB-discourse in terms of the Bakhtinian carnivalesque and grotesque, 
situated in an emotional climate of confidence. 
I then pursue the emotions of evidence-basedness into medical writing from Greenhalgh and 
Upshur; and into physiotherapy where I focus on the analysis of particular emotions, fear and 
shame. I use these to highlight the sociality of emotion implicit in Bakhtin, and to highlight the 
dialogical ordering of emotions found in different contexts of EB-discourse as a reflection of 
power. I present sociology as having achieved an emotional validation of EB-discourse. The 
stabilising of emotional repertoires involves the management of trust and ambivalence as 
emotional currencies. Soft and hard emotionalities are juxtaposed to produce ambivalent states; 
trust and distrust are accorded to various parties and entities in EB-discourse. Trust and 
ambivalence work together to convince readers of the validity of EB-discourse. Finally, I re-
connect sociologists’ use of emotions in EB-discourse to the theoretical concerns of Barbalet, 
Bakhtin and Foucault. 
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7.1  Introduction. 
It can be surprising that a literature of rationality, as evidence-basedness literature (EB-literature) 
is, would consistently elicit responses noticeable for their emotive content. Researching other 
types of health-related social life, this situation might be inverted. Reading about experiences of 
chronic illness, for example, one prepares to be moved by painful emotions. One is then in a 
position to be surprised if such accounts turn out to be predominantly rational and technical. 
Given that I have been concerned with processes of dialogue which revolve around oppositional 
dichotomies, one can also wonder how categories of emotionality and rationality can come 
sharply into focus. In the prosaic routines of modern life, there is no general need to categorise 
actions by rationality or emotionality; no need to separate out the emotional and rational 
dimensions of decision-making. Both operate together unproblematically and in continuity (I 
emotionally want a cup of tea, so I rationally make one).  
In some discourses there appears a need to assert this distinction forcefully; and then one can 
feel sure (by virtue of embodied experience) that one is dealing either with Rationality or with 
Emotion, and that the two are rightly separate. In rational discourses generally, and in EB-
discourse in particular, the separation between rationale and emotion is made so that emotions 
can be marginalised and excluded. Within this context of exclusion, emotion can be ‘brought 
back in’, as if by design, or one can observe that the marginalisation of emotion leads to its 
reappearance at the centre. The central importance of emotion then seems to result from the 
attempt to bracket emotions off. In The Cultural Politics of Emotion, and in a broad historical 
context, Sara Ahmed (2004) makes just this observation: 
‘(…) even if emotions have been subordinated to other faculties, they have still remained at 
the centre of intellectual history. (…) This is not surprising. What is relegated to the 
margins is often right at the centre of thought itself.’ 
         Ahmed 2004:4. 
Thus it is possible that the act of suppressing and marginalising emotions has the effect of 
purifying them and bringing them to the centre of thought and action. To go further, it might be 
suggested that some emotions, or some aspects of emotion, owe their experienced sharpness 
and recognisability as emotion, perhaps even their existence, to processes of suppression and 
marginalisation. In theorising the role of emotion in EB-discourse, one must maintain an 
awareness of dialogical processes. The discourse is full of emotion, which I shall report upon. 
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But the term of ‘emotion’ depends on having a dialogical other, rationality, which is not-
emotion, and of which emotion is nominally the opposite. Barbalet (2001:26) suggests that it is 
not emotion in general, but only particular feelings identified as emotions which can be 
experienced; but to use emotion as a general term is already to sponsor a categorical distinction 
between rationality and emotionality. 
 
7.2 Theorising Emotion. 
Neither Foucault nor Bakhtin, in their writings on discourse, explicitly address emotion as a 
general topic; but both of their legacies are compatible with a consideration of emotions. Taking 
Foucault’s project first, it begins with a historical study of madness as unreason (Foucault 1961). 
Boyne’s (1990) appraisal of Foucault includes a demonstration of how this interest was attached 
by Foucault to Descartes as a founding philosopher of modernity. As Boyne (1990:46-7) 
explains, Foucault identifies madness as a special case in Descartes’ pursuit of certainty, a case 
which is not argued through but rejected by reflex. Madness, for Descartes, can be rejected 
automatically as a source of influence on knowledge because it denies the sovereign subject who 
thinks; and the subject who thinks is, for Descartes, the wellspring of truth. The possibility of 
truth from madness can simply be refused. This philosophical exclusion of madness – the 
Cartesian exclusion, as it is known – produces the sovereign subject, the ‘defining figure of the 
post-renaissance world’ (ibid). 
The Cartesian exclusion, for Foucault, mainly signals the start of the Great Confinement – 
institutional removal of madness from public social life1. But it also has significance for thought 
around embodiment and emotion, for Descartes’ sovereign subject is made purely of rational 
intellect. As Boyne puts it:  
‘We are not speaking here of the subject as a body; bodies can malfunction, the brain can 
be invaded by dark vapours. Nor is it a question of the subject as a will. For the will is 
propelled by passion, and the untamed will is a source of error and sin.’ 
         Boyne 1990:46. 
                                                          
1
 ‘unreason is plunged deeper under the ground, there no doubt to disappear, but there also to take root’ 
– Foucault in Boyne 1990:47. 
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Here emotion, as embodied passion, is a source of error and sin. Descartes’ thinking subject has 
an emotional will, but this will is to be tamed. It is not a source of truth, but connects the 
subject to madness; or, the emotional will is the madness that lives in the thinking subject and 
threatens to unseat their reason. By this route can the germinal presence of emotions be located 
in Foucault’s work on madness and reason, and on the formulation of the modern rational 
subject2.  
A similar feat can be achieved for Bakhtin, who does not confront the issue of emotion/non-
emotion directly, but implicitly. This can be demonstrated by considering the Bakhtinian 
concern with the Prosaic dimension of everyday social life, a concern reconstructed by Gardiner 
(2000). As Gardiner shows, Bakhtin was sensitive to the limits of formal rationalities in which 
bodily, lived experience is invalidated: 
‘what Bakhtin terms ‘discursive theoretical thinking’ denigrates the sensuous and tangible 
character of the lived event’ 
       Gardiner 2000:48 emphasis added. 
While suspicion of the ‘epistemic certitude sought by scientific rationalism’ (ibid) is not 
reducible to the idea of emotion, emotion is an integral part of it. In advocating practical-
rationality, actual communion rather than theoretical abstraction, and answerability to the other, 
Bakhtin placed value on the ‘emotional-volitional tone’ as a signature characteristic of human 
acts (2000:51). Further, there is in Bakhtin the suggestion of emotionality-behind-rationality; he 
brings into question the ‘yearning for transcendence from the ambivalence and messiness of daily 
life’ which can ‘only result in a ghostly, illusory existence’ (Gardiner 2000:49 emphasis added). 
Foucault and Bakhtin are receptive to emotions and protective of their importance for 
explaining social life, but do not specifically address emotion as a socio-theoretical topic per se. 
To create a context for theoretical discussion, I use the work of Jack Barbalet who has advanced 
the case for emotions as a topic in contemporary sociology. Barbalet (2001) connects with the 
‘general sociological acceptance of emotion as a category of explanation’, and also more 
specifically with the ‘significance of emotion in large-scale or macroscopic social processes (…) 
in the mobilisation of collective social actors’ (2001:28). The empirical chapters of his (2001) 
book are concerned with particular emotional patterns and social effects (for example, 
                                                          
2
 This can also be done through Foucault’s later work, where subjects are governed through their desires, 
which I discuss briefly in chapter 8. 
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confidence in relation to action; shame in relation to conformity; fear in relation to change), but 
he begins with a general account of emotion and rationality, which is of direct relevance to the 
analysis of evidence-basedness discourse (EB-discourse). 
Barbalet anticipates the paradox of emotionality in EB-discourse, which is an emotional set of 
responses to the attempted removal of emotion from institutional proceedings: 
‘The conventional approach holds that emotion is the opposite of reason. But such a view is 
ultimately subverted by the fact that those who wish to suppress emotion in fully realising 
reason are typically engaged by an emotional commitment to the project.’ 
         Barbalet 2001:29. 
This subversion reflects an alternative to the ‘conventional approach’: that emotion is not the 
opposite of reason, but supports reason or is the basis for reason. Barbalet calls this the critical 
approach. He argues in favour of a third approach – the radical approach – which is that reason 
and emotion are not properly separate, but are continuous and ultimately the same thing. My 
argument in this chapter is to give empirical support to the radical approach from the case of EB-
discourse; to show that the maintenance of EB-discourse depends on sustaining the emotional-
rational dichotomy by means of the conventional and critical approaches; and consequently to 
suggest that the sustenance of a dichotomy between reason and emotion is fundamental to the 
dialogical working of EB-discourse as an expression of modern functional social power. 
Barbalet’s theoretical argument for the radical approach is achieved through a comparison of the 
works of William James and Max Weber3. He shows that these apparently incompatible views 
are in fact convergent, because Weber’s unsuccessful attempts to exclude emotion ultimately 
provide support for James’ position. James, Barbalet explains, is willing to recognise what 
Weber is not, even while describing it: that ‘there is a human passion for clarity and order, and a 
need for intellectual frameworks’ (2001:54, emphasis added). Rationality is not only something 
aided or hindered by emotional states, but is itself an emotional state. This point being made, I 
now put general considerations to one side and begin an account of the emotions in EB-
discourse, starting once again with medicine then moving on to physiotherapy and sociology. 
 
                                                          
3
 Barbalet (2001:45-54) discusses James’ work on ‘the sentiment of rationality’ which makes emotion 
central to reason, and Weber’s typologies of rationality, which formalise the exclusion of emotion from 
rational thought. 
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Emotions and Evidence-Basedness. 
Common definitions for the term evidence often depend upon already having available the ideas 
of proof and facts. For example, the Free Online Dictionary4 names evidence as ‘data presented 
in proof of the facts in issue’. The Oxford English Dictionary (online) confusingly names it as 
‘the available body of facts indicating whether a belief is true’ (emphasis added). A link can be 
made instead from the legal context, perhaps citing the Roman rhetorician Quintilian, between 
evidence and emotion; here, evidence marks the capacity of language to engage the emotional 
state of certainty (see for example Katula 2003). In the first case evidence has to do with 
establishing objectivity, in the second case it has to do with eliciting a convinced subjective state. 
In EB-discourse both of these formulations are present. The preference primarily presumed, 
most often made explicit, and distilled into the term ‘evidence-based’ is for the proof of facts. 
But implicit across the discourse, and manifested by way of the rhetorical strategies endorsed 
and applied, is an overwhelming concern for emotive persuasion. 
In illustration of this tension, Sackett and Rosenberg (1995:330) set out their vision for EBM by 
distinguishing between ‘established facts based on data derived from patients’, and evidence 
from theory, ‘extrapolated from principles and logic’. Earlier that year, Rosenberg and Donald 
(1995) had identified the central dynamic of EBM as the need to distinguish between 
information ‘invalid or irrelevant to clinical practice, out of date or based on overinterpretation 
of experience’ and information ‘from powerful investigations such as randomised trials and 
rigorous clinical studies’(1995:1122, emphasis added). Where Sackett and Rosenberg principally 
invoke facts and non-facts, Rosenberg and Donald use emotionally-evocative terminology to 
mark off ‘strong and useful’ from ‘weak and irrelevant’ facts (ibid). Such divergences can be 
accommodated easily enough, being at an unobtrusive level of double-voicedness. In this case, 
they are issued even through a common co-writer, William Rosenberg, and at roughly the same 
time. 
By contrast, where the influence of emotion on thought and action is more clearly discredited, 
the conditions are set for more oppositional dialogue. On the one side, things identifiable as 
emotions are profaned and suppressed; on the other they are exalted. The EBMWG (1992), in 
their manifesto for evidence-based medicine (EBM), began by explicitly ‘de-emphasizing 
intuition and unsystematic clinical experience’ as bases for decisions. Intuition and emotionality 
are conceptually close together, and links can be made from intuition to tacit knowledge, and 
                                                          
4
 Both online dictionaries accessed September 30
th
 2012.  
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thence to embodiment and emotion, a route I followed in chapter 6. ‘Unsystematic experience’ 
might also be taken to imply emotionality if it produces knowledge which is instinctive and 
wilful rather than codified and controlled. Having been excluded, the re-instatement of intuition 
can then be pursued either as a binary complement to research-evidence or as an alternative 
science to counterbalance evidential-epidemiology5. 
Grahame-Smith (1995) was unusual in using an actual (rather than incipient or gestural) 
dialogue to form a narrative of EBM. There the issue of emotionality is raised. Grahame-Smith’s 
advocate for evidentialism, Enthusiasticus Meta-analyticus, is inclined towards ‘statistical 
methods and reasoning to enable us to take a dispassionate overview of the results of given 
medical practice’ (1995:1127 emphasis added). Tension arises in this piece from the fact that 
Socrates is the more reasonable character, and it is Enthusiasticus’ passionate enthusiasm which 
makes him vulnerable to be misled; yet it is Enthusiasticus who gives voice to a distaste for 
emotion. Others critical of EBM make variations on this theme. Tanenbaum (1999:760) was to 
suggest that evidence-basedness lacked a kind of emotional maturity necessary to cope with the 
complexities of probabilistic uncertainty. Indeed, EBM did not have to be imagined as rational at 
all; Couto’s (1998:267) castigation of EBM as ‘simply irrational’, for instance, makes space for a 
highly emotive portrayal of it as callous, malign and wicked. 
These instances being acknowledged, it is rare to find EBM defined in terms of rationality and 
emotionality. For an example of explicit distaste for emotion one can look to sociologists Cronje 
and Fullan (2003), who make rationality the keystone of their defence of EBM: 
‘The idea of ‘rational’ action exists because people find it useful6 to distinguish actions 
based on reason from actions based on emotions, impulses or random choice – 
‘rationality’, then, is what protects our actions from arbitrariness, subjectivity, bias or 
error.’ 
        Cronje and Fullan 2003:354. 
Here, Cronje and Fullan explicitly characterise emotions and impulses by their randomness, 
arbitrariness, bias and error, in contradistinction to rationality. In other medical contexts this 
would be unsustainable; a glance at pharmacological literature (for example Iannaccone and 
Ferini-Strambi (1996); Nahas et al (1998)) discovers that emotional instability and emotional 
                                                          
5
 as does Greenhalgh (2002), for instance, in her advocacy of intuitive reasoning through clinical 
storytelling 
6
 There is not space in this thesis to discuss the implications of ideas existing because they are useful. 
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incontinence are, in contemporary western societies, classed medically as forms of deviance, 
which can be disciplined chemically. In the context of EB-discourse however, the conflation of 
all emotion with randomness and lability can pass without challenge. 
 
Metaphors for emotion. 
Instead of discussion in terms of reason and emotion, it is common in EB-discourse to find 
alternative expressions for this opposition made through related dichotomous distinctions. 
Common among these is the distinction between art and science, which had been established as 
a debate in medicine before the advent of EBM. The art-science binary opposition in EBM is the 
major theme in Greer (1988), Sackett and Rennie (1992), Kenny (1997), Saunders (2000), 
Malterud (2001), Saha et al (2001), Kitson (2004) and Pollio (2006), and a prominent theme in 
Smith and Taylor (1996), Green and Britten (1998) and Evans (2003b), to name a selection. 
Whatever the stated intentions of such authors for the understanding of art and science in 
medicine, all are reliant on a tacit understanding of difference-in-kind between art and science in 
which the two are conceptualised as a bifurcated pair, and which can be presumed with 
confidence as a basis for discussion. 
In EB-discourse, as elsewhere, this bifurcation has to do with the attitude adopted towards 
emotion: true science is imagined as that in which the corrupting influence of emotion is 
excluded; art as that in which the influence and expression of emotion is celebrated7. The 
discussion of art and science in the context of medicine is not a promising route to discussion of 
emotion in EB-discourse because it has been conducted on the basis of the conventional 
approach to emotion in science; a presumption that emotions are an obstruction to science, 
rather than necessary or foundational to science. The most direct argument against this view, 
and in favour of emotions as basis for a sociology of science, comes from Barbalet (2002). The 
use of the art/science dichotomy allows authors to avoid addressing the issue of emotion by 
sublimating it into other terms whose relation to emotionality is obscure. 
The incidences described above begin to establish emotion as a sensitive topic in EB-discourse, a 
sensitivity made particularly explicit in Cronje and Fullan (2003). A pervasive sensitivity to 
emotion in EB-discourse is commonly manifested less directly, being voiced through other 
                                                          
7
 For critical discussion of the emotional terms of this dichotomisation in general see Tauber (1996), 
Garoian and Matthews (1996); for critical discussion of the dichotomy in medicine, see Parker (2005), 
Solomon (2008). 
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expressions, and in particular, through a dualism of hardness and softness. In her ‘Cultural 
Politics of Emotion’ (2004), Sara Ahmed opens with a discussion of uses of metaphors of 
softness and hardness as means of relationally constituting social identities through the 
attribution of emotional states. Ahmed distances herself from psychological work on emotion 
through her insight that emotions are a type of social currency or capital. Rather than being the 
property of the individual, they are constitutive of individual identities which are configured 
relationally as soft and hard (2004:4).  
As Ahmed explains (2004:4), it is not that softness is emotional and hardness is not, but that 
hardness is an emotional attitude which involves orientation against identified ‘others’, and the 
abrogation of recognisable emotions. Softness is an emotional attitude which conditionally 
accommodates others and in which emotionality is cultivated and regulated8. Instances of the 
direct use of hardness and softness metaphors in EB-discourse are plentiful, and are sometimes 
identified as a motif of symbolic significance (see Blair and Robertson (2005), Jensen et al 
(2005), Mitton and Patten (2004)9). To write of hard (or harsh) realities, hard facts, hard data, 
hard science, and by association of rigid approaches, robust methods, concrete knowledge, solid 
results, firm evidence and sturdy measures is routine in EB-discourse.  
Conversely, the adjective ‘soft’ gets applied directly and by implication to experiences, opinions 
and types of expertise which are thereby designated as unscientific, unsystematic, flimsy, 
insubstantial, nebulous and unreal. These formulations are as likely to be made by EB-advocates 
as by critics, and can carry positive, pejorative or fluctuating meanings depending on the context 
of their use. They can be subverted, as for example does Greenhalgh (1999:323) in her 
discussion of ‘misplaced concreteness’, or satirised by the liberal use of inverted commas around 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ (see Feinstein and Horwitz 1997:531). Hardness and softness are not 
consistently imposed by either declared side upon the other, but labels tossed back and forth 
across the lines of dialogical exchange.  
They can also be associated with other categories of thought. Alongside the metaphor of 
hardness and softness, for example, there can be found in EB-discourse an aesthetic dialogue 
between simplicity and complexity. In hard evidentialism, there is an attraction to simplicity. 
Action requires truth, evidence provides truth, and truth dictates action. Anything which 
complicates the simplicity of this pathway – such as a problem translating knowledge from the 
                                                          
8
 The idea of hard and soft emotion is also put to empirical use by Sanford (2007) in the context of 
interpersonal relationships. 
9
 See also Gherardi and Turner (2002) and Cassell (2002). 
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general to the specific – can provoke frustration, incomprehension and resentment. Re-assertion 
of the need for simplicity might be experienced as aggressive or violent by those for whom 
complexity is valuable. Hard violence meets soft vulnerability. Consequently these aesthetic 
categories are closely associated with emotional experiences. Keeping in mind the metaphor of 
softness and hardness (and the aesthetic of simplicity and complexity) it is possible to trace 
emotional exchanges in EB-discourse.  
Metaphor is required because emotion eludes direct expression in language. Emotion does not 
usually appear in discourse by name (and anyway names for emotions are unreliable), but can be 
discerned from its effects. A dualistic, dialogical metaphor (hardness vs softness) is useful 
because of the dialogical nature of EB-discourse, which I have shown to be arranged around an 
open set of oppositional categories. In Bakhtin’s theory, there is space to consider the principle 
of dialogue in discourse, and there is space to consider emotion in social life. There is logic in 
combining these principles in search of a dialogue conducted in emotional terms, and perhaps a 
dialogue of emotional exchange. Hardness and softness, being relative to each other, create such 
a dialogue. Where each can be identified in the emotional currents of discourse, it is in relation 
to the other. 
 
7.3 Emotions in Early-Stage EBM. 
Emotional effects can be observed at the inception of EB-discourse, in the assertive confidence 
which facilitates a transition from clinical epidemiology to EBM. Remember that Alvan Feinstein, 
the original advocate of clinical epidemiology as a science for medicine, insisted that clinical 
epidemiology was a science of populations, and as such not suitable for making inferences in 
relation to individuals. Feinstein and Horwitz (1997) are unequivocal on this point: 
‘[EBM] has major constraints for the care of individual patients. (…) the data do not 
include many types of treatments or patients seen in clinical practice; and the results show 
comparative efficacy of treatment for an ‘average’ randomized patient, not for pertinent 
subgroups formed by clinical features (…) and clinical nuances.’ 
       Feinstein and Horwitz 1997:529. 
This caution in using general data for specific instances is the same caution, for example, that 
sociology tutors may urge of their students in relation to health inequality. On statistical average, 
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people from lower socio-economic classes suffer worse health than people from higher socio-
economic classes. This strictly does not mean that a particular individual from a lower class must 
suffer worse health than a particular individual from a higher class. 
The move from clinical epidemiology to EBM can be seen as an emotional step insofar as it 
satisfies the urge to make macro-scale general data available for reasoning in the specific 
individual case. This might be characterised as a throwing of caution to the wind, a leap of faith, 
a performance of confidence, a show of determination, or a demonstration of courage, to name 
a few emotional possibilities. It challenges the enlightened reader to dare to know; to risk 
certainty, and so to reap the benefits. As such it can seem aggressively or assertively determined, 
offensive rather than defensive, brave rather than cowardly, and hard rather than soft. By 
steeling our nerve, it says, we can assume the responsibility for knowledge and become our own 
masters.  
Along with emotional hardness, the move to EBM brings an aesthetic of simplicity. For Feinstein 
and Horwitz (1997), clinical nuances are important and valuable. There is complexity and 
subtlety in patient-illness which requires sensitivity, rather than a simple transposition from 
general to individual problems10. EBM can be imagined to encase the soft subtleties of medical 
care in the hard concrete of brave simplicity. Barely sooner than this assertive step is proposed 
and achieved by a hardening of the will, it is cushioned in a sympathetic appeal to soft 
emotionalities. In the appendix I have described the evidence paradox – an irresolvable problem 
of circularity in providing evidence for Evidence. In EB-discourse the evidence paradox usually 
manifests not as a theoretical problem but an empirical one; an anxiety over the lack of trial-
type evidence for EBM.  
The EBMWG (1992) raise this problem, and the rhetorical means they use to escape it is 
emotional. They explain that in response to the challenge of EBM, clinicians must divide 
themselves into two groups:  
‘ (…) those who find the rationale compelling (…) and those who (…) find that the practice 
of medicine in the new paradigm is more exciting and fun.’    
       EBMWG 1992:2424, emphasis added. 
                                                          
10
 This idea occurs also in Plsek and Greenhalgh (2005) who present complexity with a rhetoric of 
‘challenge’. 
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Here is a choice between compulsion – an instinctive irresistible drive towards evidence-
basedness – and joy. While the recourse here to the joyful emotions of excitement and fun is 
ironic (possibly even sarcastic) it carries at least the sincere suggestion that clinicians ought not 
to be hostile or defensive to EBM – that they should soften their emotions. Instead of being 
cautious, clinicians are urged to receive EBM with glad hearts, and this gladness of heart should 
be their guarantee and vehicle to a convinced state.  
Slightly later, Davidoff et al (1995) advanced a different conception of EBM in which the crucial 
emotion was not excitement but guilt; specifically, the guilt associated with doing harm: 
‘In earlier eras limitations in our understanding (…) meant that major advances were 
published less commonly. Consequently, clinicians’ failure to keep up did not harm patients. 
(…) Many [interventions] may do more harm than good.’ 
        Davidoff et al 1995:1085. 
The thrust of this argument is not in its rational coherence but in its appeal to an emotional 
category for persuasive effect. Without the supposition of harm being done, this justification for 
EBM would fall flat. Here the clinician is imagined not as a voracious and enthusiastic consumer 
of evidence, but as one running to stay ahead of a tireless stalker; fear of their own guilt at falling 
behind.  
Such strategies as these are a soft complement to the hard determination required for the leap to 
EBM. There are initial problems; the unknowability of nature, the indeterminacy and 
irregularity of practice, the wilfulness of emotion. A move is made to bring these elements 
under control, to assert rationality, and to renounce emotion; but this move is itself emotional. 
Simply, it is a refusal to be nature’s victim, a determination to be in charge. At first this move is 
emotionally hard. It is resolute, courageous and compelling. It silences doubt and fear. It does 
not compromise, but boldly seizes the initiative. Then it softens to make room for coaxing, 
cajoling and seductive appeals to more submissive emotional types. It offers to take clinicians to 
a happier state, where they can be relieved of the terrible responsibility of fallibility.  
If clinicians cannot be led by happiness, then they can be led by softer and sadder emotions, such 
as guilt and fear. EBM is then sympathetic, comforting and protective, rather than intoxicating 
in its power, and defensive rather than aggressive. In chapter 2 I gave two examples of EBM-
advocacies (Sackett (1997a) and Straus and Sackett (1999)) which responded to criticism using 
cancer patients as exemplar cases. The provocative nature of these articles, both of which I 
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noted for illustrating (rather than challenging) common critiques of EBM, gives insight on the 
strategic use of soft-emotion rhetoric. What better way to demonstrate the sensitive nature of 
EBM than to use cancer, a condition which must cause everyone to feel compassion? The 
hypothetical patients used in these pieces operate like a human shield, or as tactical hostages in 
the ongoing conflict between doctor factions.  
 
Emotions in Dialogical Exchange. 
Responses to EBM found in the letters pages of the BMJ and Lancet indicate that the proffered 
soft emotions did not project onto their imagined audience of chastened doctors. The assertive 
hardness of EBM engendered other hard emotions: indignation, pride, anger, resentment, and 
contempt. At first being tentatively expressed, these were solidified into consistent emotional 
trends in the JECP, a publication of which the defining attitude is the aggressive defence of 
clinical expertise. I have drawn attention to the dialogical symmetry of EBM-controversy in its 
early stages, in which protagonists and antagonists arranged themselves oppositionally around 
dialogical principles which were tacitly agreed upon. While the hard emotions of this sector of 
the discourse have some asymmetry – determination and courage on one side meeting anger and 
contempt on the other – there are other emotions which are common to both.  
Miles et al (1997:84) claim ‘intense irritation’ as a dissident emotional response to EBM; but 
Sackett and Wennberg’s (1997) discussion of research methods, preceded by an injunction on 
discussions of research methods and a directive to ‘stop squabbling’, is an exemplary display of 
an irritated emotional state. Petticrew and Roberts (2003:529) were also to lament the ‘energy 
dissipated’ in debates on methodological primacy. In relation to the hierarchisation of evidence, 
it seems that commentators of different persuasions are united in their susceptibility to 
annoyance. This unity can be related again to a general aesthetic preference for clarity and 
simplicity, and frustration when a systematic and simple categorisation of research methods 
proves complicated and difficult to achieve. In the early period of medical EB-discourse, 
emotions are close to the surface and can be picked out and situated relative to each other.  
It is worth pausing a moment to think how this discourse, as a discussion about the relative 
merits of different types of empirical belief, could have been different in relation to emotion and 
rationality. Consider Martin Kusch’s philosophical writing, in Knowledge by Agreement, on 
‘second-order questions about rationality’: 
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‘Why is it that the dichotomy ‘rational versus irrational’ can be applied to empirical beliefs? 
Are there constraints on possible empirical beliefs in virtue of which some empirical beliefs 
are rational and others are irrational? Are empirical beliefs rationally constrained? Is there a 
boundary within the realm of possible empirical beliefs that divides the rational from the 
irrational empirical beliefs?’ 
         Kusch 2002:86. 
This passage has emotional and aesthetic content; it has an elegance and precision typical of 
philosophical abstraction, and the tranquility of rational reflection. It identifies questions which, 
except for being phrased in generality, are not so different from the questions of EB-discourse. 
Beliefs from abstract grand-scale data and from particular clinical experiences are empirical 
beliefs, after all. EB-discourse depends on questions as to which of these are rational and which 
irrational, which is to say, it depends on second-order questions about irrationality. The care 
and caution of Kusch’s phraseology is, however, not to be found in early medical EB-discourse. 
In that discourse, unruly emotions are not tranquilised and subdued, but given free reign.  
In fact this discourse ‘about’ rationality can be read as a celebration or (to repeat a Bakhtinian 
term from chapter 5) a carnival of emotions. In Bakhtin’s descriptions of carnival (1984[1968]) 
can be found passages which resonate particularly with the anti-EBM polemics of the JECP. On 
the laughter of carnival, Bakhtin (1984:12) writes that ‘it is gay, triumphant, and at the same 
time mocking, deriding’. On carnival language, he writes (1984:16) that ‘it is characteristic for 
the familiar speech (…) to use abusive language, insulting words or expressions, some of them 
quite lengthy and complex’. At the same time, there is a carnivalesque and disorienting 
inversion of logic at work where emotions are placed at the centre of a nominally-rational 
discourse. There is a ‘shifting from top to bottom, from front to rear, (…) a world inside-out’ 
(1984:11). 
Emotional carnival is also accompanied in early EB-discourse, Bakhtinian scholars may note, by 
some grotesque imagery. An illustration of this is an occasional theme of the killing of babies. 
Miles et al (1997:85), for example, had expressed the hope that ‘the screaming baby of EBM be 
consigned to nostalgic formaldehyde’. Haynes (1999), in more sinister mode, turned this threat 
outward from medicine and onto complementary practitioners: 
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‘”.. doctors are adopting some of your young (…) They will mix them with treatments that 
may counteract or drown any beneficial effects. So, complementary practitioners, start 
taking care of your own young.”’ 
    Haynes 1999, (quoted also in Villanueva-Russell 2005:553). 
The symbolic allusion to the drowning of babies carries an emotional threat; and it might also be 
taken as a veiled reference to reproductive and lower-bodily functions. This subtext mirrors 
another carnivalesque motif, Miles et al’s (2006:44) suggestion that EBM causes some to 
experience sexual excitement. Such subversive observations are expressions of emotional energy 
which does not merely underlie the debate over EBM, but is in the very substance of the 
discourse. Looking at this sector of EB-discourse as a whole one can discern the details of 
emotional currents within it. But one can also detect an overarching emotional pattern, where 
soft emotions give way to hard emotions. Early medical EBM writing, from either side, is not 
fearful and not ashamed, but is confident in a way which goes unapologetically beyond the point 
of arrogance.  
Confidence has been examined by Barbalet (2001), in the context of business and finance, as the 
emotion which enables the apprehension of possible futures, and consequently provides the basis 
for action. In the context of EB-discourse, one can anticipate why confidence would be 
particularly important in its formative stages. As I showed at the beginning of this thesis, EB-
discourse began at a time when the institution of medicine seemed to be at risk of decline. 
General collective confidence in medicine appeared to be lessened, but, within the confines of 
existing social structures, no alternative could be imagined. EB-discourse confidently asserted a 
positive future for medicine as an institution, and opened up possibilities for ways of collectively 
bringing such a future to ideological realisation. 
 
The Ubiquity of Emotions in Medical EB-discourse (1); Greenhalgh Revisited. 
I have recounted how the tone and diversity of medical EB-discourse was affected particularly by 
two writers, Trisha Greenhalgh and Ross Upshur. The contributions of these writers can be 
understood in emotional terms,  as both managed ambivalence through the manipulation of hard 
and soft emotional techniques. Again taking Greenhalgh first, her use of narrative set-pieces 
allowed her to bring soft emotions confidently into juxtaposition with the hard emotions 
dominant in EBM. Her tale of the heroic Dr Jenkins (in Greenhalgh 1999), for example, places 
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the doctor back at the hub of medical expertise. It is not ruthless adherence to hard-facts which 
enables the doctor to save the life of a child, but his soft-sensitivity to language use and ability to 
listen. A more difficult-to-read example comes from the third edition of Greenhalgh’s critical-
appraisal textbook for clinicians, ‘how to read a paper’ (Greenhalgh 2006).  
In a chapter on ‘the science of ‘trashing’ papers’, and apropos of nothing, Greenhalgh includes 
this anecdote: 
‘I once corresponded with an author whose work I had recommended should not be 
published. He wrote to the editor and admitted he agreed with my opinion. He described 5 
years of painstaking and unpaid research done mostly in his spare time and the gradual 
realisation that he had been testing an important hypothesis with the wrong method. He 
withdrew the paper ‘with a wry smile and a heavy heart’ and pointed out several further 
weaknesses in his study. (…) His paper remains unpublished, but he is a true (and rare) 
scientist.’  
        Greenhalgh (2006:41). 
In this paragraph, Greenhalgh takes her readers on an emotive detour behind the scenes of 
evidence-basedness. This narrative begins with an unpleasant task for the writer herself; having 
to disappoint somebody who, despite being heroic (for doing painstaking and unpaid research on 
his own), is also tainted by having used a method which is not merely unusual, eccentric or 
irregular, but plain wrong. Tragically, the certification of wrongness comes from the subject 
himself. Through self-condemnation and self-abasement he transcends his status as a rejected 
author, attaining a distance from his work and its limitations that is noble, perhaps even saintly. 
In the eyes of Greenhalgh, this author becomes emblematic of the type of science to which all 
should aspire. 
While the martyred protagonist has attained redemption by sacrificing his pride at the altar of 
science, it is not clear where this leaves the writer and reader. The writer has become an almost 
sado-masochistic conduit to voyeurism, conveying a tale of self-flagellation in which she is 
tragically unable to intervene, and humbled by the selflessness of the hero. The reader might 
feel a troubling sense of having intruded on private grief. Ought they to feel comfortable with 
the outcome of this drama? Does the narrator seem to feel comfortable with it herself, or is it 
something for which she is asking forgiveness? How does this detour tie in with the larger 
narrative of deriving clinical knowledge from texts? These questions are not easily answerable; 
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and as soon as they arise they are swept away by the ensuing discussion of mechanisms of critical 
appraisal.  
This passage can be interpreted in terms of hard and soft emotionalities, on two levels. Firstly, 
the hero subjugates his own soft emotions (his heavy heart) and takes a hard view of his own 
frailties (chastising himself for further weaknesses of method) in order to become a true scientist. 
Secondly, the writer and reader together confront the softness within themselves, and harden 
themselves against it. EBM emerges as having an oddly cold character of its own, wilfully blind 
to the moral and ethical conundrums which it can produce. In sum, the passage reveals a 
turbulent emotional dynamic where different feelings struggle against each other, and remain 
unresolved. It is not that these emotions operate in service of rationality or in opposition to 
rationality (as they would do in Barbalet’s conventional and critical approaches), but that they 
are bound up with different kinds of rationality (as they would be in his radical approach). The 
discourse is over-determined with emotion. It is emotionally-saturated. 
 
The Ubiquity of Emotions in Medical EB-discourse (2); Upshur Revisited. 
Where Greenhalgh used narratives from practice to construct emotionally-laden points, Upshur 
used the quintessentially-rational discourse of philosophy to create another emotional space in 
the context of debate over EBM. This can be read as a stepping-away from the splenetic passion 
of medical EB-discourse in accordance with a different emotional perspective. Upshur (1997, 
1999, 2000) was explicit in his disapproval of intemperate polemics. His aggressive pursuit of a 
philosophy for EBM, and conviction that such a philosophy must be determinable, instantiates a 
different kind of hardness. In comparison with Upshur’s careful excavations of philosophical 
meaning in EBM and his refusal to land on one side or the other, the carnivalesque practices of 
other medical writers seem reckless. Upshur helped pave the way for others to develop and 
formalise the more official discourse of evidence-basedness; but Upshur’s eventual path into 
dissidence against EBM suggests that his own emotional trajectory progressed in the opposite 
direction. 
It was in 2005 that Upshur renounced his philosophical allegiances, and that his writing took a 
practical-political turn. This turn, while marking a discontinuity and departure-point for Upshur, 
demonstrates continuity in the emotional currencies of medical EB-discourse. To explain this 
idea I compare a piece of Upshur’s (from 2006) with the aforementioned article of Sackett and 
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Rosenberg (1995). Sackett and Rosenberg (1995) begins in a well-controlled, explanatory 
manner which clarifies the difference between old and new medicine: 
‘Previously it had been considered sufficient to understand the pathophysiological process in 
a disorder and to prescribe drugs shown to modify this process. (…) However, randomized 
controlled trials examined outcomes, not processes (…) The issue today is no longer how 
little of medical practice has a firm basis in such evidence, but how much of what is firmly 
based is applied in patient care.’ 
       Sackett and Rosenberg 1995:330-1. 
So far, all is calm and reasonably clear. As the plot thickens, a cause emerges for concern, just as 
emphatic words (like ‘really’ and ‘simply’), non-neutral schematics (like ‘unfortunately’ and ‘no 
wonder’) and emotive ideas (like failure, decline and surprise) creep into use: 
‘For although we clinicians really do need to keep up to date, (…) we usually fail to do so. 
(…) Unfortunately, this leads to progressive declines in our clinical competency. No 
wonder there is increasing interest in continuing medical education (… but) the effects of 
continuing medical education on quality of care are surprising and disappointing.’ 
       Sackett and Rosenberg 1995:331. 
As further complexities and problems with ‘continuing medical education’ emerge, the 
narrative loses clarity. It degenerates along a tangent of confusion and doubt, leading to the 
discouraged and forlorn question, ‘does anything work?’ (1995:332). This expression of 
exasperation marks a turning point, for it provides an opportunity to re-state EBM in the form 
of numbered tenets and, in so doing, regain a sense of order and directional momentum. This 
gives the authors the confidence to make a pledge of faith: 
‘EBM is a process of life-long learning in which caring for our patients creates the need for 
clinically important information (…), and in which we (1) convert information needs into 
answerable questions; (2) track down, with maximum efficiency, the best evidence (…); (3) 
critically appraise that evidence’s performance (…); (4) apply the results in our practice; 
and (5) evaluate our performance’ 
       Sackett and Rosenberg 1995:332. 
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In this passage, a stirring recovery is achieved by the repeated use of lists, brisk statements of 
empowerment and positive intent, and an inversion of the situation as it was originally stated. 
Having been introduced as a demand imposed upon clinicians, EBM undergoes a turning of the 
tables and is transformed into something demanded by clinicians who are in position to seek 
knowledge with swashbuckling maximal efficiency. Clinicians become the evaluators rather than 
the evaluated.  
Buoyed by this sudden and complete rehabilitation, the narrators elaborate three strategies for 
successful EBM, and conclude with a list of a further five reasons why EBM should be celebrated. 
Roughly half of the article is given to these smoothly-flowing matters, the emotional hard work 
having been done within the space of a few turbulent paragraphs. In the tumultuous middle 
section, writers and readers start from tense neutrality. They plunge into a bleak valley of 
uncertainty and vulnerability (a soft state) to emerge re-invigorated and primed for battle (a 
hard state), having refused the role of victim. Yet there is a residual uneasiness to be found in 
reflecting on this process. On page 330, EB was promised to be straightforward and problem-
free. Who could have anticipated the drama which was waiting on pages 331 and 332? 
Now consider Ross Upshur’s later (2006) commentary on an article by Jenicek (2006). By this 
time, much had been written about EBM but in certain emotional respects much had remained 
unchanged. Although openly critical of EBM from the first page, the conversational matter-of-
fact style of Upshur’s commentary recalls the opening paragraphs of Sackett and Rosenberg 
(1995): 
‘Increasingly, we see comments in the literature concerning the ascendancy, triumphs and 
benefits of EBM despite it yet neither meeting its own standard for determination of value, 
nor meeting the serious criticisms advanced against it. (…) There is no shortage of those 
arguing for a preferred view of what EBM is or is not, [and] an abundance of recent 
scholarly volumes on EBM, many of a revisionist flavour.’ 
         Upshur 2006:420. 
So far, all is once again calm and reasonably clear. But anxieties start to emerge as Upshur 
confesses to harbouring concerns. These have to do with overtly prescriptive accounts of 
evidence-basedness, a degeneration in consensus as to the meaning of EBM, and a feeling of 
conceptual drift which leads EB-writers to lose grasp of their topic. Upshur edges into more 
direct criticism of his respondent Jenicek, and more urgently expressive tone: 
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‘(…) he does not appreciate the profound move within EBM away from fostering critical 
thinking, and creating dependency. (…) Of course, standards of best evidence are set (…) 
without any discussion of what grants the authority to interpret health research for others. 
(…) I find it very difficult and contradictory that Professor Jenicek accepts that EBM is 
unquestionably the right approach.’ 
         Upshur 2006:421-2. 
The rhythm and pace of EB-writing often seems to quicken as narrators (and their readers) 
become emotionally drawn into the quandaries of EBM. Although they are written from 
different points of view, this effect is common to both of the articles considered here. But where 
Sackett and Rosenberg’s (1995) steely resolve sees them through to a galvanised and euphoric 
state, Upshur’s narrative hardens into resentment and confrontation: 
‘These trends do nothing to establish the truth or validity of EBM. (…) It is a fallacious 
inference to derive veracity from popularity. (…) My question to Professor Jenicek is, ‘why 
adhere to EBM so rigorously?’ The thrust of your arguments is to undermine this adherence. 
I find it somewhat disturbing that in his reflections, there are no citations from the very 
active debate and critique of EB-practices (…).’ 
         Upshur 2006:422. 
For Upshur, as for other critics of EBM, there is no escape into a utopia of perfect practice. At 
the point in narrative where Sackett and Rosenberg played the get-out-of-jail-card of standing 
their own argument on its head, for Upshur there is only a descent into a disturbed state. The 
narrative transition passes from a kind of worried-neutral, through expressions of concern and 
doubt (softness), into resolute readiness for confrontation (hardness). Such is the consistent 
emotional climate of medical EB-discourse. 
 
7.4 Emotions in EB-discourse in Physiotherapy: Fear and Shame. 
EB-discourse is not the same everywhere it occurs. This variability holds true for its emotional 
content as well as other aspects already discussed. Whereas in medicine the dominant emotions 
of EB-discourse were confident, combative and hard, those in physiotherapy (for example) were 
the softer emotions associated with the perception of threat – principally, fear and shame. Two 
190 
 
quotes from editorial physiotherapy writing make explicit the continuing influence of fear. 
Tracy Bury urged physiotherapists to confront their fear of change: 
‘Unless the profession learns to base its practice on evidence then it can be argued that 
purchasers will not buy physiotherapy (…). We must not be afraid to make extinct [certain] 
elements of our practice.’ 
         Bury 1996:75-6. 
Later, Alan Jette reiterated the fearful situation in which the profession found itself: 
‘[This workshop] underscores the peril that the profession faces if it continues to practice 
with inadequate evidence (…). We must make no mistake about how vulnerable the 
profession remains.’ 
         Jette 2005:303. 
Fear is called out in physiotherapy EB-discourse by name, and its appropriateness and relevance 
insisted upon. Shame, on the other hand, is an emotion which is not given a name but whose 
presence throughout this section of the discourse can be felt. 
In the examples of tentative dissent against evidence-based practice (EBP) from physiotherapy 
writers which I gave, Bithell (2000), Hurley (2000) and Grimmer et al (2004) all suggested 
criticisms of EBP which they immediately withdrew. In Hurley’s case this led to a claim that 
EBP was ‘impossible to argue against’ (2000:341). In Herbert et al (2001) and Schreiber and 
Stern (2005) this impulse to denial was manifested as a self-punishing critique of physiotherapy. 
Schreiber and Stern (2005) particularly endorsed a hard-line approach to the re-disciplining of 
physiotherapists. Such a strategy is emotionally ‘hard’, but the climate of feeling within this 
literature suggests that it is underwritten by the softer emotion of shame. This might be clearer 
in comparison with the editorial piece of Emma Stack (2006), whose expressions of pride in 
physiotherapy, and seeming absence of fear, freed her from the obligation of apologetic 
subscription to EBP. Others from the same literature bear out these emotional trends. 
Clemence’s ‘EB-physiotherapy: seeking the unattainable’ (1998), for example, follows the 
tradition of cataloguing ‘barriers’ to EBP11. These barriers are not problems which can be 
identified with EBP itself, whatever it is, but which can be attributed to methodological 
incapabilities and the attitudes of clinicians. The ‘unattainability’ of EBP to physiotherapy is here 
                                                          
11
 See chapter 5. 
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a reflection of weakness of character. O’Brien’s (2001) report of processes of behaviour change 
contains a long passage (2001:188-190) on the need for particular surveillance of 
physiotherapists, and the appropriateness of RCTs for meeting this need. It ends by pleading for 
physiotherapists to humbly recognise their own faults: 
‘The most important step (…) is to remember that we are learners for life. (…) We need 
to ask ourselves if we are able to keep up-to-date (…). Sometimes, in an effort to help our 
clients, we can be too quick to adopt treatments that are unsubstantiated and too slow to 
take up those that are effective.’ 
         O’Brien 2001:197. 
Such defeated self-scrutiny contrasts poignantly with the general assuredness of medical EB-
writing. Correspondingly, medical EB-writers do not insist on subjecting themselves to RCTs of 
their own clinical behaviour, as if they were patients subject to treatment interventions (in fact 
they insist on the impossibility of doing so). This is something that physiotherapists have 
consistently done as testament of their own subservient commitment to EBP. 
Maher et al (2004) reflect on ‘challenges for evidence-based physiotherapy’. They are adamant 
(2004:652) that such challenges are not to be read as criticisms of EBP, whatever it is, but as 
professional shortcomings. Physiotherapists are to assume responsibility for accessing research 
(even though research may not be institutionally accessible – 2004:647-8), for developing their 
own skills of judging research applicability (even though such data is generally inapplicable – 
2004:650), and for empowering healthcare consumers. There is produced a vision of an omni-
capable clinician, an ideal vision of which the real phsyiotherapist can only fall short. This 
contrasts with the account of ‘obstacles to the implementation of EBP’, based on a study of 
Belgian physiotherapists, given by Karin et al (2009). There, is an acknowledgement of 
problems with EBP, whatever it is, across different disciplines (2009:476-7). There is a concern 
not to discipline physiotherapists but to enhance their professional autonomy (away from 
medical control) and accord value to their testimony. The absence of fear and shame 
accompanies an argument that physiotherapists be given the freedom to develop a version of 
EBP on the basis of their experienced clinical needs. 
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Theorising Fear and Shame in Conformity. 
Fear and shame are both emotions considered by Barbalet (2001): fear in relation to social 
change; shame in relation to social conformity. His argument concerning fear, to paraphrase, is 
that it is associated with different social responses depending on the context in which it is felt. 
Fear is conventionally associated with those in subordinate social positions, Barbalet (2001:161) 
explains; but in fact it affects social elites, especially as a signal that their elite status is under 
threat. In such a scenario fear can be a lever for systematic change, for those who are in a 
position to resolve the source of their fear through collective action will do so. Such is Barbalet’s 
focus, but he does not return to the case of fear as it affects those in relatively powerless 
positions. The case of physiotherapy in EB-discourse can shed light on this.  
Physiotherapists felt fear in response to the imposition of demands from external sources for 
particular values of Evidence. Physiotherapists were not in a position to remove the source of  
fear by challenging these demands or re-negotiating on their own terms. Consequently 
physiotherapists’ fear led, as fear is conventionally thought to do, to paralysis of reason. This 
observation can be qualified; some physiotherapists’ fear did lead them to look for ways to alter 
the terms of Evidence (see for example Wakefield’s (2000) advocacy of pragmatic, rather than 
explanatory RCTs). But I have spoken before of others for whom the imperative to Evidence, 
set against loyalty to practice, created unmanageable tension; and I have used Herbert et al’s 
(2001:208) suggestion that ‘it makes sense to make decisions on the basis of expected outcomes, 
even though we know that the expected outcome will probably not occur’ as an examplary case 
of paralysis in reasoning.  
Often, the inescapability of this emotional predicament has been associated with a further 
emotional response, which is shame. Barbalet’s (2001) argument concerning shame has two 
aspects which are of relevance here. One is the operation of shame as a low-visibility emotion, 
which is still influential upon social behaviour even if unacknowledged; the second is his use of a 
specific typology of shame in modern social life (2001:123). The significance of shame as a low-
visibility emotion is that in modern life, shame is not readily expressed or acknowledged. It may 
occur below the threshold of conscious awareness, in which case its pertinence can be read from 
its effects; or it is diverted into expressions indicative of other emotions, which are reactions to 
the unacceptable emotion of shame.  
In physiotherapy EB-discourse, shame is not called out by name, and not directly expressed; but 
its influence can be inferred from trends of self-punishment in the discourse, which I have 
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reported. These trends suggest the influence of a particular kind of shame, which in Barbalet’s 
classification is represented as deferential shame. In deferential shame, the agency which creates a 
context for shame is the other, rather than the self. In the case of EB-discourse, the active other 
is EBP, which acts to attribute to physiotherapists a responsibility for attaining authoritative 
knowledge-status. The fault which makes this status unreachable is not attributed to the external 
other, but is internalised. In other words, physiotherapists assume guilty responsibility for not 
being in a position to meet the expectations carried by EBP. ‘The typical response of this type of 
shame’, writes Barbalet (2001:124), ‘is deference and rigid conformity’. 
The understanding of shame outlined above is particularly compatible with a dialogical 
understanding of emotion. At a mechanistic and inter-personal level, shame as theorised by 
Barbalet (2001) depends upon the presence of another whose perspective on the self can be 
imagined (2001:103). As such shame is a most unavoidably social emotion, such that even one 
most committed to thinking of emotion as individual physiology, Charles Darwin, was 
compelled to recognise its social basis (2001:112). Barbalet’s typology of shame in relation to 
attributions made to self and other (2001:123) resonates powerfully with Bakhtinian dialogism. 
Looking at the bigger picture of EB-discourse reveals a further dynamic of dialogical balance. 
EB-discourse is concerned, as I have explained, with the preservation and defence of healthcare 
institutions around medicine. Within medicine, hard emotions dominate soft emotions as 
doctors confidently assert their right to knowledge. In contexts adjacent to medicine – in this 
case physiotherapy as an allied profession – soft emotions dominate hard emotions. Fear and 
shame impose emotional limits upon what physiotherapists can think and write. 
 
7.5 Emotions in EB-discourse in Sociology: Ambivalence and Trust. 
In chapter 3 I explained that the structuring context for EB-writing in sociology was its removal 
from the clinic; sociologists became assured that they were to write about evidence-based 
healthcare (EBHC) from an outside-looking-in perspective which protected the clinic as a 
natural space. In chapters 4 and 5 I showed how this transition accompanied changes in the 
dialogical structuring of discourse, to the institution of a dialogue of rationalities. The argument 
I advance in this section is that the detachment of the discourse from the clinic has also been 
accompanied by a change in emotional climate which affectively-stabilises and affectively-
validates the discourse as a whole. Sociology validates EB-discourse by moving towards the 
stable management of emotional repertoires. To explain this achievement I use the emotional 
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concepts of ambivalence and trust. It is mainly through actions pertaining to ambivalence and 
trust that sociology has channelled the emotional energies of EB-discourse into rational 
consciousness. 
I have mentioned ambivalence before in relation to double-voicedness. Among others, I used 
Sandra Tanenbaum (1999) as an example of skilful construction of dialogue between the 
institutions of research and clinic. In the present chapter there is space to acknowledge that 
concurrent with political and rational ambivalence, people can experience emotional 
ambivalence; indeed, ambivalence is essentially an emotional state. It is an emotional state 
insofar as it is produced when people are forced to choose between apparently non-emotional 
things placed in opposition (such as Research knowledge and Practical knowledge), both of 
which seem to have benefits and drawbacks. It is also a purely-emotional state insofar as it can be 
produced out of the interference between other emotions; as for example when one experiences 
fear and love, contentment and envy, pleasure and pain at the same time. Far from being a 
secondary or derivative emotion though, ambivalence is the single emotion which (as a 
consequence of the evidence-paradox) characterises EB-discourse more than any other. 
Where there is ambivalent tension in clinical EB-writing, it always has an emotional dimension 
in which, again, softness and hardness are useful metaphors. When the management of 
ambivalent tension breaks down, emotional undercurrents are exposed. This may happen where 
the sociological perspective is close to the clinic. Grypdonck (2006), for example, writing in 
defence of qualitative research as a means of accessing the perspectives of patients, offers this 
passionately-felt view: 
‘Understanding what it means to be ill, to live with an illness, to be subject to physical 
limitations, to see one’s intellectual capacities gradually diminish or to be healed again, to 
rise from death after a bone marrow transplant, leaving one’s sick life behind, to meet 
people who take care of you in a way that makes you feel really understood and cared for, 
understanding all this is a major asset of practitioners who use findings from qualitative 
research.’ 
        Grypdonck 2006:1381. 
In this elegiac passage there is a direct appeal to soft emotions; understanding, empathy, 
sympathy, compassion, warmth and personal heroism on the part of qualitative researchers. 
Here it is through softness that strength is derived.  
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Where EBHC is concerned though, Grypdonck’s stance is hard. She issues a warning against 
EBHC which comes by way of the emotive issue of trust. Trust is a recognised currency among 
qualitative researchers, but when quantitativists are trusted to impose their methods on the 
regulation of trust, ‘there is a snake in the grass’. A pact of resistance is made; ‘we should not 
let this happen’ (2006:1373). In Grypdonck’s conclusion, she entreats against ‘flirting with 
quantitative researchers who decide about publication in high-ranking journals and undermine 
the true nature of qualitative research’ (2006:1382). EBHC here becomes the arena for 
infidelity, betrayal and bitterness. Juxtaposed with admiration for soft qualities, then, 
Grypdonck takes a hard attitude of zero-tolerance to EBHC in which there is no place for fence-
sitting, and in which an effect of urgency is produced through the use of sharply-contrasting 
extremes of emotion. 
Moving away from the clinic into the arena of health policy and analytic sociology uncovers hard 
and soft emotionalities used together in more subtle ways to create more comfortable 
ambivalences. Witness Summerskill and Pope (2002), who manoeuvre these themes into a 
pincer-effect with their concluding sentence. They propose a strategy to  
‘.. avoid forcing GPs to choose between ‘evidence’ and what they see as other important 
aspects of patient care, such as responding to patient anxiety or nurturing long-term 
professional relationships.’ 
       Summerskill and Pope (2002:610). 
The language of ‘responding to anxiety’ and ‘nurturing’ is recognisably soft, and ‘evidence’ 
denotes the hard-other which risks placing GPs in a position of unavoidable compromise and 
vulnerability. This admixture of softness and hardness recalls the assurances of Sackett et al 
(1996:72) that ‘clinicians who fear top-down cookbooks will find the advocates of EBM joining 
them at the barricades’. Such an expression of sympathy and brotherhood brings with it the 
insistence that there are indeed barricades which (although metaphorical) are real not imagined, 
and a battle which necessarily must be fought in aid of some unspecified greater good. The hard 
and the soft work together to constitute the clinician, from the outside, as someone who faces 
an inescapable and difficult choice. 
Ambivalence is a rational emotional response to being placed in such a position as this. When 
reading EB-writing, one consequently becomes accustomed to having to assimilate phrases in 
which caveats and qualifications force one to look in two directions at once. For example, 
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Moseley and Tierney (2005), writing broadly in support of EBP at policy level, but still 
requiring to maintain sympathy for practical clinical perspectives and knowledges, construct this 
sentence: 
‘There may, understandably, be some ideological opposition to EBP if it is (mis)conceived 
as a threat to professional expertise and autonomy’ 
       Moseley and Tierney 2005:115. 
This sentence puts the reader firmly into limbo, having been told at once that EBP is and is not a 
threat to autonomy, and that opposition to EBP is both a logical expectation and an error. 
Ambivalent phrases and sentences are convenient for demonstrating the awkward positions in 
which writers find themselves. In these latter cases though, there is not the urgent tension found 
elsewhere, but the maintenance of ambivalence as a stable emotional state. The tonal contrasts 
between trust and distrust in such statements are not harsh, but gentle. 
 
Trust Within Ambivalent Sociological Narratives. 
As I have mentioned, there is a sociological tradition of interest in trust as it can be observed 
amongst others; but reflexive sociologists must also be aware of their own position as brokers of 
trust and allocators of trust and distrust in particular ways. I noted that Pope (2003) 
encountered a dilemma as to whether to trust the accounts of surgeons she had interviewed; 
they were simultaneously trustworthy (their opinions were sincere) and untrustworthy (their 
hidden concern was to protect their own status as experts). Dilemmas of who and what to trust 
affect all sociologists writing about EBHC; for the discourse depends on a lack of trust. Neither 
clinical nor research knowledge is necessarily to be trusted. The two ‘sides’ in the controversy 
are defined in distrust for each other.  
This lack of trust entails a paradox; for the summative effect of EB-discourse is to protect and 
maintain healthcare institutions, which means increasing their social status in terms of 
confidence, faith and trust. The logic of this process is that collectively We can be assured that 
clinicians and researchers are being held accountable (through their mutual distrust) for 
healthcare-knowledge production. We can therefore trust that healthcare institutions produce 
knowledge which does not just seem right, but is right. Sociologists are in a unique position to 
monitor this process: to look at the terms of EB-discourse and ask how it works. Sociologists 
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have not uncovered the dialogical mechanisms of EB-discourse to see how the same questions 
are repeatedly asked and never answered. In emotional terms sociologists, through their role as 
brokers of trust in EB-discourse, have contributed to the restoration of trust in health 
institutions. 
Some examples show how this has occurred. Consider first the sociology-in-EBHC debate over 
medical autonomy and inter-professional politics, a debate of which the various writings of 
Timmermans are emblematic. These writings can be interpreted in the emotional terms of trust. 
Can guidelines be trusted as a means of holding doctors to account? Timmermans (2005) thinks 
not. Can guidelines be trusted as an indication of a shift in the epistemology of medicine? 
Timmermans and Kolker (2004) think so. Can doctors themselves be trusted with the handling 
and interpretation of guidelines? Timmermans and Mauck (2005) think not, but Timmermans 
and Angell (2001) think so. Can EBM be trusted to make medicine scientific and responsive to 
change? Timmermans (2008) thinks so. Thus are various possibilities for institutional trust and 
mistrust played repeatedly against each other.  
The impression created is thoroughly ambiguous; but it is also to suggest unequivocally that EB-
discourse fits its function as a field in which these types of questions can legitimately be asked 
and answered. Questioning the terms of EB-discourse is beyond the reach of these types of 
analysis. Consider also the sociology-of-EBHC debate over the macro-social significance of 
EBHC, of which the writings of May are emblematic. These too can be interpreted along the 
emotive lines of trust for EB-discourse within a broad social context. Are RCTs a type of 
Evidence which health policy-makers either should trust, or generally do trust? May (2006) 
thinks not. Can EBM, in concert with patient-centred care, be trusted to facilitate the 
technological re-conditionning of clinical behaviour? May et al (2006) think so. Can EBHC be 
trusted as an indicator of and vehicle to a global shift to corporate healthcare? May (2007) thinks 
so.  
In each of these cases there may be nuances as to whether groups of people trust each other or 
don't; but the emotional climate is one in which what is happening institutionally, situated in its 
broad social context, is happening in good faith. Sociologists stamp EB-discourse with the 
validation implicit in their technical understandings; something which medical writers, left to 
the emotionally restrictive devices of their quasi-dialogues, have not been in a position to do. 
Together medicine and sociology make a further notable contrast with allied clinical professions. 
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In sections of the literature may be discerned a possibility of guilt in relation to EBHC12. 
Generally, medical and sociological writing does not purvey feelings of guilt in the way that, I 
have suggested, physiotherapeutic writing does. The minor profession takes on the less palatable 
emotional work. In its wholeness EB-discourse is a guarantor of trust in healthcare; but once 
again, different sectors bear the weight of different emotional responsibilities.  
 
Completing the Disciplinary Picture: Helen Lambert and Anthropology. 
To develop this point about the distribution of emotion across disciplines, and to add a final 
layer to the discussion of trust and ambivalence as emotional partners, I look in detail at two 
pieces from anthropologist Helen Lambert. Lambert (2006) gives an ‘assimilationist’ history of 
EBM while Lambert (2009), with some reservations, urges anthropologists to follow the 
evidence-based imperative to make transparent the evidential basis for their own discipline. This 
internalisation of EB-imperatives is something which, by and large, has not affected sociologists 
of EBHC. In a sense these pieces of Lambert’s are analogous to the physiotherapeutic literature I 
have considered, being in the fashion of EB-discourse ‘turned inwards’, within the context of a 
sub-discipline concerned to protect its own institutional space. They are also useful for drawing 
together the themes I have been writing about, and moving towards the conclusions to come. 
Lambert maintains an even pace of writing, without abrupt transitions between hard and soft 
states. Her style is characterised by an adversarial hardness, evident for example in a swipe at 
‘social scientists of an interpretive bent who can (and all too readily do) mock with great fluency 
the positivist tendencies of biomedical science’ (2006:2633). This hardness is punctuated by 
moments of persuasive-softness in sympathy for EBHC. Lambert (2006) follows the familiar 
dialogical strategy of demarcating EBHC by listing and categorising the objections it has elicited. 
By typologising the ‘alleged limitations’  of EBHC, she marshals them into submissive positions 
but, unlike others who follow this strategy, she neither dismisses nor upholds them, and so 
maintains a position of dialogical balance. 
Through the perspective of assimilationism, Lambert (2006) demonstrates how the survival of 
EBHC is assured, so long as it remains flexible enough to bend out of the way of any criticisms 
                                                          
12
 This comes closest to expression, I think, where the power wielded by pharmaceutical companies is 
considered. 
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which might arise13. To illustrate, she recounts a diagram devised by Haynes et al (2002), which 
makes space for ‘clinical expertise’ as a recognised knowledge form, but also sneakily 
undermines it by the use of a dotted, rather than solid line. Similarly she praises the EBMWG 
(1992) for their ‘admirably frank admission that there is little or no evidence that EBM improves 
outcomes’ (2006:2639), thus avoiding the dilemmas associated with the evidence paradox. 
Lambert does not address these tensions, but moves on to a discussion of other rhetorical 
strategies deemed effective in neutralising threats to the respectability of EBHC (2006:2637).  
She thus holds the reader in an ambivalent state, a state reflected in the equivocal sentence ‘this 
limitation is dealt with by encompassing it’ (ibid). The temptation to read inverted commas 
around the words ‘dealt with’ is strong; for the unspoken implication here is that the objection 
has simply been hidden from view. The implicit critical question is that if EBHC is indeed 
inoculated against all criticism, if its content is so mutable as to be indefinable, then what can it 
be taken to mean? And what interests are served in this situation, where the only certainty 
seems to be the preservation of EBHC as a sign which does not refer consistently to anything 
outside of itself? Lambert provokes these questions, but does not acknowledge them. Further 
tensions arise with downplaying the conflictual nature of EBHC, in relation to which Lambert 
deploys softly-persuasive strategies.  
For example, she uses the increasing presence of EBHC modules in medical curricula as 
evidence for the success of EBHC in practice, playing on the indeterminability of the 
embodiment of EB-discourse (see chapter 6). This strategy brings the discourse back to its point 
of origin (the possibility of a gap between pedagogical theory and practice), a problem 
crystallised through the following double-voiced sentence: 
‘Far from being an incidental indicator of EBM’s success, the pedagogical dimension is 
central to the EBM initiative (…)’ 
         Lambert 2006:2638. 
The thought that EB-pedagogy might indeed be an incidental indicator of EBM’s success occurs 
in the mind of the writer; but she hardens herself against it, and invites the reader to do so too 
(ibid). EBM emerges from Lambert’s account as curiously formless and faceless: 
                                                          
13
 This is reminiscent of the dialogical interpretation I have given, although Lambert does not interpret 
its significance as I do. 
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‘EBM is an indeterminate and malleable range of techniques and practices unified not (…) 
by methodological rigour, but by the pursuit of a new approach to medical knowledge and 
authority.’ 
         Lambert 2006:2639. 
Evidence-basedness here transcends its birth-connection to methodologies, becoming mystical 
in its power.  
Neither is this power attached to any particular group or contextual goal, but to the 
disembodied and quintessentially modern life-force that is newness. Something thus removed 
and transubstantiated might be presented as un-emotional in itself; but this presentation 
displaces the emotional workload onto the reader who is manoeuvred under ambivalent tension 
into the witness and approval of an investment of trust in EBHC. Thus a developing theme 
throughout the narrative is the strengthening of the author’s own emotional commitment to 
EBHC, especially once the meaning of EBHC has slipped its chains and become obscure. EBHC 
here is a vital, compelling and self-guaranteeing force, and a trustworthy vehicle to reach a 
utopian state which is free, at last, from doubt. 
Lambert (2009) builds upon the ambivalent tensions of Lambert (2006), and makes clear where 
trust, which will resolve the dilemmas of EBHC, is to be found. This article begins by 
positioning EBM within a culture of audit, and as having achieved hegemony. A twist comes 
when the position of qualitative methods in EBHC comes to be considered. Anthropology is a 
discipline with a qualitative tradition, but tests of methodological rigour developed for RCTs are 
not necessarily transferable to qualitative research. Lambert has pledged her faith firmly to 
EBHC, posing a dilemma which brings her into the realms of openly-emotive writing: 
‘(we) need to ensure quality and veracity by adhering to disciplinarily variant standards of 
research integrity. In order to do this, however, we badly need to clarify what these 
standards are within our own discipline.’ 
       Lambert 2009:19, emphasis added. 
In these sentences, which are the first time Lambert (2009) makes an appeal to her 
anthropological readership to create a ‘we’, EBHC is brought home to roost. She continues; 
‘Our reluctance to examine the nature of anthropological knowledge production seriously 
limits our ability to make claims regarding its evidentiary status. If anthropology is to 
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contest the encompassing tendencies of EBM (…), it is no longer sufficient to provide a 
deconstructive commentary without explicating the grounds for it.’ 
           Ibid. 
This passage is paradoxical, arguing that evidence-basedness is to be challenged by aquiescence 
to evidence-basedness; resistance pursued through compliance. Suddenly, the restraint falls 
away from Lambert’s writing as she looses her distrust in the direction of her own discipline: 
‘… unless and until we take seriously our own notions of evidence, we are in no position 
to critique natural-science based notions of evidence (…). While our activities rely on 
accepted criteria for the evaluation of evidence, these remain largely implicit (…). Failure 
to consider the generic nature of anthropological evidence (…) rules out the possibility of 
academic anthropology making any such claims (to truth).’ 
           Ibid. 
Here, anthropology is isolated from any other socially-validated knowledge forms and left 
defenceless, in a way which suggests that its status as a discipline is entirely self-guaranteed, and 
that it might quite possibly have no claim whatsoever to trustworthiness. The concurrent 
implication is that epidemiological and statistical evidence, by opposition, is absolutely 
trustworthy and need be subjected to no criticism by standards other than its own. The solid 
ground of quantitative evidentialism having been gained, Lambert (2009:20) is able to finish by 
reflecting on her evidential imperatives as being ‘a sign that the discipline is maturing’, just as 
Bury (1996:75) began her fearful warnings for physiotherapy with speculation that the 
healthcare industry was ‘coming of age’. 
 
Limited Sociological Awareness of Emotion. 
Finally I note two sociological perspectives upon the role of emotion in EB-discourse, and their 
significance for theorising emotion. Dopson et al (2003), having identified a failure of EBM to 
infiltrate medical practice, plan to assist the transition with emotional tactics: 
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‘EBM has thus far concentrated on logos – the clarity and logic of argument (…). Effective 
rhetoric, however, also relies on pathos – the power to stir the emotions, beliefs, values 
knowledge and imagination of the audience and generate empathy (…).’ 
      Dopson et al 2003:318, italics preserved. 
Dopson et al (2003) give no sign of being aware of the paradox in their position – using a 
principle supposedly antithetical to EBM to argue for EBM. Emotion is here something to which 
the other (as audience) is hoped to be susceptible; and what is tacitly dismissed is the possibility 
that emotion is already active in conditioning the consciousness of the self. 
Underlying this reflexivity issue is a tacit commitment to Barbalet’s ‘critical’ use of emotion in 
support of reason. Consider again Cronje and Fullan (2003) who put themselves in the circular 
position of having to rationalise why rationality should be preferred to irrationality, and argue 
this: 
‘Rationality appeals because we believe that rational procedures provide reliable results. 
EBM, because it focuses on integrating quantified scientific evidence into the decision-
making process, thus promises to be a more reliable practice with better health outcomes 
for patients.’ 
        Cronje and Fullan 2003:354. 
To escape a position of circularity, Cronje and Fullan make recourse to the concept of 
reliability. Rational (reasonable) beliefs are argued to be better than irrational (unreasonable) 
ones because they are more reliable. This is presented in the manner of an empirical statement – 
implying that irrational and unreasonable beliefs could contingently have turned out, to people’s 
perpetual surprise, to be systematically reliable. This reasoning is tautological because reliability 
is so close to rationality and reasonableness. But insofar as reliability can be separated from these, 
it is because it is an emotional idea, which implies trustworthiness, reassurance and comfort. 
What happens then, is that Cronje and Fullan (2003), in trying to justify the exclusion of 
emotion, draw immediately on an emotional category for persuasive support. 
Like Barbalet’s (2001) discussion of Weber discussed earlier, this conventional approach gives 
way to the radical one, where emotion is the basis for reason. Sociologists are in a better 
position than clinicians to notice the emotional properties of EB-discourse, and it is to the credit 
of both Dopson et al (2003) and Cronje and Fullan (2003) that they have done so. However, 
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these examples suggest that sociological commentators on EBHC have yet to begin the process 
of coming to a reflexive emotional consciousness. 
 
7.6 Conclusion. 
In this chapter I have examined the significance of emotion in EB-discourse. Having introduced 
some social-theoretical perspectives on emotion, I followed it into the same literary sectors as I 
have used throughout this thesis – of earlier and later medical, physiotherapeutic and 
sociological writing. Principally using the metaphor of softness and hardness, I found a set of 
emotions which occur in dialogical relation to each other. In early medical EB-discourse there is 
a climate of confidence where ‘hard’ emotions predominate and produce a dynamic which is 
carnivalesque and (at times) grotesque. Elsewhere, I found different emotional currents: in 
Greenhalgh, a discourse saturated with softer emotions, revealing possibilities for considerable 
depth of feeling within evidence-basedness; but in Upshur, an emotional trajectory which led 
back towards the hard emotions of polemic. These are testament to the broad repertoire and 
ubiquity of emotion within EBM. 
In physiotherapy I found the soft-other to the hardness of medical EB-discourse, where fear, 
shame and guilt held dominion. Such emotions were associated with conformity, meaning a 
broad incapacity to engage with evidence-basedness through creative thought. This tallies with 
the contrast found in chapter 5 between medical EB-discourse experienced as productive, and 
physiotherapeutic EB-discourse as repressive forms of power. In sociology I found a situation 
more emotionally complex, where hard and soft emotions operate together to create an 
emotional dialogue harmonious with the genuine-dialogues of rationality I have previously 
identified. In this context, trust and ambivalence are recurrent emotional themes through which 
(to borrow the phraseology of Ahmed (2004)) the relations between those represented in the 
discourse take shape. I used the emotionally-rich writing of Helen Lambert to collect many of 
these emotional themes together. Trust and ambivalence were there, and emotional hardness; 
but also detectable were the softer emotions familiar from physiotherapy, where Lambert 
sought to position anthropology within evidence-basedness. 
Although I have offered theoretical perspectives on the emotions found, the primary objective in 
this chapter has been empirical; to map the systematic occurrence of emotions in different 
sectors of EB-discourse. Previously this rich emotional content has not been recognised. Using 
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just a few examples, I have uncovered an emotionally-saturated form of social life. This task is 
just begun, but still complete enough to return now to theorisations of emotion and see what 
can be added for understanding social power. As I explained, space for emotion can be found in 
both Foucault’s and Bakhtin’s accounts of social life, but neither of them elaborated a full theory 
of emotions in relation to power or in relation to other things which are not-emotion. Ahmed 
and Barbalet had moved towards recognising the central importance of emotions in social life. 
To my earlier conclusions that contemporary power works dialogically, and that it works by 
instituting a separation and hierarchy between mind and body, can now be added another 
dimension. Power works through emotion, and through emotional dialogues. As Ahmed has 
found, emotions are relational, meaning they occur through contact between social entities 
constructed in mutual difference. Emotions power social life within contexts (as where doctors 
are engaged in emotional antagonisms with each other) and between contexts (as where 
different emotional climates are produced in disciplines institutionally juxtaposed). Also, 
emotions themselves exist in dialogue with rationality. But as Barbalet has found, the distinction 
between rationality and emotion is not tenable. Rationality is a product of emotion, or a type of 
emotion, or an artefact of emotion. Without emotion, no rationality is possible. 
Consequently sociologists are entitled to expect discourses of rationality to be a good source of 
material for studying emotion. EB-discourse is a prime target for such study not just because it 
rests upon attempts to exclude emotion, but also because its participants have barely begun to 
grasp the profound significance of emotion in the work they do. In this context raw emotions 
can be accessed in ways not possible in other domains of social life. It is because of the 
supposition that emotion could be removable from social life that it becomes so powerful in EB-
discourse. Like the splitting of power and knowledge, like the splitting of mind and body, the 
splitting of rationality and emotion is an effect of power. It makes our own emotions seem 
foreign to us, and a source of threat. EB-discourse shows that if we become worried about our 
vulnerability to emotion, the last thing we should do is make a stranger of emotion. For then 
emotion becomes more powerful than we can imagine. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion: on the Nature of Power. 
 
Summary. 
This thesis begins as a study of EBHC, and a study of EBHC it remains to the end. But EBHC is 
of interest because it is a manifestation of power, and the thesis becomes progressively more ‘of 
power’ as it proceeds. Steps towards an understanding of power are taken by making the 
conceptual move from EBHC to EB-discourse, and by identifying dialogue as the principle 
which structures this discourse. Two key dialogues, of embodiment and emotion, are 
discovered as being specifically important to the discourse. These dialogues reflect broader 
features of contemporary modern social life, in which body is tacitly subordinated to mind, and 
in which emotion is supposedly subordinated to reason. The principle of dialogue is imagined in 
terms of being general to the social condition. Without something which is dialogical, there can 
be nothing which is power. 
In this concluding chapter I summarise the thesis in its implications for sociological thought, 
which bring implications for future research. These discussions take up the bulk of the chapter. 
They are  arranged in accordance with the three strands of dialogue, embodiment and emotion. 
They contain no new analysis, but I give some further commentary on familiar examples in 
illustration of the arguments I have made. In the course of my analysis, however, a particular 
outcome has emerged in relation to the patient as they are thought about in EBHC and in 
bureaucratic healthcare. It has ethical implications which were unforeseen, but which are 
important for healthcare itself. I present these at the end with added emphasis. I finish the 
chapter with some reflections on the role of sociology, and the sociologist, as they are implicit in 
this thesis. 
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8.1 Implications for Sociological Thought. 
Power as Dialogue. 
When I have written in this thesis about Evidence-Basedness discourse (EB-discourse) as a 
discourse of power, I have relied upon an instinctive and tacit definition of power as something 
which is an inherent feature of social life. In classical Marxism power is something attributable 
according to social class. It is attached to higher classes, and wielded downwards in the 
subjugation of lower classes. Among post-Marxist theorists, it is Foucault who made a 
contribution to the re-conceptualisation of power which has become socio-theoretical 
orthodoxy. Power, he said, is productive and diffuse, exercised everywhere and in all directions. 
Effectively people do not wield power, but power wields people. This step of Foucault’s was 
not merely to correct the understanding of power, but to alter the meaning of the term. 
In this thesis the influence of classical Marxism persists. Like no other discourse in recent times, 
EB-discourse has made defensible the social institutions of healthcare. That this is an act of 
Marxist-type power can be seen from the observation that the conditions of illness treated by 
healthcare remain systematically related to social inequality. This is demonstrable statistically 
from population studies, and can also be witnessed in experience. As a way of thinking about 
conduct in institutions socially constructed, EB-discourse well fits the Marxist concept of 
ideology. My debts to Foucault and Bakhtin, both of whom found trouble with the Marxist 
distinction between ideological superstructure and material base, have not discouraged me from 
using the term. Especially in chapter six, I perceive EB-discourse as an ideology which is built 
upon a material base of embodiment.  
While having these characteristics which spell Marxism, EB-discourse has others which are 
Foucauldian. Many have criticised evidence-based healthcare (EBHC), but without necessarily 
seeing it as a repressively-deployed force. It is easy to imagine EBHC as a productive set of ideas 
which elicits new ways of working and a new type of collective confidence, and easier still to see 
it as a pervasive force which wields people, rather than being wielded. Through my studies of 
the discourse in which these perspectives on power can be found together, I have reached a 
position from which the meaning of power can be shifted again. I propose new ways of 
answering the question ‘how does power work?’ which move away from doctrinaire generalities 
where power is all-repressive or all-productive, just-locatable or just-diffuse. To say that power 
works through dialogue is a generalisation which opens the way to elaboration and specification.  
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Dialogical power works by being split into different forms which inter-relate. There are 
superficial dialogues and there are deep dialogues. There are both productive and repressive 
dialogical forms. Dialogue is an answer to the question of how power works, but it also re-
frames the definition of what power is: power is the dialogical constitution of social life. 
Everything dialogical can be read in terms of power. Wherever people interact dialogically there 
must be issues of power at work, as experienced from the inside or viewed from the outside of 
dialogue, and whether interpreted as productive or repressive. The dialogical principle 
consequently offers a route to a social-epistemological basis for understanding power. If the 
basic social unit is the dialogical pair, and all social life is involved with power, then all power 
must be dialogical.  
 
Dialogue and Social Epistemology. 
Dialogical power offers people choices. In EB-discourse, the primary choice is between two 
idealisations of healthcare, and two power-streams; a top-down approach (which clinicians can 
think of as statistical, and sociologists can think of as biopower) and a bottom-up approach 
(which clinicians can think of as expertise, and sociologists can think of as disciplinary power). 
The effect of dialogical splitting is to make it seem as if these choices exhaust all the plausible 
ways of thinking about healthcare, and that they are not both expressions of power. Participants 
in dialogical discourses align themselves with one choice or the other. This process of choice-
making is not generally active and conscious, but feels natural. The oppositional choice, revealed 
to people as the ‘other’, appears as an expression of power and something to be resisted.  
People become systematically aligned with or against each other, and their energies, by these 
identifications, are productively channelled into the reproduction of social systems (in this case 
the healthcare system). Thus power becomes productive: a system of healthcare knowledge-
making and practice is created and maintained. Key to this productive splitting of power is the 
distinction between power and knowledge. Foucault (1975) was suspicious of this distinction, 
and characterised it as an equivalence. Re-casting this equivalence as a dialogue, and power as 
dialogical, allows me to express this suspicion in a different way by saying that the distinction 
between power and knowledge is itself an artefact of power. Power being conceived in dialogue 
with knowledge has consequences for understanding the social institution of knowledge in 
dialogical terms. In EB-discourse the presence of the power-knowledge distinction is reflected 
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not in the dialogue between research and practice, but in the dialogue between politics and 
philosophy. 
I have drawn at points on the social epistemology of Martin Kusch (2002). Kusch’s theoretical 
social philosophy can now be supplemented with an empirical-sociological result. Through EB-
discourse there is achieved the collective agreement that healthcare institutions are legitimate and 
that their knowledge is valid. How is this agreement achieved? For the most part it is not 
achieved directly by consensus. We social beings do not spend much time explicitly agreeing 
upon the knowledge-status of healthcare institutions; in fact we generally disagree about the 
details of how they should run. But through our dialogues and disagreements, healthcare 
institutions and health knowledge are protected and preserved. The dialogical account of power 
provides a way to make sense of the tension between collective agreement and disagreement. 
Through disagreeing on the details of how to perform healthcare, people are able to endorse and 
perpetuate healthcare as a social institution without doing so explicitly.  
By committing to a position set against other positions in EB-discourse (of which there are many, 
dialogically inter-related), people can agree that the sign of Evidence-Basedness is equipped to 
focus debate about the issues in healthcare which are important. The more fervently do people 
explicitly disagree on points within the discourse, the more fervently do they tacitly endorse the 
legitimacy of the discourse and the institutions to which it is attached. By this means is EB-
discourse, and by association healthcare, continually constructed and energised. This 
productivity is not absolute; power cannot create something from nothing. Where power is 
experienced as productive, it is also repressive in a way which is hidden from view. To make 
things visible which had been hidden is not to step outside of power (for power has no outside) 
but to access a repressive stream of power.  
 
Embodiment and Repressive Power. 
As classical Marxism tells, power is not purely ideological, but also material. By thinking about 
embodiment, the material manifestations of power in EB-discourse can be brought to light, and 
a dialogical repressive relation between ideological and material realms made visible. In EB-
discourse this relation appears in different forms. The discourse itself is about embodied 
behaviour (that is, its subject is the things people do in an embodied way in clinics); but its 
content has very little to do with embodiment (it pays little heed to embodied and tacit 
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knowledge, for example). Embodied knowledge is dependent for expression upon testimony; 
but EB-discourse militates against the recognition of testimony as generative of knowledge (and 
it has well-developed technologies which are means to the disguise of testimony).  
These dialogical relations reflect a power-hierarchy which is endemic to contemporary social life: 
the dominance of (disembodied) mind over body. Sociologists might ask what is new about the 
subordination of body to mind in the context of EB-discourse. At least since Engels (1845) they 
have been aware of the association between ideological inequality and embodied ill health. Leder 
(1990b) has written about the body as a necessary phenomenological and theoretical absence 
(which we can only perceive when it is in dysfunction). Feminist sociologists have been aware of 
the material implications of gendered asymmetries in the theorisation of embodiment (see eg. 
Witz 2000). These absences and asymmetries seem to match up with a concern that classical 
sociology has not been attentive to issues of embodiment (a charge which Shilling (2001), for 
example, defends against). 
Interest in embodiment seems often to be presented as something new, but in truth it is a well-
worn theoretical issue, which remains difficult to conceptualise because of the contradiction in 
discussing the extra-discursive. What my study of EB-discourse yields, however, is a new 
urgency in theorising embodiment because of the tangible consequences of the mind-body split 
for lived experiences of power. The dualism of mind and body is not a point of innocent and 
incidental theoretical abstraction, but a manifestation of power whose effects in illness are real. 
In EB-discourse I have highlighted three ways of noticing these power effects. First, a 
disconnection between EB-discourse as ideology and the embodiment of practice. Second, a 
disguise of testimony as knowledge-generative, which makes us think of social interactions in 
terms of trust. Third, and arguably most important, an inability to recover the patient. 
 
Practice and testimony as blind spaces. 
In the historical narrative of EB-discourse it might be possible in hindsight to locate a tipping-
point when EBHC became less a proposal for the future and more a doctrine of the present. Due 
in large part to protocols and guidelines, healthcare workers can now (in 2013) claim to be 
doing things because of The Evidence, and so to imply that healthcare in the past had no genuine 
basis in secure knowledge. The present is thus kept in constant renewal, and validated by 
dissociation from the past. The impossibility of giving evidence-for-evidence – the evidence 
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paradox and attendant condition of unknowability – warn that we should be wary of cutting the 
past adrift. Before EBHC, clinicians had justifications for the treatments they administered to 
patients, treatments administered after-the-fact of illness and to economic benefit. After EBHC, 
clinicians have justifications for the treatments they administer to patients, treatments 
administered after-the-fact of illness and to economic benefit. The justifications have changed, 
but the social dynamics have not. 
The past is always lost to the present. We cannot easily give evidence that EBHC has 
substantively changed the embodied practices of healthcare, even though most commentators on 
the topic believe it to be so. Besides, faith in the present remains necessary for functional social 
life. This necessity of faith in the present is not an accident. It is EB-discourse as power which, 
along with other discourses, encourages us in this faith, and which has renewed our collective 
commitment to the institutions of healthcare. EB-discourse as ideology has kept the 
embodiment of health practice a secret which now can never be told. It is not by chance that we 
cannot tell how EBHC has changed health practices, but is an effect of power. Power splits the 
body from the mind, and keeps the body as leverage to dictate the thoughts of minds. It makes 
us believe that we can wield it with our minds; but all the time it wields us. 
Embodied knowledge can only come into linguistic discourse through testimony, and in EB-
discourse testimony is banished. It is only once testimony has been disguised as something non-
testimonial that EB-discourse will have us think of it as knowledge. A dialogue between 
quantitative and qualitative is the key pathway for this effect. First, quantitative expressions are 
imagined as being non-testimonial and disembodied, even as being outside of language. Then 
qualitative expressions are re-instated as also being data, as potentially having the same status as 
is accorded to numbers. This dialogical flip-flopping makes us forget about testimony, and 
consequently we forget also about embodiment as being a necessary source of knowledge. In this 
way the disconnection of mind from body is siphoned into an implicit dialogue of rationality 
against irrationality. Rational-mental forms are played against each other, and the body, 
imagined as irrational, left behind. 
Residual worries about testimonial knowledge are channelled into concern over trust. EB-
discourse draws our attention to attributions of trust which we can consciously make, 
particularly as to which types of evidence are trustworthy. Here the effect of power, like when 
it convinces us that we can use our minds to control our bodies, is to make us feel in control – 
as though the allocations of trust which we make consciously are the ones which matter. In EB-
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discourse, the important allocations of trust have already been made for us. They are the 
decisions which make testimonies seem as if they cannot possibly become evidence, and which 
make the criterion for Evidence that it is independent of testimony, when in fact all evidence is 
originally testimonial. This process of exclusion affects everyone present to EB-discourse; but 
the person most severely affected is the patient. This leads into a discussion of implications for 
healthcare, which I reserve until the end of the chapter. 
 
Emotion and Productive Power. 
I lastly argue that another dialogue basic to EB-discourse and to power is between rational 
thought and emotion. Like the mind-body split, in which our bodies are made strange to our 
minds creating an asymmetry through which power is generated, the dialogue of thought and 
emotion is asymmetrical. Thought is elevated above emotion, and emotion driven out of sight. 
We are socially conditioned to fear emotion, to guard ourselves against it, to cast it out, and not 
to recognise it. By this exclusion we make ourselves unable to acknowledge emotion as it 
returns in the structuring of our thoughts, and the control of our actions. We have no means to 
explicit dialogue with emotion, having ourselves denounced it. We make emotion powerful, 
and in so doing we become subservient to it. 
The dialogue of thought and emotion (although it involves the repression of emotion) leads to 
productive power. Here the powerful influence of emotions can be described using a metaphor 
of power to energy1. The topics addressed explicitly in EB-discourse are of rational thought, and 
the rationalisation of rationalities. Yet the discourse is saturated with emotional undercurrents 
which regularly break the surface and become visible. EB-discourse hums with emotional life. It 
is driven by emotional energy which holds its participants in thrall, but which they cannot 
acknowledge. Without emotional will, people would not be compelled to participate in EB-
discourse. Without emotion to power it, this rational discourse would come to a halt. Emotions 
thus guide actions in a way whose relationship to conscious intentions is ambiguous.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 A philosophical-sociological precedent for this use is Collins (1993). 
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Coming to emotional consciousness. 
In what I have written about the emotions of sociological EB-writing there is the implication that 
sociologists, more than their clinical counterparts, have the capacity to channel the emotions of 
EB-discourse in accordance with the rationality of their arguments. I do believe that sociology is 
better positioned than other disciplines to trouble the dichotomy of thought and emotion, and 
indeed that sociologists have a responsibility to do so. Judging from EB-discourse though, this 
process is yet to begin. If they acknowledge emotion as a legitimate social factor at all, 
sociologists are likely to imagine it as something which can be deployed in service of rationality 
or which supports rationality, not something which is a necessary part of rationality.  
I have argued through my methodology that if sociologists are to understand emotion in relation 
to power – as they must do if they are to understand social life – they must be prepared to use 
their selves as a means to analysis. As I have also noted, emotion (being connected to 
embodiment) is something at least partly outside of linguistic discourse. Ethnographic 
immersion is therefore necessary for emotion to be experienced, and the task of bringing it into 
conscious expression remains difficult. To think outside of a simple dichotomy between emotion 
and rationality demands great care and effort, but must nevertheless be attempted. EB-discourse 
is a forum in which this dichotomy is unusually sharp, and therefore one in which the 
consequences of trying to escape emotion can be investigated. Further, the profusion and 
immediacy of emotional experience in EB-discourse – its emotional saturatedness – suggests 
that the attempt to expel emotion from rational social life is quite the most futile of endeavours. 
Emotion and social theory. 
These insights contribute directly to the developing field of sociology of emotions. They are an 
empirical manifestation of Barbalet’s (2001) radical approach which sees emotion as 
fundamental to rationality. They also work against current understandings of emotion which do 
not recognise the implications of the dialogical situation of emotion as other to rationality. For 
example, Simon Williams has argued (1998, 2001) that in a modernity which is rationalising, 
emotions remain a source of authenticity which is to be celebrated. He writes: 
‘… however troubling their manifestations may be, [emotions] none the less express the 
irrepressible spirit and recalcitrant language of the heart: one which, despite its best efforts, 
rational modernity will never manage to crush or destroy.’ 
         Williams 1998:764. 
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For Williams, emotions are always a site of resistance to nefarious rationality. He does not see 
that the experience of emotions as ‘troubling’ is an effect of power. He does not see that 
emotion and its valorisation is as much a part of modernity as is rationalisation. The two are 
dialogical partners in power.  
My study suggests that emotion precedes rationality, transcends rationality in its power to 
determine our actions, and is the basis of rationality. Perhaps we should indeed fear the power 
of emotion! Except that the great part of the power of emotion is power which it accrues 
through our inability to recognise it, and our unexamined conviction that we subdue it to 
rational control. Indications from EB-discourse are that the more we try to formalise the 
rational control of emotion, the more unwittingly emotional do we become. Therefore we 
should not see our task as being to tame emotions to our rational will; nor should it be to 
celebrate our emotions for their mystical and unquenchable humanity. It should be to ask how 
we are led to recognise things as emotional or not, and to what vulnerabilities we expose 
ourselves by making a natural distinction between emotionality and rationality.  
Towards the end of his life, Foucault (in The History of Sexuality) began to consider emotion as 
power in terms of the subject’s relationship to self. It fell to Nikolas Rose (various) to develop 
the idea that we are ‘governed through our desires’. In light of the present thesis I make the 
argument that ‘desires’ are merely a small subset of the emotions which power the actions of 
participants in EB-discourse. Confidence, anger, indignation, resentment, bravery, fear, shame, 
determination, trust, guilt, suspicion and complex ambivalences are the emotional capillaries for 
power in the writings of EB-discourse. The work of Jack Barbalet has helped me to follow the 
details of some of these emotional pathways. With the aid of Bakhtinian dialogism, I have 
reached further beyond Barbalet. I have shown how these emotional currents are in dialogue 
with each other; and I have raised the strong possibility that the importance of emotion for 
conducting social power is precisely a consequence of the dialogical exclusion of emotion from 
rationality in modern social life. 
Through the categories of embodiment and emotion I have shown that in EB-discourse much of 
the ideological work of power is done without the acknowledgement of those whose actions are 
manifestations of power. That is to say, power works through a kind of collective subconscious. 
In this respect a possible theoretical next step for my work is towards psychoanalysis, where the 
idea of the subconscious is given a full explanatory capacity. In that case, an area for 
development would be the reconciliation (or not) of the psychological (individualistic) 
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understandings of subconscious mind, which are central to psychoanalysis, with an 
understanding of the subconscious which is originally social. 
 
 
8.3 Implications for Future Research.  
Dialogical Method. 
In moving to the dialogical model of power I have drawn upon the theory of Mikhail Bakhtin. 
Although Bakhtin is recognised as a social theorist, he remains peripheral to sociology (Bell and 
Gardiner 1998). There are positive reasons why the Bakhtinian perspective is the most helpful in 
this case. Bakhtin recognises language (and discourse) as fundamental to empirical social study. 
Language is the observable trace of social life, but, Bakhtin tells us, it does not fix meaning. It 
exists in dialogue and its character is dialogical; it speaks always with more than one voice. 
Through recognising the dialogical nature of language, sociologists can understand the structural 
mechanics of social thought. They can describe the dialogues which are found in social life, from 
the particular to the general; and they can describe how these dialogues operate in dialogue with 
each other.  
The principle of dialogue links theory with empirical practice. It thus allows sociologists to span 
a wide range of inquiry from empirical sociology to social epistemology. While using dialogue to 
describe the intricate mechanisms of power, sociologists can also make space to think outside of 
dialogical boundaries; to ask what thoughts are excluded from powerful dialogues, to get access 
to residual categories and see things which are normally outside of thought. That is, sociologists 
can witness the repressive as well as the productive aspects of power. This is what I have done in 
addressing phenomena which by their nature are difficult to access through rational (powerful) 
linguistic discourse. Embodiment, being supposedly outside of the mind, and emotion, being 
supposedly outside of rationality, are elusive topics for thought. But the importance of their 
influence can be perceived from its effects in EB-discourse. 
The value of the dialogical approach has been that it enabled me at length to find some solid 
ground for sociological analysis. In EB-discourse, which is densely populated with straw-men, 
commenting on any single perspective keeps the researcher chasing phantoms. The substance of 
the discourse is not in its separable perspectives, but in the support they offer each other, even 
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(or especially) when placed in opposition. In this discourse where every truth which is asserted 
can be doubted, the dialogical method allowed me to find something real in the relationality 
between versions of truth. Sociologists before me have drawn upon dialogical principles in social 
research and social theorising; but in general I feel that the explanatory potential of dialogue for 
sociology has yet to be realised.  
No doubt there are ways of taking issue with the details of my account of EB-discourse, and 
ways it could be expanded (perhaps to include health professions which I have not addressed, 
and evidence-basedness outside of healthcare). However I see my principal findings – the need 
for a dialogical approach, and the fundamental importance of embodiment and emotion – as 
being robust. The most promising of possibilities are those which lead away from EB-discourse 
towards other fields of study. In institutional policy-making there is a possibility for more 
research into the emotional work done through unexamined values of science, and particularly 
through the affective value accorded to numbers. The emotional properties of numbers could be 
investigated within the institutional contexts of their social use and exchange, but also for their 
more inherent capacities as vectors for emotion.  
This would mean working towards a more fully-developed sociology of pure-mathematics, 
which could connect in turn to applied mathematics and an updated sociology of financial 
institutions. In relation to science and mathematics, there is more to be known about the 
dialogical dynamics of their rhetorical form. For example, think of the phenomenon of science, 
which is indisputably among the most powerful knowledge-generating institutions in 
contemporary life. A crucial principle in science (and particularly in health-related scientific 
study) is that of null-hypothesis, in which an argument is made for a proposition not directly, 
but by showing that an argument against the proposition is unsupported. The equivalent 
technique in EB-discourse, which I have highlighted, is to make arguments not about what 
evidence-basedness is, but about what it is not. By investigating such dialogical strategies, 
sociologists can demonstrate the processes through which thoughts attain powerful expression: 
they can observe the intricate details of dialogical power even in technical discourses. 
In politics the dialogical principle might be used in relation both to exercises of repressive power 
which are clear-cut, and to more symmetrical cases. For example, the current UK coalition 
government has introduced initiatives in the name of safeguarding the national economy. This 
productive endeavour, insofar as it is achieved, has come at the expense of the systematic 
persecution of vulnerable social sectors, framed as cost-cutting. The repressive and productive 
216 
 
streams of this power are both visible. In contrast, The Troubles in Northern Ireland are an 
example of stable conflict, which continues on well-established terms with sporadic unsuccessful 
attempts at resolution. Here the dialogical approach could be used to demonstrate the collusion 
which underlies conflict, where the sides tacitly agree to maintain the extant situation by 
continual reference to the past. 
 
Embodiment and Emotion in Science. 
It is through embodiment that the dialogue between the material and ideological aspects of 
power can potentially be revealed. In EB-discourse I have shown that embodiment is a channel 
for repressive power, but this might not always be the case: in sociologies of science, for 
example, embodied expertise (as tacit knowledge) can be conceptualised as productive. It might 
be that in science, there is a reversal of roles with EB-discourse, in that emotion is associated 
with repressive power. I have speculated that emotions as such do not simply exist by 
themselves, but in dialogical relation to things which we perceive to be non-emotional. It is with 
this possibility in mind that the emotional role of science in EB-discourse can be made sense of.  
In chapter two I noted a scientific impulse which contributed to the eventuality of EBHC; but I 
hesitated to describe EB-discourse as a scientific discourse, as it is far removed from the hard-
science of the laboratory in which there is a tradition of sociological interest. What can be said is 
that EB-discourse involves an affective aspiration towards scientific ideals, not just on behalf of 
those who advocate EBHC, but on behalf of many of those who contribute to the discourse. It is 
in the realm of emotionality that EB-discourse is continuous both with other discourses in 
healthcare and policy, with discourses which are securely scientific, and with bureaucratic 
modern discourses generally. This indicates a possibility for sociologies of science-as-emotion. 
Barbalet (2002) has written about science in terms of emotion. His focus is on the role of 
particular emotional patterns – relating to joy, commitment and competition, and ‘moods of 
solidarity’ (2002:144), for example – in scientific processes. Expanding this emotional 
understanding of science just slightly, science itself might usefully be typified not just as 
necessarily involving emotions, but as being an emotion (albeit a complex one). Those of us who 
have passed through scientific phases in our lives can perhaps consider those times in terms of 
being in the embodied experience of an emotion. This emotion might be resolved into 
combinations of other emotions, but is nonetheless a coherent and stable emotion in itself. In an 
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embodied way, one can feel science just as one can feel anger, happiness or regret. The 
emotional complex of science is ubiquitous in EB-discourse – it is among the principal emotional 
currents which drives it. 
This typification of science as emotion can be taken more literally or more metaphorically; 
science is an emotion, or it is something like an emotion. Either way, the case of science can be 
a lens for splitting the dialogicality of rationality and emotion, for science is constructed out of 
the urge to rationality. As Barbalet (2002:132) also notes, science is commonly imagined to be 
formed from the exclusion of recognisable emotion. The propositional, disembodied and 
explicit parts of science we can think of as being rationality (even if rationality is an emotion); 
but its embodied and tacit parts we can think of as being emotional, and impossible to rationalise. 
Thus is the interdependence of rationality, embodiment and emotionality revealed. Science as 
emotion is condensed from the rational language in which it is constructed, and exists through 
embodiment, outside of linguistic thought.  
 
 
8.3 Implications for Healthcare. 
Power and the Patient. 
My arguments around embodied practice and exclusion of testimony have a macro-social 
character which relates to broad social trends in the recognition of expertise and knowledge. 
Their effects might be perceived in micro-social interactions by clinicians; and insofar as they are 
perceived, they indicate whether EBHC has indeed changed the nature of health practices, for 
better or worse. Changes in ideology are real changes, even if their relation to embodied and 
material changes is opaque. My analysis has identified a problem in relation to the patient which 
operates at the micro-social level and has the potential to directly affect the experiences of 
particular people. The impact of this problem is not eased by spreading the load across 
disciplinary groups, but can fall heavily upon the individual recipient of healthcare. It amounts to 
an ethical issue which leads into an area of ongoing concern for health practice. 
In EB-discourse the patient must be present at the beginning (as the site for evidence production) 
and at the end (as the target for practice). Throughout the discourse the patient is assumed 
simply to exist. Their potential influence upon the definition of evidence is ignored. Their 
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provenance and social construction is not subjected to scrutiny. Their passivity is not questioned. 
EB-discourse can be imagined as constructing a trap for the patient; it demands of them always 
to be a patient, required for the derivation of evidence and the performance of practice. But 
through the obliviation of testimony, it denies them the right to enter discourse through speech 
which is their own. In these ways the materiality of the power expressed in EB-discourse is 
given a point of acute focus. As researchers, clinicians and policy-makers, people might 
experience EB-discourse as ideological and productive. But from the viewpoint of the patient, 
EB-discourse is material (through embodiment) and repressive. 
The two examples of this repressivity which I gave – both from first-person accounts of cancer – 
have the character of illustrations. They show that EB-discourse does in some cases have 
deleterious effects for illness sufferers because it makes their views impossible to acknowledge. 
Without these examples I would perhaps make my argument less assertively, but still I would 
make it. The absence of the patient from any active role in EB-discourse immediately raises 
ethical concerns: partly because sociologists know the patient-class to be connected in its 
production to social inequality; partly because of the dishonesty inherent to the act of hiding the 
patient as a generative source of knowledge; and partly because in practice, anyone can become 
a patient and find their testimony unheard. Consequently this argument around the patient in 
EB-discourse has something of a predictive character; the patient is silenced in ideology, and so 
sociologists should expect to find them silenced in body, as I have found. 
 
Re-thinking Patienthood. 
The role of the patient is sometimes acknowledged as problematic in EB-discourse; and where 
this problem has been called to account, it has been through the parallel discourse of patient-
centred care. The argument I make, arrived at through theoretical interest in embodiment, is 
not a continuation of patient-centred care. The concern is not with giving the patient rights as-a-
patient, or with telling the patient that it is proper for them to be active in their own 
institutional care. This would merely encourage the patient to speak as a patient, and so to 
consolidate their own identity-status as patient. The concern is to allow them to speak as a being. 
This means making a disconnection between the illness and the person experiencing it, a 
connection which is made through the body.  
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This disconnection makes space to question the category of patient, a category of which the non-
questioning is largely the embodied basis for EB-discourse. The questioning of the category of 
patient carries the hope that collectively we can work towards the deconstruction of the patient 
in ways that would be experienced as productive rather than repressive. In this thesis I do not 
offer specific recommendations for working towards the liberation of people from patient-status, 
but I can identify some areas of possibility. First there is a need to recognise the social genesis of 
illness, rather than focus narrowly on reactive treatment. Healthcare should not be confined 
within the clinic, where special rules about evidence and practice are to apply. Nor should it be 
thought about as ‘preventive’, where people routinely take medicinal measures to counteract 
the specific risks of social life.  
Healthcare should begin with the politics of social equality. Indeed, this is the concern with 
which epidemiology began, before it became clinical epidemiology and then EBM.  Healthcare 
ought not just to treat the patient who is already sick, nor be preoccupied with how they became 
sick, as if their sickness were a matter of mere happenstance. It should ask how they were made 
sick. This conceptual move would make permeable the boundaries of the clinic, boundaries 
within which the person who finds themselves a patient may have no voice to speak. It requires 
an act of sociological imagination, and it allows people who pass through the clinic to give 
testimony not as accidental witnesses, but as equal and competent members of the social body. 
This means that at the level of clinical interaction, the constructed distinction between clinician 
and patient identities also requires attention.  
The experienced construction of patienthood – particularly in bureaucratic healthcare – should 
be investigated by sociologists without commitments to institutional healthcare, rather than by 
those working in disciplines where the naturalised notion of patienthood is secure. Such study 
would not necessarily start with patients, but more likely with professionals. Greenfield and 
Findlay (2012) have already presented a study which found that doctors who fell ill found it 
difficult to play the social role of patient, preferring not to acknowledge their symptoms or to 
self-medicate. A situation where doctors cannot easily see themselves as patients is symptomatic 
of a powerful discourse built upon the tacit systematic subjugation of the patient. I have 
suggested that because of its unique proximity to practicalities of embodied knowledge and 
patient testimony, physiotherapy should be considered a crucial disciplinary case. 
Physiotherapists must work in continuity with patients, and in spite of EB-discourse, in a 
manner of which further study might be beneficial for working towards the more general 
validation of patient testimony.  
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8.4 Closing Comments. 
Uniting Dialogue, Embodiment and Emotion. 
As I have presented them, the three analytic strands of this thesis exist in a hierarchical 
relationship to each other. The dialogical principle of power comes first, and its character is one 
of generality. The principles of embodiment and emotion are instances of the dialogical principle 
which are specific to EB-discourse. They are both streams of dialogical power within the 
discourse, and they operate in dialogical relation to each other. In both cases there are dialogues-
within-dialogues; and dialogical relationships between those sub-dialogues. There are also areas 
where the concepts merge. This is an indication of the common origin of embodiment and 
emotion in the realm outside of language. It suggests a further dialogical relation between 
linguistic and non-linguistic discourse. Sociologists should be cautious of this relation in its 
powerful consequences: the conviction that we can use language to make sense of the world, 
including its non-linguistic elements, is another manifestation of power. 
In this respect the analyses of embodiment and emotion – because they reveal the mechanisms of 
power in specific dialogues – provide empirical support for the idea that power is dialogical by 
nature. The dialogues of power may change between contexts, but the necessity of dialogical 
mechanisms for power to operate does not. Regarding this argument, there is not so much need 
for caution. The argument is not that power is in some cases dialogical; that it is dialogical only 
in modernity, or only in bureaucracy, or only in global capitalist-industrial societies. The 
character of the argument is that power is always and everywhere dialogical – that the idea of 
power requires dialogical understandings if it is to be meaningful. It is both a theoretical and an 
empirical argument, and indeed one in which the theoretical and empirical aspects work 
together dialogically. 
For sociology as a discipline the arguments within this thesis have implicit consequences. At 
present there is pressure in academia to demonstrate ‘impact’ – that research should feed 
quickly back into social life outside educational contexts. Methodologically, I employ academic 
discourse-analysis as a type of anthropology (and writing as ethnography) in a way which is 
counter-intuitive to the imperative for involvement with non-academic life. I portray the 
sociologist not as someone involved in the immediacy of social proceedings at the expense of 
understanding, as sociologists of EBHC have generally been. Instead I see the sociologist as an 
outsider prepared to exercise a critical conscience. This leads to a sociology where 
understanding precedes impact. (In the case of the patient, theoretical understanding leads very 
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quickly to a suggestion for practical change.) As sociologists, I hope that if we pursue proper 
understanding, we can have ambitions to achieve impact which goes further than those who 
customarily use the term would have us aspire to. 
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Appendix. 
Three philosophical arguments concerning EBHC. 
 
A.1  The co-existence of philosophies in EBHC and EB-discourse. 
Consider the issue of objectivity in evidence-based healthcare (EBHC). EBHC can be 
understood, to begin with, as an attempt to correct an existing, errant body of practices and 
knowledges in accordance with an objective standard. The redemption promised by advocates of 
EBHC can be presented as unassailable in its objectivity, and it is this supposed objectivity which 
critics frequently position themselves against. Thorne (2009), for example, defending 
knowledge-diversity in nursing practice, re-states the potential for objective scientific 
knowledge to show that clinical wisdom is untrustworthy: 
‘. . the human mind can most certainly be misled. (…) [EBP] asks us to consider that which 
can be known objectively as a prompt for practice.’ 
         Thorne 2009:574. 
McNutt and Livingston (2010), doctors writing in JAMA, mount a critique of meta-analysis 
specifically on the basis that the quest for objectivity is misguided. For them, knowledge must be 
contextually-located to count as truth, and the yardstick for evidence ought not to be whether it 
is objective, but whether it is clinically helpful. They affirm the ‘need for judgement where 
certainty is impossible’ (ibid:455). Those who relinquish the claim to objectivity can make 
recourse to other sources of legitimacy, which for McNutt and Livingston (2010) are pragmatic1.  
Not all detractors from EBHC give up so easily on objectivity. Holmes et al (2006), writing 
from a postmodern perspective in nursing, give a scathing critique of EBP as ‘microfascism’, but 
their advocacy of the deconstructive method rests on the argument that a sceptical approach 
constitutes objectively better science. Critiques of EBHC are generally to the effect that EBHC, 
in its supposed objectivity, is flawed not subjectively but objectively. If it could be shown in the 
first place that EBHC did itself rest upon a claim to objectivity, then maybe these types of 
arguments could be sustained. Paying attention to the detail of early advocacies of evidence-
based medicine (EBM) though, shows that the problem of objectivity is not a firm bedrock for 
                                                          
1
 An earlier discussion of objectivity in EBM was between Gupta (2003) and Couto (2003) 
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this philosophical analysis. Consider once again the view of Davidoff et al (1995), proponents of 
EBM, who explain themselves as follows: 
‘In earlier eras limitations in our understanding of human biology and the absence of 
powerful research methods meant that major advances were published far less commonly 
than now. Consequently, clinicians’ failure to keep up did not harm patients.’ 
        Davidoff et al 1995:1085 
Davidoff et al’s explanation makes a passing foundational-objectivist reference to human biology; 
but the line of reasoning followed is based on social institutions: advancing research methods, 
profuse publishing, and a failure by clinicians to keep pace with social progress. The harm done 
to patients is not absolute, but relative; a consequence of changing conventions and expectations. 
This becomes gradually clearer: 
‘Most doctors lack the time or skill to track down and evaluate evidence. (…) 
Consequently there is a widening chasm between what we ought to do and what we 
actually do. [EBM can] halt the progressive deterioration in clinical performance that is 
otherwise routine.’ 
          Ibid. 
The danger here is not presented in terms of objective rights and wrongs, but in terms of an 
expectation for change which creates a chasm. What ‘ought to be done’ is constantly changing; 
clinical performance deteriorates not by getting worse, but by staying the same.  
Although they do not comment upon it, Davidoff et al (1995) suggest a conventionalist or 
relativist, at any rate non-objectivist, justification for EBM. Similarly, the EBMWG (1992) had 
laid claim to the Kuhnian status of ‘paradigm shift’ for EBM. As Laudan (1990) points out, 
Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts has clear implications of relativism. For this to be significant, it 
is unimportant that the initial presentation of EBM as a paradigm shift was subsequently 
criticised. The significant thing is that EBM-advocates laid claim to a relativistic philosophy in an 
attempt, however rhetorical, to influence perceptions of EBM. This shows that advocates of 
EBM need not be committed to objectivism as a basis for EBM. They might have other, non-
objectivist philosophical commitments which can be explicated; or they might have grounds for 
advocacy which are not properly philosophical in character. 
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Moving on from objectivism then: an empiricist philosophical position often introduced in terms 
of a contrast with positivism (Sayer 1999), and relevant to the problems of EBHC, is Critical 
Realism. Critical realism is of relevance because of the exclusion in EBM of ‘pathophysiologic 
rationale’, or explanatory causal mechanisms, from Evidence. Intended perhaps to guard against 
the implementation of harmful drug treatments which have not been scrupulously tested2, this 
aspect of EBM has drawn critical comment (see eg. Tonelli 1998, 2006). A parallel can be noted 
between these complaints and critical realist complaints about positivism. In critical realism the 
necessity of invoking real causal mechanisms as a path to explanation is insisted upon. Such 
mechanisms are not directly observable, and so are classed, under strict positivism, as nonsense. 
A look at the reasoning underlying the randomised-controlled trial (RCT), the totemic research 
method of EBM, allows the relevance of this problem to be made clear3. 
Imagine an RCT in which population Z with problem Y is divided randomly into two halves, to 
which interventions A or B are blindly administered. Observation of the difference in change 
between the two groups enables a causal influence to be attributed, or not, to intervention A 
compared to intervention B. The EBM-advocate, eschewing pathophysiologic rationale, cannot 
advance an account of the mechanism by which A is effective, but at the same time they must 
use a concept of causation if they are to claim that the trial has the capacity to generate meaning. 
This replicates the realist critique of positivism: that it relies tacitly upon causal principles which 
are explicitly renounced in its doctrine. The EBM-advocate must simultaneously follow 
positivist (causation-denying) and realist (causation-invoking) epistemological schemes. In 
strictly-philosophical terms these schemes are mutually incompatible (see Keat and Urry 
1975:27), leaving the EBM-advocate in need of a new philosophical model. Alternatively, they 
might decide not to worry too much about philosophy, and maintain faith in the RCT for 
pragmatic and political reasons. 
In writing on EBHC, the exclusion of pathophysiologic rationale is not usually elaborated in such 
a way as would bring this philosophical difficulty to light. It is sometimes noted, however, that 
EBM-advocates are reliant on causal suppositions in order to decide which interventions to test 
by RCT. This predicament has led to some elaborate sarcasm, for example from Smith and Pell 
(2003:1459-61), who present a systematic review of RCTs on ‘parachute use to prevent death 
and major trauma related to gravitational challenge’. While also poking fun at the 
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 the classic example being thalidomide (McBride 1961). 
3
 Oakley (1998) gives a sociological history of the RCT. For a medical perspective see Deveraux and 
Yusuf (2003). 
225 
 
‘medicalisation of free fall’ and the demonisation of the ‘parachute industry’, the sharp end of 
their humour is offered to protagonists of EBM, who are invited to follow their principles to 
logical conclusion, and participate in a randomised trial of parachute use. Such mean-spirited 
banter reflects the carnivalesque character of medical EB-discourse; but the earnest 
philosophical point of interest is the difficulty of constructing an after-the-fact philosophical 
account of EBHC which is both coherent and a faithful reflection of the controversy. 
I have identified two philosophical contradictions in EB-discourse. EBHC seems to be both 
objectivist and relativist; and it seems to be both positivist and realist4. From a viewpoint 
situated inside the discourse, concerned either to defend or attack EBHC, this matters; it feels as 
though some way must be found to unify the theory of EBHC, or else concede that it is fatally 
flawed. From an outsider’s viewpoint though, the significance of these difficulties is different; 
they demonstrate that EBHC does not require philosophical unity in order for EB-discourse to 
be powerful. It is likely that multiple philosophies are necessary to make the discourse ‘work’. 
But it is also interesting that writers within the discourse would present philosophical discussion 
as if it did have the potential to settle disputes over EBHC. A sociology of EB-discourse should 
be able to make sense of the purpose served by philosophy in the maintenance of the discourse. I 
now present two more case-studies in the philosophy of EBHC. The first I call the Hermeneutic 
Programme, the second I call the Evidence Paradox. 
 
A.2  The Hermeneutic Programme. 
In writing on EBHC, hermeneutics has been mentioned as a way of dissociating ideas from 
evidence-basedness. For example, physiotherapist-writers Gibson and Martin (2003:351) use 
the term in opposition to ‘mathematical’ evidence, and nurses McKenna et al (2004:372) use it 
in conjunction with ‘phenomenology’ to characterise health research conducted at the 
qualitative end of the method spectrum. Upshur et al (2001:93) use ‘hermeneutic dimensions’ 
to connect to a ‘concern with the interpretation of meaning rather than quantities or properties 
of objects’, as if quantities and properties of objects are not themselves concerned with meaning. 
Upshur (2005:480), written in a period when he was becoming more openly critical of EBM, 
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 I could also have used falsificationism for a philosophical case study, referencing Shahar (1997) 
among others. While this could link to the politics of fallibility (see Goodman 2002), i see it as a 
philosophically trivial point given the practical ambitions of EBHC, which are ultimately not to 
undermine practice but to support it. 
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cites the hermeneutics of Gadamer in support of an argument that EBM excludes by definition 
considerations of patients’ perspectives.  
To make such connections as these is understandable; hermeneutics has come to be used as a 
catch-all term for philosophies which are imagined to be obscure and non-scientific5. What these 
authors, and most authors in EB-discourse have not acknowledged, is a more fundamental way 
in which EBHC is conservatively and obviously hermeneutic. Hermeneutics as the study of texts 
has its historical origins in the interpretation of biblical scripture (see Thiselton 2009). Although 
references to the religious zealotry of EBHC are common in the discourse, (hence Greenhalgh’s 
(2006:xiii) request not to be seen ‘as an evangelist for the gospel according to EBM’) this is not 
the sense in which I appropriate the term. EBHC is hermeneutic simply because it is concerned 
with knowledge transmission through the act of reading.  
Greenhalgh’s popular textbook on critical appraisal, ‘how to read a paper’ (1996 and later 
editions) is exemplary of this hermeneutic initiative. It is a treatise on the act of reading for 
clinical practice, and a manifesto for the discipline of reading a particular type of literature 
(health-research reports). It is presented in a way which, in Foucauldian language, governs 
productively; clinicians are empowered in their subjectivities, one might say, by learning to read 
the language of research. They are incited to want to read and think in an evidence-based way. 
This incitement concurs with a prototypical form of the hermeneutic programme in early 
advocacy of EBM, which is seen in Rosenberg and Donald’s (1995) prescriptive guide to 
literature searching and appraisal.  
Using an example of a 77 year-old patient with impaired ventricular function, Rosenberg and 
Donald describe a process of literature searching, in which important supporting actors are 
computer technologies and librarians; appraisal, in which the individual clinician takes centre-
stage as a critical reader; and implementation, in which the clinician returns to the social frame 
and, by demonstrating to colleagues their hermeneutic skill, institutes a clinical action6. The 
clinician is imagined as a reader; not a reader of bodies, or patients, or clinical scenarios (cf. 
Leder 1990a), but a reader of literature. Their hermeneutic work takes place not at the bedside 
with the stethoscope, but in the library with the database. Further, the path from library to 
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 Kusch (2002:5) notes with disappointment that some philosophers have associated hermeneutics with 
‘sloppy thinking’, and chooses an alternative terminology as a result. 
6
 The political nature of Rosenberg and Donald’s (1995) hermeneutic vision is clear. They conclude by 
contemplating the consequences of EBM for the hierarchical dynamics of medicine: ‘some will rue the 
day when a junior member of the team, by conducting a search and critical appraisal, has as much 
authority and respect as the team’s most senior member.’ 1995:1125. 
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clinic is unproblematic. The clinical act is an act of heroic exegesis – ‘sticking to the letter of 
hallowed texts’7. 
As an ideal based around texts as vectors for knowledge and determinants of action, the 
epistemological properties of EBHC are basically hermeneutic. Mykhalovskiy (2003) draws 
attention to texts as the fundamental technology of EBM, and the act of reading as its central 
practice: it is a ‘technology of applied reading’ (2003:341) which ‘centers (sic) on and is enabled 
by texts’ (2003:332), and can achieve ‘immanent normalisation’ by ‘hooking readers into a 
common system of representation’ (2003:338). Reading becomes a process of ‘rehabilitation’ 
(2003:341) for doctors, and their reading practices constituted as ‘an object for intervention’ 
(2003:343). In this ontological inversion, the doctor has become a patient, rather than the 
heroic figure imagined by Rosenberg and Donald (1995); but still a patient who sees themselves 
as ill and desires health.  
The hermeneutic programme brings with it a demand for skilled writers as well as readers. The 
emergence of a new figure, the medical science ghost-writer, reflects this. As writing 
mercenaries, science ghost writers have caused anxiety among medical researchers (see 
Bodenheimer 2000, DeAngelis and Fontanarosa 2008) which has begun to attract sociological 
attention (Lynch 2004). The secretive nature of this emerging form of hermeneutic expertise 
suggests something concealed, perhaps shameful. The ease with which a principle of 
hermeneutics can be applied to EBHC causes philosophical and political trouble if EBHC is held 
to depend upon principles incompatible with the hermeneutic tradition; foundationalism, 
naturalism and empiricism. If EBHC is hermeneutically based on social-conventional acts of 
reading, it is more difficult to think of it as natural-scientific, an idea central to the rhetoric of 
EB-advocacy. 
 
A.3  The Evidence Paradox. 
Alongside the mainstream philosophies just discussed, EBHC can be philosophised in terms of 
lesser-known philosophical problems. In particular, there is a problem with providing evidence-
for-Evidence which can be assessed with reference to Harry Collins’ concept of ‘experimenter’s 
regress’ (Collins 1992). The experimenter’s regress encapsulates the circular relation between 
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 These are the words of Zygmunt Bauman in Bauman and Tester (2001:23), from a passage which links 
into the emotions associated with reading. 
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empirical procedures and scientific outcomes8. In one of Collins’ exemplars, the existence (or 
non-existence) of gravitational (G) waves is shown to coincide with the validation of apparatus 
and statistical techniques used to attempt their detection (Collins 1998). This means that one 
cannot know whether G-waves exist until one has (or has not) detected them; but one cannot 
know whether one’s means of detecting G-waves is reliable, except by first knowing the correct 
result (whether or not G-waves exist). This crisis can be resolved only through the influence of 
secondary factors; theories as to whether G-waves ‘should’ exist, or other reasons to trust the 
means of detection.  
Collins’ interest is in the role of social-political factors in deciding the outcomes of such 
scientific controversies. The experimenter’s regress can be rephrased in such a way as to make 
clear its relevance to EBHC. In empirical science, experimenters are not normally required to 
provide a general justification for empirical method. (There are special cases where 
experimental method and scientific outcome are instituted together, for example Louis 
Pasteur’s successful demonstration of vaccination techniques (see Latour 1983)). For the most 
part, scientists work within a culture of experimentation without being asked to justify it in 
general terms. But if the experimental method is called to account, it must be justified by means 
other than the experimental method.  
No experiment can be done which itself demonstrates the legitimacy of experiments, because 
this would set up a circularity of reasoning. Other reasons – philosophical, political or 
theological ones, perhaps – must be given in support of the conviction that experiments yield 
knowledge. In EB-discourse, the issue of evidence for Evidence is discussed. EBHC is, evidently, 
an unusual case in which justification is required; but on pain of circularity, Evidence-Based 
methods cannot be advanced in their own defence. This difficulty has gone unnoticed in the 
literature on EBHC. EBHC-advocates from EBMWG (1992) onwards (eg. Djulbegovic et al 
2000, Grol and Wensing 2004, Jensen et al 2005, Schreiber and Stern 2005) have lamented the 
absence of comparative trials which would support their cause. Critics, conversely, seize upon 
this absence to claim that EBHC is inconsistent, and a failure to itself (Charlton 1997, Goodman 
1999, French 2002, Arndt and Bigelow 2009).  
Consider Norman (1999) who presents a critique of EBM which itself takes an evidence-based 
approach. He summarises his argument as follows: 
                                                          
8
 It is related to Mary Hesse’s (1980) work on the theory-laden nature of observation. 
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‘It seems reasonable that practitioners who keep up to date are going to deliver better care. 
Do we need the burden of numerical proof to support such a self-evidently correct 
assumption? The answer is, of course, ‘Yes’. EBM, if it has done nothing else, has made us 
wary of accepting unsubstantiated claims of efficacy, regardless of how plausible they may 
appear. Regrettably, the claims of EBM fall into the same category.’ 
         Norman 1999:144. 
The ‘of course’ in this passage, as usual, is significant. It signals a problem of which authors are 
conscious at some level, but which is silenced. By the logic explained above, an Evidence-Based 
argument could not be used to support Evidence-Basedness, even if it were possible to produce 
appropriate data for it. Norman’s (1999) argument against EBM is based on an EBM ideal. It is 
an acceptance of EBM in order to reject it.  
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